

# Demography report 2010

*Older, more numerous and diverse Europeans*



Social Europe



# **Demography Report 2010**

## ***Older, more numerous and diverse Europeans***

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**European Commission**

Directorate-General for Employment, Social Affairs and Inclusion, Unit D.4

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Any remaining errors or omissions are the sole responsibility of the authors in the European Commission.

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<sup>(1)</sup> <http://www.gallup.com/>

<sup>(2)</sup> <http://clandestino.eliamep.gr/>

<sup>(3)</sup> <http://www.nidi.knaw.nl/smartsite.dws?lang=NL&ch=NID&id=2807>

<sup>(4)</sup> <http://www.oeaw.ac.at/vid/>

<sup>(5)</sup> <http://www.demogr.mpg.de/>

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# SUMMARY

Since the last 2008 Demography Report was published in 2008, the EU population has passed the 500 million mark while continuing to develop along lines that were already discernible two years ago. The EU's demographic picture has become clearer: growth is fuelled mainly by immigration, whereas the population is becoming older and more diverse. The impact of the economic crisis is still difficult to assess.

In its October 2006 Communication entitled 'The Demographic Future of Europe — from Challenge to Opportunity'<sup>(6)</sup>, the Commission presented its views on the demographic challenges the EU was facing and on options for tackling them. The Communication expressed confidence in Europe's ability to cope with demographic change and an ageing population in particular, but also stressed the need to act in five key policy areas: demographic renewal, employment, productivity, integration of migrants and sustainable public finances.

This third Demographic Report aims to provide the latest facts and figures that are needed for an informed debate on these issues. In addition to the EU-level overview, data are provided as far as possible for each EU-27 Member State, enabling policy makers and stakeholders to compare their own country's situation with that of other Member States, to understand the specific characteristics of their country and, possibly, to identify other countries that could provide interesting experiences from which to learn.

This year the report is a joint undertaking between the Directorate General for 'Employment, social affairs and inclusion' and Eurostat, and draws on Eurostat's experience in demographic analysis. It consists of two parts, a short annex on migration in the recession and a country annex.

Part I looks at historical and recent trends in fertility, life expectancy and migration - the three drivers of population change. It includes a review of population structure by age and family composition.

Part II explores an increasingly important phenomenon that was identified in a recent Eurobarometer survey: the increasing number of European citizens who seek opportunities across national borders for study, work, life experience and inspiration, resulting in different forms of international connectedness across national borders.

## 1. MORE, OLDER AND MORE DIVERSE EUROPEANS

### 1.1. New patterns lead to slight increases in fertility

Gradual but nonetheless major changes are affecting the population of Europe. Two main positive trends are emerging: a slight increase in fertility and greater life expectancy. Lowest-low fertility – below 1.3 children per woman – has ended in all Member State and the most recent figure for EU-27 was 1.6 and could rise to over 1.7 if adjustments for the postponement of births (the so-called 'tempo effect') are taken into account. This small adjustment does not make up for the shortfall in relation to the replacement

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<sup>(6)</sup> COM(2006) 571, adopted on 12 October 2006.

ratio of 2.1, but it could contribute to a slower rate of population decline in the medium/longer term, in conjunction with a possible increase in fertility as EU Member States become wealthier.

The modest increase in fertility results from somewhat new family building patterns: countries with fewer marriages, more cohabitation, more divorces and an older average age of women at childbirth tend to have higher fertility rates. Changing social perceptions of the role of marriage and greater fragility of relationships have resulted in more extramarital births, including to lone parents, or in childlessness.

The impact of family policies on these trends is difficult to assess since cultural factors play an important role. However, the data suggest that postponement of childbearing to a later age is accompanied in some countries (France, Denmark, Finland and the Netherlands for instance) by higher fertility rates and relatively generous public support for parents. At the other end of the scale, in countries such as Romania, Slovakia and Hungary, a lower age at childbirth is not associated with a high fertility rate.. This would also be consistent with the first indications that fertility rises again with wealth, after decades of decaying fertility as countries grew richer. The emerging evidence reinforces the case for having better policies that can help parents to cope with the constraints of a modern society.

## 1.2. An "ageing" population structure

Although it is difficult to predict the impact of policies, an analysis of the impact of changes in population structure is more straightforward. Low fertility rates are only one side of the coin, the other being a decline in the number of deaths or, in more positive terms, an increase in life expectancy. In 2009, the median age of the population was 40.6, and it is projected to reach 47.9 years by 2060.

The EUROPOP2008 projections prepared by Eurostat and presented in the previous Demography Report indicate that by 2014 the working age population (20-64) will start to shrink, as the large baby-boom cohorts born immediately after World War II are now entering their sixties and retiring. The number of people aged 60 and above in the EU is now rising by more than two million every year, roughly twice the rate observed until about three years ago. The working population is also ageing, as the proportion of older workers in employment increases compared to the cohorts made up of younger workers. Every year about 5 million children are born in the EU-27 and over 2 million people immigrate from third countries. Births outnumber deaths by several hundred thousand persons each year, whereas net migration is well over a million. As a result, migration accounts for the largest proportion of the EU's population growth.

In 2008 life expectancy for the EU-27 was 76.4 for men and 82.4 for women. Differences among Member States are still very significant, ranging from almost 13 years for men to 8 for women. Infant mortality in 2009 was also still relatively high in some countries like Romania (10.1‰) and Bulgaria (9.0‰), even though a reduction of about 50 % for EU-27 has been achieved over the last 15 years. Socio-economic status appears to play a major role, especially in some Central European countries. Consequently, by improving the life expectancy of disadvantaged groups, a general increase in overall life expectancy is also to be expected.

A possible development is the improvement in healthy life expectancy by delaying the stage at which physical condition starts to deteriorate rapidly, thereby postponing death to a later age. More evidence and analysis is required on this important subject.

Policies which address the ageing of the population and the work force focus on enabling older workers to remain active and productive for a longer proportion of their life span. One of the benefits of an ageing population is that it offers more opportunities for flexible arrangements during the life course. A longer active life allows for extended or recurring periods in education; greater working-time flexibility during the intense years when childbearing and career commitments coincide; occasional career breaks when it becomes necessary to take care of family members; and productive retirement through volunteering and general engagement in the civil society.

### 1.3. Europe on the move

Migration, especially from non-EU countries, could provide a (temporary) respite from population ageing, since most people migrate primarily as young adults (aged 25-34). As young cohorts of foreigners feed progressively into the older national cohorts, the total population is rejuvenated and diversity increases. Unprecedented levels of immigration both from third countries and within the EU-27 (intra-EU mobility) over the past decade have substantially increased the proportion of EU-27 inhabitants who do not live in their own native country or culture.

EU-27 Member States are host to some 20 million non-EU-nationals. A further 10 million EU nationals are living in another Member State, and about 5 million non-nationals have acquired EU citizenship since 2001. As most migrants are relatively young and have arrived quite recently, they contribute to the size of the EU-27 labour force. In the future, the labour force will increasingly include people with a migration background. Among EU nationals, in addition to the approximately 8% of foreign-born<sup>(7)</sup> people residing in the EU, a further 5% have at least one foreign-born parent, and this category will continue to grow. By 2060, persons of all nationalities with at least one foreign-born parent are expected to account for close to a third of the EU-27 population. An even larger percentage of the work-force will be of foreign descent.

These trends imply that additional efforts are needed to ensure that immigrants have the opportunity to integrate into their host society and, crucially, to enable them to contribute to the labour market by making full use of their education. A mobile population can be seen as an asset to the host countries. As more people seek experience abroad, they can contribute to a more efficient and productive economy, while also enhancing their personal skills.

## 2. AN INCREASINGLY DIVERSE AND MOBILE EU POPULATION

As the flows of migration from non-EU countries and mobility between Member States have intensified, a growing proportion of the working-age population (15% in 2008) was either born abroad or has at least one parent who was born abroad.

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<sup>(7)</sup> Here foreign-born includes those who were born in a different Member State than the one in which they reside.

Changing patterns of migration and mobility in Europe are making national sentiments and feelings about belonging to a particular nation more diffuse and complex, especially in the case of mobility between EU Member States. Although traditional long-term, employment-driven, male-dominated migration still takes place, other forms of migration and mobility are emerging. Mobility flows have also changed: some of the major traditional emigration Member States have become poles of attraction for migrants.

Large-scale migration and mixing of cultures are clearly not new phenomena in the history of the EU. Past flows have had a different impact on the size and structure of the population in most EU-27 Member States, and they have contributed to a more European outlook among its citizens. Immigrants often want to maintain a close attachment to their country of origin, but these linkages tend to weaken over time.

The integration of immigrants across generations occurs rather rapidly. In most countries with a substantial proportion of second-generation immigrants, these fare far better in education and on the labour market than first-generation immigrants and almost as well as those of no foreign descent; this applies to descendants of mobile people from other Member States and of immigrants from non-EU countries. Nevertheless, even after three generations – the time it usually takes for full integration – descendants of migrants maintain some attachment to the countries of their ancestors, through their knowledge of foreign languages, for example.

Alongside traditional migration and mobility, new forms of mobility are taking place. People are moving abroad for shorter periods, mainly to other Member States, to seek work, pursue their education or other life opportunities. These mobile people tend to be well-educated young adults, towards the higher end of the occupational scale. Increasingly, this form of mobility is based on personal preferences and life choices, and not only on economic opportunities. The increased propensity to be mobile could be of great benefit to the EU by enabling a better matching of skills and language ability with job opportunities. The results of a Eurobarometer survey<sup>(8)</sup> point to the presence of a diverse, growing number of mobile young people characterised by a common interest in looking beyond national borders.

The Eurobarometer survey also indicates that around one in five of the EU-27 respondents has either worked or studied in another country at some point, lived with a partner from another country or owns a property abroad. Half of these respondents have ties to other countries by ancestry; the other half are most often young and well educated and consciously making a life choice that brings them into contact with other countries. They share a strong willingness, if not propensity, to move abroad, up to four times greater than those who do not have any connections with another country. Given that this phenomenon is likely to become even more important in the future, policy makers may want to consider its implications in planning for the socio-economic future of the European population.

### 3. DEMOGRAPHIC POLICY IN THE RECESSION

Before the economic recession, EU Member States' commitment to implementing the policy goals in the Lisbon agenda had begun to show results in the form of employment for young people, women, older workers

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<sup>(8)</sup> Eurobarometer EBS 346 at [http://ec.europa.eu/public\\_opinion/archives/ebs/ebs\\_346\\_en.pdf](http://ec.europa.eu/public_opinion/archives/ebs/ebs_346_en.pdf)



and migrants. When the recession struck, the first groups to be affected were younger people and immigrants. Governments faced increasing difficulties in balancing support for families, consolidation of budgets, assistance for young people and immigrants in a shrinking labour market, and funding for retirement schemes.

It is too early to draw any firm conclusions about the effect of the crisis on fertility and life expectancy. Recent experience with past recessions indicates that both fertility and mortality may initially decrease slightly, only to return to their pre-recession levels shortly after the crisis has ended.

New Eurostat data on residence permits throws light on the reasons for migration from non-EU countries. The available data show that the decline in migration is largely due to a reduction in migration for employment and family reasons, while the number of residence permits issued for education and other reasons increased slightly from 2008 to 2009.

#### 4. WHAT IS BEING DONE

In June 2010 the European Council adopted the new 10-year Europe 2020 strategy for more jobs and smart, sustainable and inclusive growth<sup>(9)</sup>. The strategy sets out to reorientate existing policies from crisis management to medium- and longer-term goals to promote growth and employment and ensure the future sustainability of public finances. The latter is a precondition for sustainable social cohesion in the EU.

The recession has not diminished the commitment of Member States to respond to the demographic challenge; on the contrary, the commitment appears to have been reinforced. The strategy adopted in addressing demographic change seems to dovetail with the overall thrust of the new Europe 2020 strategy. In the wake of the recession, and despite the bleak outlook for public finances, the European Commission is convinced that the demographic dimension deserves to be taken fully into account by Member States when they are formulating their exit strategies from the current recession.

The need to mobilise the EU's demographic potential was already highlighted in October 2006 in the Commission Communication on Europe's Demographic Future<sup>(10)</sup>. This Communication suggested that the problem of low fertility should be addressed by creating better conditions for families to deal with the problem of a shrinking labour force by raising employment rates and productivity levels, by relying on immigration and better integration and, finally, by preserving the ability to meet the future needs of an ageing society by creating sustainable public finances. Member States are responsible for deciding how they realise their potential. The Communication highlighted the type of support that the EU can offer to Member States in terms of existing policy coordination. At the request of the Member States, and with the support of the European Parliament, this process is complemented by the activities organised under the umbrella of the European

<sup>9</sup> [http://ec.europa.eu/europe2020/index\\_en.htm](http://ec.europa.eu/europe2020/index_en.htm)

<sup>10</sup> <http://eur-lex.europa.eu/LexUriServ/LexUriServ.do?uri=COM:2006:0571:FIN:EN:PDF>.

Alliance for Families <sup>(11)</sup> and the planned European Year 2012 for Active Ageing <sup>(12)</sup>.

The success of the strategy hinges largely on the EU's ability to face up to the major demographic transformations of this coming decade.

Europe's future depends to a great extent on its capacity to tap the strong potential of the two fastest growing segments in its population: older people and immigrants. Three policy areas appear crucial to boost economic growth and achieve greater social cohesion:

- The promotion of active ageing: older people, and in particular ageing baby-boomers, can look forward to many more years of healthy life, and they possess valuable skills and experience. More opportunities for active ageing will allow them to continue to contribute to society, even after retirement.
- The integration of migrants and their descendants: this is crucial for Europe because migrants will make up an even larger share of Europe's labour force. The low employment rate of migrants is both socially and financially unaffordable.
- The reconciliation of paid work and family commitments: people with caring responsibilities still lack adequate support and suitable arrangements for combining their different responsibilities. As a result, economic growth is hampered because too many people are not able to exploit their high level of skills and education on the labour market. Women are particularly affected because of the persistent gender-employment and pay gaps.

At the same time, Europe needs to find ways of maintaining greater productivity while preparing for increasing levels of ageing-related expenditure, despite the demise of public finances as a result of the recession.

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<sup>(11)</sup> [http://ec.europa.eu/employment\\_social/emplweb/families/index.cfm](http://ec.europa.eu/employment_social/emplweb/families/index.cfm)

<sup>(12)</sup> <http://ec.europa.eu/social/main.jsp?langId=en&catId=89&newsId=860>

## ÜBERBLICK

Seit der Veröffentlichung des letzten Demografieberichts im Jahr 2008 hat die EU-Bevölkerung die 500-Millionen-Marke überschritten und sich weiter in die bereits vor zwei Jahren erkennbare Richtung entwickelt. Mittlerweile liegt ein klareres Bild der demografischen Situation in der EU vor: Das Wachstum wird hauptsächlich durch Immigration genährt, während die Bevölkerung immer älter und vielfältiger wird. Überdies sind die Auswirkungen der Wirtschaftskrise noch schwierig abzuschätzen.

Im Oktober 2006 hat die Kommission die Mitteilung ‘Die demografische Zukunft Europas – Von der Herausforderung zur Chance’<sup>(13)</sup> herausgegeben und ihre Ansichten zu den demografischen Herausforderungen der EU und den möglichen Herangehensweisen vorgestellt. In der Mitteilung wurde zum Ausdruck gebracht, dass man darauf vertraue, Europa werde mit dem demografischem Wandel und insbesondere der alternden Bevölkerung zurechtkommen, aber es wurde auch Handlungsbedarf in fünf politischen Schlüsselbereichen ermittelt: demografische Erneuerung, Beschäftigung, Produktivität, Integration von Migranten und zukunftsfähige öffentliche Finanzen.

Mit diesem dritten Demografiebericht sollen die aktuellen Fakten und Zahlen vorgelegt werden, die für eine fundierte Debatte über diese Punkte vonnöten sind. Neben dem EU-weiten Überblick werden soweit möglich Daten für alle 27 Mitgliedstaaten der EU vorgelegt, die politische Entscheidungsträger und Interessenvertreter nutzen können, um die Situation ihres Landes mit der anderer Mitgliedstaaten zu vergleichen, um die besonderen Merkmale ihres Landes zu verstehen und um etwaige andere Länder zu ermitteln, die über interessante Erfahrungen berichten, von denen man lernen kann.

Der diesjährige Bericht ist das Ergebnis eines Gemeinschaftsprojekts zwischen DG ‘Beschäftigung, Soziales und Integration’ und Eurostat und stützt sich auf die Erfahrung von Eurostat im Bereich demografischer Untersuchungen. Er besteht aus zwei Teilen, einem kurzen Anhang zur Abwanderung in Zeiten der Rezession und einem Länderanhang.

Teil I befasst sich mit den früheren und aktuellen Entwicklungstrends in puncto Geburtenhäufigkeit, Lebenserwartung und Migration, den drei Faktoren, die Bevölkerungsveränderungen auslösen. Darin enthalten ist ein Überblick über die Bevölkerungsstruktur nach Alter und Familienzusammensetzung.

In Teil II wird ein zunehmend an Bedeutung gewinnendes Phänomen untersucht, das in einer kürzlich durchgeführten Eurobarometer-Studie ermittelt wurde. Die Studie war der steigenden Zahl europäischer Bürger gewidmet, die sich ins Ausland begeben, um dort zu studieren, zu arbeiten, Lebenserfahrung zu sammeln oder nach Anregungen suchen, was zu unterschiedlichen Formen internationaler Verbundenheit über Staatsgrenzen hinweg führt.

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<sup>(13)</sup> KOM(2006) 571, angenommen am 12. Oktober 2006.

## 1. VERMEHRT ÄLTERE UND VIELFÄLTIGERE EUROPÄER

### 1.1. Neue Lebensweisen führen zu geringfügiger Steigerung der Geburtenhäufigkeit

Die Bevölkerung Europas ist von allmählichen Veränderungen betroffen, die jedoch beträchtliche Ausmaße erreichen. Es sind zwei positive Haupttrends auszumachen: ein leichter Anstieg der Geburtenrate und eine höhere Lebenserwartung. Die Geburtenrate befindet sich in keinem Mitgliedstaat mehr auf niedrigstem Niveau (weniger als 1,3 Kinder pro Frau). Neuesten Zahlen für die EU-27 zufolge lag sie bei 1,6 und könnte bei Bereinigung um die Geburtenverschiebung (der sogenannte 'Tempoeffekt') auf über 1,7 steigen. Diese kleine Anpassung kann das Defizit in Bezug auf die Ersatzrate von 2,1 nicht ausgleichen. Sie könnte jedoch zusammen mit einer möglichen Zunahme der Geburtenrate bei zunehmendem Wohlstand in den EU-Mitgliedstaaten mittel- bis längerfristig zu einem langsameren Bevölkerungsrückgang beitragen.

Der mäßige Anstieg der Geburtenzahlen ergibt sich aus ziemlich neuen Mustern der Familienzusammensetzung: In Ländern, in denen weniger geheiratet wird, mehr eheähnliche Gemeinschaften bestehen, es mehr Scheidungen gibt und Frauen, die Kinder gebären, ein höheres Durchschnittsalter haben, liegt die Geburtenrate tendenziell höher. Die sich verändernde gesellschaftliche Wahrnehmung der Bedeutung des Heiratens und die geringere Dauerhaftigkeit von Beziehungen haben zu mehr außerehelichen Geburten, auch alleinerziehender Eltern, bzw. Kinderlosigkeit geführt.

Es ist schwierig, den Einfluss der Familienpolitik auf diese Trends zu ermitteln, da eine wichtige Rolle kulturellen Faktoren zukommt. Die Daten lassen allerdings darauf schließen, dass das spätere Kinderkriegen in einigen Ländern (z. B. Frankreich, Dänemark, Finnland und die Niederlande) mit höheren Geburtenraten und relativ großzügiger staatlicher Unterstützung für die Eltern einhergeht. Auf der anderen Seite besteht für Eltern in Ländern, wie z. B. Rumänien, die Slowakei und Ungarn, die ein niedrigeres Alter bei Geburt der Kinder aufweisen kein Zusammenhang mit einer hohen Geburtenrate herstellen.. Dies würde auch mit den ersten Anzeichen übereinstimmen, die darauf hindeuten, dass die Geburtenraten mit steigendem Wohlstand auch wieder steigen, nachdem zuvor jahrzehntelang genau das Gegenteil der Fall gewesen war. Aus den vorliegenden Anhaltspunkten geht hervor, dass wir eine bessere Politik benötigen, die Eltern dabei unterstützt, mit den Zwängen einer modernen Gesellschaft zurechtzukommen.

### 1.2. Eine „alternde“ Bevölkerungsstruktur

Es ist schwierig, die Auswirkungen politischer Maßnahmen vorherzusagen. Eine Analyse der Konsequenzen einer sich verändernden Bevölkerungsstruktur ist da einfacher. Niedrige Geburtenraten sind nur die eine Seite, auf der anderen steht ein Rückgang der Sterblichkeitsziffer oder positiv ausgedrückt eine längere Lebenserwartung. 2009 betrug das durchschnittliche Bevölkerungsalter 40,6. Hochrechnungen zufolge wird es 2060 bei 47,9 Jahren liegen.

Laut den Eurostat-Projektionen EUROPOP2008, die im vorangegangenen Demografiebericht enthalten waren, wird sich ab 2014 ein Rückgang der Erwerbsbevölkerung (20–64) bemerkbar machen, da die Babyboomer, die direkt nach dem Zweiten Weltkrieg geboren wurden, jetzt Anfang 60 sind und in Rente gehen. Die Zahl der 60- und Über-60-Jährigen in der EU steigt gegenwärtig um über 2 Millionen jedes Jahr, rund doppelt so schnell wie noch vor drei Jahren. Auch die Erwerbsbevölkerung altert, da der Anteil älterer Arbeitnehmer in Arbeit verglichen mit den jüngeren Arbeitnehmergruppen zunimmt. Jedes Jahr werden rund 5 Millionen Kinder in der EU-27 geboren und wandern über 2 Millionen Menschen aus Drittländern ein. Jedes Jahr werden mehr Geburten als Sterbefälle gezählt, wobei die Differenz mehrere Hunderttausend beträgt, und werden unter dem Strich weit über eine Million Einwanderer verzeichnet. Die Zuwanderung trägt folglich am meisten zum Wachstum der EU-Bevölkerung bei.

2008 lag die Lebenserwartung von Männern in der EU-27 bei 76,4 und von Frauen bei 82,4 Jahren. Es gibt nach wie vor signifikante Unterschiede zwischen den Mitgliedstaaten, die von knapp 13 Jahren für Männer bis zu 8 bei Frauen reichen. Außerdem war die Säuglingssterblichkeit 2009 in einigen Ländern wie Rumänien (10,1 %) und Bulgarien (9,0 %) noch immer relativ hoch, auch wenn in den vergangenen 15 Jahren ein Rückgang von um die 50 % in der EU-27 erreicht wurde. Eine größere Rolle scheint dabei der sozioökonomische Status zu spielen, insbesondere in einigen mitteleuropäischen Ländern. Infolgedessen darf eine Erhöhung der Lebenserwartung insgesamt erwartet werden, wenn die Lebenserwartung von benachteiligten Gruppen verbessert wird.

Eine mögliche Entwicklung ist die Verbesserung der gesunden Lebenserwartung, durch Verzögerung des Stadiums, in dem der Gesundheitszustand sich rasch zu verschlechtern beginnt, und dadurch die Verschiebung hin zu einem höheren Sterbealter. Zu dieser Frage sind weitere Belege und Untersuchungen nötig.

Programme, die sich mit der alternden Bevölkerung und Erwerbsbevölkerung befassen, sorgen schwerpunktmäßig dafür, dass ältere Arbeitnehmer länger im aktiven und produktiven Erwerbsleben bleiben können. Einer der Vorteile einer alternden Bevölkerung liegt darin, dass sich mehr Möglichkeiten für flexible Vereinbarungen im Laufe des Lebens bieten. Ein längeres aktives Leben ermöglicht ausgedehnte oder wiederkehrende Weiterbildungsphasen, eine höhere Arbeitszeitflexibilität während der Jahre, in denen Kinder und berufliche Verpflichtungen nur schwer miteinander vereinbart werden können, die Unterbrechung der beruflichen Laufbahn, wenn man sich um Familienangehörige kümmern muss, und ein produktives Ausscheiden aus dem Arbeitsleben durch ehrenamtliche Mitarbeit und allgemeines gesellschaftliches Engagement.

### 1.3. Europa in Bewegung

Die Migration, insbesondere aus Nicht-EU-Staaten, könnte die Überalterung der Bevölkerung (vorübergehend) stoppen, da in erster Linie junge Erwachsene (im Alter von 25–34) in andere Länder abwandern. Durch die jüngeren ausländischen Personengruppen, die zunehmend zu den älteren nationalen Personengruppen hinzukommen, verjüngt sich die Gesamtbevölkerung und erhöht sich die Vielfalt. Aufgrund der Einwanderung sowohl aus Drittländern als auch aus der EU-27 (innereuropäische Mobilität) in bislang unbekanntem Ausmaß während des

vergangenen Jahrzehnts hat sich der Anteil der EU-27 Einwohner, die nicht in ihrem Heimatland oder Kulturkreis leben, beträchtlich erhöht.

In den Mitgliedstaaten der EU-27 leben rund 20 Millionen Nicht-EU-Staatsbürger. Weitere 10 Millionen EU-Staatsbürger leben in einem anderen Mitgliedstaat und etwa 5 Millionen Menschen haben seit 2001 die EU-Staatsbürgerschaft erworben. Da die meisten Einwanderer relativ jung sind und erst vor recht kurzer Zeit in die EU gekommen sind, leisten sie einen großen Beitrag zur Erwerbsbevölkerung der EU-27. In der Zukunft wird sich die erwerbstätige Bevölkerung zunehmend aus Menschen mit Migrationshintergrund zusammensetzen. Von den EU-Staatsbürgern haben neben den rund 8 % der EU-Ansässigen ausländischer Herkunft <sup>(14)</sup> weitere 5 % mindestens ein im Ausland geborenes Elternteil, und dieser Anteil wird weiter wachsen. Man geht davon aus, dass der Anteil der Personen aller Staatsangehörigkeiten mit mindestens einem im Ausland geborenen Elternteil bis zum Jahr 2060 knapp ein Drittel der Bevölkerung der EU-27 betragen wird. Bei der Erwerbsbevölkerung wird ein noch größerer Teil ausländischer Abstammung sein.

Diese Trends erfordern, dass zusätzliche Anstrengungen unternommen werden, um sicherzustellen, dass Immigranten die Möglichkeit haben, sich in die Gesellschaft ihres Gastlandes zu integrieren. Noch wichtiger ist es, ihnen zu ermöglichen, sich ihrem Bildungsniveau entsprechend am Arbeitsmarkt zu beteiligen. Eine mobile Bevölkerung kann eine Bereicherung für die Gastländer sein. Immer mehr Menschen möchten Auslandserfahrung machen. Dadurch können sie zu einer effizienteren und produktiveren Wirtschaft beitragen und außerdem ihre persönlichen Kompetenzen verbessern.

## **2. EINE ZUNEHMEND VIELFÄLTIGE UND MOBILE EU-BEVÖLKERUNG**

Da die Zuwanderung aus Drittländern und die Mobilität zwischen den Mitgliedstaaten zunimmt, stammt ein wachsender Teil der Erwerbsbevölkerung (15 % im Jahr 2008) aus dem Ausland oder verfügt über mindestens ein Elternteil, das im Ausland geboren wurde.

Durch die sich verändernden Muster der Zuwanderung und Mobilität innerhalb Europas wird das Gefühl der Zugehörigkeit zu einer bestimmten Nation diffuser und komplexer, insbesondere im Falle der Freizügigkeit zwischen den EU-Mitgliedstaaten. Wenngleich die traditionelle langfristige, beschäftigungsbedingte und männerdominierte Zuwanderung nach wie vor existiert, immigrieren zunehmend auch Frauen und bilden mittlerweile in einigen Mitgliedstaaten die Mehrheit. Auch die Richtung der Mobilität hat sich geändert: Einige der Mitgliedstaaten, aus denen traditionell viele Auswanderer stammten, sind mittlerweile sehr beliebte Einwanderungsländer.

Es ist definitiv kein neues geschichtliches Phänomen, dass die Bürger der EU in andere Länder abwandern und die Kulturen sich vermischen. Frühere Migrationsströme haben sich unterschiedlich auf die Größe und Struktur der Bevölkerung in den meisten EU-27-Mitgliedstaaten ausgewirkt und bei den Bürgern zu einer verstärkt europäischen Perspektive beigetragen. Einwanderer möchten häufig eine enge Bindung zu ihrem Herkunftsland

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<sup>(14)</sup> Zur Gruppe der im Ausland Geborenen zählen hier Personen, die in einem anderen Mitgliedstaat geboren sind als dem, in dem sie wohnen.

aufrechterhalten, diese Verknüpfungen nehmen jedoch mit der Zeit tendenziell ab.

Die generationsübergreifende Integration von Einwanderern erfolgt recht zügig. In den meisten Ländern, in denen ein beträchtlicher Anteil an Einwanderern der zweiten Generation lebt, schneiden diese in der Schule und im Berufsleben deutlich besser als die erste Generation und fast so gut wie die Einwohner ohne ausländische Wurzeln ab. Dies gilt sowohl für Nachkömmlinge von Migranten aus anderen Mitgliedstaaten als auch für diejenigen aus Drittländern. Trotz allem sind die Nachkommen von Migranten auch noch in der dritten Generation – der üblichen Dauer bis zu vollständigen Integration – in gewisser Weise mit dem Herkunftsland ihrer Vorfahren verbunden, beispielsweise in Form von Fremdsprachenkenntnissen.

Neben der traditionellen Migration und Mobilität sind auch neue Formen der Mobilität zu erkennen. Umzüge ins Ausland finden hauptsächlich innerhalb der Mitgliedstaaten und für kürzere Zeiträume auf der Suche nach Arbeit, im Rahmen der Ausbildung oder zwecks Wahrnehmung sonstiger Möglichkeiten statt. Bei diesem mobilen Teil der Bevölkerung handelt es sich in der Regel um gut ausgebildete junge Menschen, die eher am oberen Ende der Berufsskala angesiedelt sind. Diese Form der Mobilität basiert zunehmend auf persönlichen Präferenzen und der Wahl eines bestimmten Lebensstils, und nicht ausschließlich auf wirtschaftlichen Gründen. Die erhöhte Mobilitätsneigung könnte für die EU von großem Nutzen sein, da so ein besserer Abgleich von Kompetenzen und Sprachkenntnissen mit Stellenangeboten möglich wird. Die Ergebnisse einer Eurobarometer-Studie <sup>(15)</sup> deuten auf das Vorhandensein einer vielfältigen und wachsenden Anzahl mobiler junger Menschen hin, die sich dadurch auszeichnen, dass sie allesamt gerne einen Blick über die eigenen Landesgrenzen hinweg werfen möchten.

Der Eurobarometer-Studie ist ferner zu entnehmen, dass ungefähr ein Fünftel der Teilnehmer aus den 27 EU-Ländern irgendwann im Laufe des Lebens entweder im Ausland gearbeitet oder studiert hat, mit einem Partner aus einem anderen Land liiert war oder Immobilien im Ausland besitzt. Bei der Hälfte dieser Befragten sind Vorfahren aus anderen Ländern der Grund für die Verbindung, bei der anderen Hälfte handelt es sich meistens um junge und gut ausgebildete Menschen, die sich bewusst für eine bestimmte Lebensform entscheiden, um andere Länder kennenzulernen. Ihre Bereitschaft, wenn nicht gar Lust, auszuwandern, ist bis zu viermal höher als bei Personen, die keinerlei Verbindungen zu einem anderen Land haben. Da dieses Phänomen künftig wahrscheinlich noch stärker an Bedeutung gewinnt, sollte die Politik die damit verbundenen Konsequenzen in die Planung der sozioökonomischen Zukunft der europäischen Bevölkerung mit einbeziehen.

### 3. BEVÖLKERUNGSPOLITIK WÄHREND DER REZSSION

Vor Beginn der Rezession hatte das Engagement der EU-Mitgliedstaaten im Hinblick auf die Umsetzung der politischen Zielsetzungen des Vertrags von Lissabon bereits erste Ergebnisse in Form von Beschäftigung für junge Menschen, Frauen, ältere Arbeitnehmer und Einwanderer gezeigt. Die ersten, die die Rezession zu spüren bekamen, waren jüngere Menschen und Einwanderer. Den Regierungen fiel es zunehmend schwer, die Unterstützung

<sup>(15)</sup> Eurobarometer EBS 346 abrufbar unter [http://ec.europa.eu/public\\_opinion/archives/ebs/ebs\\_346\\_en.pdf](http://ec.europa.eu/public_opinion/archives/ebs/ebs_346_en.pdf)

für Familien, die Konsolidierung der Haushalte, die Leistungen für junge Menschen und Einwanderer sowie die Finanzierung der Rentensysteme vor dem Hintergrund eines schrumpfenden Arbeitsmarktes miteinander zu vereinbaren.

Es ist noch zu früh für sichere Schlussfolgerungen in Bezug auf die Auswirkungen der Krise auf die Geburtenhäufigkeit und Lebenserwartung. Die in vergangenen Rezessionsperioden gemachte Erfahrung zeigt, dass sowohl die Geburtenrate als auch die Sterblichkeit anfangs leicht zurückgehen, aber dann kurz nach Ende der Krise wieder auf den Stand vor der Krise steigen.

Neue Wohnsitzdaten von Eurostat lassen Rückschlüsse auf die Gründe für die Einwanderung aus Drittländern zu. Den verfügbaren Daten ist zu entnehmen, dass der Zuwanderungsrückgang hauptsächlich darauf zurückzuführen ist, dass weniger Menschen aus beruflichen und familiären Gründen auswandern, während die Zahl der zu Studien- und sonstigen Zwecken ausgestellten Aufenthaltsgenehmigungen zwischen 2008 und 2009 leicht angestiegen ist.

#### 4. WAS WIRD UNTERNOMMEN?

Im Juni 2010 verabschiedete der Europäische Rat die neue zehnjährige Strategie Europa 2020 für mehr Beschäftigung und intelligentes, nachhaltiges und integratives Wachstum<sup>(16)</sup>. Die Strategie dient der Neuausrichtung vorhandener politischer Maßnahmen weg vom Krisenmanagement hin zu mittel- bis längerfristigen Zielsetzungen zur Förderung von Wachstum und Beschäftigung sowie zur Sicherstellung der zukünftigen Tragfähigkeit öffentlicher Finanzen. Letzteres ist eine Grundvoraussetzung für den sozialen Zusammenhalt in der EU.

Die Rezession hat das Engagement der Mitgliedstaaten, sich den demografischen Herausforderungen zu stellen, nicht geschwächt. Die Mitgliedstaaten scheinen im Gegenteil noch stärker dazu entschlossen zu sein. Die Strategie, mit der man den demografischen Veränderungen begegnen wollte, stimmt anscheinend genau mit dem Grundtenor der neuen Strategie Europa 2020 überein. Als Folge der Rezession – und trotz der trüben Aussichten für die öffentlichen Haushalte – ist die Europäische Kommission davon überzeugt, dass der demografische Aspekt von den Mitgliedstaaten bei der Ausarbeitung ihrer Strategien zur Überwindung der derzeitigen Rezession umfassend berücksichtigt werden muss.

Bereits im Oktober 2006 hat die Kommission in ihrer Mitteilung zur demografischen Zukunft Europas<sup>(17)</sup> hervorgehoben, dass sich die EU die demografischen Möglichkeiten zunutze machen sollte. In der Mitteilung hieß es, man solle das Problem der niedrigen Geburtenraten durch Schaffung besserer Bedingungen für Familien angehen, damit das Problem der schrumpfenden Erwerbsbevölkerung gelöst würde, indem man die Beschäftigungsquote und Produktivitätsrate erhöht, sich auf Zuwanderung und bessere Integration stützt und letztendlich auch die zukünftigen Bedürfnisse einer alternden Gesellschaft durch Schaffung tragfähiger öffentlicher Haushalte erfüllt. Es liege in der Verantwortung der Mitgliedstaaten, zu entscheiden, wie sie ihr Potenzial verwirklichen. In der

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<sup>(16)</sup> [http://ec.europa.eu/europe2020/index\\_de.htm](http://ec.europa.eu/europe2020/index_de.htm)

<sup>(17)</sup> <http://eur-lex.europa.eu/LexUriServ/LexUriServ.do?uri=COM:2006:0571:FIN:DE:PDF>



Mitteilung wurde die Art der Unterstützung hervorgehoben, welche die EU den Mitgliedstaaten im Hinblick auf die Koordinierung der bestehenden politischen Maßnahmen anbieten kann. Auf Ersuchen der Mitgliedstaaten und mit Unterstützung des Europäischen Parlaments wird dieser Prozess durch die Aktivitäten ergänzt, die unter dem Dach der Europäischen Allianz für Familien<sup>(18)</sup> und des geplanten Europäischen Jahres für aktives Altern 2012<sup>(19)</sup> organisiert werden.

Der Erfolg der Strategie ist weitgehend an die Fähigkeit der EU gebunden, sich den großen demografischen Veränderungen des kommenden Jahrzehnts zu stellen.

Die Zukunft Europas hängt in hohem Maße davon ab, ob das hohe Potenzial der beiden am schnellsten wachsenden Bevölkerungsteile genutzt werden kann: ältere Menschen und Einwanderer. Es lassen sich drei politische Bereiche ausmachen, die für die Förderung des Wirtschaftswachstums und die Schaffung eines stärkeren sozialen Zusammenhalts entscheidend sein dürften:

- Die Förderung des aktiven Alterns: Ältere Menschen und insbesondere die älter werdende Generation der Babyboomer können sich auf ein langes gesundes Leben freuen und verfügen über wertvolle Kompetenzen und Erfahrungen. Durch ein größeres Angebot an Möglichkeiten des aktiven Alterns können diese Personengruppen auch nach ihrer Pensionierung noch einen sozialen Beitrag leisten.
- Die Integration von Migranten und deren Nachkommen: Dieser Punkt ist für Europa von entscheidender Bedeutung, da Migranten sogar einen noch größeren Teil der Erwerbsbevölkerung ausmachen werden. Die niedrigen Beschäftigungsquoten von Migranten sind sowohl in sozialer als auch finanzieller Hinsicht nicht tragbar.
- Die Vereinbarkeit von bezahlter Arbeit und familiären Verpflichtungen: Personen mit Betreuungsverantwortung erhalten immer noch keine angemessene Unterstützung und geeignete Optionen, um ihre unterschiedlichen Pflichten miteinander zu vereinbaren. Als Folge davon wird das Wirtschaftswachstum blockiert, weil zu viele Menschen ihre erstklassigen Kompetenzen und erworbenen Kenntnisse auf dem Arbeitsmarkt nicht in vollem Umfang nutzen können. Besonders Frauen sind aufgrund der hartnäckigen geschlechterbezogenen Kluft in Bezug auf Beruf und Gehalt betroffen.

Gleichzeitig müssen in Europa aber auch Wege gefunden werden, wie eine höhere Produktivität aufrechterhalten werden kann, während man sich auf steigende Kosten in Verbindung mit einer alternden Gesellschaft einstellen muss, und das vor dem Hintergrund schrumpfender öffentlicher Haushalte infolge der Rezession.

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<sup>(18)</sup> [http://ec.europa.eu/employment\\_social/emplweb/families/index.cfm?langId=de&id=1](http://ec.europa.eu/employment_social/emplweb/families/index.cfm?langId=de&id=1)

<sup>(19)</sup> <http://ec.europa.eu/social/main.jsp?langId=de&catId=89&newsId=860>

## RÉSUMÉ

Depuis le dernier Rapport 2008 sur la démographie, publié la même année, la population de l'UE a franchi le seuil des 500 millions d'individus tout en continuant à se développer conformément à l'évolution déjà perceptible il y a deux ans. Le tableau démographique de l'UE a gagné en précision : la croissance est principalement alimentée par l'immigration, tandis que la population vieillit et se diversifie. L'influence de la crise économique est toujours difficile à évaluer.

En octobre 2006, dans sa communication intitulée «*L'avenir démographique de l'Europe, transformer un défi en opportunité*»<sup>(20)</sup>, la Commission a présenté ses points de vue sur les défis démographiques rencontrés par l'UE et sur les options pour les relever. La communication a exprimé sa confiance en la capacité de l'Europe à faire face aux changements démographiques et au vieillissement de la population en particulier, mais a également souligné la nécessité d'agir dans cinq secteurs clés : le renouveau démographique, l'emploi, la productivité, l'intégration des migrants et les finances publiques soutenables

Ce troisième Rapport sur la démographie vise à fournir les derniers chiffres et données nécessaires pour un débat éclairé sur ces questions. Outre la vue d'ensemble au niveau communautaire, les chiffres sont donnés, dans la mesure du possible, pour l'ensemble des 27 États membres de l'UE, permettant aux décideurs politiques et aux parties prenantes de comparer la situation de leur propre pays avec celle des autres États membres, de comprendre les caractéristiques spécifiques de leur pays et, si possible, d'identifier d'autres pays qui pourraient apporter d'intéressantes expériences dont on pourrait s'instruire.

Cette année, le rapport est réalisé en collaboration avec la Direction Générale «Emploi, affaires sociales et inclusion» et Eurostat, et tire parti de l'expérience d'Eurostat en matière d'analyse démographique. Il se compose de deux parties, d'une brève annexe sur la migration au cours de la récession et d'une annexe contenant des fiches par pays.

La partie I est consacrée aux tendances historiques et récentes concernant la fécondité, l'espérance de vie et la migration, qui sont les trois facteurs clés de l'évolution de la population. Elle inclut un examen de la structure de la population par âge et composition familiale.

La partie II se penche sur un phénomène de plus en plus important qui a été identifié dans une récente enquête Eurobaromètre : un nombre croissant de citoyens européens recherchent des opportunités au-delà des frontières de leur pays pour étudier, travailler, puiser leur inspiration et vivre des expériences, ce qui conduit à la création de différentes formes de liens par-delà les frontières nationales.

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<sup>(20)</sup> COM(2006) 571, adoptée le 12 octobre 2006.

## 1. DES EUROPÉENS PLUS NOMBREUX, PLUS ÂGÉS, VIVANT DANS UNE PLUS GRANDE DIVERSITÉ

### 1.1. Des modèles nouveaux entraînent une légère augmentation de la fécondité

Des changements progressifs, mais néanmoins significatifs, touchent la population en Europe. Deux tendances positives principales émergent : une légère augmentation de la fécondité et une plus grande espérance de vie. La très faible fécondité – inférieure à 1,3 enfant par femme – n'est plus de mise dans l'ensemble des États membres. Le chiffre le plus récent pour l'Europe des 27 s'est élevé à 1,6 et pourrait grimper à plus d'1,7 si les ajustements pour le report des naissances (les dénommés « effets de tempo ») sont pris en considération. Ce petit ajustement ne compense pas le déficit par rapport au seuil de renouvellement de 2,1, mais pourrait contribuer à un ralentissement du taux de la baisse de la population à moyen/plus long terme, parallèlement à une possible augmentation de la fécondité à mesure d'un enrichissement des États membres de l'UE.

La progression modeste de la fécondité est le résultat de modèles quelque peu nouveaux en termes de schéma familial : des pays avec moins de mariages, davantage de concubinage, plus de divorces et une moyenne plus élevée de l'âge des femmes au moment de l'accouchement tendent à engendrer une fécondité plus élevée. Le changement des perceptions sociales quant au rôle du mariage et une plus grande fragilité des relations sont à l'origine d'un nombre plus élevé de naissances extraconjugales, y compris dans les familles monoparentales, ou d'une infécondité.

L'impact des politiques familiales sur ces tendances est difficile à évaluer dans la mesure où les facteurs culturels jouent un rôle important. Cependant, les données suggèrent que l'ajournement de la maternité à un âge plus avancé s'accompagne dans quelques pays (France, Danemark, Finlande et Pays-Bas par exemple) de taux de fécondité plus élevés et d'aides publiques relativement généreuses pour les parents. À l'autre extrémité de l'échelle, dans des pays comme la Roumanie, la Slovaquie et la Hongrie, un âge inférieur à l'accouchement n'est pas associé à un taux de fécondité élevé. Cette situation serait également en phase avec les premiers éléments indiquant que la fécondité s'accroît encore avec la richesse, après des décennies de fécondité en berne alors que les pays s'enrichissaient.

Cette évidence émergente étaye la thèse selon laquelle il est nécessaire de disposer de meilleures politiques pouvant aider les parents à faire face aux contraintes d'une société moderne.

### 1.1. Une structure de la population « vieillissante »

Bien qu'il soit difficile de prédire l'influence des politiques, une analyse de l'impact des changements dans la structure de la population est plus simple. Les faibles taux de fécondité ne constituent qu'un des deux aspects du phénomène, l'autre aspect étant une baisse du nombre des décès, ou en termes plus positifs, d'une hausse de l'espérance de vie. En 2009, l'âge moyen de la population était de 40,6 et il devrait atteindre, selon les prévisions, 47,9 ans d'ici 2060.

Les projections EUROPOP2008, préparées par Eurostat et présentées dans le précédent Rapport sur la démographie, indiquent que d'ici 2014, la population active (20-64) commencera à se contracter alors que d'importantes cohortes de « baby-boomers » nés immédiatement après la Seconde Guerre atteignent désormais la soixantaine et prennent leur retraite. Le nombre d'individus âgés de 60 ans et plus au sein de l'UE croît actuellement de plus de deux millions chaque année, à peu près deux fois le taux observé jusqu'il y a encore trois ans. La population active vieillit également du fait de l'accroissement de la proportion des travailleurs plus âgés en activité par rapport aux groupes de travailleurs plus jeunes. Chaque année, environ 5 millions d'enfants voient le jour dans l'Europe des 27 et plus de 2 millions de personnes immigreront de pays tiers. Les naissances dépassent les décès de plusieurs centaines de milliers de personnes chaque année tandis que l'immigration nette est nettement supérieure à un million. En conséquence, l'immigration représente la part la plus importante de la croissance de la population de l'UE.

En 2008, l'espérance de vie pour l'Europe des 27 était de 76,4 ans pour les hommes et de 82,4 ans pour les femmes. Les écarts parmi les États membres sont toujours très significatifs, allant de presque 13 ans pour les hommes à 8 ans pour les femmes. La mortalité infantile en 2009 est aussi toujours relativement élevée dans certains pays tels que la Roumanie (10,1 ‰) et la Bulgarie (9,0 ‰), même si une baisse d'environ 50 % pour l'UE-27 a été enregistrée au cours des 15 dernières années. Le statut socio-économique semble jouer un rôle majeur, notamment dans certains pays d'Europe centrale. Par conséquent, en améliorant l'espérance de vie des catégories désavantagées, une hausse générale de l'espérance de vie globale devrait également se profiler.

Une évolution possible serait l'amélioration de l'espérance de vie en bonne santé, en retardant le moment auquel les conditions physiques commencent à se détériorer rapidement, reportant de ce fait la mort à un âge ultérieur. Ce sujet important exige d'autres preuves et analyses.

Les politiques abordant le vieillissement de la population et la main-d'œuvre visent à permettre aux travailleurs plus âgés de rester actifs et productifs pendant une plus longue période de leur vie. L'un des avantages d'une population vieillissante est qu'elle offre plus de possibilités en termes de souplesse des dispositions au cours de la vie. Une plus longue vie active permet des périodes prolongées ou périodiques en matière d'éducation ; une plus grande flexibilité du temps de travail pendant les années d'effervescence où la maternité et les engagements professionnels coïncident ; une interruption de carrière temporaire quand il devient nécessaire de prendre soin de membres de la famille ; et une retraite productive via le volontariat et un engagement général dans la vie sociale.

## 1.2. L'Europe en mouvement

L'immigration, notamment en provenance des pays non membres de l'UE, pourrait fournir un sursis (provisoire) au vieillissement de la population, puisque la plupart des personnes émigrent principalement lorsqu'elles sont de jeunes adultes (25-34 ans). Alors que les groupes de jeunes étrangers entrent progressivement dans les cohortes nationales plus âgées, l'ensemble de la population rajeunit et la diversité s'accroît. Des niveaux sans précédent d'immigration provenant tant de pays tiers que de l'UE-27 (mobilité intracommunautaire) au cours de la dernière décennie ont sensiblement

augmenté la part d'habitants de l'UE-27 qui ne vivent pas dans leur propre pays natal ou dans leur milieu culturel.

Les États membres de l'UE-27 accueillent environ 20 millions de ressortissants ne provenant pas de l'UE. 10 autres millions de ressortissants de l'UE vivent dans un autre État membre et environ 5 millions de ressortissants tiers sont devenus citoyens européens depuis 2001. Étant donné que la plupart des migrants sont relativement jeunes et sont arrivés assez récemment, ils contribuent notablement à l'ampleur de la main-d'œuvre de l'UE-27. À l'avenir, la main-d'œuvre comptera de plus en plus de personnes provenant de l'immigration. Parmi les ressortissants de l'UE, outre le taux approximatif de 8 % de personnes résidant dans l'UE et nées à l'étranger <sup>(21)</sup>, 5 % supplémentaires ont au moins un parent né à l'étranger, et cette catégorie continuera à croître. En 2060, les personnes de toute nationalité ayant au moins un parent né à l'étranger devraient représenter près d'un tiers de la population de l'UE-27. Un pourcentage encore plus important de la main-d'œuvre sera d'origine étrangère.

Ces tendances impliquent que des efforts supplémentaires sont nécessaires pour garantir que les immigrés aient l'opportunité de s'intégrer dans leur société d'accueil et, fondamentalement, de leur permettre de contribuer au marché du travail en utilisant pleinement leurs qualifications. Une population mobile peut être perçue comme un atout par les pays d'accueil. Dans la mesure où de plus en plus de gens recherchent une expérience à l'étranger, ils peuvent contribuer à une économie plus efficace et productive tout en renforçant leurs compétences personnelles.

## 2. UNE POPULATION EUROPÉENNE DE PLUS EN PLUS DIVERSE ET MOBILE

Alors que les flux migratoires en provenance des pays non membres de l'UE et la mobilité entre États membres se sont intensifiés, une proportion croissante de la population active (15 % en 2008) est née à l'étranger ou a au moins un parent né à l'étranger.

L'évolution des schémas migratoires et de la mobilité en Europe rendent le sentiment national relatif à l'appartenance à une nation particulière plus diffus et complexe, en particulier dans le cas de la mobilité entre les États membres de l'UE. Bien que l'immigration traditionnelle à long terme, motivée par l'emploi, principalement masculine, soit toujours à l'ordre du jour, les femmes immigrantes sont de plus en plus présentes et sont désormais majoritaires dans certains États membres. Les flux de mobilité ont également changé : certains des principaux États membres traditionnels d'émigration sont devenus des pôles d'attraction pour les migrants.

La migration à grande échelle et le mélange des cultures ne sont évidemment pas un nouveau phénomène dans l'histoire de l'UE. Les flux passés ont eu un impact différent sur la taille et la structure de la population dans la plupart des États membres de l'UE-27 et ils ont contribué à une perspective plus européenne parmi ses citoyens. Les immigrés souhaitent souvent conserver un attachement proche à leur pays d'origine, mais ces liens tendent à s'amenuiser au fil du temps.

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<sup>(21)</sup> L'expression « nées à l'étranger » inclut ici les personnes nées dans un État membre différent de celui dans lequel elles résident.

L'intégration des immigrés à travers les générations s'effectue plutôt rapidement. Dans la plupart des pays disposant d'une proportion substantielle d'immigrés de la seconde génération, ceux-ci réussissent nettement mieux sur le plan de l'éducation tout comme sur le marché du travail que les immigrés de la première génération et presque aussi bien que les individus sans origine étrangère ; cela s'applique aux descendants des migrants provenant des autres États membres et des immigrés en provenance des pays non membres de l'UE. Néanmoins, même après trois générations, – le temps habituellement nécessaire pour une intégration totale – les descendants des migrants conservent un certain attachement aux pays de leurs ancêtres, par leur connaissance des langues étrangères par exemple.

Parallèlement à l'immigration et à la mobilité traditionnelles, il existe de nouvelles formes de mobilité. Les individus se déplacent à l'étranger, principalement dans d'autres États membres, pour des périodes plus courtes en vue de chercher du travail, de poursuivre leur formation ou pour toute autre opportunité de vie. Ces individus mobiles tendent à être de jeunes adultes instruits, dirigés vers l'extrémité supérieure de l'échelle professionnelle. Cette forme de mobilité est basée de plus en plus sur des préférences personnelles et des choix de vie, et pas seulement sur des opportunités économiques. La propension accrue à la mobilité pourrait être très bénéfique à l'UE en permettant une meilleure mise en adéquation des qualifications et des capacités linguistiques avec les offres d'emploi. Les résultats d'une enquête Eurobaromètre <sup>(22)</sup> mettent en évidence la présence d'un nombre varié et croissant de jeunes gens mobiles caractérisés par un intérêt commun pour ce qui se fait au-delà des frontières nationales. L'enquête Eurobaromètre indique également qu'une personne sondée sur cinq de l'UE-27 a étudié ou travaillé dans un autre pays à un moment donné, vécu avec un conjoint d'un autre pays ou possède un bien immobilier à l'étranger. La moitié de ces personnes sondées a des liens avec d'autres pays par ascendance ; l'autre moitié est le plus souvent jeune et instruite et effectue consciemment un choix de vie qui la met en contact avec d'autres pays. Ils partagent une forte volonté, sinon une propension à se déplacer à l'étranger, jusqu'à quatre fois plus que les personnes qui ne disposent d'aucune connexion avec un autre pays. Étant donné que ce phénomène est susceptible de devenir bien plus important à l'avenir, il est possible que les décideurs politiques souhaitent tenir compte de ses implications dans la planification de l'avenir socio-économique de la population européenne.

### 3. POLITIQUE DÉMOGRAPHIQUE AU COURS DE LA RÉCESSION

Avant la récession économique, l'engagement des États membres de l'UE à mettre en application les objectifs politiques inscrits dans le programme du traité de Lisbonne avait commencé à donner des résultats sous la forme de l'emploi des jeunes, des femmes, des travailleurs plus âgés et des migrants. Quand la récession est survenue, les premiers groupes à être affectés ont été les jeunes et les immigrés. Les gouvernements ont fait face à des difficultés croissantes en équilibrant soutien aux familles, consolidation des budgets, aide aux jeunes et aux immigrés sur un marché du travail en contraction, et en finançant les régimes de retraite.

<sup>(22)</sup> Eurobaromètre EBS 346 sur [http://ec.europa.eu/public\\_opinion/archives/ebs/ebs\\_346\\_en.pdf](http://ec.europa.eu/public_opinion/archives/ebs/ebs_346_en.pdf)

Il est trop tôt pour tirer toute conclusion définitive concernant l'impact de la crise sur la fécondité et l'espérance de vie. L'expérience récente des récessions passées indique que la fécondité et la mortalité peuvent baisser légèrement dans un premier temps pour revenir à leurs niveaux antérieurs à la récession peu de temps après la fin de la crise.

Les nouvelles données d'Eurostat sur les permis de séjour mettent en lumière les raisons de l'immigration en provenance des pays non membres de l'UE. Les données disponibles montrent que la baisse de l'immigration est en grande partie due à une réduction de l'immigration pour des raisons professionnelles et familiales, alors que le nombre de permis de séjour délivrés pour les études et d'autres raisons a légèrement augmenté de 2008 à 2009.

#### 4. MESURES PRISES

En juin 2010, le Conseil européen a adopté la nouvelle stratégie Europe2020 pour les dix ans à venir afin de créer davantage d'emplois et parvenir à une croissance intelligente, durable et exhaustive <sup>(23)</sup>. La stratégie définit une réorientation des politiques existantes depuis la gestion de la crise jusqu'aux objectifs à moyen et plus long terme pour favoriser la croissance et l'emploi et pour assurer la durabilité future des finances publiques. Ce dernier point est une condition préalable pour la cohésion sociale durable dans l'UE.

La récession n'a pas amenuisé l'engagement des États membres à relever le défi démographique. Au contraire, cet engagement semble avoir été renforcé. La stratégie adoptée pour aborder la mutation démographique semble concorder avec la poussée globale de la nouvelle stratégie Europe 2020. Dans le sillage de la récession, et en dépit des mornes perspectives pour les finances publiques, la Commission européenne est convaincue que la dimension démographique mérite d'être entièrement prise en considération par les États membres lorsqu'ils formulent leurs stratégies de sortie de la récession actuelle.

La nécessité de mobiliser les possibilités démographiques de l'UE a été déjà soulignée en octobre 2006 dans la communication de la Commission sur l'avenir démographique de l'Europe <sup>(24)</sup>. Cette communication a suggéré que le problème de la faible fécondité devrait être abordé en créant de meilleures conditions pour aider les familles et traiter le problème d'une contraction de la main-d'œuvre en relevant les taux d'emploi et les niveaux de productivité, en se fiant à l'immigration et à une meilleure intégration et, pour finir, en préservant la capacité à répondre aux besoins futurs d'une société vieillissante en créant des finances publiques durables. Il appartient aux États membres de décider de quelle manière réaliser leur potentiel. La communication a mis en évidence le type d'aide que l'UE peut apporter aux États membres en termes de coordination des politiques existantes. À la demande des États membres et avec l'appui du Parlement européen, ce processus est complété par les activités organisées sous l'égide de l'Alliance européenne pour les familles <sup>(25)</sup> et de l'Année européenne du vieillissement actif désignée pour 2012 <sup>(26)</sup>.

<sup>(23)</sup> [http://ec.europa.eu/europe2020/index\\_fr.htm](http://ec.europa.eu/europe2020/index_fr.htm)

<sup>(24)</sup> <http://eur-lex.europa.eu/LexUriServ/LexUriServ.do?uri=COM:2006:0571:FIN:FR:PDF>

<sup>(25)</sup> [http://ec.europa.eu/employment\\_social/emplweb/families/index.cfm?langId=fr&id=1](http://ec.europa.eu/employment_social/emplweb/families/index.cfm?langId=fr&id=1)

<sup>(26)</sup> <http://ec.europa.eu/social/main.jsp?langId=fr&catId=89&newsId=860>

Le succès de cette stratégie s'articule en grande partie autour de la capacité de l'UE à faire face aux principales transformations démographiques de cette prochaine décennie.

L'avenir de l'Europe dépend dans une large mesure de sa capacité à exploiter le grand potentiel des deux segments augmentant le plus rapidement au sein de sa population : les personnes âgées et les immigrés. Trois secteurs semblent essentiels pour relancer la croissance économique et parvenir à une plus grande cohésion sociale :

- la promotion du vieillissement actif : les personnes âgées, et en particulier les baby-boomers vieillissants, peuvent espérer vivre de plus longues années en bonne santé, et détiennent des qualifications et des expériences précieuses. Davantage d'opportunités en vue d'un vieillissement actif leur permettront de continuer à apporter leur contribution à la société même après la retraite.
- l'intégration des immigrés et de leurs descendants : c'est primordial pour l'Europe parce que les immigrés constitueront une part encore plus importante de la main-d'œuvre européenne. Les faibles taux d'emploi des immigrés sont socialement et financièrement très élevés.
- la conciliation d'un travail rémunéré et d'obligations familiales : les personnes ayant une charge familiale manquent toujours d'une aide adéquate et de mesures appropriées pour combiner leurs différentes responsabilités. En conséquence, la croissance économique est entravée, trop de personnes ne pouvant pas mettre leur niveau élevé de qualifications et d'éducation à disposition du marché du travail. Les femmes sont particulièrement touchées en raison de la persistance des différences d'emploi selon le sexe et des écarts de salaire.

Parallèlement, l'Europe doit trouver les moyens de maintenir une plus grande productivité tout en se préparant à des niveaux croissants de dépenses liées au vieillissement en dépit de l'assèchement des finances publiques consécutif à la récession.



## INTRODUCTION

The Commission's Europe 2020 Strategy has identified concern about population ageing, together with globalisation, climate change, competitiveness and macroeconomic imbalances, as one of the key challenges that the European Union needs to overcome.

Sixty years ago the number of births rose sharply and remained high for about 20 to 30 years. Now the first of those baby-boomers, have reached the age of 60 and have started retiring. This marks a turning point in the demographic development of the European Union and makes it all the more important to consider the policy responses that are required by this major change. Population ageing, long discussed as a looming prospect, has now become a reality.

This Report is the third in a series of biennial European Demography Reports to which the Commission committed itself in its 2006 Communication 'The Demographic Future of Europe — From Challenge to Opportunity'. This Communication showed that Europe has reasons to envisage its demographic future with confidence. Population ageing is above all the result of economic, social and medical progress, as well as greater control over the timing of births and the number of children that people have. The same progress affords Europe significant opportunities for responding to the challenges of demographic change, notably in five key areas:

- better support for families;
- promotion of employment;
- raising productivity and economic performance;
- better support for immigration and the integration of migrants;
- sustainable public finances <sup>(27)</sup>.

Major reforms and decisive action are necessary to meet these challenges. The Communication stressed that there is only a small window of opportunity, of about 10 years, during which further employment growth remains possible. Increasing the number of highly productive and high quality jobs is the key to ensuring that Europe's economy and societies will be able to meet the needs of ageing populations. The current economic crisis has not invalidated the EU's strategy; on the contrary, it has made the speedy implementation of this strategy more urgent.

The 2006 Communication announced that every two years the Commission would hold a European Forum on Demography to take stock of the latest demographic developments and to review where the European Union and the Member States stand in responding to demographic change. The first Forum took place on 30-31 October 2006, the second on 24-25 November 2008 and the third on 22-23 November 2010. The purpose of the present Demography Report is to provide the up-to-date facts and figures that are needed for an informed debate with the stakeholders taking part in the Forum and, in particular, with the group of government experts on demography, involved in the conception of this report.

As far as possible, data are provided for all EU-27 Member States, allowing policy makers and stakeholders to compare their own country's situation with that of others, to understand the specific characteristics of their country and, perhaps, to identify countries that provide interesting examples of practice from which lessons could be learned. In so doing, the report responds to request from Member States wishing to learn from the range of national experience across the European Union.

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<sup>(27)</sup> any text

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**Data sources and comments**

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Online data Most of the data in this publication come from Eurostat's data base. Individual data codes tables used in the various figure (graph or table) are referenced by a code provided under each figure. To find more complete, updated or detailed data, visit [http://epp.eurostat.ec.europa.eu/portal/page/portal/statistics/search\\_database](http://epp.eurostat.ec.europa.eu/portal/page/portal/statistics/search_database) and insert the code(s) in the 'search in tree' textbox.

Where a code is not available, the data are not available as a standard table and were obtained in answer to a special query.

Some data comes from Eurobarometer surveys. Two main surveys are used in this publication, namely the November 2009 survey on mobility (EBS 337, from the EB round 72.5, can be found at [http://ec.europa.eu/public\\_opinion/archives/eb\\_special\\_339\\_320\\_en.htm](http://ec.europa.eu/public_opinion/archives/eb_special_339_320_en.htm) and the report at [http://ec.europa.eu/public\\_opinion/archives/ebs/ebs\\_337\\_en.pdf](http://ec.europa.eu/public_opinion/archives/ebs/ebs_337_en.pdf)) and the March 2010 survey on the 'New Europeans' (EBS 346, from the EB round 73.3, survey at [http://ec.europa.eu/public\\_opinion/archives/eb\\_special\\_359\\_340\\_en.htm#346](http://ec.europa.eu/public_opinion/archives/eb_special_359_340_en.htm#346) and the report at [http://ec.europa.eu/public\\_opinion/archives/ebs/ebs\\_346\\_en.pdf](http://ec.europa.eu/public_opinion/archives/ebs/ebs_346_en.pdf)).

This publication made use of other more ad-hoc sources and their links can be found in the text or in footnotes.

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Comments Comments and suggestions on this report will be gratefully received at

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Symbols	
1. Member State codes	
EU-27	The European Union (27 countries as in 2010)
BE	Belgium
BG	Bulgaria
CZ	The Czech Republic
DK	Denmark
DE	Germany
EE	Estonia
IE	Ireland
EL	Greece
ES	Spain
FR	France, including overseas territories; 'Metropolitan France' excludes overseas territories.
IT	Italy
CY	Cyprus
LV	Latvia
LT	Lithuania
LU	Luxembourg
HU	Hungary
MT	Malta
NL	The Netherlands
AT	Austria
PL	Poland
PT	Portugal
RO	Romania
SI	Slovenia
SK	Slovakia
FI	Finland
SE	Sweden
UK	The United Kingdom
2. Other symbols	
:	Data not available
s	Eurostat estimate
p	Provisional data
b	Break in series
-	Not applicable
(xx)	Data in brackets have low reliability



# Part I

## Main Demographic Trends



# 1. INTRODUCTION

As the 500-millionth person was born – or arrived from abroad as an immigrant – EU-27 was, and still is, undergoing major demographic changes. These changes are slow, but they are very significant.

Indicators observed just before the recession suggest that fertility seems to be increasing again, albeit only slowly. Life expectancy keeps rising. The labour force keeps growing and EU-27 has attracted large numbers of migrants.

When ten new countries joined the EU-27 in 2004, most of them had known little economic migration. Then, many of them experienced significant emigration but, recently, some of them have attracted migrants. Life expectancy in these countries had not improved much in the 1990s, and had even regressed in some countries, but in the early 2000's, the figures started to catch up with the 15 pre-2004 Member States.

In the meantime, EU-27 has developed some peculiar demographic patterns.

- Across countries, those where there are more marriages do not necessarily report more births – on the contrary.
- A younger average age at childbirth goes with lower fertility rates.
- Wealth and life expectancy are not strongly linked; some Member States are poorer than others and yet their citizens live longer.
- There may be signs that as countries become wealthier, fertility increases.

Other patterns of change are less surprising in a developed, ageing society. The population of working age has been increasing less and will start shrinking soon. The first decade of the 21<sup>st</sup> century has seen large waves of immigrants come from outside the EU. The first post-World War II ‘baby boomers’ are entering their 60s, and are retiring. From now on, the older population will keep swelling.

Table I.1.1: **Main demographic trends: main findings**

Fertility is slightly on the rise. Lowest-low fertility, i.e. below 1.3 children per woman, has ended in every Member State and the average is approaching 1.6 as of 2008.
Fertility indicators confirm the ongoing postponement of births to later ages in life. An adjustment for this ‘tempo’ effect would raise the 2008 fertility rate in the EU to just over 1.7. This is still well below the replacement rate of 2.1.
Life expectancy continues to rise, especially from gains at older ages. Since there are large discrepancies among and within countries, there is scope for raising average life-spans for the less-advantaged groups.
Not only people are living longer lives; they may be living longer healthy lives. There is evidence that the process of ageing, during which people become progressively disabled until they die, is not becoming slower; rather, it is progressively delayed. However, some data indicate that healthy life expectancy fell from 2007 to 2009, and there is a need for more information on this subject.
The most recent large wave of immigrants, that has swollen the cohorts of foreigners in mediterranean countries such as Greece, Italy and Spain, has abated in 2008.
Immigrants tend to be less-well educated and employed in jobs below their qualifications.
The EU population ages at varying speed. Populations that are currently the oldest, such as Germany's and Italy's, will age rapidly for the next twenty years, then stabilise. Some populations that are currently younger, mainly in the East of the EU, will undergo ageing at increasing speed and by 2060 will have the oldest populations in the EU.


## 2. FERTILITY

Fertility is increasing, albeit slightly. Most of the increase is in countries that have experienced extremely low fertility in the recent past, that is, fertility below 1.3 children per woman. At the same time, women are delaying motherhood, giving birth much later in their lives.

### 2.1. RECOVERY OF FERTILITY

In 2009, around 5.4 million children were born in the EU-27, compared to about 7.5 million at the beginning of the 1960s. The highest annual total for the EU-27 was recorded in 1964, with 7.7 million live births. Over the past 30 years, the total number of live births has been growing again, albeit moderately, after reaching a low in 2002 (less than 5 million live births, see Graph I.2.1).

Graph I.2.1: Number of live births in EU-27, 1980-2009



Source: Eurostat (online data code: demo\_gind).

The slowdown in population growth in the EU-27 is due partly to lower fertility.

The main indicator of fertility is the Total Fertility Rate (TFR): this is the mean number of children that would be born alive to a woman during her lifetime if she were to pass through her childbearing years conforming to the age-specific fertility rates of a given year. A total fertility rate of around 2.1 children per woman is considered to be the replacement level, that is, the average number of children per woman required to keep the population size constant in the absence of inward or outward migration. A TFR below 1.3 children per woman is described as 'lowest-low fertility'. TFR is used as an indicator for the fertility level and is comparable across countries, since it takes into account changes in the size and structure of the population.

Table I.2.1 shows the TFR in the EU-27 and in all Member States for selected years. The total fertility rate declined steeply between 1980 and 2000-2003 in many Member States, falling far below replacement level. In 2000, values had fallen below 1.3 in Bulgaria, the Czech Republic, Greece, Spain, Italy, Slovenia and Slovakia. After reaching a minimum between 2000 and 2003, in the six years to 2009, the TFR had risen in most Member States, and in 2009, all EU-27 countries were displaying rates above 1.3.

Table I.2.1: Total Fertility Rate (TFR), selected years

	1980	1990	2000	2003	2009
EU-27	:	:	:	1.47	1.60
BE	1.68	1.62	1.67	1.66	1.84
BG	2.05	1.82	1.26	1.23	1.57
CZ	2.08	1.90	1.14	1.18	1.49
DK	1.55	1.67	1.77	1.76	1.84
DE	:	:	1.38	1.34	1.36
EE	:	2.05	1.38	1.37	1.62
IE	3.21	2.11	1.89	1.96	2.07
EL	2.23	1.40	1.26	1.28	1.52
ES	2.20	1.36	1.23	1.31	1.40
FR	1.95	1.78	1.87	1.87	1.98
IT	1.64	1.33	1.26	1.29	1.42
CY	:	2.41	1.64	1.50	1.51
LV	:	:	:	1.29	1.31
LT	1.99	2.03	1.39	1.26	1.55
LU	1.50	1.60	1.76	1.62	1.59
HU	1.91	1.87	1.32	1.27	1.32
MT	1.99	2.04	1.70	1.48	1.44
NL	1.60	1.62	1.72	1.75	1.79
AT	1.65	1.46	1.36	1.38	1.39
PL	:	2.06	1.35	1.22	1.40
PT	2.25	1.56	1.55	1.44	1.32
RO	2.43	1.83	1.31	1.27	1.38
SI	:	1.46	1.26	1.20	1.53
SK	2.32	2.09	1.30	1.20	1.41
FI	1.63	1.78	1.73	1.76	1.86
SE	1.68	2.13	1.54	1.71	1.94
UK	1.90	1.83	1.64	1.71	1.96

EU-27, IT, UK: 2008 instead of 2009; FR: Metropolitan France

Source: Eurostat (online data code: demo\_find)

Over the past 30 years, total fertility rates in the EU-27 Member States have been converging: in 1980, the disparity between the highest (Ireland) and the lowest (Luxembourg) was 1.7. By 1990, this difference had decreased to 1.1 (between



Cyprus and Italy); in 2009 it was down to 0.8, with Ireland and Latvia representing the two extremes.

Among the countries for which 1980 data are available, in eight Member States (Belgium, Denmark, France, Luxembourg, the Netherlands, Finland, Sweden and the United Kingdom), the 2009 TFR is equal to or higher than that in 1980. On the other hand, the TFR fell by more than 40 % between 1980 and 2009 in Romania and Portugal. In absolute terms, the decline in the total fertility rate was steepest in Ireland, from 3.21 to 2.07.

Groups of countries with similar trends in TFR can be identified in Table I.2.1. A steady increase in TFR is found in Denmark, the Netherlands and, to a lesser extent, Finland. A small group composed of Cyprus, Malta and Portugal displays a steadily-declining TFR since 1980. In other Member States, the trend is more often in the form of a U-shaped curve, with the TFR bottoming out around 2000 or 2003, and recovering by 2009. By contrast, Germany, Cyprus, Luxembourg, Malta and Portugal had lower fertility in 2009 than in 2000.

The (slight) increase in fertility between 2000 and 2009 may be partly due to a catching-up process, following postponement of the decision to have children. When women give birth later in life, the total fertility rate first decreases, then recovers. While in 2003, EU-27 TFR was 1.47 children per woman, by 2009 it had risen to 1.60. The lowest value in 2009 was in Latvia (1.31 children per woman), while rates in Belgium, Denmark, Ireland, France, Finland, Sweden and the United Kingdom were above 1.8.

## 2.2. WOMEN STILL POSTPONING BIRTHS

Over the past 30 years, the timing of births has also changed significantly: the mean age of women at childbirth has been postponed<sup>(28)</sup>. The highest ages at childbirth in 2009, as shown in Table I.2.2, were in Ireland (31.2 years) and Italy (31.1 years), whereas the lowest were in Bulgaria (26.6 years) and Romania (26.9 years). The difference between the highest and the lowest mean age at childbirth was 4.6 years. In 2009, women in the following 13 Member States tended to have their children when they were aged 30 or over: Denmark, Germany,

Ireland, Greece, Spain, France, Italy, Cyprus, Luxembourg, the Netherlands, Slovenia, Finland and Sweden.

Table I.2.2 shows that in the past 30 years, mean age at childbirth rose by as much as six years in Luxembourg. The difference is striking between Member States that joined the EU after 2004 and the others: in Bulgaria, the Czech Republic, Lithuania, Malta, Romania and Slovakia, the mean age rose relatively little (and in some cases even fell) between 1980 and 1990, whereas the rise was more marked in the other Member States. However, since 1990, a catching-up is also taking place in Member States that joined the EU after 2004. In fact, since 1990, while mean age at childbirth has been rising most rapidly in countries that joined the EU after 2004, the trend appears to be gradually slowing down in the other Member States.

Table I.2.2: Mean age of women at childbirth, selected years

	1980	1990	2000	2003	2009
EU-27	:	:	:	29.3	29.7
BE	26.6	27.9	28.8	29.6	29.6
BG	23.9	23.9	25.0	25.5	26.6
CZ	25.0	24.8	27.2	28.1	29.4
DK	26.8	28.5	29.7	30.1	30.5
DE	:	:	28.8	29.2	30.2
EE	:	25.6	27.0	27.7	29.1
IE	29.7	29.9	30.4	30.8	31.2
EL	26.1	27.2	29.6	29.5	30.2
ES	28.2	28.9	30.7	30.8	31.0
FR	26.8	28.3	29.4	29.6	30.0
IT	27.5	28.9	30.4	30.8	31.1
CY	:	27.1	28.7	29.3	30.4
LV	:	:	:	27.2	28.4
LT	26.7	25.9	26.6	27.1	28.6
LU	24.4	28.4	29.3	29.6	30.7
HU	24.6	25.6	27.3	27.9	29.1
MT	28.8	28.9	27.9	28.8	29.2
NL	27.7	29.3	30.3	30.4	30.7
AT	26.3	27.2	28.2	28.8	29.7
PL	:	26.2	27.4	27.9	28.6
PT	27.2	27.3	28.6	29.0	29.7
RO	25.3	25.5	25.7	26.2	26.9
SI	:	25.9	28.2	28.9	30.0
SK	25.2	25.1	26.6	27.3	28.5
FI	27.7	28.9	29.6	29.8	30.1
SE	27.6	28.6	29.9	30.3	30.7
UK	26.9	27.7	28.5	28.9	29.3

EU-27, IT, UK: 2008 instead of 2009; FR: Metropolitan France  
Source: Eurostat (online data code: demo\_find)

<sup>(28)</sup> A more appropriate indicator to measure birth postponement would be the mean age of women at first childbirth; however, this indicator cannot be produced for all Member States due to lack of data.

Table I.2.3 summarises the TFR and the mean age of women at childbirth for the EU-27 from 2002 to

2008, the only years for which information is available for all 27 Member States composing the EU aggregate. The total fertility rate rose slowly but consistently from 1.45 children per woman in 2002 to 1.60 in 2008. The mean age of mothers at childbirth also rose between 2003 and 2008, by 0.4 years, to reach 29.7 years in 2008.

Table I.2.3: Total fertility rate and mean age of women at childbirth in EU-27, 2002-2008

	2002	2003	2004	2005	2006	2007	2008
TFR	1.45	1.47	1.50	1.51	1.54	1.56	1.60
Mean age at childbirth	:	29.3	29.4	29.5	29.6	29.7	29.7

TFR in 2002: EU-27 is estimated without BE  
 Source: Eurostat (online data code: demo\_find)

The comparison among countries paints a different picture.

Graph I.2.2 shows that many of the countries with the highest total fertility rate also display a high mean age for women at childbirth. Based on the point representing the EU-27, four different groups of Member States can be identified. One group is composed of Denmark, Ireland, France, the Netherlands, Finland and Sweden, where both the TFR and the mean age at childbirth are above the EU-27 average. In the diagonally opposite quadrant lie most of the countries that joined the EU after 2004, plus Austria and Portugal. In these


Member States, both the TFR and the mean age of mothers at childbirth are below the EU-27 values.

The third group of Member States shows mothers with a higher age at childbirth and lower TFR as compared to the EU-27 average: this is the case in Germany, Greece, Spain, Italy, Cyprus, Luxembourg and Slovenia. The fourth and last group is composed of Belgium, Estonia and the United Kingdom, countries for which the TFR is higher than the EU-27 value, but where the mean age of mothers is lower. However, the age at childbirth is still above 29 in these countries.

At the end of the first decade of the 21st century, women in the EU-27 appear to be having fewer children while they are young, and more later. While the fertility rates of women aged under 30 have declined since the 1980s, those of women aged 30 and over have risen, which would seem to confirm that the long-term decline in fertility rates within the EU-27 is associated with the postponement of childbirth.

Graph I.2.3 compares fertility rates of mothers aged 30 and over between 2000 and 2009. The proportion has increased in all the EU-27 countries. In the Czech Republic, Cyprus, Hungary, Slovenia and Slovakia, the increase was above 15 percentage points (p.p.) in the eight years


Graph I.2.2: Mean age of women at childbirth and total fertility rate, 2009



EU-27, IT, UK, 2008 instead of 2009; FR: Metropolitan France  
 Source: Eurostat (online data code demo\_find)

considered. At the other end of the scale, the increase was smaller, but still positive, in Spain and in the Netherlands (both +2 p.p.).


Graph I.2.3: Fertility of mothers aged 30 and over, 2000 and 2009 (% , ordered by difference 2009-2000)



IT, UK: 2008 instead of 2009; FR: Metropolitan France ;LV: 2002 instead of 2000  
Source: Eurostat (online data code: demo\_frate)

In 2009, 51 % of the EU-27 fertility rate in was to mothers aged under 30 and 49 % to mothers aged 30 and over. In Ireland, Spain, Italy, the Netherlands, Luxembourg, Sweden, Denmark, Germany, Greece, Cyprus and Finland, ‘young’ fertility, i.e. births to mothers aged below 30, represents less than 50% of the total fertility rates in 2009 (Graph I.2.4). These Member States are also found in Table I.2.2 to have the highest mean age of women at childbirth. Ireland displays the highest TFR in EU-27 in 2009, mainly due to the high fertility rate among women aged 30 and over. Conversely, in Slovakia, Poland, Lithuania, Latvia, Romania and Bulgaria, fertility of women aged under 30 represents more than 60% of the TFR, and these are countries with low fertility rates.

Graph I.2.4: Fertility by age group of mothers, 2009 (%)



EU-27, IT, UK: 2008 instead of 2009; FR: Metropolitan France  
Source: Eurostat (online data code: demo\_frate)

The postponement of births makes it difficult to estimate ‘real’ total fertility rates: postponement depresses the TFR until the process comes to an end.

### 2.3. REVISITING FERTILITY TRENDS

The postponement of births introduces a bias in total fertility rates, since fertility rates are computed in a given year using information across different cohorts of women. Postponement results in the TFR being underestimated. Because it is possible to estimate the postponement effect, the TFR can be adjusted. The ‘tempo’ effect is one such method of adjustment.

Table I.2.4: Fertility rate differences (2006-2008) and 'tempo' adjustment

	TFR 2006 (a)	TFR 2008 (b)	Tempo- adjusted TFR (c)	Gap (c)-(a)	Diff. TFR (b)-(a)
EU-27	1.54	1.60	1.72	0.18	0.07
BE	1.80	1.86	1.85	0.05	0.06
BG	1.38	1.48	1.73	0.35	0.10
CZ	1.33	1.50	1.79	0.47	0.17
DK	1.85	1.89	1.97	0.13	0.04
DE	1.33	1.38	1.62	0.29	0.05
EE	1.55	1.65	1.90	0.36	0.11
IE	1.93	2.10	2.08	0.15	0.17
EL	1.40	1.51	1.52	0.12	0.11
ES	1.38	1.46	1.40	0.02	0.08
FR	1.98	1.99	2.13	0.15	0.01
IT	1.35	1.42	1.47	0.12	0.07
CY	1.45	1.46	1.96	0.51	0.01
LV	1.35	1.44	1.61	0.26	0.10
LT	1.31	1.47	1.75	0.44	0.16
LU	1.65	1.61	2.05	0.40	-0.04
HU	1.34	1.35	1.65	0.31	0.01
MT	1.39	1.44	1.59	0.20	0.05
NL	1.72	1.77	1.79	0.07	0.05
AT	1.41	1.41	1.66	0.25	0.00
PL	1.27	1.39	1.50	0.23	0.12
PT	1.36	1.37	1.56	0.20	0.01
RO	1.32	1.35	1.55	0.23	0.04
SI	1.31	1.53	1.60	0.28	0.21
SK	1.24	1.32	1.66	0.42	0.08
FI	1.84	1.85	1.93	0.09	0.01
SE	1.85	1.91	1.94	0.09	0.05
UK	1.84	1.96	2.07	0.22	0.11

Tempo adjusted refers to the mean for 2005-2007 (IT: 2004-2006); FR: Metropolitan France

Source: (a) and (b): Eurostat (online data code: demo\_find); (c): VID, European Demographic Data Sheet 2010

Table I.2.4 compares the unadjusted total fertility rate with its adjusted version <sup>(29)</sup>: the figures reported suggest that actual fertility could represent almost 0.2 children per woman more in the EU-27 than the unadjusted TFR.

The adjustment seems to be smaller (fewer than 0.15 children per woman) in countries such as Belgium, Denmark, Greece, Spain, Italy, the Netherlands, Finland and Sweden, indicating that, in these countries, the postponement process seems to be coming to an end. By contrast, the adjustment is most marked in the Czech Republic, Cyprus, Lithuania, Luxembourg and Slovakia, where it is over 0.4 children per woman. These findings suggest that, at least in these countries, the unadjusted TFR indicator may significantly underestimate actual fertility.

Postponement does not bias fertility estimates for ever. Eventually, even unadjusted TFR increases, as more births are recorded for women at higher ages. In fact, the difference between the 2008 and 2006 TFR is generally in the same direction and is often proportional to the difference between the tempo-adjusted and unadjusted TFR, thus lending support to the tempo estimate.

An estimate of just over 1.7 children per woman in the EU-27, as suggested by the tempo adjustment, does not, however, result in a sustainable rate.

A large inflow of immigrants would still be required to prevent the size of the population from shrinking in the long run. This adjusted estimate is much higher than the current 1.6, at which the population would shrink naturally at a much faster rate. If, in addition, socio-economic development plays a positive role in increasing fertility (see Box I.7.1), observed fertility might rise to a level above the 1.7 children tempo estimate. Nonetheless, it seems unlikely that the increase will reach the replacement level of 2.1, or that the ageing of the population in Europe will be reversed.

<sup>(29)</sup> The adjusted TFR is calculated by the Vienna Institute of Demography (VID), for more information please refer to <http://www.oeaw.ac.at/vid/datasheet/index.html>.

### 3. MORTALITY


Over the past 50 years, life expectancy at birth has increased by about 10 years for both men and women in the EU-27. Further gains will be achieved mostly from the reduction in mortality at older ages.

While life expectancy is rising in all Members States, there are still major differences between and within countries. In some cases, improvements in education and standards of living have contributed to longer life expectancy, suggesting that it could be extended further in future.

#### 3.1. MORTALITY TRENDS OVER THE PAST 30 YEARS

Since 1980, the annual number of deaths in the EU-27 has remained fairly stable at around 4.9 million. A peak was reached in 1993, with about 5 million deaths.

Graph I.3.1: Number of deaths in EU-27, 1980-2009



Source: Eurostat (online data code: demo\_gind)

The total number of deaths depends on the size of the cohorts reaching the end of their life cycle and on mortality rates. A simple but very powerful way of illustrating the trend in mortality is to consider life expectancy at birth. Economic development and the improvement of environmental conditions and health systems across Europe have resulted in a continuous rise in life expectancy at birth. This process has been going on for longer in Europe than in most other countries of the world, making the EU-27 a world leader for life expectancy. The gradual reduction in mortality is the most important factor contributing to the ageing of the population in the EU-27, in conjunction with the reduction in fertility.

#### 3.2. RECENT GAINS IN LIFE EXPECTANCY

In the 16 years between 1993 and 2009 (see Table I.3.1), the rise in life expectancy at birth for men in the EU-27 Member States has ranged from a minimum of 2.5 years (in Bulgaria) to a maximum of 7.5 years (in Estonia); for women, the rise has ranged from 2.3 years (in Bulgaria) to 6.2 years (in Estonia).

Table I.3.1: Life expectancy at birth by sex, 1993 and 2009

	Men		Women	
	1993	2009	1993	2009
<b>EU-27</b>	:	76.4	:	82.4
<b>BE</b>	73.0	77.3	79.9	82.8
<b>BG</b>	67.6	70.1	75.1	77.4
<b>CZ</b>	69.3	74.2	76.5	80.5
<b>DK</b>	72.6	76.9	77.8	81.1
<b>DE</b>	72.8	77.8	79.4	82.8
<b>EE</b>	62.3	69.8	74.0	80.2
<b>IE</b>	72.5	77.4	78.1	82.5
<b>EL</b>	75.0	77.8	79.8	82.7
<b>ES</b>	74.1	78.7	81.4	84.9
<b>FR</b>	73.4	78.0	81.7	85.0
<b>IT</b>	74.6	79.1	81.0	84.5
<b>CY</b>	74.7	78.6	79.8	83.6
<b>LV</b>	:	68.1	:	78.0
<b>LT</b>	63.1	67.5	75.0	78.7
<b>LU</b>	72.2	78.1	79.6	83.3
<b>HU</b>	64.7	70.3	74.0	78.4
<b>MT</b>	:	77.8	:	82.7
<b>NL</b>	74.0	78.7	80.1	82.9
<b>AT</b>	72.8	77.6	79.5	83.2
<b>PL</b>	67.2	71.5	75.9	80.1
<b>PT</b>	71.0	76.5	78.1	82.6
<b>RO</b>	65.9	69.8	73.4	77.4
<b>SI</b>	69.4	75.9	77.6	82.7
<b>SK</b>	67.8	71.4	76.3	79.1
<b>FI</b>	72.1	76.6	79.5	83.5
<b>SE</b>	75.5	79.4	80.9	83.5
<b>UK</b>	73.5	77.8	78.9	81.9

EU-27, IT, UK: 2008 instead of 2009; FR: Metropolitan France

Source: Eurostat (online data code: demo\_mlexpec)

##### 3.2.1. Life expectancy by Member State

Differences in life expectancy at birth throughout the EU-27 Member States of remain significant (Table I.3.1). For men, the lowest life expectancy in 2009 was recorded in Lithuania (67.5 years) and the highest in Sweden (79.4 years). For women, the range was narrower, from a low of 77.4 years in Bulgaria and Romania, to a high of 85.0 years in France.

In 1993, the differences between the highest and lowest life expectancies among EU Member States

amounted, respectively, to 13.2 years for men (between Sweden and Estonia) and 8.3 for women (between France and Romania). In 2009, the differences were 11.9 years for men and 7.7 years for women. Thus, while life expectancy has been rising in all countries, it has gone up slightly more in some of the countries where it was lower. There has been some catching up.


### 3.2.1. Life expectancy by gender

In all EU-27 Member States, women live longer than men, but the difference varies substantially between countries (see Graph I.3.2). In 2009, the gender gap in life expectancy at birth varied from four years in the United Kingdom and Sweden to over 11 years in Lithuania. In the Baltic States, women can expect to live more than 10 years longer than men; the difference is under five years in six Member States (Denmark, Greece, Malta, the Netherlands, Sweden and the United Kingdom).

During the 16-year period, the gender gap decreased, with the exception of Romania, where the difference between the sexes increased by 0.1 years. The reduction in the gender gap was largest in Luxembourg (7.4 years in 1993 and 5.2 years in 2009) and the Netherlands (6.1 years in 1993 and 4.2 years in 2009).

As people live longer, interest has shifted to the older generations; Table I.3.2 shows life expectancy at age 65 by sex.

Graph I.3.2: The gender gap (women – men) in life expectancy at birth, 1993 and 2009



EU-27, LV, MT: not available in 1993; EU-27, IT, UK: 2008 instead of 2009; FR: Metropolitan France  
**Source:** Eurostat (online data code: demo\_mlexpec)

In 2009, once a man had reached the age of 65, he could on average expect to live at least another 13.4 years, as in Latvia and in Lithuania, and a maximum of 18.7 years, as in France. The life expectancy of women at age 65 was higher. In 2009, it ranged from 17.0 years in Bulgaria to 23.2 years in France.

Table I.3.2: Life expectancy at age 65 by sex, 1993 and 2009

	Men		Women	
	1993	2009	1993	2009
EU-27	:	17.2	:	20.7
BE	14.5	17.5	18.9	21.1
BG	12.9	13.8	15.5	17.0
CZ	12.6	15.2	16.0	18.8
DK	14.0	16.8	17.6	19.5
DE	14.5	17.6	18.3	20.8
EE	11.7	14.0	15.7	19.2
IE	13.4	17.2	17.0	20.6
EL	15.9	18.1	18.1	20.2
ES	15.9	18.3	19.8	22.5
FR	16.0	18.7	20.6	23.2
IT	15.6	18.2	19.5	22.0
CY	15.7	18.1	18.0	20.9
LV	:	13.4	:	18.2
LT	12.6	13.4	16.6	18.4
LU	14.2	17.6	18.7	21.4
HU	11.9	14.0	15.7	18.2
MT	:	16.8	:	20.6
NL	14.4	17.6	18.9	21.0
AT	14.7	17.7	18.4	21.2
PL	12.5	14.8	16.2	19.2
PT	14.2	17.1	17.5	20.5
RO	12.8	14.0	15.2	17.2
SI	13.2	16.4	17.1	20.5
SK	12.4	14.1	16.2	18.0
FI	14.1	17.3	18.0	21.5
SE	15.6	18.2	19.3	21.2
UK	14.2	17.7	17.9	20.3

EU-27, IT, UK: 2008 instead of 2009; FR: Metropolitan France  
Source: Eurostat (online data code: demo\_mlexpec)

Table I.3.3 shows life expectancy at birth and at age 65 for men and women for the EU-27 from 2002 to 2008: these are the only years for which information is available for all 27 Member States composing the EU aggregate.


Table I.3.3: Life expectancy in EU-27 by age and sex, 2002-2008

	2002	2003	2004	2005	2006	2007	2008
<b>Men</b>							
At birth	74.5	74.6	75.2	75.4	75.8	76.1	76.4
Age 65	15.9	15.9	16.4	16.4	16.8	17.0	17.2
<b>Women</b>							
At birth	80.9	80.8	81.5	81.5	82.0	82.2	82.4
Age 65	19.5	19.4	20.0	20.0	20.4	20.5	20.7

Source: Eurostat (online data code: demo\_mlexpec)

In the six years between 2002 and 2008, life expectancy at birth in the EU-27 rose by 1.9 years for men and by 1.5 years for women. The rise for men and women who had reached the age of 65 was, respectively, 1.3 and 1.2 years. The gender gap at birth in the EU-27 decreased from 6.4 in 2002 to 6.0 in 2008. The gender gap at age 65 fell to 3.5 years in 2008, down from 3.6 years in 2002.

Graph I.3.3: The gender gap (women — men) in life expectancy at age 65, 1993 and 2009



EU-27, LV, MT: not available in 1993; EU-27, IT, UK: 2008 instead of 2009; FR: Metropolitan France  
Source: Eurostat (online data code: demo\_mlexpec)

Graph I.3.3 shows the changes in the gender gap in life expectancy at age 65 between 1993 and 2009: due to the faster rise in life expectancy for women at older ages, the gender gap at age 65 widened in about half of the EU-27 Member States over the period. The largest rise in the gap was observed in Estonia with +1.2 years between 1993 and 2009. In the other Member States, the gender gap narrowed over the period; the decrease was largest (more than half a year) in Belgium, Denmark, Germany, Luxembourg, the Netherlands, Sweden and the United Kingdom.

In 2009 the largest gaps in gender differences were in the Baltic States, where women are expected to live around five years longer than men; at the other end of the scale, the smallest gap, two years, was in Greece.

Table I.3.4: Distribution of gains in life expectancy by age group, men, 1993 and 2009

	Increase (in years) in life expectancy										Total	at birth
	Age											
	0	1 - 9	10 - 19	20 - 29	30 - 39	40 - 49	50 - 59	60 - 69	70 - 79	≥80		
EU-27	4.8	2.0	2.7	4.9	5.1	11.7	6.7	18.9	25.5	17.7	100%	1.9
BE	8.8	1.7	2.7	5.3	4.4	7.8	6.6	20.4	28.0	14.3	100%	4.1
BG	18.3	7.9	3.8	7.1	13.9	17.3	8.6	3.0	12.5	7.6	100%	2.5
CZ	10.0	2.6	2.6	4.2	5.6	11.2	16.8	20.4	20.2	6.3	100%	4.9
DK	5.2	2.2	2.7	2.8	8.0	9.0	10.0	25.9	25.2	9.0	100%	4.3
DE	4.1	1.6	2.9	4.9	7.0	8.9	11.6	23.0	23.0	13.1	100%	5.0
EE	11.4	4.0	5.9	9.3	12.3	18.3	15.3	13.8	6.1	3.5	100%	7.5
IE	4.5	1.7	1.1	0.5	-1.6	2.9	14.9	30.4	32.6	13.0	100%	4.8
EL	14.8	1.5	1.5	1.3	2.4	3.9	4.5	25.9	23.8	20.4	100%	2.9
ES	6.4	2.2	3.0	11.0	12.8	7.8	8.7	16.3	19.5	12.4	100%	4.6
FR	6.1	2.0	3.2	8.1	10.5	9.4	8.7	19.6	18.8	13.6	100%	4.5
IT	6.5	2.4	2.9	5.6	7.1	5.9	12.9	24.7	22.3	9.7	100%	4.6
CY	8.6	4.6	7.1	-0.5	0.9	7.8	11.1	25.7	30.3	4.2	100%	3.9
LV	6.5	5.1	1.8	12.3	16.2	21.0	18.3	10.1	4.7	4.0	100%	3.5
LT	16.7	5.0	3.3	11.5	13.8	23.5	14.9	3.8	6.5	0.9	100%	4.4
LU	6.9	2.5	4.2	9.9	7.6	7.3	9.3	21.4	24.4	6.4	100%	5.9
HU	10.3	2.3	1.7	5.8	17.5	21.3	13.9	13.5	9.2	4.5	100%	5.6
MT	22.9	4.0	5.8	1.3	1.5	8.1	12.8	21.2	15.2	7.2	100%	3.1
NL	5.0	1.6	2.6	2.8	4.1	6.1	11.7	25.3	27.6	13.0	100%	4.7
AT	5.4	1.5	3.8	6.4	6.0	8.6	11.8	21.6	22.6	12.2	100%	4.8
PL	19.0	2.7	2.0	3.8	7.1	11.1	13.7	18.1	15.6	7.0	100%	4.4
PT	8.2	4.9	5.8	11.2	8.7	4.1	9.3	18.9	18.8	10.1	100%	5.5
RO	25.6	10.9	2.6	5.7	12.2	12.4	8.4	7.4	8.8	5.9	100%	3.9
SI	6.8	0.9	2.9	7.1	8.8	10.9	17.3	21.9	15.7	7.8	100%	6.5
SK	10.7	1.3	2.4	4.1	8.0	16.3	18.5	19.9	14.0	4.8	100%	3.6
FI	4.0	2.4	1.2	3.0	4.7	8.4	12.0	22.5	28.7	13.1	100%	4.5
SE	5.6	0.9	1.4	0.9	4.9	7.6	12.3	23.3	28.3	14.7	100%	3.9

EU-27: 2002-2008; IT, UK: 2008 instead of 2009; LV: 2002 instead of 1993; MT: 1995 instead of 1993. FR: Metropolitan France  
**Source:** Eurostat (online data code: demo\_mlifetable)

### 3.2.2. Gains in life expectancy at older ages

Improvements in life expectancy at birth are achieved by lowering mortality throughout the life cycle. Therefore, when analysing changes in life expectancy at birth over time, it is useful to estimate the contribution of specific age groups to changes in life expectancy. Tables I.3.4 and I.3.5 report the percentage breakdown of changes in life expectancy, known as the ‘Arriaga decomposition’, for men and women between 1993 and 2009 by age groups, for each of the 27 Member States and the EU-27 aggregate.

#### Gains in life expectancy by age group (Arriaga decomposition)

In Tables I.3.4 and I.3.5, the last column is the absolute difference between life expectancy at birth in 2009 and life expectancy at birth in 1993 (according to available data). The columns to its left represent the percentage contribution from mortality decreases in the corresponding age group to the total increase in life expectancy; positive values indicate that mortality has decreased in that age group, thus contributing to longer life expectancy.

For example, taking the row for EU-27, life expectancy for men at birth increased in total by 1.9 years: 4.8 % of this increase is due to lower infant mortality (deaths before the first birthday), 2.0 % is due to lower mortality at ages 1-9, and similarly for older age groups. Since the decomposition is based on 2 years of data, results should be interpreted with caution in countries recording a small number of deaths.

In most countries, the decline in mortality was particularly marked for men in their sixties and seventies and for women aged over 60 years old. In more detail, for men, more than 50 % of the rise in life expectancy at birth is found to occur between the ages of 60 and 79 in Denmark (51.1 %), Ireland (63.0 %), Cyprus (56.0 %), the



Table I.3.5: Distribution of gains in life expectancy by age group, women, 1993 and 2009

	Increase (in years) in life expectancy										at birth	
	Age											
	0	1 - 9	10 - 19	20 - 29	30 - 39	40 - 49	50 - 59	60 - 69	70 - 79	≥80		Total
EU-27	5.6	1.8	1.6	2.2	3.1	6.7	4.9	12.4	27.9	33.9	100%	1.5
BE	9.4	1.8	1.7	3.3	2.3	5.4	3.2	13.5	28.8	30.7	100%	2.7
BG	15.2	7.0	2.8	4.4	3.5	1.3	4.4	19.0	25.6	16.8	100%	2.3
CZ	9.2	1.9	1.5	2.2	3.2	5.9	9.2	20.5	30.0	16.5	100%	4.0
DK	4.7	1.8	1.5	1.4	4.4	9.2	14.8	25.6	20.8	15.8	100%	3.3
DE	4.9	1.9	1.8	2.2	4.6	7.2	7.2	17.7	30.9	21.7	100%	3.4
EE	12.4	3.9	3.5	1.8	4.2	9.3	11.6	17.9	20.5	14.9	100%	6.2
IE	5.1	0.9	0.1	-0.2	0.7	2.7	9.1	22.4	31.1	28.0	100%	4.4
EL	13.3	1.3	1.9	0.8	1.0	3.8	5.2	23.9	36.1	12.9	100%	2.9
ES	6.8	2.7	1.6	3.9	4.6	2.7	5.0	14.5	27.3	30.8	100%	3.6
FR	5.5	2.0	2.6	4.6	4.5	3.8	4.0	11.7	22.4	38.9	100%	3.2
IT	7.6	3.3	1.5	3.1	4.3	4.2	7.1	15.1	27.3	26.5	100%	3.5
CY	11.9	0.7	1.8	4.1	0.6	1.7	4.7	18.5	36.3	19.8	100%	3.8
LV	6.2	7.8	5.1	0.9	5.5	6.9	15.2	12.8	18.6	21.0	100%	2.0
LT	18.4	5.9	2.1	3.7	4.1	9.6	11.3	13.3	20.6	11.0	100%	3.7
LU	4.0	2.0	4.7	4.9	5.0	8.0	6.7	10.8	26.4	27.5	100%	3.7
HU	10.7	2.2	1.3	3.1	10.5	11.5	8.1	16.6	20.0	16.0	100%	4.4
MT	3.0	-1.8	0.4	-3.9	-1.1	4.4	7.8	17.8	43.4	29.9	100%	3.2
NL	5.3	2.5	1.3	2.6	4.6	4.9	5.3	15.4	26.9	31.2	100%	2.8
AT	4.7	1.6	2.0	2.3	3.6	7.8	8.2	14.1	28.3	27.2	100%	3.7
PL	16.9	2.1	0.8	1.4	3.4	6.4	5.2	16.2	28.1	19.7	100%	4.3
PT	8.1	4.2	2.6	3.5	3.4	4.8	8.8	15.2	28.0	21.3	100%	4.4
RO	21.6	8.3	1.2	2.7	6.7	6.4	7.6	13.9	19.9	11.8	100%	4.0
SI	4.8	1.5	1.3	3.1	4.8	7.1	9.5	19.1	26.3	22.5	100%	5.0
SK	11.3	2.5	1.1	2.5	4.7	5.1	10.9	23.6	28.2	10.2	100%	2.8
FI	2.4	1.2	0.2	0.8	2.8	3.3	4.0	14.8	36.0	34.6	100%	3.9
SE	5.4	1.5	1.5	2.5	4.3	6.1	8.0	14.7	26.1	29.9	100%	2.6

EU-27: 2002-2008; IT, UK: 2008 instead of 2009; LV: 2002 instead of 1993; MT: 1995 instead of 1993. FR: Metropolitan France  
Source: Eurostat (online data code: demo\_milifetable)

Netherlands (53.0%), Finland (51.2%), Sweden (51.6%) and the United Kingdom (61.5%).

Bulgaria, the Czech Republic, Estonia, Greece, Cyprus, Lithuania, Hungary, Poland and Slovakia.

For women, the age groups 60-79 explain more than 50% of the rise in life expectancy in the Czech Republic (50.5%), Ireland (53.6%), Greece (60.0%), Cyprus (54.8%), Malta (61.3%), Slovakia (51.8%), Finland (50.7%) and the United Kingdom (57.7%). The ages 80 and above contribute more than 25% to the rise in life expectancy at birth for women in Belgium, Ireland, Spain, France, Italy, Luxembourg, Malta, the Netherlands, Austria, Finland and Sweden.

In several Member States, particularly for men, the gains in life expectancy at birth from lower infant mortality are much more significant in percentage terms than the gains due to the older ages (80 or above). This is the case in Bulgaria, Lithuania, Malta, Poland and Romania and, to a lesser extent, in the Czech Republic, Estonia, Cyprus, Latvia, Hungary and Slovakia.

### 3.2.3. Falling infant mortality


On the other the other hand, in some of the other countries, lower infant mortality (defined as deaths of children under one year of age) had a greater impact on life expectancy at birth between the two years analysed; above 20% for men in Malta (22.9%) and Romania (25.6%), and for women in Romania (21.6%). A few countries showed smaller but still substantial (>10%) gains from lower infant mortality for men or for women:

Infant mortality rates<sup>(30)</sup> halved in the EU-27, from 8.7 to 4.3‰ between 1993 and 2009 (see Graph I.3.4). The fall in the Central and Eastern Member States is greater than in other Member States. Despite this progress, in some Member States, the 2009 infant mortality rate was still

<sup>(30)</sup> The rate is defined as the number of deaths of children under one year of age per 1,000 live births in a given year.

relatively high: Romania (10.1‰) and Bulgaria (9.0‰). The lowest infant mortality rate within the EU-27 in 2009 was in Slovenia (2.4‰).

Graph I.3.4: Infant mortality rate, 1993 and 2009 (ranked by size of reduction)



The rate is defined as the number of deaths of children under one year of age per 1000 live births.

FR: Metropolitan France

Source: Eurostat (online data code: demo\_minfind)

### 3.2.4. Healthy life expectancy

The average number of healthy life years that a newborn can expect to live is about 62 for a woman and 61 for a man. The difference between the sexes is smaller than for life expectancy; this indicates that although women tend to live longer, they also live longer with activity limitations. There are large disparities among Member States and there have been large variations in some Member States between 2007 and 2009.

Table I.3.6: Healthy life years at birth by sex, 2007 and 2009

	Men		Women	
	2007	2009	2007	2009
EU-27	61.5	60.9	62.3	62.0
BE	63.3	63.7	63.7	63.5
BG	67.0	61.9	73.8	65.6
CZ	61.3	60.9	63.2	62.5
DK	67.4	61.8	67.4	60.4
DE	58.8	56.7	58.3	57.7
EE	49.5	54.8	54.6	59.0
IE	62.7	63.7	65.3	65.2
EL	65.9	60.2	67.1	60.9
ES	63.2	62.6	62.9	61.9
FR	63.0	62.5	64.2	63.2
IT	62.8	62.4	61.9	61.2
CY	63.0	65.1	62.7	65.8
LV	50.9	52.6	53.7	55.8
LT	53.4	57.0	57.7	60.9
LU	62.2	65.1	64.6	65.7
HU	55.0	55.7	57.6	58.0
MT	68.9	69.1	70.6	70.6
NL	65.7	61.4	63.7	59.8
AT	58.4	59.2	61.1	60.6
PL	57.4	58.1	61.3	62.1
PT	58.3	58.0	57.3	55.9
RO	60.4	59.5	62.3	61.4
SI	58.6	60.6	62.3	61.5
SK	55.4	52.1	55.9	52.3
FI	56.7	58.1	58.0	58.4
SE	67.5	70.5	66.6	69.5
UK	64.9	65.0	66.1	66.3

EU-27, IT, UK: 2008 instead of 2009.

Source: Eurostat (online data code: tsdph100)

### 3.2.5. Life expectancy among highly educated men and women

Another important factor contributing to the disparity in life expectancy is ‘socio-economic status’. The inverse relationship between status and mortality is well known, based on a number of studies <sup>(31)</sup>: the higher the status, the lower the mortality rates and, consequently, the higher life expectancy. There are significant inequalities in the EU-27 Member States regarding socio-economic status, with negative consequences for health, social cohesion and economic development. In all countries, mortality, health and the age at which people die are strongly influenced by socio-economic factors such as education, employment and income.

<sup>(31)</sup> For an overview, see for example Mackenbach J.P., Meerding W.J., Kunst A., 2007, Economic implications of socio-economic inequalities in health in the European Union, study supported by the European Commission, DG SANCO, available at [http://ec.europa.eu/health/ph\\_determinants/socio\\_economic\\_s/documents/socioeco\\_inequalities\\_en.pdf](http://ec.europa.eu/health/ph_determinants/socio_economic_s/documents/socioeco_inequalities_en.pdf).

### Box 1.3.1: Living longer healthy lives

In comparison with earlier generations, people today spend longer in education, start working later, start having children later and spend fewer years of their life in family building; they die at a later age; life expectancy has increased by about 2 years per decade<sup>(1)</sup>. People's lives are being stretched out over an ever longer period.

The same analysis could be applied to frailty: the period in a person's life when s/he starts to develop a disabling condition that makes them dependent and vulnerable, leading eventually to death. Life expectancy has increased not because frailty lasts longer, but rather because it starts at a later age; as a result, healthy life expectancy has been increasing at about the same rate as life expectancy<sup>(2)</sup>.

Health problems that used to be characteristic at the age of 70 are now characteristic of the age of 80, and conditions that prevailed at age 80 now prevail at age 90. The number of years spent in self-perceived good health has been increasing in most of the countries studied.

The findings about frailty need to be examined further. Poor health is more difficult to measure than death and is often reported unreliably.

The evidence about the severity of disabilities in old age is mixed, especially for individuals over the age 85: whereas some severe disabilities appear to be declining, some less severe forms of disability and certain illnesses seem to be increasing, although this may be due to earlier diagnosis and greater life expectancy.

Some detailed data are available from the Danish Health Interview Survey<sup>(3)</sup> (Table 1). They show not only that healthy life expectancy has been increasing, but also that the proportion of the remaining life expectancy in good health increased between 1994 and 2005; healthy life expectancy has thus been growing faster than overall life expectancy.

<sup>(1)</sup> J. Oeppen and J. W. Vaupel, 'Broken limits to life expectancy', *Science*, 10 May 2002;.

<sup>(2)</sup> J.W. Vaupel, H. Lundström, 'The future of mortality at older ages in developed countries, in 'W. Lutz (ed.), *The Future Population of the World. What can we Assume Today?*, 1994; and J.W. Vaupel, 'Biodemography of human ageing', *Nature* 464, 25 March 2010, 536-542.

<sup>(3)</sup> see <http://www.sifolkesundhed.dk/Forskning/Befolkningens%20sundhedstilstand/Sundhed%20og%20sygelighed%20SUSY.aspx?lang=en>

Table 1: Life expectancy at age 65, with and without long-term, limiting illnesses, Denmark; by sex, selected years

		Expected lifetime			
		total	with long-standing, limiting illnesses	without long-standing, limiting illnesses	
		years	years	years	%
Men	1994	14.1	6.2	7.9	56.2
	2000	15.0	6.1	8.9	59.1
	2005	16.0	5.4	10.5	66.0
Women	1994	17.6	9.4	8.2	46.6
	2000	18.1	8.6	9.5	52.3
	2005	19.0	7.9	11.1	58.4

Source: Danish Health Interview Survey

The connection between national wealth and health are not well understood. Frailty is being delayed due to advances in public health (treatment and prevention) and living conditions. In principle, prosperity makes better treatment possible; more productive and prosperous populations also expect to be healthier. However, two countries at the same level of per capita income may have different healthy life expectancies, and some countries with modest standards of living perform as well as wealthier ones; as examples in the EU, Spain and Italy, as well as France and Sweden, have the highest life expectancy.

Overall, most people in wealthier countries, and increasingly in developing countries, can look forward to relatively long, and mostly healthy, lives. This prospect enables people to make fuller use of their lives, for example by re-allocating their time during their lives and planning their education, employment and retirement over the life span.

Greater life expectancy does not necessarily entail the collapse of the social system under the growing mass of frail elderly people. Many older people are in good health and can play an active part in the labour force according to their condition and abilities, contributing to the economy and allowing younger people to extend their education.

In J.W. Vaupel's words: 'While the 20th century was the century of redistribution of wealth, the 21st century may be the century of the redistribution of work to older age groups'.

Overall levels of mortality have been declining across socio-economic groups. But differences in life expectancy between higher and lower socio-economic status groups have on the whole remained unchanged. In some cases, the gap has even widened.


For the first time, Eurostat has published estimates, based on provisional data, of life expectancy in 2007-2008 by sex, age and educational attainment level for a selected number of EU-27 Member States <sup>(32)</sup>. These results confirm the inverse relationship between educational attainment as a proxy for ‘socio-economic status’ and mortality <sup>(33)</sup>.

As reported in Table I.3.7, in most of the countries examined, for both men and women, life expectancy increases with educational attainment. The more education people have, the longer they are expected to live. Life expectancy for women at a given educational attainment level is always higher than that for men at the same level. However, differences between the sexes decline as educational attainment increases. Based on the data in Table I.3.7, life expectancy ‘gaps’ or mortality differentials between educational attainment groups can be assessed. They are generally larger among men than among women; in many cases they are twice as large. Also, as can be observed in Graph I.3.5, these gaps are larger among young men.

Gaps in life expectancy between men with medium and low educational attainment at any age in Table I.3.7 are also much bigger than between men with high and medium levels. For women at any age, life expectancy gaps between those with high and medium educational attainment and between those with medium and low levels are less pronounced. While life expectancy for women is consistently higher than for men, the differences are smaller

between educational attainment groups for women than for men.

Graph I.3.5: Life expectancy gaps between high and low educational attainment at selected ages by sex, 2008



IT: 2007 instead of 2008

Source: Eurostat (online data code: demo\_mlexpecedu)

Large differences in life expectancy by educational attainment level are evident among the Member States examined, and particularly so for men in the available Member States that joined the EU after 2004 — Bulgaria, the Czech Republic, Estonia, Hungary, Poland, Romania. Among the other countries examined, differences are less pronounced.

The published data highlight another important ‘mortality advantage’ that women have over men: the life expectancy of men with higher education is lower than the life expectancy of women with the lowest level of educational attainment. In other words, on average, all women live longer than well-educated men. As can be observed in Table I.3.7, this was true in 2008 at all ages for Italy, Malta, Poland, Romania, Slovenia, Finland and Sweden. For the other countries under study, this was true in about 50% of cases, mostly at ages 50, 60 and 70.

<sup>(32)</sup> For details see [http://epp.eurostat.ec.europa.eu/portal/page/portal/product\\_details/publication?p\\_product\\_code=KS-SF-10-024](http://epp.eurostat.ec.europa.eu/portal/page/portal/product_details/publication?p_product_code=KS-SF-10-024).

<sup>(33)</sup> Low educational attainment corresponds to pre-primary, primary and lower secondary education (ISCED levels 0, 1, 2); medium corresponds to upper secondary and post secondary non-tertiary education (ISCED levels 3 and 4); high corresponds to tertiary education (ISCED levels 5 and 6). The selection of countries is dependent on data availability: to calculate the required indicator, detailed data are needed broken down by sex, age and educational attainment for both mortality and population stocks. Although all countries can provide mortality data by sex and age, only a few can provide data also by socio-economic characteristics such as educational attainment.

Table I.3.7: Life expectancy by sex and educational attainment at selected ages, 2008

	Educational attainment	Men					Women				
		Age 30	Age 40	Age 50	Age 60	Age 70	Age 30	Age 40	Age 50	Age 60	Age 70
BG	Total	41.6	32.3	23.8	16.6	10.7	48.3	38.7	29.4	20.8	12.9
	Low	33.9	25.9	19.6	14.7	10.3	44.1	35.4	27.4	19.7	12.5
	Medium	44.5	34.9	25.9	18.0	11.1	49.7	40.0	30.5	21.6	13.3
	High	47.4	37.6	28.0	19.2	11.6	51.4	41.5	31.8	22.6	13.8
CZ	Total	45.0	35.5	26.5	18.7	12.1	51.0	41.3	31.8	23.0	14.9
	Low	38.0	29.5	21.8	15.5	10.9	51.4	42.0	32.7	23.7	15.2
	Medium	44.8	35.3	26.3	18.6	12.2	50.3	40.5	31.1	22.4	14.6
DK	Total	47.5	38.0	28.8	20.4	13.1	51.5	41.8	32.4	23.6	15.6
	Low	44.0	35.3	26.8	19.3	12.6	49.0	39.8	30.9	22.7	15.3
	Medium	47.8	38.1	28.9	20.5	13.2	52.2	42.5	33.0	24.1	15.8
EE	Total	40.5	31.5	23.2	16.4	11.0	50.4	40.8	31.5	22.9	15.0
	Low	30.7	23.3	17.0	13.0	9.3	45.0	35.8	28.3	21.4	14.5
	Medium	41.2	32.1	24.0	17.2	11.4	49.5	39.9	30.8	22.7	15.0
IT	Total	49.7	40.1	30.8	22.0	14.2	54.8	45.0	35.4	26.2	17.6
	Low	48.0	38.6	29.7	21.4	14.1	54.0	44.3	34.9	26.0	17.5
	Medium	52.9	43.1	33.4	24.1	15.2	56.6	46.8	37.0	27.5	18.2
HU	Total	41.1	31.7	23.4	16.8	11.2	49.0	39.3	30.3	22.0	14.4
	Low	34.0	25.2	18.4	13.7	10.8	46.3	37.0	28.7	21.2	14.3
	Medium	43.7	34.2	25.8	19.2	12.0	50.6	40.9	31.7	23.2	14.9
MT	Total	48.5	39.0	29.7	20.9	13.4	53.1	43.3	33.6	24.4	16.0
	Low	48.0	38.7	29.5	20.8	13.3	53.0	43.2	33.5	24.3	15.9
	Medium	49.4	39.5	29.9	21.8	13.8	53.5	43.5	33.6	25.1	16.3
PL	Total	42.6	33.4	25.1	17.9	11.9	50.8	41.1	31.8	23.2	15.2
	Low	36.5	28.6	22.3	16.7	11.4	48.6	39.3	31.0	22.8	15.1
	Medium	43.1	33.9	25.3	18.0	12.0	51.0	41.3	31.9	23.3	15.4
RO	Total	41.6	32.4	24.0	17.1	11.2	48.6	38.9	29.7	21.1	13.4
	Low	35.3	26.9	20.6	15.9	10.8	46.4	37.1	28.7	20.8	13.3
	Medium	44.5	35.1	26.5	19.0	12.0	50.7	40.9	31.5	22.5	14.0
SI	Total	46.5	37.0	28.0	20.1	12.9	53.1	43.3	33.8	24.8	16.4
	Low	42.7	33.6	25.3	18.2	12.3	51.8	42.3	33.0	24.4	16.2
	Medium	47.0	37.4	28.4	20.4	13.1	53.6	43.8	34.2	25.2	16.6
FI	Total	50.0	40.2	30.7	21.9	13.7	54.3	44.5	34.8	25.6	16.7
	Low	47.6	38.2	29.2	21.2	14.0	53.9	44.1	34.6	25.7	17.2
	Medium	44.8	36.2	27.9	20.5	13.8	51.8	42.5	33.7	25.3	17.1
SE	Total	47.5	38.0	29.2	21.2	14.0	54.0	44.3	34.8	25.8	17.3
	Low	50.8	41.1	31.5	22.7	14.5	55.2	45.3	35.6	26.3	17.4
	High	50.0	40.4	30.9	22.1	14.3	53.8	44.0	34.4	25.3	16.9
SE	Total	48.1	38.9	29.9	21.5	14.1	52.2	42.6	33.4	24.7	16.7
	Low	50.1	40.4	31.0	22.2	14.3	53.8	44.0	34.4	25.3	16.9
	High	51.9	42.1	32.4	23.1	14.6	55.0	45.1	35.5	26.1	17.2

(1)IT: 2007 instead of 2008

Source: Eurostat (online data code: demo\_mlexpecedu)

Consequently, by improving the life expectancy of disadvantaged groups, a general increase in overall life expectancy is also to be expected<sup>(34)</sup>.

<sup>(34)</sup> The European Commission has raised the issue of health inequalities in the Member States as well as the question of disparities in life expectancy, especially for disadvantaged people. A proposal to address the problem was outlined in the October 2009 European Commission Communication

COM/2009/0567 'Solidarity in health: reducing health inequalities in the EU', available at [http://ec.europa.eu/health/social\\_determinants/policy/mission\\_communication/index\\_en.htm](http://ec.europa.eu/health/social_determinants/policy/mission_communication/index_en.htm). The EU is thus working directly, through EU policies, and indirectly, through national authorities and stakeholders, to reduce health inequalities.

## 4. MIGRATION: TRENDS

Migration is the main driver of population growth in the most of the EU-27 Member States. Migratory movements are making the EU's population more diverse and creating new challenges and opportunities for European societies.

### 4.1. MIGRATION FLOWS

The first decade of the 21st century has seen large waves of migration both within the EU and from outside it. The highest inflow in that decade appears to have peaked in 2007.


#### 4.1.1. Migration as one of the key drivers of population growth in EU Member States

Migration plays a significant role in the population dynamics of European societies. In recent years, the increase in the population of the EU-27 Member States has mainly been due to high net migration rates <sup>(35)</sup>. The share of international migration in total population growth in the EU has varied.

From 2004 to 2008, the population of EU Member States increased, on average, by 1.7 million per year, solely because inflows outweighed outflows. Although immigration to the EU-27 Member States fell in 2008 and emigration increased, net migration still contributed 71% of the total population increase.

In many EU-27 Member States, immigration is not only increasing the total population, but also bringing in a much younger population. The age structure of the EU-27 Member States' total population at 1 January 2009 and of immigrants to EU Member States in 2008 is illustrated by the age pyramid in Graph I.4.1.


Graph I.4.1: Age structure of the population on 1 January 2009 and of immigrants in 2008, EU-27



EU-27 immigration data excluding BE, EL, CY, RO and UK  
**Source:** Eurostat (online data code: migr\_pop2ctz, migr\_imm2ctz)

In 2008, 3.8 million people migrated to and between the EU-27 Member States and at least 2.3 million emigrated from them, resulting in a net gain of 1.5 million residents <sup>(36)</sup>. In comparison to 2007 <sup>(37)</sup>, immigration decreased by 6% (Graph I.4.2) and emigration by 13%.

Graph I.4.2: Immigration, EU-27, 2004-2008



Includes also migration between EU-27 Member States.  
**Source:** Eurostat (online data code: migr\_imm1ctz)


<sup>(35)</sup> The expression 'total net migration' of the EU Member States is to be distinguished from the expression 'total net migration to/from the EU as a whole': the former also includes international migration between the EU Member States.

<sup>(36)</sup> Includes also migration between EU-27 Member States.  
<sup>(37)</sup> 2007 migration data are not fully comparable with 2008, since several EU-27 Member States changed methodology and definitions to improve and harmonise the data. For further details see the Eurostat Metadata page. Detailed analysis of comparable data shows that these methodological changes had a limited impact.

#### 4.1.2. EU citizens are becoming more mobile

Immigrants to EU Member States are of a wide variety of origins, especially since the enlargements of 2004 and 2007. Larger numbers of EU-27 citizens have been included in migration flows. The number of EU-27 citizens migrating to a Member State other than their own country of citizenship increased on average by 12% per year during the period 2002-2008, and peaked in 2007 (see Graph I.4.3). In 2008, 36% of migrants to EU-27 Member States were citizens of another Member State, 2 points lower than was observed in 2007 (38%).


Graph I.4.3: Relative change in migration inflows to EU Member States by citizenship groups, EU-27, 2002-2008



Source: Eurostat (online data code: migr\_imm1ctz) and Eurostat estimates

The percentage of immigrants with non-EU citizenship has been growing at a somewhat slower pace. In 2008, non-EU citizens accounted for 49% of all immigrants to EU-27 Member States (see Graph I.4.4). When nationals moving to their country of citizenship are excluded, 57% of immigrants are found to be citizens of countries outside the EU.


Graph I.4.4: Immigrants by citizenship groups, EU-27, 2008



Source: Eurostat (online data code: migr\_imm1ctz) and Eurostat estimates

Slightly above 10% of immigrants were returning to their own country of birth (see Graph I.4.5). The majority of immigrants were, however, born outside the EU and were moving to it (52%), thereby exceeding the number of non-EU citizens by almost 4%.

Graph I.4.5: Immigrants by groups of country of birth, EU-27, 2008



Source: Eurostat (online data code: migr\_imm3ctb) and Eurostat estimates

#### 4.1.3. Origins of immigrants

It is estimated that more than half (55%) of immigrants to the EU in 2008 were previously residing outside the EU, while 44% of immigrants had previously also been residing in an EU-27 Member State (other than the country of immigration). Immigrants to the EU can be further differentiated according to the level of development of the country of previous residence. The Human Development Index (HDI) was used to reflect this structure<sup>(38)</sup>.

According to this indicator, half of all immigrants to the EU previously resided in medium developed countries, slightly fewer in highly developed countries (44%) and only 6% arrived from less developed countries (Graph I.4.6).


This distribution is almost in line with the distribution of the total population in those countries, according to the level of development of the countries in question. On the basis of the latest

<sup>(38)</sup> This index is calculated by the United Nations (UN) under the UN Development Programme. It is a composite index incorporating statistical measures of life expectancy, literacy, educational attainment and GDP per capita. The Eurostat list of countries by the level of development, based on UN's 2006 classification, was used in order to reflect this structure. In this index countries are classified as highly, medium and less developed. Since the countries are evolving, each year they are classified, based on the new values for the statistical indicators included in the index (for details see the UN site at: <http://hdr.undp.org/>).

available United Nations, Eurostat and national data for the total population in these countries, it is estimated that the share of the population living in countries categorised as medium developed is 68 %, whereas the share of the total population in highly developed countries is 22 %, with 10 % for less developed countries.

The noticeable difference is that immigrants from highly developed countries were over-represented by 22 % among immigrants to the EU-27 Member States, compared to the share of the total population living in countries classified as highly developed.

Graph I.4.6: Immigrants to EU-27 (from outside EU) by the level of development of the country of previous residence, EU-27, 2008



No detailed data for BE, HU and UK.  
**Source:** Eurostat (online data code: migr\_imm5prv) and Eurostat estimates

In 2008, the EU-27 Member States received nearly two millions migrants of other EU nationalities. Romanians were the most mobile, followed by Poles and Germans (note that these migrants were not necessarily previously residing in their country of citizenship). If returning nationals (see category ‘EU citizens (excluding nationals)’ in Table I.4.1) are excluded from the analysis, Romanians still ranked first, followed by Poles and Bulgarians. The EU-27 Member States received 384,000 Romanian citizens, 266,000 Polish citizens, Poland and 91,000 Bulgarian citizens.

The remaining 1.8 million immigrants to EU-27 Member States were non-EU citizens. Among them, Moroccans were the biggest group, the only one exceeding 100,000, followed by citizens of China, India, Albania and the Ukraine.

Most Moroccans migrating in 2008 went to Spain (almost 94,000) or to Italy (37,000). In the same year, Spain also received the largest share of all Chinese immigrants (28 % or 27,000 in absolute

terms). The United Kingdom was the main destination for citizens of India.


Table I.4.1: Top ten citizenships of immigrants to EU-27 Member States, 2008 (in thousands)

EU citizens		Non-EU citizens	
including nationals	excluding nationals		
country of citizenship	country of citizenship	country of citizenship	
Romania : <sup>(1)</sup>	Romania 384	Morocco	157
Poland 302	Poland 266	China	97
Germany 196	Bulgaria 91	India	93
United Kingdom 146	Germany 88	Albania	81
France 126	Italy 67	Ukraine	80
Italy 105	France 62	Brazil	62
Bulgaria 92	United Kingdom 61	United States	61
Netherlands 81	Hungary 44	Turkey	51
Spain 61	Netherlands 40	Russian Federation	50
Belgium 48	Portugal 38	Colombia	49

(1) At least 384,000.  
**Source:** Eurostat (online data code: migr\_imm1ctz) and Eurostat estimates

Graph I.4.7 suggests that the biggest group of non-EU nationals migrating to one of the EU-27 Member States in 2008 was formed by citizens of countries in Asia (29%), followed by North, Central and South America (24%).

Graph I.4.7: Non-EU immigrants by continent of country of citizenship, EU-27, 2008



**Source:** Eurostat (online data code: migr\_imm1ctz) and Eurostat estimates



**Box I.4.1: Where immigrants come from**

Eurostat data on residence permits that were valid at the end of 2009 can be broken down to show the geographical origins of non-EU nationals<sup>(1)</sup> by continent (Table 1).

The total of 16.7 million residence permit holders – excluding Denmark, Luxembourg and the United Kingdom – is spread unevenly among the continents of origin. The numbers are roughly proportional to the population of the continents of origin, although Europe is over-represented whereas Asia and North America are under-represented.

Each of the five largest EU-27 Member States attracts the majority of the people from a particular continent: most Africans hold permits in France (1.6 million), most Asians in Italy (1.1 million), most Europeans in Germany (2.6 million), and most South Americans in Spain (1.5 million).

More permits were issued in 2009 in the United Kingdom to immigrants from North America and/or Oceania, than the total number of valid permits at the end of 2009 in any other country.

The largest number of authorisations to reside in an EU-27 Member State in 2009 was issued to the citizens of India (190,000), followed by United States (176,000), China (170,000) and Morocco (156,000). These four countries accounted for nearly 30% of all permits issued in EU-27 in 2009. The largest proportion of Indians and Chinese entered the EU for the purpose of education or employment. Respectively 72,000 Chinese and 61,000 Indians were issued with education related permits, whereas 51,000 Chinese and 63,000 Indians entered the EU for employment reasons. By contrast, Moroccans were granted the highest number of permits issued for family reasons in EU (62,000), and only less than 5 per cent (7,000) were granted permission to reside for education reasons. The country ranking based on new permits is similar to the one from other official sources, although there are some differences.

<sup>(1)</sup> EU nationals still needing residence permits under transitional measures are not included in the table below; for the transitional measures see <http://ec.europa.eu/social/main.jsp?langId=en&catId=466>


Table 1: **Valid residence permits at 31 December 2009 by issuing country and continent of origin**

	Africa	Asia	Europe	North America	South America	Oceania	Other	Total
<b>EU-27</b>	4,436,036	2,962,637	6,575,292	277,785	2,258,451	61,161	108,807	16,680,169
<b>BE</b>	160,021	70,910	86,322	21,081	16,340	2,127	8,138	364,939
<b>BG</b>	246	2,095	9,192	689	105	93	24	12,444
<b>CZ</b>	4,263	95,429	196,084	6,231	1,885	1,219	35	305,146
<b>DE</b>	210,150	647,296	2,622,613	83,124	85,386	17,987	28,588	3,695,144
<b>EE</b>	104	1,554	210,475	583	120	38	0	212,874
<b>IE</b>	34,252	64,829	12,119	9,237	9,229	4,062	424	134,152
<b>EL</b>	21,157	86,004	450,487	2,469	2,302	339	2,837	565,595
<b>ES</b>	1,000,602	307,849	162,178	25,151	1,486,214	2,028	8,470	2,992,492
<b>FR</b>	1,588,957	255,987	280,283	30,677	111,641	4,048	1,635	2,273,228
<b>IT</b>	1,071,553	899,489	1,206,788	41,241	365,362	3,220	0	3,587,653
<b>CY</b>	8,831	85,720	29,640	1,206	474	214	22	126,107
<b>LV</b>	112	1,896	382,340	601	133	241	0	385,323
<b>LT</b>	153	2,451	20,786	512	80	4,651	0	28,633
<b>LU</b>	:	:	:	:	:	:	:	:
<b>HU</b>	3,826	32,045	49,829	4,453	1,911	437	17	92,518
<b>MT</b>	719	1,862	1,667	191	112	51	6	4,608
<b>NL</b>	115,223	97,926	104,401	19,537	21,751	4,801	52,875	416,514
<b>AT</b>	13,007	35,434	383,038	5,588	7,484	1,251	188	445,990
<b>PL</b>	4,054	25,912	52,571	2,391	1,263	1,090	64	87,345
<b>PT</b>	122,032	30,315	82,418	2,994	122,210	293	60	360,322
<b>RO</b>	3,718	21,498	33,375	2,076	705	428	0	61,800
<b>SI</b>	170	1,603	86,336	350	422	89	109	89,079
<b>SK</b>	678	7,200	12,699	944	390	144	13	22,068
<b>FI</b>	16,165	36,432	47,343	4,004	2,770	1,877	4,323	112,914
<b>SE</b>	56,043	150,901	52,308	12,455	20,162	10,433	979	303,281
<b>Residence permits issued in 2009 (only flow data available for the countries below)</b>								
<b>DK</b>	2,056	15,644	5,937	4,187	1,440	985	6	30,255
<b>UK</b>	75,092	365,303	28,241	131,775	34,537	31,680	4,696	671,324

No data available for LU; the EU-27 total was computed using the 24 available Member States.

**Source:** Eurostat (online data code: migr\_resvalid and (for DK and the UK) migr\_resfirst)

Graph I.4.8: Immigration, EU-27, 2008 (per 1,000 inhabitants)



Immigration data for EL and RO include non-nationals only and are therefore not included.

**Source:** Eurostat (online data code: migr\_imm1ctz)

#### 4.1.4. Spain, Germany and the United Kingdom reported the highest immigration in EU-27 in 2008

The EU as a whole is attractive for immigrants, but Member States differ as to scale and patterns of migration. The majority of EU-27 Member States in 2008 reported more immigration than emigration, but in Germany, Poland, Romania, Bulgaria and the three Baltic States (Lithuania, Latvia and Estonia) emigrants outnumbered immigrants.

In absolute terms, Spain, Germany and the United Kingdom were the EU Member States with the highest immigration. They received more than half (53%) of all immigrants in 2008, but at the same time, they also experienced high emigration.

Relative to the size of the resident population, Luxembourg (with 36.3 immigrants per 1,000 inhabitants) had the highest immigration in EU-27 in 2008, followed by Malta with 21.9 and Cyprus with 17.8 (Graph I.4.8).

Luxembourg, the country with the highest immigration per capita and one of the smallest countries in EU-27 in terms of population size, also reported the highest rate of emigration in 2008, with 20.6 emigrants per 1,000 inhabitants.

#### 4.1.5. More men than women migrate

In 2008, there were more men than women in migration flows to and from EU-27 Member States in general. Around 48% of immigrants were women. By contrast, Cyprus, Italy, Spain, France and Ireland reported that women outnumbered men among immigrants. In Cyprus, this was mainly due to women with Filipino, Sri Lankan and Vietnamese citizenship, whereas in Italy and Spain


women outnumbered men in the biggest group of immigrants (with Romanian citizenship in the case of Italy, and Moroccan citizenship in Spain). In addition, among immigrants to Italy, women outnumbered men among citizens of Ukraine, Moldavia, Poland and Russia, while in Spain, the same applied for citizens of Pakistan and Senegal.

#### 4.1.6. Impact on the age structure of the EU population

In 2008, immigrants to the EU-27 Member States were, on average, younger than the population of their country of destination. Whereas the median age of the total population of all EU-27 Member States (calculated from five-year age groups) was 40.6 on 1 January 2009, the median age of immigrants in 2008 was 28.4.

Graph I.4.9 compares the age of immigrants to EU-27 Member States in 2008 by basic citizenship groups.

Graph I.4.9: Age structure of immigrants by basic citizenship groups, EU-27, 2008



EU-27 excluding BE, EL, CY, RO and UK.

Source: Eurostat (online data code: migr\_imm2ctz)

Among immigrants, there were noticeable differences in the age of nationals, EU nationals and non-EU nationals. Non-EU nationals were the youngest, with a median age of 27.5 years, followed by EU nationals at 29.3 years (see Table I.4.2). Nationals were the oldest, with a median age of 30.2 years. The share in the 15-64 age group was highest among non-national men (87%) and lowest among women returning to the country of their citizenship (71%).

Table I.4.2: Median age of the population (as of 1 January 2009) and immigrants by basic citizenship groups, 2008

	Total pop.	Immigrants				
		total	nationals	foreign citizens		
				total	other EU	non-EU
EU-27	40.6 <sup>p</sup>	28.4 <sup>s</sup>	30.2 <sup>s</sup>	28.2 <sup>s</sup>	29.3 <sup>s</sup>	27.5 <sup>s</sup>
BE	40.8	:	:	:	:	:
BG	41.1	32.6	32.4	35.2	52.5	35.0
CZ	39.2	28.4	33.4	28.3	30.8	27.5
DK	40.3	26.6	27.0	26.5	27.4	25.7
DE	43.7	29.8	31.2	29.6	31.5	27.7
EE	39.3	30.8	30.4	31.1	29.0	33.3
IE	33.8	26.7	26.7	26.7	26.7	26.7
EL	41.4	:	:	37.5	42.3	35.1
ES	39.5	28.3	32.9	28.2	29.9	27.7
FR	39.5 <sup>p</sup>	26.0	25.0	26.3	27.9	25.5
IT	42.8	29.1	34.5	28.8	29.3	28.5
CY	35.9	29.9	34.2	30.0	28.9	32.4
LV	39.8	29.4	4.0	33.3	32.0	36.1
LT	38.9	31.1	29.5	35.8	27.0	36.8
LU	38.7	29.7	29.8	29.7	29.8	29.1
HU	39.6	28.7	3.2	29.5	30.5	28.6
MT	39.0	30.3	29.1	30.6	35.9	27.0
NL	40.3	27.6	28.2	27.5	27.6	27.5
AT	41.3	28.8	35.6	28.2	29.5	26.3
PL	37.5	27.7	26.5	33.7	37.4	32.6
PT	40.4	24.8	18.8	28.2	32.1	27.5
RO	38.0	:	:	:	:	:
SI	41.2	31.1	32.5	31.1	37.6	30.6
SK	36.5	30.6	31.7	30.5	32.5	28.7
FI	41.8	28.0	29.1	27.7	29.6	26.7
SE	40.7	27.0	28.2	26.8	28.7	25.7
UK	39.4 <sup>p</sup>	:	:	:	:	:

No detailed data by age available for BE, RO and UK.

Immigration data for EL include non-nationals only.

(s) Eurostat estimate; (p) provisional data

Source: Eurostat (online data code: migr\_pop1ctz, migr\_imm1ctz) and Eurostat estimates based on 5-year age group data

## 5. MIGRATION: FOREIGN POPULATION

The diversity of citizenship can be observed not only in the annual migration flows, but also in the non-national population stock of each EU-27 Member State.


### 5.1. NON-NATIONALS IN THE EU

A total of 31.9 million persons with citizenship of a country different from their country of residence were living on the territory of the EU-27 Member States on 1 January 2009, representing 6.4 % of the total EU-27 population. Of these non-nationals, more than a third (11.9 million persons) were citizens of another Member State.

#### 5.1.1. Main countries of residence

In absolute terms, the largest numbers of foreign citizens reside in Germany, Spain, the United Kingdom, France and Italy. Non-nationals in these five countries represent more than 75 % of the total EU foreign population (Graph I.5.1).

Graph I.5.1: Non-nationals in the EU by country of residence, EU-27, 2009




Source: Eurostat (online data code: migr\_pop1ctz)

In relative terms, the EU Member State with the highest percentage of non-nationals is Luxembourg (43.5%). In 2009, a high proportion of non-nationals (10% or more of the resident population) was also observed in Latvia, Estonia, Cyprus, Spain and Austria, while the countries with the lowest share of non-nationals (less than 1%) were Poland, Romania and Bulgaria.

Luxembourg, Ireland, Belgium<sup>(39)</sup>, Cyprus, Slovakia and Hungary were the only countries where the majority of non-nationals were EU citizens. In all other Member States, the majority of non-nationals were citizens of non-EU countries.

Graph I.5.2: Distribution of non-nationals by EU/non-EU citizenship, 2009 (% of the usually resident population)



For BE latest available data (for 2008) are used.

Source: Eurostat (online data code: migr\_pop1ctz)

In the case of Latvia and Estonia, the proportion of non-EU citizens is particularly large due to the high number of 'recognised non-citizens'. They are mainly citizens of the former Soviet Union, permanently resident in these countries, but who have not acquired Latvian, Estonian or any other citizenship. This phenomenon is also reflected in the median age of the foreign population of these two countries (see Table I.5.7).

<sup>(39)</sup> Based on latest available data.

Table I.5.1: Population by group of citizenship, 2009 (units and % of the resident population)

	Total population	Foreigners	%	Citizens of other EU MS	%	Citizens of non-EU countries	%
EU-27	499,703,311	31,779,900 <sup>s</sup>	6.4	11,937,200 <sup>s</sup>	2.4	19,842,700 <sup>s</sup>	4.0
BE	10,753,080	:	:	:	:	:	:
BG	7,606,551	23,838	0.3	3,532	0.0	20,306	0.3
CZ	10,467,542	407,541	3.9	145,814	1.4	261,727	2.5
DK	5,511,451	320,033	5.8	108,667	2.0	211,366	3.8
DE	82,002,356	7,185,921	8.8	2,530,706	3.1	4,655,215	5.7
EE	1,340,415	214,437	16.0	9,632	0.7	204,805	15.3
IE	4,450,030	441,059	9.9	364,847	8.2	76,212	1.7
EL	11,260,402	929,530	8.3	161,611	1.4	767,919	6.8
ES	45,828,172	5,650,968	12.3	2,274,158	5.0	3,376,810	7.4
FR	64,366,894	3,737,549	5.8	1,302,351	2.0	2,435,198	3.8
IT	60,045,068	3,891,295	6.5	1,131,767	1.9	2,759,528	4.6
CY	796,900	128,200	16.1	78,200	9.8	50,000	6.3
LV	2,261,294	404,013	17.9	9,406	0.4	394,607	17.5
LT	3,349,872	41,505	1.2	2,511	0.1	38,994	1.2
LU	493,500	214,848	43.5	185,354	37.6	29,494	6.0
HU	10,030,975	186,365	1.9	109,804	1.1	76,561	0.8
MT	413,607	18,128	4.4	8,245	2.0	9,883	2.4
NL	16,485,787	637,136	3.9	290,417	1.8	346,719	2.1
AT	8,355,260	864,397	10.3	316,995	3.8	547,402	6.6
PL	38,135,876	35,933 <sup>p</sup>	0.1	10,315 <sup>p</sup>	0.0	25,618 <sup>p</sup>	0.1
PT	10,627,250	443,102	4.2	84,727	0.8	358,375	3.4
RO	21,498,616	31,354	0.1	6,041	0.0	25,313	0.1
SI	2,032,362	70,554	3.5	4,195	0.2	66,359	3.3
SK	5,412,254	52,545	1.0	32,709	0.6	19,836	0.4
FI	5,326,314	142,288	2.7	51,923	1.0	90,365	1.7
SE	9,256,347	547,664	5.9	255,571	2.8	292,093	3.2
UK	61,595,091	4,184,011	6.8	1,793,197	2.9	2,390,814	3.9

These figures are based on national definitions that may not be fully comparable. In particular, the figures for Bulgaria and Romania are believed to exclude significant numbers of resident foreign citizens and overcount national citizens.

Source: Eurostat (online data code: migr\_pop1ctz)


### 5.1.2. Main groups of non-nationals

The citizenship structure of foreign populations in the EU-27 Member States varies considerably, and is influenced by factors such as labour migration, historical links between countries of origin and destination, and access to established networks in the destination countries.

Citizens of Turkey, Romania, Morocco and Poland are the most numerous among the EU's non-national population (Graph I.5.3). With 2.4 million people, Turks accounted for 7.5% of all non-nationals living in the EU in 2009. The second biggest group is composed of Romanian citizens living in another EU Member State (6.2% of the

EU total foreign population), followed by Moroccans.

Graph I.5.3: **Ten most numerous groups of foreign citizens usually resident in the EU-27, 2009 (millions and % of the EU total foreign population)**



Source: Eurostat (online data code: migr\_pop1ctz)

In the period 2001–2009, the number of Romanians outside their country increased most markedly: from 0.3 million in 2001 to 1.9 million by 2009. The number of citizens of Poland and China also increased significantly, joining the 10 most numerous non-national groups in 2009.

## 5.2. ACQUIRING CITIZENSHIP OF EU MEMBER STATE

Changes in non-national populations over time depend on several factors, such as the number of births and deaths, the level of immigration and emigration, as well as the number of acquisitions of citizenship, which, depending on citizenship laws in each Member State, may be granted either by naturalisation or other means, such as marriage or adoption. Between 2001 and 2008, the number of non-nationals living in EU Member States increased by 10.2 million. It should be also noted that during the same period, 5.5 million people, mainly third-country nationals, acquired citizenship of an EU-27 Member State (Table I.5.2).

Table I.5.2: **Acquisitions of citizenship, 2001-2008 (thousands)**

	2001	2002	2003	2004	2005	2006	2007	2008
EU-27 <sup>s</sup>	627.0	628.2	648.2	718.9	723.5	735.9	707.1	696.1
BE	62.2	46.4	33.7	34.8	31.5	31.9	36.1	36.1
BG	:	3.5	4.4	5.8	5.9	6.7	6.0	7.1
CZ	:	3.3	2.2	5.0	2.6	2.3	2.4	1.2
DK	11.9	17.3	6.6	15.0	10.2	8.0	3.6	6.0
DE	180.3	154.5	140.7	127.2	117.2	124.6	113.0	94.5
EE	3.1	4.1	3.7	6.5	7.1	4.8	4.2	2.1
IE	2.8	:	4.0	3.8	4.1	5.8	4.6	3.2
EL	:	:	1.9	1.4	1.7	2.0	3.9	16.9
ES	16.7	21.8	26.5	38.2	42.9	62.4	71.9	84.2
FR	:	92.6	139.9	168.8	154.8	147.9	132.0	137.3
IT	:	:	13.4	19.1	28.7	35.3	45.5	53.7
CY	:	0.1	0.2	4.5	4.0	2.9	2.8	3.5
LV	9.9	9.4	10.0	17.2	20.1	19.0	8.3	4.2
LT	0.5	0.5	0.5	0.6	0.4	0.5	0.4	0.3
LU	0.5	0.8	0.8	0.8	1.0	1.1	1.2	1.2
HU	8.6	3.4	5.3	5.4	9.9	6.1	8.4	8.1
MT	:	:	:	:	:	0.5	0.6	0.6
NL	46.7	45.3	28.8	26.2	28.5	29.1	30.7	28.2
AT	31.7	36.0	44.7	41.6	34.9	25.7	14.0	10.3
PL	1.1	1.2	1.7	1.9	2.9	1.1	1.5	1.8
PT	2.2	2.7	2.4	2.9	3.0	4.4	:	22.4
RO	0.4	0.2	0.1	0.3	0.8	0.0	0.0	5.6
SI	1.3	2.8	3.3	3.3	2.7	3.2	1.6	1.7
SK	2.9	3.5	3.5	4.0	1.4	1.1	1.5	0.5
FI	2.7	3.0	4.5	6.9	5.7	4.4	4.8	6.7
SE	36.4	37.8	33.2	28.9	39.6	51.2	33.6	30.5
UK	89.8	120.1	130.5	148.3	161.8	154.0	164.5	129.3

(s) Eurostat estimate


Source: Eurostat (online data code: migr\_acq)

On average, around 90% of the citizenships granted are to former citizens of non-EU countries. Third-country nationals generally have much greater incentive to apply for citizenship of an EU Member State than do persons who are already EU citizens and, therefore, already benefit from rights comparable to those of nationals in the host country.

In 2008 696,000 persons acquired citizenship of an EU Member State, compared with 707,000 recorded in 2007 (see Table I.5.2). This was the second decrease in consecutive years since 2001.

In 2008, the largest number of citizenships were granted by France (137,300), the United Kingdom (129,300) and Germany (94,500); these three countries together accounted for over half of all citizenships granted by EU Member States. Since 2002, these three countries have always granted the largest number of citizenships, but their contribution to the overall EU total decreased from an average of 60% over the period 2002-2007 to slightly more than 50% in 2008.

Graph I.5.4: Acquisitions of citizenship, 2008 (per 1,000 non-nationals)



BG and RO are excluded because the available data on non-national population stocks are not fully comparable. Data not available for BE.


Source: Eurostat (online data code: migr\_acq, migr\_pop1ctz)

In relation to the number of non-nationals, most citizenships were granted in Sweden (54.2 per 1,000 resident non-nationals), Portugal (50.6), Poland (48.1), Finland (46.6) and Hungary (43.5). The lowest rates were found in the Czech Republic (3.0), Luxembourg (5.6) and Ireland (6.3). The EU-27 average was 22.6 citizenships granted per 1,000 resident non-nationals (see Graph I.5.4).

In 2008, only in two countries were the majority of new citizenships granted to citizens of another EU Member State: Hungary (71.9%) and Luxembourg (56.2%). In Hungary, citizenship was granted mostly to Romanians; in Luxembourg, to former citizens of Portugal, Italy, Belgium and Germany.

The largest groups to acquire citizenship of an EU Member State were former citizens of Morocco (63,800), Turkey (49,500), Ecuador (27,300), Algeria (23,000) and Iraq (20,400) (Graph I.5.5). France granted 45% of all citizenships acquired in the EU-27 by Moroccans, Germany 49.3% of those acquired by Turks, Spain 93.5% of those acquired by Ecuadorians, France 87.9% of those acquired by Algerians, and the United Kingdom 43.5% of those acquired by Iraqis.

Graph I.5.5: Main previous citizenship of persons acquiring citizenship of an EU-27 Member State, 2008



Source: Eurostat

### 5.3. FOREIGN-BORN POPULATION

Persons who have acquired the citizenship of their country of residence are no longer counted as non-nationals. Nevertheless, the foreign background of these people can be captured by the country of birth variable, which records the country in which the birth took place, or the country of residence of the mother at the time of the birth. In some cases, people who were born on the territory of a Member State's former colony, and who later migrated to that Member State, are recorded as foreign-born, although they have held the citizenship of the reporting country since birth. In other cases, the recorded country of birth no longer exists under the same name or borders, as, for example, the former Yugoslavia, or the former Soviet Union, and those people would be included in the foreign-born population even though they may never have migrated to another country.

Table I.5.3: Population by group of country of birth, 2009 (units and % of the resident population)

	Total population	Foreign-born	%	Born in another EU MS	%	Born in a non-EU country	%
EU-27	499,703,311	:	:	:	:	:	:
BE	10,753,080	:	:	:	:	:	:
BG	7,606,551	:	:	:	:	:	:
CZ	10,467,542	384,161	3.7	135,061	1.3	249,100	2.4
DK	5,511,451	486,003	8.8	145,570	2.6	340,433	6.2
DE	82,002,356	9,548,865	11.6	3,421,094	4.2	6,127,771	7.5
EE	1,340,415	220,315	16.4	15,399	1.1	204,916	15.3
IE	4,450,030	625,896	14.1	485,774	10.9	140,122	3.1
EL	11,260,402	1,246,973	11.1	312,803	2.8	934,170	8.3
ES	45,828,172	6,339,346	13.8	2,282,149	5.0	4,057,197	8.9
FR	64,366,894	7,103,644	11.0	2,111,476	3.3	4,992,168	7.8
IT	60,045,068	4,375,240	7.3	1,391,149	2.3	2,984,091	5.0
CY	796,900	:	:	:	:	:	:
LV	2,261,294	352,036	15.6	37,164	1.6	314,872	13.9
LT	3,349,872	220,110	6.6	28,888	0.9	191,222	5.7
LU	493,500	159,030	32.2	131,581	26.7	27,449	5.6
HU	10,030,975	:	:	:	:	:	:
MT	413,607	27,655	6.7	13,519	3.3	14,136	3.4
NL	16,485,787	1,793,744	10.9	410,129	2.5	1,383,615	8.4
AT	8,355,260	1,268,358	15.2	507,489	6.1	760,869	9.1
PL	38,135,876	1,014,905 <sup>p</sup>	2.7	232,469 <sup>p</sup>	0.6	782,436 <sup>p</sup>	2.1
PT	10,627,250	782,008	7.4	182,229	1.7	599,779	5.6
RO	21,498,616	161,597	0.8	60,069	0.3	101,528	0.5
SI	2,032,362	243,404	12.0	28,056	1.4	215,348	10.6
SK	5,412,254	50,450	0.9	29,982	0.6	20,468	0.4
FI	5,326,314	214,118	4.0	76,891	1.4	137,227	2.6
SE	9,256,347	1,280,908	13.8	468,626	5.1	812,282	8.8
UK	61,595,091	6,769,300	11.0	2,165,508	3.5	4,603,792	7.5

These figures are based on national definitions that may be not fully comparable.

(p) provisional data

Source: Eurostat (online data code: migr\_pop3ctb)

More than 13% of the population in Luxembourg, Estonia, Latvia, Austria, Ireland, Sweden and Spain are foreign-born (Table I.5.3). In all of these countries (with the exception of Sweden), more than 10% of the population are also non-nationals. The specific situation in Sweden can be explained by the fact that it is the Member State with the highest rate of acquisition of citizenship per inhabitant in the EU.


In general, the number of foreign-born residents in each Member State exceeds the number of non-nationals (Graph I.5.6). The differences are most significant in Sweden, the Netherlands and Slovenia, where the number of people born abroad

is more than double the number of people with foreign citizenship living in these countries.

In Luxembourg, the number of foreign-born persons is lower than the number of foreigners. This can be explained by the significantly high share of foreigners from other EU-27 countries (who are less likely to acquire citizenship of their country of residence). There is thus a high number of foreign-born persons who keep their original citizenship and whose descendants are usually native-born foreign citizens. Similarly, in Ireland, most non-native-born people are from EU-27 Member States. In all other countries, the non-EU-born constitute a larger group than the EU-born population.



Graph I.5.6: Foreign-born and non-nationals, 2009 (% of the total population)



Data by country of birth not available for BE, BG, CY and HU.

Source: Eurostat (online data code: migr\_pop1ctz, migr\_pop3ctb)

Table I.5.4: Main countries of birth of foreign-born residents, for some EU-27 Member States, 2009

	Country of birth	number of foreign-born	% of total foreign-born
CZ	Ukraine	117,295	30.5
	Slovakia	72,424	18.9
	Vietnam	45,818	11.9
DK	Germany	33,236	6.8
	Turkey	31,771	6.5
	Poland	24,732	5.1
IE	United Kingdom	228,680	36.5
	Poland	69,850	11.2
	Lithuania	34,092	5.4
ES	Romania	747,201	11.8
	Morocco	723,334	11.4
	Ecuador	469,712	7.4
LV	Russia	183,407	52.1
	Belarus	61,241	17.4
	Ukraine	44,294	12.6
NL	Turkey	195,665	10.9
	Suriname	186,707	10.4
	Morocco	166,884	9.3
AT	Serbia and Montenegro	188,251	14.8
	Germany	187,023	14.7
	Turkey	157,750	12.4
PL	Ukraine	433,058	42.7
	Belarus	150,442	14.8
	Russia	83,113	8.2
PT p	Angola	124,510	15.9
	Brazil	118,311	15.1
	France	83,605	10.7
RO	Moldova, Republic of	44,564	27.6
	Bulgaria	19,036	11.8
	Ukraine	13,077	8.1
SI	Bosnia and Herzegovina	97,142	39.9
	Croatia	56,202	23.1
	Serbia and Montenegro	20,403	8.4
FI	Sweden	30,640	14.3
	Estonia	19,174	9.0
	Russia	6,702	3.1
SE	Finland	175,113	13.7
	Iraq	109,446	8.5
	Poland	63,822	5.0

(p) provisional value

Source: Eurostat (online data code: migr\_pop3ctb)

Table I.5.4 shows the three main countries of birth of the foreign-born residents in 13 EU-27 Member States for which detailed data are available.

The distribution by country of birth, as for the country of citizenship, is influenced largely by:

- geographical proximity (Finnish-born people residing in Sweden and vice versa, people born in Germany residing in Austria, those born in Ukraine residing in Poland and the Czech Republic),
- common history and/or language (for example between the Czech Republic and Slovakia, Russia and Latvia, Brazil and Portugal),
- former territories and colonies (for example, Yugoslavia and Suriname respectively),
- recent conflicts (Iraqi-born persons living in Sweden),
- increased opportunities for intra-EU migration following the EU enlargements.

Table I.5.5: Educational attainment of population aged 25-54 by group of country of birth, 2009 (%)

	Native-born			Foreign-born			EU-27 born			Non-EU-27 born		
	low	medium	high	low	medium	high	low	medium	high	low	medium	high
EU-27	23	49	27	35	38	26	26	45	29	39	36	25
BE	22	41	37	38	30	32	30	32	38	44	29	27
BG	19	57	24	:	(51)	(45)	:	:	:	:	(54)	(41)
CZ	7	77	17	14	62	24	14	63	23	14	61	25
DK	20	42	37	28	37	35	13	37	51	32	37	31
DE	9	63	28	:	:	:	:	:	:	:	:	:
EE	10	53	36	(4)	55	42	:	(47)	(52)	(4)	55	41
IE	25	38	37	16	34	50	19	37	44	10	26	64
EL	31	43	27	49	37	14	28	52	20	54	33	13
ES	44	21	35	43	34	23	30	39	31	48	32	20
FR	22	45	32	41	31	28	39	34	28	41	30	29
IT	40	43	16	43	44	12	31	57	12	50	38	13
CY	20	42	38	25	38	37	16	45	39	32	33	35
LV	13	60	28	7	68	25	(16)	61	23	6	68	26
LT	7	60	33	:	63	34	:	:	:	:	63	35
LU	18	53	29	25	30	45	25	30	46	24	34	41
HU	17	62	21	13	55	32	13	59	27	(11)	44	45
MT	68	17	15	53	(27)	(20)	(50)	:	:	55	28	:
NL	21	44	35	37	34	29	21	34	45	41	34	25
AT	12	68	20	30	50	20	10	58	32	40	46	14
PL	9	67	24	:	56	41	:	:	:	:	(59)	(40)
PT	68	16	16	49	30	21	40	31	29	51	29	19
RO	21	65	14	:	:	:	:	:	:	:	:	:
SI	12	61	27	32	57	11	:	64	(32)	35	56	9
SK	7	76	17	:	68	23	:	68	22	:	68	:
FI	12	47	41	25	45	30	18	52	29	29	40	31
SE	12	53	35	29	36	36	19	39	42	32	35	34
UK	24	41	35	20	44	36	15	53	32	21	41	38

Figures in brackets lack reliability due to the small sample size; ':' colon indicates unavailable or extremely unreliable data.

Source: Eurostat, EU Labour Force Survey

#### 5.4. EDUCATION LEVELS OF THE FOREIGN-BORN

The population born outside the host country, being in the prime working ages of 25-54, tends to have lower educational attainment than the native-born population<sup>(40)</sup>. In the EU as a whole, foreign-born people tend to be marginally under-represented at the high educational level (1 point difference) and over-represented to a much greater extent at the low educational level (12-point difference).


The proportions of the foreign born population with tertiary and low education differ significantly across individual EU Member States. EU Member States do not seem to attract large numbers of tertiary-educated immigrants, even though the proportions who are highly educated foreign-born reach more than 40% in some Member States (Ireland, Bulgaria, Luxembourg, Estonia and Poland). Several countries tend to attract immigrants with a lower level of education, particularly in the southern EU Members States (Greece, Portugal, Malta, Italy and Spain) and France, where 40% or more of immigrants have a low level of education (see Table I.5.5).

In addition, the data indicate that the proportion of women with tertiary education — regardless of groups of country of birth — tends to be slightly higher than for men (see Graph I.5.7). In 2009, 28% of foreign-born women (25% of men)

<sup>(40)</sup> The level of education is aggregated into three levels: low (below the second cycle of secondary education – up to ISCED level 3c short); medium (second cycle of secondary education – ISCED levels 3-4 other than 3c short); high (tertiary education – ISCED levels 5-6).

resident in an EU-27 Member State were highly educated, and 31% of women (28% of men) who moved from another EU-27 Member State. The proportion of female immigrants who moved into the EU from outside amounted to 26%, against 24% for their male counterparts.

Graph I.5.7: Educational attainment of population aged 25-54 by sex and group of country of birth, EU-27, 2009 (%)




Source: Eurostat, EU Labour Force Survey

Similar results are found when analysing data for the non-national population. At EU level, the data indicate that the proportion of highly-educated non-nationals amounts to 23%, compared to 38% for those with the low educational level.

The proportion of non-nationals with tertiary and low educational attainment levels differs significantly across the EU. The proportion of tertiary-educated non-nationals is over 40% in Ireland, Sweden and Luxembourg. However, there are also Member States with large numbers of non-nationals who have a low level of education. In the southern Member States, France and Slovenia, more than 40% of non-nationals have a low level of educational attainment (see Graph I.5.8).

Graph I.5.8: Educational attainment of non-nationals aged 25-54, 2009 (%)



Data for MT and SI (high educational attainment) lack reliability due to the small sample size. For BG, LT, PL, RO, SK - data extremely unreliable at least for one category.

Source: Eurostat, EU Labour Force Survey

#### 5.4.1. Good qualifications, lower-level jobs for the foreign-born

According to 2009 data, in almost all EU Member States, the foreign-born population with tertiary-level education is more likely to perform jobs requiring lower levels of qualification than their native-born counterparts (see Table I.4.96). In the EU as a whole, 19% of the native-born population with tertiary education have jobs requiring a lower-level qualification, compared to 34% for immigrant workers.

Furthermore, the data indicate that 29% of the foreign-born population with tertiary-level education who moved from another EU-27 Member State occupy 'medium- or low-skilled jobs. The problem of 'over-qualification' is even

greater for immigrants from outside the EU, for whom the proportion in medium- or low-skilled jobs reaches 37%.

Table I.5.6: Population aged 25-54 with high educational level having a medium or low skilled job, by group of country of birth, 2009 (% of population with high educational level)

	Native-born	Foreign-born		
		Total	EU-27 born	Non-EU-27 born
EU-27	19	34	29	37
BE	22	30	23	40
BG	21	:	:	:
CZ	7	17	:	42
DK	13	26	(16)	32
DE	20	:	:	:
EE	21	43	:	45
IE	28	40	41	36
EL	18	66	39	78
ES	31	55	49	58
FR	20	28	22	30
IT	14	50	34	59
CY	26	54	43	63
LV	15	22	:	23
LT	19	(31)	:	(33)
LU	:	4	(3)	(11)
HU	11	(9)	:	:
MT	:	:	:	:
NL	12	23	18	26
AT	20	27	18	39
PL	15	:	:	:
PT	12	30	23	34
RO	10	:	:	:
SI	7	(11)	:	(8)
SK	9	:	:	:
FI	18	29	(28)	(29)
SE	11	32	23	38

Given the differences in educational systems and qualifications between countries, this result must be taken with caution. Figures in brackets lack reliability due to the small sample size; ':' colon indicates unavailable or extremely unreliable data.


Source: Eurostat, EU Labour Force Survey

There are several explanations for this situation. For instance, migrants can experience problems in having their educational attainment and formal qualifications recognised and accepted. Even if their qualifications are properly recognised, their skills may not match the requirements of the labour market in the host country, or they may

have to accept unskilled jobs while they are acquiring necessary skills, for example, by becoming fluent in the host country's language, to enable them to exploit their full potential.

The countries where a particularly large proportion of the highly-educated foreign-born population are employed in jobs that only require a lower level of qualification are in southern Europe: Greece (66%), Spain (55%), Cyprus (54%) and Italy (50%).

Graph I.5.9: Foreign-born aged 25-54 with high educational level having a medium or low skilled job by sex, 2009 (% of population with high educational level)




Data for FI, SI (men) and LU lack reliability due to the small sample size. For BG, LT, HU, MT, PL, RO, SI (women) and SK - data extremely unreliable. DE: data not available.

Source: Eurostat, EU Labour Force Survey

In most EU Member States, the mismatch between qualifications and jobs among the immigrant population was more pronounced for highly-educated women than for highly-educated men

Graph I.5.10: Non-nationals aged 25-54 with high educational level having a medium or low skilled job, 2009 (% of population with high educational level)



Data for FI lack reliability due to the small sample size. For BG, LT, HU, MT, PL, RO, SI and SK - data extremely unreliable.  
**Source:** Eurostat, EU Labour Force Survey

(see Graph I.5.9). In the EU as a whole, 31% of tertiary-educated immigrant men were overqualified for their job, compared to 37% of tertiary-educated immigrant women. By contrast, there is no difference between over-qualification rates of male and female native-born (19% each). These data reflect the particular difficulties that highly-educated immigrant women may face in integrating into the labour market in host countries.

Comparing the data on foreign-born persons to that for non-nationals, a rather similar picture can be observed, but the over-qualification rates for non-nationals are generally slightly higher than those for foreign-born persons. The situation is similar at the European level as a whole, and in the majority of individual Member States.


In 2009, 37% of non-nationals in employment with tertiary-level education were overqualified for their job.

Analysing the situation for individual countries, the shares of highly-educated non-nationals performing jobs requiring lower qualifications were highest in the southern countries (Greece, Italy, Cyprus, and Spain). Only in Luxembourg was the proportion of overqualified tertiary-educated non-nationals under 10% (see Graph I.5.10).

### 5.5. NON-NATIONALS YOUNGER ON AVERAGE THAN NATIONALS

Analysis of the age structure of nationals and non-nationals separately shows that at EU-27 level, the foreign population is younger than the national population, particularly in the lower working-age group. This applies to both men and women and is illustrated by the Graph below.

Graph I.5.11: Age structure of the national and foreign population, EU-27, 2009



No data available for BE, CY and RO on population by single year of age.  
**Source:** Eurostat (online data code: migr\_pop2ctz)

In 2009, the median age of the EU-27 national population was 41.2 years. German nationals have the highest median age, 44.5 years, followed by citizens of Italy, Luxembourg and Greece. Apart from Ireland, the newer Member States, Latvia, Slovakia and Estonia, are among the countries with the youngest national populations in the EU-27.

Table I.5.7: Median age of the population by group of citizenship, 2009

	Nationals	Foreigners		
		Total	Citizens of other EU MS	Citizens of non-EU countries
EU-27	41.2	34.3	36.9	33.0
BE	:	:	:	:
BG	41.2	39.4	34.1	40.3
CZ	39.6	34.7	36.8	33.7
DK	41.0	32.1	33.7	31.2
DE	44.5	36.6	40.1	34.7
EE	37.3	49.3	38.1	49.8
IE	33.9	33.2	33.9	30.8
EL	42.6	34.1	44.0	32.2
ES	41.1	32.6	35.5	31.1
FR	39.3	38.3	46.2	34.1
IT	43.9	32.3	32.9	32.0
CY	:	:	:	:
LV	36.5	52.4	38.4	52.7
LT	39.0	33.4	39.6	32.5
LU	43.0	34.9	34.9	34.9
HU	39.7	37.4	37.7	37.0
MT	39.2	36.6	48.4	30.6
NL	40.8	34.0	36.1	32.6
AT	42.3	33.9	35.5	32.9
PL	37.8	42.4	49.8	40.0
PT	40.9	34.0	38.0	33.3
RO	37.9	34.1	40.3	33.1
SI	41.4	37.3	41.7	37.1
SK	36.7	36.0	38.0	32.9
FI	42.1	33.0	36.2	31.3
SE	41.3	34.0	39.1	30.7
UK	40.3	31.7	32.2	31.4

Source: Eurostat

As the age structure of the national population is largely reflected in the age structure of the total population, German nationals have consequently the highest median age of 44.5 years followed by citizens of Italy, Luxembourg and Greece. Apart from Ireland, the newer Member States Latvia, Slovakia and Estonia are among the countries with the youngest national population in the EU.

The median age of non-nationals living in the EU in 2009 was 34.3 (36.9 for the EU non-nationals and 33.0 for citizens of non-EU countries). Apart from Latvia, Estonia and Poland, non-nationals tend to be younger than the national populations in the EU Member States. The lowest median age for this group, around 32, was observed in Denmark and Italy.

Similarly, third-country nationals tend to be younger than EU non-nationals in all Member States, with the exception of Bulgaria, Latvia and Estonia. Latvian and Estonian non-EU foreigners have the highest absolute median ages, 52.7 and 49.8 years respectively, in contrast to their relatively young nationals. On the other hand, non-EU citizens in Malta, Spain and the Nordic countries (Sweden, Finland and Denmark) have the very lowest median ages in the EU-27, between 30.6 and 31.2.

## 6. POPULATION CHANGE AND STRUCTURE

The population of the EU-27 is growing, while the age structure of the population is becoming older. A turning point occurred in the early 1990s, when net migration became the main driver of population growth and has since far outpaced natural change in the population.

The impact of demographic ageing within the EU is likely to be of major significance in the coming decades. Consistently low fertility levels and higher life expectancy will transform the shape of the EU-27's age pyramid. The most important change is likely to be the marked transition towards a much older population. This trend is already becoming apparent in several Member States. The share of older persons in the total population will increase significantly in the coming decades, as a greater proportion of the post-war baby-boom generation reaches retirement. This will, in turn, lead to an increased burden on those of working age to provide for social expenditure required by the ageing population.

### 6.1. POPULATION GROWTH

The current demographic situation in the EU-27 is characterised by continuing growth. Although the population of the EU-27 as a whole increased in 2009, the population in eight EU-27 Member States was already declining.

#### 6.1.1. Over half a billion inhabitants in the EU and still growing


On 1 January 2010, the population of the EU-27 was estimated to be 501.1 million, 1.4 million people more than in the previous year.

#### Population growth

Population growth is the positive population change. Population change in a given year is the difference between the population size on 1 January of the given year and on 1 January of the following year. It consists of two components: natural change (the difference between live births and deaths) and net migration (the difference between the number of immigrants and the number of emigrants). In the context of the 'population change' statistics, Eurostat produces net migration figures by taking the difference between total population change and the natural change; this concept is referred to in this chapter as 'net migration plus statistical adjustment'. A positive natural change is also called natural increase.

The trend in EU-27 population growth has been unbroken since 1960. However, the rate of population growth has been gradually slowing down in recent decades. In the period 1990-2009, the population of the EU-27 increased on average by about 3.2 per 1000 inhabitants per year, compared to annual average of around 8 per 1000 inhabitants per year in the 1960s (Graph I.6.1).

Graph I.6.1: Population on 1 January, EU-27, 1960-2010



Source: Eurostat (online data code: demo\_pjan)

#### 6.1.2. Net migration as the main driver of population growth in the EU-27

The population of the EU-27 grew by 1.4 million in 2009, due to natural increase (the positive difference between live births and deaths) of 0.5 million and net migration<sup>(41)</sup> of 0.9 million.


Compared to 2008, both components of population growth, natural change and net migration, decreased in 2009. In terms of crude rates, the population growth of 4.1 per 1000 inhabitants was due to a natural increase of 1.2 and net migration of 2.9 in 2008. In 2009, natural increase accounted for 1.0 and net migration for 1.8 in the total population growth of 2.8 per 1000 inhabitants.

Net migration continued to be the main determinant of population growth, by contributing 63% to the total population increase in the EU-27.

The contribution of net migration to total population growth has become more significant than that of natural increase since 1992 (see Graph I.6.2) and has peaked in 2003 (95%). Since then, the contribution of natural increase to population growth has risen slowly.

<sup>(41)</sup> Including statistical adjustments.

Graph I.6.2: Population change by component, EU-27, 1961-2009



(1) Including statistical adjustment.  
**Source:** Eurostat (online data code: demo\_gind)


The relatively low contribution of the natural increase to total population growth is the result of two factors: first, net migration in the EU-27 has increased considerably since the mid-1980s; secondly, the number of births has fallen, while the number of deaths has increased. The gap between live births and deaths (see Graph I.6.3) has considerably narrowed since 1960. Since the number of deaths is expected to increase as the baby-boom generation begins to age, and assuming that fertility remains at a relatively low level, a negative natural change (more deaths than births) cannot be excluded in future. If this happens, the extent of population decline or growth will depend on the contribution of migration to total change.

### 6.1.3. Population growth within EU-27 Member States

Although the population of the EU-27 as a whole still grew in 2009, the growth was unevenly distributed across the Member States (see Table I.6.2). In 2009 the population increased in 19 EU Member States.

Conversely, the population declined in the Baltic states (Estonia, Latvia and Lithuania), in the south-eastern countries (Bulgaria, Hungary and Romania), and in Germany and Malta.

Graph I.6.3: Live births and deaths in EU-27, 1961-2009



**Source:** Eurostat (online data code: demo\_gind)

Table I.6.1: EU-27 Member States by contribution of natural change and net migration to population growth/decline, 2009

Demographic drivers	EU-27 Member States
<b>Growth, due to</b>	
only natural change	IE, PL
mostly natural change	CY, ES, FR, NL, SK, UK
mostly net migration	BE, CZ, DK, EL, LU, SI, FI, SE
only net migration	IT, AT, PT
<b>Decline, due to</b>	
only natural change	HU, EE
mostly natural change	BG, DE, LV, RO
mostly net migration	LT
only net migration	MT

Net migration includes a statistical adjustment.  
**Source:** Eurostat (online data code: demo\_gind)



Table I.6.2: Demographic balance for EU-27, 2009 (thousands)

	Population 1.1.2009 A	Natural change		Total D=B-C	Net migration <sup>(1)</sup> E=F-D	Total change F=G-A	Population 1.1.2010 G
		Live births B	Deaths C				
<b>EU-27</b>	<b>499703.3<sup>p</sup></b>	<b>5371.9</b>	<b>4848.8</b>	<b>523.1</b>	<b>877.1<sup>p</sup></b>	<b>1400.1<sup>p</sup></b>	<b>501103.4<sup>p</sup></b>
<b>BE</b>	10753.1	127.3	104.5	22.8	64.0	86.8	10839.9
<b>BG</b>	7606.6	81.0	108.1	-27.1	-15.7	-42.8	7563.7
<b>CZ</b>	10467.5	118.3	107.4	10.9	28.3	39.3	10506.8
<b>DK</b>	5511.5	62.8	54.9	7.9	15.3	23.3	5534.7
<b>DE</b>	82002.4	665.1	854.5	-189.4	-10.7	-200.1	81802.3
<b>EE</b>	1340.4	15.8	16.1	-0.3	0.0	-0.3	1340.1
<b>IE</b>	4450.0	74.3	28.9	45.4	-27.6	17.8	4467.9
<b>EL</b>	11260.4	117.9	108.3	9.6	35.1	44.7	11305.1
<b>ES</b>	45828.2	494.5	381.9	112.6	48.2	160.8	45989.0
<b>FR</b>	64367.0 <sup>p</sup>	825.6	548.7	276.9	70.2 <sup>p</sup>	347.1 <sup>p</sup>	64714.1 <sup>p</sup>
<b>IT</b>	60045.1	568.9	591.7	-22.8	318.1	295.3	60340.3
<b>CY</b>	796.9	9.6	5.2	4.4	1.8	6.3	803.1
<b>LV</b>	2261.3	21.7	29.9	-8.2	-4.7	-12.9	2248.4
<b>LT</b>	3349.9	36.7	42.0	-5.4	-15.5	-20.8	3329.0
<b>LU</b>	493.5	5.6	3.7	2.0	6.6	8.6	502.1
<b>HU</b>	10031.0	96.4	130.4	-34.0	17.3	-16.7	10014.3
<b>MT</b>	413.6	4.1	3.2	0.9	-1.6	-0.6	413.0
<b>NL</b>	16485.8	184.9	134.2	50.7	38.5	89.2	16575.0
<b>AT</b>	8355.3	76.3	77.4	-1.0	21.1	20.0	8375.3
<b>PL</b>	38135.9	417.6	384.9	32.6	-1.2	31.5	38167.3
<b>PT</b>	10627.3	99.5	104.4	-4.9	15.4	10.5	10637.7
<b>RO</b>	21498.6	222.4	257.2	-34.8	-1.6	-36.4	21462.2
<b>SI</b>	2032.4	21.9	18.8	3.1	11.5	14.6	2047.0
<b>SK</b>	5412.3	61.2	52.9	8.3	4.4	12.7	5424.9
<b>FI</b>	5326.3	60.4	49.9	10.5	14.6	25.1	5351.4
<b>SE</b>	9256.3	111.8	90.1	21.7	62.6	84.3	9340.7
<b>UK</b>	61595.1 <sup>p</sup>	790.2	559.6	230.6	182.4 <sup>p</sup>	413.0 <sup>p</sup>	62008.0 <sup>p</sup>

(1) Including statistical adjustments

(p) provisional data

Source: Eurostat (online data code: demo\_gind)

Analysing the two components of population change at a national level, eight types of change can be distinguished, separating growth from decline, and the relative weights of natural change and net migration (Tables I.6.1 for the typology and Table I.6.2 for the data).

Out of the 19 countries where the population grew in 2009, both natural increase and net migration contributed to population growth in 14 cases. Population growth was mostly due to migration, with the exception of Spain, France, the Netherlands, Slovakia and the United Kingdom, where a natural increase was still the main demographic driver of population growth. In Ireland and Poland, a natural increase compensated for negative net migration. In three other countries, Italy, Austria and Portugal, positive net migration compensated for negative natural change.

Eight EU Member States reported a negative total population change in 2009. In most cases, this was mainly due to negative natural change, with an

additional effect from negative net migration (Bulgaria, Germany, Latvia and Romania). In Lithuania, the negative total change was mainly due to negative net migration. In Malta, the natural increase was offset by negative net migration, while in Hungary and Estonia, positive net migration could not compensate for the negative natural change. The population of seven Member States continued to decrease, as in 2008; that of Malta decreased in 2009, after increasing in 2008.

Table I.6.3: Crude rates of population change in 2000, 2008 and 2009

	Crude rates of population change (per 1000 inhabitants)								
	Total			Natural change			Net migration <sup>(1)</sup>		
	2000	2008	2009	2000	2008	2009	2000	2008	2009
EU-27	2.1	4.1	2.8 <sup>p</sup>	0.6	1.2	1.0	1.5	2.9	1.8 <sup>p</sup>
BE	2.4	8.0	8.0	1.1	2.2	2.0	1.3	5.9	5.9
BG	-5.1	-4.4	-5.6	-5.1	-4.3	-3.6	0.0	-0.1	-2.1
CZ	-1.1	8.3	3.7	-1.8	1.4	1.0	0.6	6.9	2.7
DK	3.6	6.5	4.2	1.7	1.9	1.4	1.9	4.6	2.8
DE	1.2	-2.6	-2.4	-0.9	-2.0	-2.3	2.0	-0.7	-0.1
EE	-3.7	-0.4	-0.2	-3.9	-0.5	-0.2	0.2	0.1	0.0
IE	14.5	11.0	4.0	6.1	10.6	10.2	8.4	0.4	-6.2
EL	2.5	4.1	4.0	-0.2	0.9	0.9	2.7	3.2	3.1
ES	10.6	12.0	3.5	0.9	2.8	2.4	9.7	9.0	1.1
FR	7.1	5.6	5.4 <sup>p</sup>	4.4	4.5	4.3	2.7	1.2	1.1 <sup>p</sup>
IT	0.7	7.1	4.9	-0.2	0.0	-0.4	0.9	7.1	5.3
CY	10.2	9.6	7.8	4.5	5.1	5.5	5.7	4.5	2.3
LV	-7.4	-4.2	-5.7	-5.0	-3.1	-3.6	-2.3	-1.1	-2.1
LT	-7.2	-4.9	-6.2	-1.4	-2.6	-1.6	-5.8	-2.3	-4.6
LU	12.4	19.9	17.2	4.5	4.1	4.0	7.9	15.8	13.2
HU	-2.1	-1.4	-1.7	-3.7	-3.1	-3.4	1.6	1.6	1.7
MT	6.1	8.1	-1.5	3.8	2.1	2.2	2.3	5.9	-3.8
NL	7.7	4.9	5.4	4.2	3.0	3.1	3.6	1.9	2.3
AT	2.3	4.4	2.4	0.2	0.3	-0.1	2.2	4.1	2.5
PL	-10.4	0.5	0.8	0.3	0.9	0.9	-10.7	-0.4	0.0
PT	6.0	0.9	1.0	1.4	0.0	-0.5	4.6	0.9	1.4
RO	-1.1	-1.4	-1.7	-0.9	-1.5	-1.6	-0.2	0.1	-0.1
SI	1.2	10.9 <sup>b</sup>	7.2	-0.2	1.7 <sup>b</sup>	1.5	1.4	9.2 <sup>b</sup>	5.6
SK	-3.7	2.1	2.3	0.5	0.8	1.5	-4.1	1.3	0.8
FI	1.9	4.9	4.7	1.4	2.0	2.0	0.5	2.9	2.7
SE	2.4	8.0	9.1	-0.3	1.9	2.3	2.7	6.0	6.7
UK	3.6	6.6	6.7 <sup>p</sup>	1.2	3.5	3.7	2.4	3.1	3.0 <sup>p</sup>

(1) Including statistical adjustment.

(p) provisional data; (b) break in the series

Source: Eurostat (online data code: demo\_gind)

As shown in Table I.6.3, Luxembourg, Sweden, Belgium, Cyprus and Slovenia had the highest growth rates in 2009, more than 7.0 per 1000 inhabitants.

The highest positive crude rate of natural change in 2009 was in Ireland (10.2 per 1000 inhabitants) and Cyprus (5.5 per 1000 inhabitants). The highest net migration (including adjustment) was in Luxembourg, with net migration of more than 13.2 per 1000 inhabitants, followed by Sweden, Belgium, Slovenia and Italy, all above 5.0 per 1000 inhabitants.

## 6.2. POPULATION AGEING

The age structure of population in the EU-27 is becoming older, due to increasing life expectancy and low levels of fertility sustained for decades. Eurostat's population projections foresee that the ageing process will continue in future decades.

### 6.2.1. Population structure in 2010

Table I.6.4 shows the distribution of population by major age groups in the EU-27. On 1 January 2010, the young population (0-19 years old) accounted for 21.3%, the population aged 20-64 (considered to be the population of working age for the purposes of this publication and the new Europe 2020 targets) for 61.3% and the population aged 65 years or over for 17.4%.

Across Member States, Ireland had the largest proportion of 0-19 year olds, 27.5%, and Germany the smallest, 18.8%. Germany had the largest proportion of those aged 65 or over, 20.7%, followed by Italy. 20.2%. The lowest proportion of those aged 65 or over was in Ireland (11.3%), Slovakia (12.3%) and Cyprus (13.1%).

Table I.6.4: Population age structure by major age group, on 1st January 1990 and 2010 (%)

	0-19		20-64		65 or older	
	1990	2010	1990	2010	1990	2010
EU-27	26.7	21.3	59.5	61.3	13.7	17.4
BE	24.8	22.9	60.3	59.9	14.8	17.2
BG	27.8	19.1	59.3	63.4	13.0	17.5
CZ	29.7	20.1	57.9	64.7	12.5	15.2
DK	24.3	24.4	60.1	59.3	15.6	16.3
DE	21.8	18.8	63.3	60.6	14.9	20.7
EE	29.3	21.2	59.2	61.7	11.6	17.1
IE	36.7	27.5	51.9	61.2	11.4	11.3
EL	27.0	19.4	59.3	61.6	13.7	18.9
ES	28.8	19.8	57.8	63.3	13.4	16.8
FR	27.8	24.4	58.3	58.8	13.9	16.8
IT	24.5	19.0	60.8	60.8	14.7	20.2
CY	33.5	24.0	55.7	63.0	10.8	13.1
LV	28.4	20.1	59.8	62.5	11.8	17.4
LT	30.1	22.2	59.1	61.7	10.8	16.1
LU	23.2	23.7	63.4	62.4	13.4	14.0
HU	27.9	20.8	58.8	62.6	13.2	16.6
MT	30.9	22.3	58.8	62.9	10.4	14.8
NL	25.7	23.7	61.5	61.0	12.8	15.3
AT	24.4	20.8	60.7	61.5	14.9	17.6
PL	32.6	21.8	57.4	64.7	10.0	13.5
PT	29.3	20.5	57.5	61.6	13.2	17.9
RO	31.9	21.0	57.8	64.0	10.3	14.9
SI	28.2	19.2	61.2	64.3	10.6	16.5
SK	33.5	22.1	56.3	65.6	10.3	12.3
FI	25.4	22.9	61.3	60.1	13.3	17.0
SE	24.5	23.4	57.7	58.5	17.8	18.1
UK	25.9	23.9	58.4	59.8	15.7	16.3

UK: 2009 instead of 2010.  
EU-27 and FR exclude France's overseas departments.  
Source: Eurostat (online data code: demo\_pjanind)

The median age of the EU-27 population was 40.9 years. This means that half the EU-27 population today is aged 40.9 years or over. The median age of the population in the Member States ranged from 34.3 years in Ireland to 44.2 years in Germany (see Table I.6.5).

The dependency ratios<sup>(42)</sup> are used as indicators of the potential level of support needed by young people (aged 0-19) and/or older people (aged 65 or over) from the population of working age. The ratios are expressed in terms of the relative size of the young and/or older population to the population of working age.

<sup>(42)</sup> In this section, the age dependency ratios are expressed in terms of the relative size of the young (0-19 years) or/and of the old (65 or over) population to the working age population (20-64), instead of the common definition, which considers the 0-14 years as young population and the 15-64 years as working age population. This adjustment is made on grounds that, in the EU-27's Member States, most people aged 15-19 are still in education, and few of them are in paid work.

In 2010, the old-age dependency ratio of the EU-27 was 28.4%. This means that the EU-27 had around 3.5 persons of working age for every person aged 65 years or over. The old-age dependency ratio in the Member States ranged from 18.5% in Ireland to 34.1% in Germany.

Table I.6.5: Median age and age dependency ratios, 1 January 2010

	Median age (years)	Dependency ratio (%)			Pop. aged 80 or over
		Young age	Old age	Total	
EU-27	40.9	34.8	28.4	63.2	4.7
BE	40.9	38.2	28.6	66.8	4.9
BG	41.4	30.1	27.7	57.7	3.8
CZ	39.4	31.0	23.5	54.6	3.6
DK	40.5	41.2	27.5	68.8	4.1
DE	44.2	31.0	34.1	65.1	5.1
EE	39.5	34.4	27.7	62.0	4.1
IE	34.3	44.9	18.5	63.4	2.8
EL	41.7	31.5	30.7	62.3	4.6
ES	39.9	31.3	26.6	57.9	4.9
FR	39.9	41.5	28.6	70.2	5.3
IT	43.1	31.2	33.3	64.5	5.8
CY	36.2	38.1	20.7	58.8	2.9
LV	40.0	32.2	27.8	60.0	3.9
LT	39.2	36.0	26.0	62.1	3.6
LU	38.9	38.0	22.4	60.4	3.6
HU	39.8	33.2	26.5	59.7	3.9
MT	39.2	35.4	23.5	58.9	3.3
NL	40.6	38.9	25.1	64.0	3.9
AT	41.7	33.9	28.6	62.5	4.8
PL	37.7	33.7	20.9	54.6	3.3
PT	40.7	33.3	29.0	62.3	4.5
RO	38.3	32.9	23.3	56.2	3.1
SI	41.4	29.9	25.7	55.6	3.9
SK	36.9	33.7	18.7	52.4	2.7
FI	42.0	38.0	28.3	66.3	4.6
SE	40.7	40.1	31.0	71.0	5.3

UK: 2009.  
EU-27 and FR exclude France's overseas departments.  
Source: Eurostat (online data code: demo\_pjanind)


By adding the number of young people (aged 0-19) to the older population, the resulting total age dependency ratio of 63.2% in the EU-27 is equivalent to about three people of working age for every two dependent people. In 2010, the lowest total age dependency ratio was in Slovakia (52.4%) and the highest in Sweden (71.0%).

The population pyramids in Graph I.6.4 show the structure of the population by sex and by five-year age groups. Each bar corresponds to the proportion of the given sex and age group to the total population.

The population pyramid at EU-27 level in 2010 is narrow at the bottom and becomes more rhomboid as the baby boomer cohorts resulting from high fertility rates in several European countries up to

mid-1960s move up the age pyramid. The baby boomers continue to represent a significant part of the population of working age. The first of these large cohorts born over a period of 20-30 years are now reaching retirement age, as illustrated by the comparison with the 1990 population pyramid.

Graph I.6.4: Population pyramids, EU-27, 1990 and 2010



EU-27 excludes France's overseas departments.  
**Source:** Eurostat (online data code demo\_pjan)

6.2.1. Past and current trends of population ageing in EU-27

Population ageing is a long-term trend which began several decades ago in the EU-27. This ageing is visible in changes in the age structure of the EU population and is reflected by the growing proportion of older persons, while the proportion of those of working age in the total population declines.


Between 1990 and 2010, the working-age population (20-64 years) in the EU-27 increased by 1.8 percentage points, while the older population (aged 65 or over) increased by 3.7 percentage points (see Graph I.6.5). These increases came at the expense of a decrease of 5.4% in the proportion of younger people (0-19 years).

The low levels of fertility that were sustained for decades (see chapter I.2 on Fertility) have contributed to the process of population ageing, with fewer births leading to a decline in the proportion of young people in the total population. This process is known as 'ageing from the bottom' of the population pyramid, and can be observed in the reduction of the base of population pyramids between 1990 and 2010 (Graph I.6.4).

Since the proportion of older people increased between 1990 and 2010, the top of the 2010 age

pyramid is wider (Graph I.6.4). The growth in the proportion of older people can be explained by gains in longevity and is known as 'ageing from the top' of the population pyramid. A significant increase in life expectancy at birth was recorded in all EU-27 Member States for the past decades (see chapter I.3 on Mortality).


Graph I.6.5: Proportion of population aged 65 years or over (% increase/decrease 1990-2010)



EU-27 and FR exclude France's overseas departments.  
 UK: 2009 instead of 2010.  
 SI: the graph may be affected by the change of population definition from 2008 onward.  
**Source:** Eurostat (online data code: demo\_pjanind)

The change in the median age of the EU-27 population also provides an illustration of population ageing. In the EU-27, the median age of the total population rose steadily from 35.2 years in 1990 to 40.9 in 2010, as shown in Graph I.6.6.


Graph I.6.6: Median age of the total population, EU-27, 1990-2010



EU-27 excludes France's overseas departments.  
**Source:** Eurostat (online data code: demo\_pjanind)

The median age of the population rose in all Member States over the same period. It rose steeply, by more than six years, between 1990 and 2010, in Slovenia, Portugal, Lithuania, Germany, Spain, Malta, Italy, the Netherlands and Austria.

Graph I.6.7: Median age of population, 1990 and 2010



EU-27 and FR exclude France's overseas departments.  
UK: 2009 instead of 2010.  
SI: the graph may be affected by the change of population definition from 2008 onward.  
**Source:** Eurostat (online data code: demo\_pjanind)

## 6.2.2. Future trends in population ageing

Population ageing is a generalised process across EU Member States, and it is expected to continue in future decades.

### Population projections


Eurostat produces population projections for each EU Member State every three years. These projections are what-if scenarios that aim to provide information about the likely future size and age structure of the population based on assumptions of future trends in fertility, life expectancy and migration; this publication is based on the main results of the EUROPOP2008, convergence scenario.

According to Eurostat 2008-based population projections, the EU-27's population will be slightly larger by 2060, while the age structure of the population will be much older than it is now.

The likely change in age structure is of more concern than the change in population size. The median age is projected to rise to 47.9 years by 2060. The population of working age is expected to decline steadily. Older people would account for an increasing proportion of the population according to the same projections. The share of the population aged 65 or over is projected to increase from 17.4% in 2010 to 30.0% in 2060 (see Graph I.6.8). Even also significant is the progressive ageing of the older population itself. The proportion of those aged 80 or over ('oldest-old') is growing faster than any other segment of the population, and is projected to almost treble by 2060.

The old age dependency ratio (population aged 65 or over in relation to that aged 20-64) is projected to more than double from 28.4% in 2010 to 58.5% in 2060. The total age dependency ratio (calculated as the ratio of children and young people aged under 19 and older people aged 65 or over to the population aged 20-64) is expected to rise from 63.2% in 2010 to 95.5% in 2060. The implication is that there will be almost one person of working age for every dependent person aged under 19 or over 65 years in the EU-27.


Graph I.6.8: Population age structure by major age groups, EU-27, 1990-2060 (%)



1990 – 2010: Observed populations.  
 2020 – 2060: EUROPOP2008 convergence scenario.  
 EU-27 excludes France's overseas departments.  
**Source:** Eurostat (online data codes: demo\_pjan and proj\_08c2150p)

Graph I.6.9 shows a future-oriented version of the population pyramid in Graph I.6.4.

Graph I.6.9: Population pyramids, EU-27, 2010 and 2060



2010: Observed populations.  
 2060: EUROPOP2008 convergence scenario.  
 EU-27 excludes France's overseas departments.  
**Source:** Eurostat (online data codes: demo\_pjan and proj\_08c2150p)

In the coming decades, the large number of ageing baby boomers will swell the number of older people. The baby boom bulge will move up the population pyramid, leaving the middle (population of working age, 20-64), and the base (ages 0-19), considerably narrower in 2060.


### 6.2.3. The speed of population ageing

The previous section showed that EU-27's population is expected to age considerably by 2060, thereby raising a number of questions. Will ageing be faster over the coming years or at the end of the projection period? How will ageing play out in different countries?

Statisticians generally measure the speed at which the population ages by observing the proportion of older people in the population and the age dependency ratio. Both indicators were found to increase for the EU-27 in the projection period (2008-2060).

Graph I.6.10 illustrates this, measured as the increase in the proportion of the population aged 65 or over, for the EU-27 and three Member States. The leftmost segment of each bar indicates the proportion of the population aged 65 or over in 2010, ranging from 12.3% in Slovakia to 20.7% in Germany. Moving to the right, the subsequent segments indicate the likely increase in the proportion of the population aged 65 or over in subsequent decades; the longer each segment is, the faster the increase in its decade. At EU-27 level (top bar), the proportion of the population aged 65 or over is projected to increase rapidly until 2040, to reach the high-20% range; it then grows more slowly and barely reaches 30% over the next two decades.

Graph I.6.10: Population aged 65 or over in the EU, Sweden, Germany and Slovakia, 2010-2060 (%)



**Source:** Eurostat (online data code: proj\_08c2150p)

In summary, over the next 50 years, the age class 65 or over will increase its share in the EU-27 population from 17.4% to 30.0%. Most of this increase is projected to occur between 2020 and 2040.

While population projections show that ageing will affect all Member States, individual countries will experience the process at different rates and at different times; in other words, there will be variations in the pattern of ageing.

Most Member States that will experience a slow pattern of ageing start with a moderately old to older population, as illustrated by the Swedish case. In 2010, its proportion of the population aged

65 or over was the fourth highest (18.1 %) in the EU-27. By 2060, due to a slower pattern of ageing, it is projected to have the eighth lowest proportion of population aged 65 or over (26.6 %) and well below the EU-27 average (30.0 %). Similar, albeit slightly faster development, is projected for Belgium, Denmark, France, Cyprus, Luxembourg, Portugal, Finland and the United Kingdom. The Netherlands, while also belonging to this group, display an atypical pattern; their proportion of the population aged 65 or over was low in 2010 (15.3 %), is set to increase rapidly until 2040 and then to stabilise at a level which is about the same as the others in its country group (27.3 %).

much larger differences between Member States, due to differences in the speed of ageing.

Another group of Member States have in common populations that were already relatively old in 2010, and projected to age at a moderate rate. An example is Germany, where the proportion of the population aged 65 or over in 2010 was 20.7 %, the highest in the EU-27. Germany's ageing is set to proceed at a sustained pace until 2040 and then to almost halt in the 2040s and the 2050s. Other countries, namely Austria, Greece, Spain, Italy and Slovenia, are projected to follow similar patterns. Ireland shows a similar moderate-ageing pattern, albeit starting from a younger population and with sustained ageing until 2050. These two groups of countries will experience very moderate ageing from 2040.

The highest rates of population ageing, especially from 2040 onward, are expected in a third group, which includes several central and east European Member States, according to population projections. These are illustrated by Slovakia. Here the percentage of the population aged 65 or over (12.3 %) was the second lowest in the EU-27 in 2010, above only Ireland (11.3 %), but is projected to rise to 36.1 % in 2060, thereby becoming the second highest rate, just below Poland (36.2 %). In Slovakia, ageing is likely to continue at a fast pace even in the 2040s and 2050s. Similar ageing, although at a slightly less rapid pace, is expected in Bulgaria, Cyprus, Hungary, Lithuania, Latvia, Malta, Poland and Romania. In all of these Member States, the proportion of the population aged 65 or over is currently comparatively low, and is projected to increase slowly until 2020. However, it is then set to grow rapidly throughout the remainder of the projections period.

Furthermore, the graph indicates that while the spread across Member States is narrow in 2010 at about 2 percentage points, in 2060 there will be

## 7. FAMILIES

‘Family’ is a shifting concept. What it means to be a member of a family and the expectations people have of family relationships vary with time and across countries, making it difficult to find a universally-agreed and applied definition.

Legal alternatives to historically conventional marriage, such as registered partnerships, have become more widespread, and national legislation has evolved to confer more rights to unmarried couples. Alongside these new legal forms, other forms of non-marital relationships have appeared, making it more difficult for statisticians to collect data that can be compared across countries.

In their attempt to capture and track changing family forms and composition, demographers most often refer to the family nucleus and to private household units. Due to differences in the timing and formal recognition of changing patterns of family formation and dissolution, these concepts have become more difficult to operationalise. Analysts of demographic statistics therefore have access to relatively few complete and reliable datasets with which to make comparisons over time and between and within countries.

It can be observed, however, that the number of marriages is decreasing and the number of divorces is increasing, although these trends may be due in part to the ageing of the population. In addition, more and more children are born to unmarried women, and the countries with the highest extramarital birth rates are often also those with the highest fertility rates.

### 7.1. FEWER MARRIAGES, MORE DIVORCES

Marriage as recognised by the law in each country has long been considered to signal family formation. This section examines the trends in family formation and dissolution through marriage and divorce.

In 2007, 2.4 million marriages and 1.2 million divorces took place in the EU-27. The crude marriage rate, i.e. the number of marriages per 1 000 inhabitants, was 4.9, and the crude divorce rate was 2.1 per 1 000 inhabitants.

Since 1970, the crude marriage rate in the EU-27 has declined by 38% (from 7.9 per 1 000 inhabitants in 1970 to 4.9 in 2007).

At the same time, marriages have become less stable, as indicated by the rise in the crude divorce rate, from 0.9 per 1 000 inhabitants in 1970 to 2.1 in 2007. Part of this rise is due to the fact that divorce was legalised in several countries during the period.

Table I.7.1: **Crude marriage rate, 1960-2009 (marriages per 1,000 inhabitants)**

	1960	1970	1980	1990	2000	2009
EU-27	:	7.9	6.8	6.3	5.2	4.9
BE	7.1	7.6	6.7	6.5	4.4	4.0
BG	8.8	8.6	7.9	6.9	4.3	3.4
CZ	7.7	9.2	7.6	8.8	5.4	4.6
DK	7.8	7.4	5.2	6.1	7.2	6.0
DE	9.5	7.4	6.3	6.5	5.1	4.6
EE	10.0	9.1	8.8	7.5	4.0	4.0
IE	5.5	7.0	6.4	5.1	5.0	5.2
EL	7.0	7.7	6.5	5.8	4.5	5.2
ES	7.8	7.3	5.9	5.7	5.4	3.8
FR	7.0	7.8	6.2	5.1	5.0	3.9
IT	7.7	7.3	5.7	5.6	5.0	4.0
CY	:	8.6	7.7	9.7	13.4 <sup>b</sup>	7.9
LV	11.0	10.2	9.8	8.9	3.9	4.4
LT	10.1	9.5	9.2	9.8	4.8	6.2
LU	7.1	6.4	5.9	6.1	4.9	3.5
HU	8.9	9.3	7.5	6.4	4.7	3.7
MT	6.0	7.9	8.8	7.1	6.7	5.7
NL	7.7	9.5	6.4	6.5	5.5	4.4
AT	8.3	7.1	6.2	5.9	4.9	4.2
PL	8.2	8.6	8.6	6.7	5.5	6.6
PT	7.8	9.4	7.4	7.2	6.2	3.8
RO	10.7	7.2	8.2	8.3	6.1	6.3
SI	8.8	8.3	6.5	4.3	3.6	3.2
SK	7.9	7.9	7.9	7.6	4.8	4.9
FI	7.4	8.8	6.1	5.0	5.1	5.6
SE	6.7	5.4	4.5	4.7	4.5	5.1
UK	7.5	8.5	7.4	6.6	5.2	4.4

2009: EU-27 and IE, 2007; UK, 2008

(b): Before 2002, total marriages contracted in the country; from 2003 onward marriages in which at least one spouse was resident in Cyprus.

Source: Eurostat (online data code: demo\_nind)

Table I.7.1 shows that, in 2009, the crude marriage rate among the EU-27 Member States was highest in Cyprus (7.9 per 1 000 inhabitants) and Poland (6.6). At the other end of the scale, the lowest crude marriage rates were reported by Slovenia (3.2) and Bulgaria (3.4).

Regarding divorce, Ireland (0.8 per 1 000 inhabitants) and several southern European Member States, including Italy (0.9), Slovenia (1.1) and Greece (1.2) have significantly lower crude divorce rates than Belgium (3.0 per 1 000



inhabitants), Lithuania and the Czech Republic, both with 2.8 (see table I.7.2). Divorce is not legal in Malta.

Table I.7.2: Crude divorce rate, 1960-2009 (divorces per 1,000 inhabitants)

	1960	1970	1980	1990	2000	2009
EU-27	:	0.9	1.5	1.6	1.8	2.1
BE	0.5	0.7	1.5	2.0	2.6	3.0
BG	:	1.2	1.5	1.3	1.3	1.5
CZ	1.4	2.2	2.6	3.1	2.9	2.8
DK	1.5	1.9	2.7	2.7	2.7	2.7
DE	1.0	1.3	1.8	1.9	2.4	2.3
EE	2.1	3.2	4.1	3.7	3.1	2.4
IE	-	-	-	-	0.7	0.8
EL	0.3	0.4	0.7	0.6	1.0	1.2
ES	-	-	-	0.6	0.9	2.1
FR	0.7	0.8	1.5	1.9	1.9	2.1
IT	-	-	0.2	0.5	0.7	0.9
CY	:	0.2	0.3	0.6	1.7	2.2
LV	2.4	4.6	5.0	4.0	2.6	2.3
LT	0.9	2.2	3.2	3.4	3.1	2.8
LU	0.5	0.6	1.6	2.0	2.4	2.1
HU	1.7	2.2	2.6	2.4	2.3	2.4
MT	-	-	-	-	-	-
NL	0.5	0.8	1.8	1.9	2.2	1.9
AT	1.1	1.4	1.8	2.1	2.4	2.2
PL	0.5	1.1	1.1	1.1	1.1	1.7
PT	0.1	0.1	0.6	0.9	1.9	2.5
RO	2.0	0.4	1.5	1.4	1.4	1.5
SI	1.0	1.1	1.2	0.9	1.1	1.1
SK	0.6	0.8	1.3	1.7	1.7	2.3
FI	0.8	1.3	2.0	2.6	2.7	2.5
SE	1.2	1.6	2.4	2.3	2.4	2.4
UK	:	1.0	2.6	2.7	2.6	2.2

2009: EU-27 and IE, 2007; EL, FR, IT, and UK, 2008  
Divorce was not possible by law in ES before 1981, IE before 1995 and IT before 1970. Divorce is not legal in MT.  
Source: Eurostat (online data code demo\_ndivind)

## 7.2. A RISE IN BIRTHS OUTSIDE MARRIAGE

The proportion of live births outside marriage in EU-27 continues to increase, signalling new patterns of family formation alongside the more traditional pattern where children were born within marriage. Extramarital births occur in non-marital relationships or cohabiting couples as well as to lone parents.

Extra-marital births have been increasing in almost every country in EU-27, and in some Member States, mostly in northern Europe, the majority of live births are now outside marriage (Table I.7.3). Mediterranean countries like Greece, Cyprus, Italy and Malta, along with Lithuania, Poland, and Romania are at the other low end of the scale with a large proportion, over 70%, of births occurring within marriage.

The gap between the countries with the highest and lowest rates of live births outside marriage increased over the period under review. In 2009, Greece (6.6%) and Cyprus (11.7%) display rates, respectively nine and five times below in the country recording the highest rates of live births outside marriage, namely Estonia (59.2%).

Table I.7.3: Live births outside marriage, 1960-2009 (% of total live births)

	1960	1970	1980	1990	2000	2009
EU-27	:	:	:	17.4	27.4	37.4
BE	2.1	2.8	4.1	11.6	28.0	45.7
BG	8.0	8.5	10.9	12.4	38.4	53.4
CZ	4.9	5.4	5.6	8.6	21.8	38.8
DK	7.8	11.0	33.2	46.4	44.6	46.8
DE	7.6	7.2	11.9	15.3	23.4	32.7
EE	:	:	:	27.2	54.5	59.2
IE	1.6	2.7	5.9	14.6	31.5	33.3
EL	1.2	1.1	1.5	2.2	4.0	6.6
ES	2.3	1.4	3.9	9.6	17.7	31.4
FR	6.1	6.8	11.4	30.1	42.6	52.9
IT	2.4	2.2	4.3	6.5	9.7	23.5
CY	:	0.2	0.6	0.7	2.3	11.7
LV	11.9	11.4	12.5	16.9	40.3	43.5
LT		3.7	6.3	7.0	22.6	27.9
LU	3.2	4.0	6.0	12.8	21.9	32.1
HU	5.5	5.4	7.1	13.1	29.0	40.8
MT	0.7	1.5	1.1	1.8	10.6	27.4
NL	1.4	2.1	4.1	11.4	24.9	43.3
AT	13.0	12.8	17.8	23.6	31.3	39.3
PL		5.0	4.8	6.2	12.1	20.2
PT	9.5	7.3	9.2	14.7	22.2	38.1
RO	:	:	:	:	25.5	28.0
SI	9.1	8.5	13.1	24.5	37.1	53.6
SK	4.7	6.2	5.7	7.6	18.3	31.6
FI	4.0	5.8	13.1	25.2	39.2	40.9
SE	11.3	18.6	39.7	47.0	55.3	54.4
UK	5.2	8.0	11.5	27.9	39.5	46.3

1990: EU-27 excludes RO  
FR: Metropolitan France  
Source: Eurostat (online data code demo\_find)


## 7.3. FERTILITY AND THE FAMILY

Analysis of the relationship between patterns of fertility and age at childbirth (Graph I.2.2) shows that, in 2009, fertility was higher in several countries where women have children at a later age. Box I.7.1 below argues that, in the EU – and generally among developed countries – fertility rises with wealth. Graphs I.7.1 and I.7.2 below indicate that fertility was also higher in several countries where more children are born outside marriage and where there are higher employment rates for women. However, among all determinant of the different fertility levels in the 27 EU Member States studied here, the most important is child-care provision (Graph I.7.3).

### Births outside marriage and fertility

Countries with higher proportions of births outside marriage are often observed to have higher fertility rates. In Estonia, Sweden, France, Denmark, the United Kingdom and Belgium, high rates of live births outside marriage (above 45 % of live births) are associated with total fertility rates (<sup>43</sup>) above the EU-27 average of 1.60 children per woman in 2008 (Graph I.7.1).

Graph I.7.1: Proportion of live births outside marriage and total fertility rate, 2009




Total fertility rate for EU-27, IT and UK: 2008.  
**Source:** Eurostat (online data code: demo\_find)

### Women's employment rates and fertility

Arguably one of the most important trends of the past 50 years affecting family life has been the marked increase in female employment rates. Since the 1960s, more women have become economically active and have entered paid employment outside the home, particularly in the public sector, rather than working on the land or in a family enterprise as in the past. Women's employment rates have, thereby, moved closer to those of men.

Graph I.7.2 shows that the Member States with higher rates of employment for women also tend to have higher fertility; though this relationship is not very strong.

Graph I.7.2: Employment rate of women aged 25-49 and total fertility rate, 2009




Total fertility rate for EU-27, IT and UK: 2008.  
**Source:** Eurostat (online data codes: demo\_frate and lfsa\_ergan)

### Childcare provision and fertility

Overall, fertility is higher in those countries that made an earlier transition to more gender equality and female participation in employment, allowing for flexible, less traditional family-forming and child-bearing patterns.

Graph I.7.3: Childcare provision for children aged 0-2 and total fertility rate, 2009



Total fertility rate for EU-27, IT and UK: 2008.  
**Source:** Eurostat (online data codes: demo\_find and ilc\_caindformal)

Graph I.7.3 shows a strong correlation at country level between fertility and the provision of childcare, indicating that, in some of the countries where the transition to more diverse family patterns and to support parenthood in kind may have helped to raise their fertility levels. The childcare provision is measured as children cared for (by formal arrangements other than by the family) as a proportion of all children in the same age group.


<sup>(43)</sup> The total fertility rate is defined in Chapter I.2.

**Box I.7.1: Does wealth increase fertility in developed countries?**

In the past century, fertility rates have decreased as national wealth has increased. Women in developing countries still have large numbers of children, whereas the wealthier half of the world population has below-replacement fertility. With on-going development, is the trend towards lower fertility irreversible?

A recent study<sup>(1)</sup> challenges the traditional view by demonstrating that, in many countries at advanced stages of development, fertility levels are now increasing rather than decreasing. The traditional relationship between wealth and fertility seems to be reversed.

**Graph 1: Human Development Index (HDI) and Total Fertility Rate (TFR) by country in the world, 2005**



**Source:** United Nations


To reach these conclusions, the researchers analysed the relationship between the Total Fertility Rate (TFR) and Human Development Index (HDI). The HDI combines indicators for life expectancy, education, standard of living and GDP, thus taking into account factors other than material wealth alone.

The left and central parts of Graph 1, taken from the study, show that TFR is high in societies at lower levels of development (the left-hand side of the J-shaped curve) and declines rapidly as development advances.

<sup>(1)</sup> Myrskylä, Kohler & Billari, Nature 2009 <http://www.nature.com/nature/journal/v460/n7256/pdf/nature08230.pdf>

But, at the highest stages of development, the negative fertility trend changes into a positive one; in many countries, high levels of development are observed in conjunction with relatively high fertility rates. In Graph 1, this situation applies in the dense cluster of 15-30 countries at the bottom-right. Graph 2 shows the data from Graph 1 limited to EU-27 Member States. The clustered 9 countries with higher fertility (around or above 1.75 children per woman) are those with higher HDI (around 0.95 or above).

**Graph 2: Human Development Index (HDI) and Total Fertility Rate (TFR) by EU-27 Member State, 2005**




**Source:** United Nations

These relatively high fertility rates at higher levels of development are not due simply to the so-called ‘tempo effects (Table I.2.4). The study suggests that, above a certain level of development, further development may result in higher fertility rates.

Further research into these mechanisms is needed because the researchers found notable exceptions. Japan, South Korea and Canada are at advanced stages of development, but without increasing fertility. These exceptions indicate that development alone is not sufficient to reverse the downward fertility trend.

On the other hand, the Scandinavian countries have high labour force participation, innovative family policies and among the highest fertility levels in EU-27. Thus, the fertility reversal may be due to better policies to improve gender equality and facilitate a work-family balance. In fact, failure to address gender equality, work-family balance and flexibility in labour markets may well explain why fertility in rich countries in Asia continues to decrease as they grow wealthier.

Graph I.7.4: Households with children by type (single parent, couple, other), 2009 (% of all households with children)



No data available for Denmark and Sweden

Source: Eurostat (online data codes: lfst\_hhnhtych)

Ensuring suitable childcare provision is an essential step towards equal opportunities in employment between women and men. In 2002, at the Barcelona Summit<sup>(44)</sup>, the European Council set the targets of providing childcare, by 2010, to at least 33% of children under 3 years of age. Other forms of family support were comprehensively mapped across all 27 Member States in a recent EU-funded project<sup>(45)</sup> revealing considerable differences both in public policy as well as in cultural approach as regards informal support within families.

Within the EU the traditional stereotype of poorer families having several children seems to have given way to a resumption of pre-industrial revolution patterns whereby better-off families tend to have more children. Nevertheless, at the other end of the income range, there is a persistent association between poverty and number of children. The EU SILC<sup>(46)</sup> reported that in 2008 the risk of poverty in the EU grows with the number of dependent children; considering two-adult households, this is 16.3% overall, 11.4% with one dependent child, 14.5% with two dependent children and 25.9% with three or more. Thus the distribution of children is U-shaped, with larger families at both ends of the income spectrum than in the middle.

A recent EU-funded project<sup>(47)</sup> showed that possible important areas of intervention to alleviate obstacles to the fulfilment of young adults' fertility goals are job security, gender equality and the reconciliation of work and family. However, social norms and cultural settings also play a crucial role and interplay with family policies.

## 7.4. CHANGING HOUSEHOLD STRUCTURE

Household structure is constantly changing. As the population ages, more people live in smaller households, increasingly consisting of a single person. At the same time, many young adults, especially men, delay leaving the parental home to found their own household.

### 7.4.1. Smaller households

Average family and household size has been declining since the 1960s. Despite the slight increase in fertility rates in the early years of the 21st century, the decline in household size continued between 2005 and 2009 in all EU-27 Member States, except Austria, Belgium, Germany, Hungary, Romania and the United Kingdom, where it remained stable. For EU-27, average household size fell from 2.5 members to 2.4, with the largest reduction recorded in Lithuania (-0.5) and Slovakia (-0.3).

Many reasons have been provided to explain the changes observed in family and household size over the past half century. The ageing of Europe's population reported in the previous chapter led to a

<sup>(44)</sup> For the Barcelona (2004) targets see <http://europa.eu/rapid/pressReleasesAction.do?reference=MEMO/08/592&format=HTML&aged=0&language=EN&guiLanguage=en>

<sup>(45)</sup> See [www.multilinks-project.eu](http://www.multilinks-project.eu) for details.

<sup>(46)</sup> Statistics on Income and Living Conditions; the data reported is accessible online via the code ilc\_li03; the year 2009 reports on 2008 income in almost all countries.

<sup>(47)</sup> see [www.repro-project.org](http://www.repro-project.org).

decline in the proportion of young people, automatically resulting in fewer new candidates for marriage and family building. At the same time, changing value systems contributed to lower fertility rates and an increase in the number of childless couples.


#### 7.4.2. More diverse family living arrangements

The decline in family size associated with lower fertility rates and population ageing has been accompanied by a fall in the proportion of married couples, as non-marital relationships and lone parenting have become more widely accepted. The proportion of single-person households has also increased, as older people have become less likely to live with their children or grandchildren.

The majority of households with children in the EU comprises two adults (Graph I.7.4), almost always living in a couple partnership. Between 2005 and 2009, despite the small increase in fertility rates, the percentage of two-adult households with children fell from 29 % to 27.5 % across Europe. This reduction may also be partly explained by population ageing, as older people are more likely to be living alone.

Single-parents households are relatively common in Estonia and the United Kingdom (both above 20%). In the United Kingdom and Ireland, 8 % and 6 % respectively of young women aged 15-24 are single parents (Graph I.7.5).

Graph I.7.5: Single parents among women aged 15-24, 2009 (%)




Several Member States are missing due to low values and/or small sample size

Source: Eurostat (online data code lfst\_hhaceday)

#### 7.4.3. Age on leaving the parental home and entering labour market

Young adults in Northern and Western European countries leave the parental home earlier than in other EU Member States. In all countries, women tend to leave their parents' home earlier than men (Graph I.7.6). The main reason is probably that women, on average, marry or move in with a partner at a younger age than men.

Graph I.7.6: Young adults who live with at least one parent and no spouse/partner by sex and age group, EU-27, 2009 (%)



Source: Eurostat, EU Labour Force Survey

This situation has changed slightly in recent years. Between 2005 and 2009, young adults in their twenties seemed to be leaving the family home a little earlier, whereas young adults over 30 were remaining somewhat longer with their parents.

The proportion of young adults (aged 25-29) living with their parent(s) varies from 15% or less in France, the Netherlands and Finland (Table I.7.4) to 55% or more in Bulgaria, Italy, Malta, Slovenia and Slovakia. It exceeds 50% in 16 Member States. Cultural aspects or different lifestyle arrangements, which are difficult to assess, may help to explain differences between countries.

A 2001 Eurobarometer survey<sup>(48)</sup>, suggested that material difficulties are the main obstacle to young people leaving the parental home. These material difficulties reflect changes in the housing and labour markets (for instance, lack of job security), or the conditions under which young people pursue their education. These difficulties are also reflected in the large number of young people living with their parents even if they are employed. In 2008,

<sup>(48)</sup> Eurobarometer 151, 2001: 67% of young adults aged 15-24 quoted material difficulties as the main reason for not leaving their family home. Such difficulties were the main reason in all countries except Luxembourg and the Netherlands.

this was the case for 51.1% of young adults aged 18-34 in EU-27, of whom 36% held a temporary work contract.

Table I.7.4: **Young adults living with at least one parent and no spouse/partner, by sex and age group, 2009 (%)**

	Men		Women	
	25-29	30-34	25-29	30-34
<b>EU-27</b>	41	20	26	11
<b>BE</b>	34	12	19	6
<b>BG</b>	66	36	40	18
<b>CZ</b>	51	24	31	10
<b>DE</b>	26	11	12	4
<b>EE</b>	24	15	15	(6)
<b>IE</b>	33	16	20	9
<b>EL</b>	66	42	51	23
<b>ES</b>	57	26	40	16
<b>FR</b>	18	7	8	3
<b>IT</b>	70	35	52	19
<b>CY</b>	44	17	27	10
<b>LV</b>	48	29	35	21
<b>LT</b>	40	21	23	14
<b>LU</b>	37	7	23	(4)
<b>HU</b>	57	28	36	16
<b>MT</b>	80	38	59	22
<b>NL</b>	19	5	7	(2)
<b>AT</b>	35	17	20	8
<b>PL</b>	50	23	34	15
<b>PT</b>	61	28	43	18
<b>RO</b>	54	24	29	12
<b>SI</b>	72	38	45	18
<b>SK</b>	68	38	46	23
<b>FI</b>	12	6	4	(2)
<b>UK</b>	26	11	14	5

Figures in brackets have low reliability. No data available for Denmark and Sweden.

**Source:** Eurostat, EU Labour Force Survey

The young adults' difficulties in forming new families and the rising proportion of the elderly are decreasing the average household size in the EU.

# Part II

Borderless Europeans





# 1. INTRODUCTION

Not only is EU-27 population ageing rapidly; it is also becoming more diverse and more connected across borders.

Firstly, the migratory movements of the past century have intensified. The great majority of EU-27 Member States have become a pole of attraction for migrants. In recent years, non-EU citizens have been joining EU countries at a rate of 1 to 2 million per year and intra-EU mobility has also increased. At the same time, the children and grandchildren of migrants have been integrating into their host countries.

Secondly, in recent years, new forms of mobility have been emerging. Young, well-educated Europeans take advantage of opportunities to work, study and live abroad. They usually move for short periods of time but are much more numerous than long-term migrants; they go largely unnoticed by official statistics, which tend to focus on longer term migration.

These new migrants bring with them connections to another Member State or to a country outside the EU. These connections may be the result of permanent migration, an extended stay in another country or strong personal ties with people in or from other countries, their culture and their customs.

## The Eurobarometer 'new' European survey

The Eurobarometer (EB) is an opinion survey carried out periodically using a standard questionnaire and an *ad-hoc* questionnaire on specific topics (EBS, special). Interviewers visit some 25,000 EU nationals – about 1000 per country – and put the questions to them face-to-face. Non-EU nationals are excluded from the survey. Partly making up for the small sample and limited coverage, this methodology yields high response and accuracy rates.

The EBS 337 <sup>(49)</sup> on mobility was carried out in November 2009. Respondents provided information on their cross-border mobility experience, knowledge and attitudes.

The EBS 346 <sup>(50)</sup> on new Europeans was carried out in March 2010. Respondents provided information about the transnational components in their ancestry, life history, relatives and knowledge/culture. In addition, they were asked about their attachment to their own country, other countries and the EU; the likelihood that they would move abroad in the future; their feeling of belonging to minority or majority groups and the importance of the EU for them. Whereas the response rate was generally high, some respondents could not, or did not, answer all the questions, making it impossible to report on the degree of connectedness for some 17 % of respondents.

These 'new' or 'borderless' <sup>(51)</sup> Europeans do not make up a closed, well-defined group; rather, the majority of citizens experience cross-border connections to varying degrees. For most of them, the connections are moderate, involving regular holidays to a favourite location abroad, following

<sup>(49)</sup> see [http://ec.europa.eu/public\\_opinion/archives/ebs/ebs\\_337\\_en.pdf](http://ec.europa.eu/public_opinion/archives/ebs/ebs_337_en.pdf)

<sup>(50)</sup> see [http://ec.europa.eu/public\\_opinion/archives/ebs/ebs\\_346\\_en.pdf](http://ec.europa.eu/public_opinion/archives/ebs/ebs_346_en.pdf)

<sup>(51)</sup> The Eurobarometer report focuses on counting EU citizens with varying degrees of connections; this report underlines the connections themselves in degrees of borderless-ness.

Table II.1.1: **Borderless Europeans: main findings**

By 2008, 12.7% of EU-27 residents aged 15-74 were foreign-born or had at least one foreign-born parent. By 2060, the proportion is projected to double and reach over 25%.

The potential for sustained immigration to the EU is strong. Many EU-27 Member States rank at the top of the scale of attractiveness as destinations for migrants from other countries in the world.

In the four Member States with the largest cohorts of second-generation migrants and reliable data (BE, FR, NL, AT, UK), integration typically occurs two-to-three generations, when the children of migrants come close to the education levels and approach the labour market levels of local populations; overall in the EU-27, by the third generation, grandchildren of migrants no longer feel that they are part of a minority group.

A new group of mobile Europeans is emerging: they tend to be younger and better educated than the average in the host country; and they often move between countries for short periods of time.

People who are connected to other countries (both traditional migrants and 'new' mobile people) tend to be more proficient in foreign languages and to envisage moving abroad for study or work.

### Box II.1.1: Cross-border migration, mobility and marriages

There are a small number of long-term migrants in the EU, compared to, for instance, North-America. They are on the increase and, together with their descendants, are increasing the diversity in the EU populations.

However, a lot more people are experiencing shorter-term forms of mobility and intermarrying. While these change populations less dramatically and in subtler ways, they help spreading a sense of cross-border connections.

Table 1 presents rough estimates of the numbers of people falling into different categories, made non-overlapping. Apart from the 20 million (4%) non-EU citizens living in the EU (Eurostat population statistics), the estimates are based on a Eurobarometer survey, which only includes EU-nationals in its sample.

About 10% of EU citizens do not live in the country in which they were born. An additional 5% have at least one parent or grandparent who was born abroad.

A fourth major group are EU citizens who have worked or studied abroad or live or have lived with a foreign partner. Not counting here are those with foreign ancestry, up to their grandparents, they make up a further 11% of EU nationals.

Table 1: **Counting Borderless Europeans (% and millions)**

	%	millions
1. Non-EU citizens living in the EU	4	20
2. EU citizens who were born abroad	10	50
3. EU citizens born in the country but whose parents or grandparents were born abroad	5	25
4. EU citizens with work/study experience abroad or have/had a foreign partner (1)	11	55

(1) Group 4. excludes those born abroad or with foreign-born ancestry

Source: 1. Eurostat online data code migr\_pop1ctz; 2.-4. Eurobarometer EBS 346

In total, people with migration background, mobility experience or foreign spouse/partners represent one third of Europe's population, or around 150 million people.

In addition to them, many more people, not belonging to any of the above groups, are connected to other countries in other ways. They speak foreign languages, including non European languages, have friends or relatives abroad or from abroad, follow foreign news, eat foreign foods.

foreign news and the like. For a smaller proportion of them, being married to a foreigner or having lived or been born abroad, the connections are stronger.

Official statistics provide some information on the cross-border connectedness of Europeans. They categorise Europe's population as nationals and non-nationals (EU and non-EU) or native-born and foreign-born. Some surveys also collect information about citizenship at birth, as in the case of a special module of the Labour Force Survey covering respondents' parents.

This part of the report draws largely on sources such as the Eurobarometer. It tries to go beyond the traditional dichotomies, which tend to divide populations into nationals and foreigners or people with and without a background of migration; such categorisations are certainly relevant, but they should be supplemented with indications of past migration experiences. The Eurobarometer offers some information about the degree to which

increased mobility within the EU leads to an 'ever closer union' at a personal level.

Increasing cross-border connectedness of Europe's population has important implications for future migration patterns. It creates a more cohesive and inclusive society. It has the potential to make labour markets more efficient through cross-border matching of supply and demand. It promotes the exchange of knowledge and experience.

At the same time, as people become more connected across country boundaries, they also become more prone to short- and long-term migration. This influences population dynamics and, more importantly, it exposes policy makers to the risk of unprecedented responses from the public to their demographic policies. Europeans with connections to other countries are more aware of opportunities elsewhere and more willing to move. They are up to four times more likely to do so than those without any foreign experience or background. For instance, Member States

experiencing social and economic difficulties could rapidly lose people, not just to other EU Member States but also to other developed countries such as the United States, or to the countries of origin of migrants present in the EU, such as Turkey. The people most likely to move are the younger and better educated, so that the impact on economic growth in the countries affected could be significant.

## 2. MIGRANTS ACROSS GENERATIONS

This chapter presents a time-line of migration within and into the EU. It draws mostly on official sources for the most part and focuses on traditional, long-term migration as opposed to the new forms of mobility introduced in the next chapter.

Migratory flows over past decades have had a significant impact on the current population size in most Member States, although the picture is very diverse. Some Member States have lost people. Others have gained as a result of migration. For some member States, the impact of past migrations is far larger than is revealed by statistics on foreign nationals.

Generally speaking, long-term migrants and their descendants integrate fairly well as regards education outcomes, and less well as regards labour market outcomes, into their host countries within the second generation. In so doing, they tend to retain some of their traditions, for instance the language of their ancestors.

Europe continues to attract migrants and the share of migrants and their descendants is projected to increase in the future.

### 2.1. HOW MIGRANTS SHAPE THE STRUCTURE OF EU-27 POPULATIONS

The migration flows of the past decades have left their mark on population size and structure in many Member States. In this section, some simulations are presented that compare the population in 2007 with what it would have been if no migration had taken place since 1960. These simulations take account of the fact that immigrants settle down and have partners, children and grandchildren in the host country.

Fertility and mortality rates are used to calculate a theoretical population that would have been observed in 2007 had there been no migration. It is possible, through a comparison with the actual population, to visualise the long-term impact of migration on both total population numbers and age structure. Where applicable, a comparison with the number of non-nationals allows visualising the 'hidden' impact of migration, that is the impact beyond the proportion of non-nationals from official statistics.

Table II.2.1 shows the impact of migration on the population size of different Member States <sup>(52)</sup>.

Table II.2.1: Differences between actual 2007 population and 2007 population based on projections that exclude migration from 1960, age 0-79 (thousands and share of actual population)

	thousands	%
BE	1,204	12
BG	-1,010	-14
CZ	-19	0
DK	346	7
DE	12,352	16
EE	106	8
IE	158	4
EL	:	:
ES	5,555	13
FR	10,047	17
IT	1867	3
CY	:	:
LV	:	:
LT	-42	-1
LU	:	:
HU	46	0
MT	:	:
NL	1,412	9
AT	1139	14
PL	-1731	-5
PT	-2,144	-21
RO	:	:
SI	:	:
SK	-182	-3
FI	-243	-5
SE	1,226	14
UK	2,671	5

For ES, the starting year is 1971 rather than 1960. The data necessary for this analysis was not available for EL, CY, LV, LU, MT, RO and SI.

Source: D. Philipov and J. Schuster, see note (51), (Table 5)


The population of Germany and France has increased by 16% and 17% respectively as a result of migration. An increase of more than 10% can also be noted in Belgium, Spain, Austria and Sweden, whereas in the United Kingdom migration has only resulted in a 5% increase in total population. Portugal (-21%) and Bulgaria (-14%), on the other hand, would have had a larger population without migration. In the case of Italy, recent immigration has compensated for the effects of emigration losses at the beginning of the period under review.

<sup>(52)</sup> Data are from D. Philipov and J. Schuster 'Effect of migration on population size and age composition in Europe', 2010, at [http://www.oeaw.ac.at/vid/download/edrp\\_2\\_10.pdf](http://www.oeaw.ac.at/vid/download/edrp_2_10.pdf), following 'method 2'; the source for the foreign population in the Graphs is Eurostat (online data code migr\_pop1\_ctz)

Graphs II.2.1-5 illustrate the impact of migration across the age range of five selected countries, representing five different types of effects that migrants have had on the populations of EU Member States.

France (Graph II.2.1) has been receiving migrants for a long time, and their impact is particularly visible in the younger age groups which, in the absence of immigration would be about 25 % smaller. In 2007, the actual population was about 60.5 million; had there been no migration, it would have been only 50.5 million. Of the 10 million difference caused by migration since 1960, 3.5 million is made up by the non-nationals in 2007; the outstanding 6.5 million are a wider demographic impact taking into account the immigrants' children and grandchildren<sup>(53)</sup>. Moreover, the difference is larger at the younger age groups. The vast majority of these additional young people are French nationals, whereas in the older age groups immigrants are much less likely to have acquired French citizenship.

Graph II.2.1: France, population without migration since 1960 and migration effect, by age group, 2007 (millions)




The effect of migration since 1960, coloured area, is estimated as the difference between the actual 2007 population and the population projected from 1960 to 2007 using only natural growth.

Source: D. Philipov and J. Schuster; Eurostat; see note (51)

Spain (Graph II.2.2) presents a very different picture, due to the fact that it has only recently experienced large-scale immigration. As a result, the population increase resulting from immigration is concentrated in the working-age population. Most of the additional population resulting from migration since 1971 (some 5.6 million) is made up of foreign nationals, although there are also a

few additional people at very young ages, representing the children of recent immigrants.

Graph II.2.2: Spain, population without migration since 1971 and migration effect, by age group, 2007 (millions)




The effect of migration since 1971, coloured area, is estimated as the difference between the actual 2007 population and the population projected from 1971 to 2007 using only natural growth.

Source: D. Philipov and J. Schuster; Eurostat; see note (51)

Ireland (Graph II.2.3<sup>(54)</sup>) has been traditionally an emigration country, but in recent years – before the recession – it experienced a significant inflow of migrants, including Irish nationals returning to their country. As a result, the working-age population is significantly larger than it would have been in the absence of migration. In the youngest age groups, however, past emigration has left a small deficit. The 2008 recession has dampened the effect of immigration to Ireland, as many foreigners have left the country.

Graph II.2.3: Ireland, population without migration since 1960 and migration effect, by age group, 2007 (100,000s)



The effect of migration since 1960, dashed area, is estimated as the difference between the actual 2007 population and the population projected from 1960 to 2007 using only natural growth.


Source: D. Philipov and J. Schuster; see note (51)

<sup>(53)</sup> This does not represent an estimate of the number of children and grand-children of immigrants since 1960.

<sup>(54)</sup> A line graph has been used to make show that the lines representing the actual and hypothetical populations cross.

Portugal's population today is significantly smaller than it would have been in the absence of migration (Graph II.2.4). In 2007, the total population was slightly over 10 million; if there had been no migration, it would have been well over 12 million. Portuguese nationals represent the largest group of foreigners in Luxembourg and France. The effect of emigration is visible across almost the entire age range of the population, with the exception of the very old age group.

Graph II.2.4: Portugal, actual population and population without migration since 1960, by age group, 2007 (100,000s)




The effect of migration since 1960, white area above, is estimated as the difference between the population projected from 1960 to 2007 using only natural growth and the actual 2007 population.

Source: D. Philipov and J. Schuster; Eurostat; see note (51)

Some Central and Eastern European Member States have recently become emigration countries on a significant scale. Lithuania (Graph II.2.5) is a case in point. Emigration resulted in a population deficit among the prime working-age groups, which also led to fewer children being born in the country.

Like Lithuania, Bulgaria, Latvia and Romania have experienced a decade of large population losses also due to the emigration of young adults.

Graph II.2.5: Lithuania, population without migration since 1960 and migration effect, by age group, 2007 (100,000s)



The effect of migration since 1960, dashed area, is estimated as the difference between the population projected from 1960 to 2007 using only natural growth and the actual 2007 population.

Source: D. Philipov and J. Schuster; see note (51)

## 2.2. INTEGRATION OF MIGRANTS AND THEIR DESCENDANTS ACROSS GENERATIONS

This section presents new data on the second- and third-generation migrants. The data from the 2008 ad-hoc module of the EU Labour Force Survey<sup>(55)</sup> allows estimating the education levels and labour market outcome by place of birth of the respondent and their parents. The data from the Eurobarometer 346, limited to EU-27 citizens, allows estimating the feeling of belonging to a minority group and the knowledge of foreign languages by place of birth of the respondents and of their parents and grandparents.

The tables below mainly compare current foreign-born with current children of foreign-born migrants, both of prime working age (25-49 or 25-54). This is a comparison between two different cohorts; the children of the current working-age foreign-born residents may behave differently when they will be of working age.

### 2.2.1. Second-generation migrants

This sub-section focuses on the traditional, broad definition of second-generation migrants, as anyone who was native-born, but who has at least one parent born in another country, including another EU Member State. However, a special

<sup>(55)</sup> In 2008 the Labour Force Survey included an ad-hoc module which also covered the place of birth of the respondents' parents. Data are available for most Member States although they are relevant and reliable for only a few.

case is made for people whose parents were born in another EU-27 Member State. The analysis covers labour market outcomes.

The percentage of people aged 25-54 is only significantly high in Belgium, France, Italy, the Netherlands, Austria and the United Kingdom<sup>(56)</sup>. In other countries labour market outcome statistics, especially for unemployment, generally lack the necessary reliability.

Globally, employment rates of second-generation migrants converge towards those with native-born parents. However, this convergence is hampered by persisting high unemployment.

### Unemployment

Unemployment rates<sup>(57)</sup> of the foreign-born are always higher than those of the native-born with native-born parents. This applies to both sexes.

Table II.2.2: Unemployment rates of women aged 25-54 by place of birth, own and of parents, 2008

	Born abroad	Native-born with parents born		
		abroad		native
		total	in EU-27	
BE	14.1	12.8	10.2	4.5
CZ	10.6	10.9	11.6	5.1
ES	15.1	21.5	22.1	10.8
FR	12.8	8.9	:	6.6
IT	11.3	(7.3)	:	7.5
LU	5.5	(5.4)	(5.6)	(3.0)
NL	6.0	(2.8)	:	2.1
UK	5.5	4.6	3.6	3.2

Parents are considered as born abroad when at least one parent is. See also footnotes 55 and 56.  
Source: Eurostat, EU Labour Force Survey ad hoc module 2008 (online data code: lfso\_08cobsp)

Among both women and men, unemployment is high even at the second generation, although in France and the United Kingdom it is substantially lower (Table II.2.2 and II.2.3). Among women in Spain, it is higher at the second generation.

<sup>(56)</sup> Most of the second-generation migrants in Estonia, Latvia and Slovenia are the result of exceptional historical events. The data from Germany, Finland and Sweden are not reliable due to the high non-response rate. In addition, Germany does not collect information on country of birth in the Labour Force Survey. In the 2008 LFS ad-hoc module, citizenship rather than country of birth was surveyed for the respondents' parents. Therefore, these countries are excluded from the analysis.

<sup>(57)</sup> The Unemployment Rate is the ratio between those seeking employment and the total labour force. The Employment Rate is the ratio between the employed and the total populations. As such, the two rates are not complementary (they do not add up to 100).

Unemployment for the native-born with foreign-born parents is still far higher than for those with native-born parents.

Table II.2.3: Unemployment rates of men aged 25-54 by place of birth, own and of parents, 2008

	Born abroad	Native-born with parents born		
		abroad		native
		total	in EU-27	
BE	14.0	12.1	8.9	3.3
CZ	4.7	5.0	5.5	2.6
ES	14.3	10.7	10.6	7.6
FR	11.1	8.9	:	4.4
IT	5.3	(4.7)	:	4.6
NL	5.0	(3.4)	:	(1.2)
AT	5.5	(4.8)	:	2.1
UK	6.0	4.7	3.8	3.6

Parents are considered as born abroad when at least one parent is. See also footnotes 55 and 56.  
Source: Eurostat, EU Labour Force Survey ad hoc module 2008 (online data code: lfso\_08cobsp)

### Employment

Employment rates improve from the first to the second generation.

Table II.2.4: Employment rates of women aged 25-54 by place of birth, own and of parents, 2008

	Born abroad	Native-born with parents born		
		abroad		native
		total	in EU-27	
BE	53.4	62.2	66.3	79.0
CZ	68.8	70.8	70.0	75.6
IE	66.2	73.2	72.9	70.2
EL	55.7	55.9	50.0	62.9
ES	65.9	60.4	61.3	66.0
FR	58.8	74.9	78.7	80.5
IT	56.7	67.5	68.6	60.9
CY	78.7	73.9	76.9	76.4
LU	68.9	72.4	71.6	69.5
HU	68.0	73.1	74.3	67.9
NL	62.5	83.4	83.5	83.5
AT	70.8	78.8	80.7	82.6
PL	(65.1)	68.8	59.7	70.7
PT	78.5	81.9	:	76.0
SK	81.4	79.6	81.1	72.8
UK	62.6	75.1	77.5	77.8

Parents are considered as born abroad when at least one parent is. See also footnotes 55 and 56.  
Source: Eurostat, EU Labour Force Survey ad hoc module 2008 (online data code: lfso\_08cobsp)

Among the women, data from the Netherlands show the fastest convergence; second generation foreigners have the same employment rates as those with native-born parents (Table II.2.4).

Among other countries with many second-generation immigrants, a fast convergence is registered in France, Austria and the United Kingdom. In Belgium, on the other hand, employment rates remain low for the second generation. In Italy, second generation migrant women have higher employment rate than native-born with native-born parents.

Table II.2.5: **Employment rates of men aged 25-54 by place of birth, own and of parents, 2008**

	Born abroad	Native-born with parents born		
		abroad		native
		total	in EU-27	
BE	76.6	76.9	82.1	90.2
CZ	88.8	88.1	87.2	92.4
DK	81.7	89.4	:	93.0
IE	85.9	87.4	86.8	86.7
EL	93.9	84.3	75.9	90.5
ES	80.4	80.7	79.9	85.3
FR	81.4	84.7	86.0	90.5
IT	89.0	89.8	89.5	87.0
CY	83.9	84.6	81.3	93.8
LU	88.8	92.1	92.3	92.2
HU	87.4	79.3	77.8	80.9
NL	82.1	90.8	90.4	95.0
AT	85.1	89.7	92.2	92.1
PL	88.5	78.7	79.7	83.9
PT	89.2	80.7	:	87.8
RO	81.4	97.3	:	87.8
SK	87.1	87.8	89.6	85.9
UK	84.1	86.7	86.9	88.5

Parents are considered as born abroad when at least one parent is. See also footnotes 55 and 56.

Source: Eurostat, EU Labour Force Survey ad hoc module 2008 (online data code: lfso\_08cobsp)

The patterns observed for women also apply to men, although foreign-born men have higher employment rates and a smaller gap compared to native-born than women. Here employment rates rise fast in the second generation in The Netherlands and the United Kingdom (Table II.2.5). In Belgium, there is hardly any improvement, except for the children of those born from other EU-27 Member States. In Italy, first and second generation migrants have higher employment rate than native-born with native-born parents.

### 2.2.2. Second-generation migrants from non-EU countries

This sub-section focuses on 'non-EU-born', i.e., the residents who were born outside EU-27 as well as to EU-born with parents born outside the EU-27. The focus on the non-EU-born was chosen because their integration is perceived as being

relatively difficult. In addition, the analysis focuses on education in addition to employment. This is because immigrants from non-EU-27 countries tend to have low education rates, and more specifically high rates of low education (ISCED 0-2).

The age group used in the comparisons for the detailed country analysis is restricted to 25-49. In analysing the education attainment, this narrow age group limits the influence of trends in education; in analysing the employment rates, it serves to remove the influence of late-joining and early-exiting from the labour market.

The percentage of people aged 25-49 born in EU-27 with one or both parents born outside EU-27 is significant in only a few countries, primarily Belgium, France, the Netherlands, Austria and the United Kingdom; these countries are the focus of analysis below (Graph II.2.6).

It must be underlined that the population born outside the EU is very diverse. The differences between countries are in part due to the different composition of the foreigners' origins.

Globally, education rates of the non-EU-born appear to converge fast after one generation; the convergence is slower for employment rates.

### Education


For reasons explained above, the analysis below focuses on the share of the population with low educational attainment (ISCED 0-2).

The education of those with non-EU-born parents is much higher than that of non-EU-born people with the exception of Spain, Italy and Portugal, where there are relatively few people with non-EU-born parents (Tables II.2.6 and II.2.7).

The gap between the non-EU-born and the EU-born with both EU-born parents is almost 15 percentage points for the women and over 12 for the men. The EU-born with one non-EU-born parent tend to have an even lower share of low education, that is, even better education, than those with both parents born in the EU; this is the case in all reported Member States for the men and all except Belgium, the Czech Republic and France for the women.



Graph II.2.6: Resident population aged 25-49 born in EU-27 by place of birth of parents, 2008 (%)



The bars for Germany, Finland and Sweden are omitted because they are affected by very high rates of non-response; the bars for Estonia, Latvia, Lithuania and Slovenia are omitted because of the exceptional nature of their second-generation immigrants. The EU figures are computed only on the Member States shown.

Source: Eurostat, EU Labour Force Survey ad hoc module 2008

These EU-level results mask large differences among individual member States. Among Member States with large second-generation immigrant populations, the education gap is positive in Belgium, France, the Netherlands and Austria and negative in the United Kingdom. (Table II.2.6).

Table II.2.6: Women aged 25-49 with ISCED 0-2 level of education by place of birth, own and of parents, 2008 (%)

	Non-EU born	Born in the EU		
		Parents born outside the EU		
		2	1	neither
EU-27	38.1	23.6	18.2	23.4
BE	39.9	33.8	24.1	16.6
CZ	18.2	:	(14.4)	7.2
EL	42.7	(35.8)	(20.4)	24.2
ES	42.1	54.3	26.9	35.3
FR	43.4	25.2	21.3	20.1
IT	44.5	:	14.8	33.9
LU	22.3	(3.5)	:	29.0
NL	41.5	25.1	15.1	18.2
AT	40.4	29.1	20.0	13.6
PT	47.7	72.1	30.0	62.2
UK	22.2	17.1	13.8	23.4

See footnotes 55 and 56.

Source: Eurostat, EU Labour Force Survey ad hoc module 2008

Education rate convergence for women is slow in Austria and, especially, Belgium. Here the lower education of people with one non-EU-born parent may partly explain their employment patterns (see Tables II.2.8 and II.2.9).

Table II.2.7: Men aged 25-49 with ISCED 0-2 level of education by place of birth, own and of parents, 2008 (%)

	Non-EU born	Born in the EU		
		Parents born outside the EU		
		2	1	neither
EU-27	38.6	26.4	19.5	26.2
BE	37.4	34.3	20.6	21.9
IE	9.0	:	(17.9)	26.9
EL	61.0	(31.5)	(22.2)	31.3
ES	44.9	27.2	28.4	41.8
FR	35.5	29.4	17.7	21.2
IT	55.4	62.6	34.2	42.1
NL	42.6	29.4	18.3	20.7
AT	28.8	33.4	5.7	6.2
PT	49.4	51.6	59.2	71.6
UK	17.4	20.9	19.8	22.3

See footnotes 55 and 56.

Source: Eurostat, EU Labour Force Survey ad hoc module 2008

### Employment

Similar results are found when analysing the employment rates. In almost all Member States, the employment rate of the non-EU-born population is substantially lower than for the EU-born with EU-born parents (Table II.2.4 and II.2.9); at EU-27 level this gap is over 13 percentage points for the women and 6 for the men.

- Among the EU-born, the employment gap between those with two non-EU-born parents and those with both parents born in the EU is about 7 percentage points for the women and 7.5 for the men; in other words, at the second generation, most of the women's employment gap between EU-born and non-EU-born

disappears. On the other hand, for the men the (smaller) gap actually increases at the second generation when both parents are born outside the EU; it must be considered that male migration is often employment-driven.

- Furthermore, women with one non-EU-born parent have even higher employment rates than those with both parents born in the EU. Among the men, the employment rates for those with one non-EU-born parent are lower than those with both parents born in the EU; however, the gap is very small.

Table II.2.8: Employment rates of women aged 25-49 by place of birth, own and of parents, 2008

	Non-EU born	Born in the EU		
		Parents born outside the EU		
		2	1	neither
EU-27	59.7	66.4	76.7	73.2
BE	46.3	41.5	75.5	80.1
CZ	63.1	:	82.1	73.7
IE	61.7	(51.6)	76.4	71.3
EL	54.8	62.7	73.4	65.0
ES	67.0	33.0	62.0	67.8
FR	52.7	64.0	76.5	81.1
IT	56.9	60.8	66.4	61.7
CY	82.4	:	(69.8)	78.0
LU	48.2	(77.4)	77.9	73.2
HU	68.1	:	(74.4)	67.7
NL	58.4	79.1	87.4	85.2
AT	65.8	74.1	77.5	83.4
PL	67.1	81.3	77.1	72.9
PT	80.7	80.8	78.1	77.8
SK	(72.1)	:	(69.1)	72.9
UK	56.8	69.3	78.5	77.7

See footnotes 55 and 56.

Source: Eurostat, EU Labour Force Survey ad hoc module 2008

Children of non-EU-born have higher employment rates than non-EU-born immigrants especially in France, the Netherlands, Austria and the United Kingdom; less so in Belgium and Austria. Interestingly, among children of non-EU-born, low employment rates in Belgium contrasts with very high rates in the neighbouring Netherlands (Table II.2.9).

Table II.2.9: Employment rates of men aged 25-49 by place of birth, own and of parents, 2008

	Non-EU born	Born in the EU		
		Parents born outside the EU		
		2	1	neither
EU-27	82.7	81.0	86.8	88.6
BE	69.3	60.9	77.7	90.6
CZ	89.2	(100.0)	97.2	92.7
DK	88.0	(77.7)	:	93.3
IE	79.5	(78.8)	87.9	87.5
EL	95.4	89.7	83.8	91.2
ES	79.9	72.2	77.1	85.7
FR	81.4	79.3	87.2	90.7
IT	89.5	90.2	87.3	87.0
CY	77.3	:	92.0	93.8
LU	71.5	(83.1)	90.4	92.5
NL	81.3	89.5	93.3	95.5
AT	84.4	82.7	86.4	93.5
PL	83.9	74.3	80.9	86.1
PT	87.9	83.2	82.4	88.6
UK	81.0	84.6	89.0	89.6

See footnotes 55 and 56.

Source: Eurostat, EU Labour Force Survey ad hoc module 2008

### 2.2.3. Do people of foreign descent feel that they belong to a minority?

Many migrants feel that they are part of a minority group or that they are perceived by others as belonging to a minority. In the Eurobarometer survey, 32.2% of foreign-born and only 7.4% of native-born residents felt that they belonged to a minority group. Similar differences applied to those who felt they were perceived by others as belonging to a minority.

Over the generations, do people of foreign descent feel progressively more integrated? Although the concept of integration is difficult to define, the Eurobarometer responses provide some indication of the extent to which integration is perceived to be taking place.

Feelings of belonging to a minority group vary significantly depending on where people and their parents and grandparents were born (Table II.2.10). The summary table presents findings for groups of people who are first-, second- or third-generation migrants. The largest proportion of respondents who feel they belong to a minority (34.3%) is found among those who were born abroad, as were their parents and grandparents. The lowest proportion (6.6%) is for those who were born in the country of residence as were their parents and grandparents. The cases in between show an almost linear relationship between ancestry and the feeling of belonging to a minority.

Table II.2.10: EU nationals feeling that they belong to a minority or majority group by ancestry, 2010 (%)

	Feeling of belonging to a:	
	majority group	minority group
<b>Respondent foreign born?</b>		
Yes	50.7	32.2
No	76.2	7.4
<b>Parents and respondent foreign born?</b>		
Both parents foreign born, resp. native-born	58.2	23.6
One parent foreign born, resp. native-born	71.9	12.4
<b>Grandparents, parents and respondent foreign born?</b>		
Two or more grandparent foreign born, respondent and parent native-born	74.3	10.2
All grandparents native born	76.9	6.6

Source: Eurobarometer, EBS 346

Among native-born respondents with both parents born abroad, 23.6% felt that they belong to a minority, while only 12.4% of those with only one parent born abroad felt so. 10.2% of native-born respondents with native-born parents and two or more foreign-born grand-parents felt that they belonged to a minority group.

Respondents were also asked if they felt that others perceived them as belonging to a minority group. The percentages follow a similar pattern to that shown in Table II.2.10.

#### 2.2.4. Foreign descent and languages

The same pattern applies to language proficiency. According to the Eurobarometer 346, among the foreign-born population in the EU, 75% speak a foreign language, compared to 45% of those born in the country of residence. Of those with one foreign-born parent (but not foreign born themselves), 65% speak another language. Among those with foreign-born grandparents (but not themselves or their parents) about 60% speak another language, which is well above the average for those who were not born abroad. Positive aspects of having foreign roots, such as speaking other languages, tend to last longer over the generations than do feelings of belonging to a minority group.

The findings concerning education levels, employment rates, feeling of belonging to a minority group and speaking foreign languages point to a progressive integration of migrants by the third generation. At the second generation, integration in terms of education levels is more advanced than in terms of employment. Further

study may be required to assess the integration of different migrant groups/ethnicities in countries with different policies. In addition, many third-generation migrants in the EU come from countries that now belong to EU-27. In the future, a larger proportion of new Europeans may be descendants of migrants from outside Europe, and their integration patterns could be different from those observed here.

### Box II.2.1: Are there many irregular migrants?

Official statistics aim to cover all migrants. However, not all Member States are able to report fully on irregular migrants.

The Clandestino<sup>(1)</sup> project has estimated the number of 'irregular' residents and workers in several EU Member States, drawing on records from border-enforcement agencies, police, labour inspections, regularisation exercises and NGOs.

The project also yielded broad and patchy breakdowns by gender, occupational status and sector, and main geographical areas. The reliability of this information in no way matches that of the wealth of the documentation that official statistics provide mainly on regular foreign residents.

In 2008, an estimated 31 million foreigners lived in EU-27 Member States, comprising 11.5 million citizens from other EU Member States and 19.5 million non-EU nationals.

<sup>(1)</sup> The project was funded by the EU. See <http://irregular-migration.hwwi.net/Home.6177.0.html>

Most irregular residents are non-EU-nationals. The Clandestino project estimated that between 1.9 and 3.8 million people lived 'irregularly' in EU-27, accounting for between 7% and 13% of estimated foreigners<sup>(2)</sup>. A few may have been included in official statistics.

The number of irregular immigrants appears to have been declining in recent years, mainly because many are nationals of countries that have joined the EU. As restrictions to the freedom of movement have been gradually eased, many have found that their situation has been regularised. Also, periodically, governments allow the regularisation of immigrants who have entered the country clandestinely. Hence the number of illegal immigrants fluctuates considerably from one year to the next.

<sup>(2)</sup> The percentages are computed over the total number of non-nationals from official statistics. The comparison between official data and Clandestino estimates is undermined by partial coverage overlap and the low reliability of Clandestino.

## 2.3. HOW MIGRANTS CAN SHAPE FUTURE EU POPULATIONS

Immigration is generally expected to continue to be an important determinant of population trends in the EU, notably as the working-age population starts to shrink from 2014.

### 2.3.1. Migrants and their descendants in the future

On the basis of the migration assumptions used in the latest (2008) population projections by Eurostat<sup>(58)</sup> the total population in 2060 would be 91 million people larger than it would have been in the absence of migration. Due to immigration, the population projection indicates that, in 2060, Europe's population is projected to be slightly larger than today, even though the number of deaths in the EU is expected to exceed the number of births.

<sup>(58)</sup> see [http://epc.eurostat.ec.europa.eu/portal/page/portal/statistics/search\\_database](http://epc.eurostat.ec.europa.eu/portal/page/portal/statistics/search_database), online data codes proj\_08c.

Under these assumptions about future immigration used in the population projections, the number of people of foreign background (either born abroad or the children of foreign-born parents) is projected to increase significantly.


According to the *ad-hoc* module of the EU Labour Force Survey implemented in 2008 (see also Graph II.2.7), 12.7% of the EU residents aged 15-74 were foreign-born or had at least one foreign-born parent.

According to a research study<sup>(59)</sup>, in 2060 this group may more than double and exceed 25% of the population (Graph II.2.7) across all ages.

<sup>(59)</sup> See G. Lanzieri, 'Fewer, older and multicultural? A projection of the populations of the European Union Member States by foreign/national background'. Paper for the European Population Conference, Vienna, 1-4 September 2010

<http://epc2010.princeton.edu/download.aspx?submissionId=100315>

Graph II.2.7: Projected foreign-born population and their descendants, 2061 (%)



FR: Metropolitan France.

Source: Model 1 in Lanzieri G. (2010) see note (59)

According to the same projections, the proportion of people of foreign background may vary substantially across Member States. In several countries, it would largely exceed 25% of the population, thereby increasing the number of EU residents with foreign ancestry.

In addition, among young adults the proportion of first and second generation immigrants is projected be far greater than today.

### 2.3.2. The potential supply of migrants

EU-27 is host to about one fifth of world migrants according to estimates by the Development Research Centre on Migration, Globalisation and Poverty<sup>(60)</sup> (Table II.2.2).

Table II.2.11: Foreign-born population by world area of residence (millions and share of foreign-born)

	Number of foreign-born	
	Millions	%
EU-27	34.7	19.8
Europe, other	25.3	14.4
US + Canada	40.4	23.0
America, other	6.1	3.5
Oceania	5.1	2.9
Asia	48.2	27.4
Africa	16.0	9.1
Total	175.7	100.0

Source: Global Migrant Origin Database

The 34.6 million foreign-born in the various EU-27 Member States include some 15 million who were born in another Member State (see Table I.5.3).

Europe is likely to continue to attract migrants. The supply will depend to some extent on economic and political developments in home countries.


There are, however, signs that the potential for further migration into the EU will not cease in the near future. In a recent world-wide survey of people's intention to migrate if the opportunity arose, many more people declared that they would migrate to an EU Member State than would emigrate.

Gallup collected data on intentions to move permanently out of a country if the opportunity arose. The survey<sup>(61)</sup> was carried out between 2007 and 2010 among respondents in most world countries. Graph II.2.8 indicates the net migration that would be observed if all the expressed interest in migrating materialised and people moved to their target countries. The Graph shows the degree of attractiveness of EU Member States and the potential for population increase through migration.

<sup>(60)</sup> At <http://www.migrationdrc.org/>. The figures differ from those presented in Part I since they refer to a different year and are based on a different methodology.

<sup>(61)</sup> See <http://www.gallup.com/poll/142364/Migration-Triple-Populations-Wealthy-Nations.aspx#1>

Graph II.2.8: Theoretical net migration (% of the population aged 15 or over)



The theoretical net migration is the expected increase that would occur if all those who expressed their wish to migrate to a specific country do so.

Source: Gallup, see <http://www.gallup.com/poll/142364/Migration-Triple-Populations-Wealthy-Nations.aspx#2>

The most attractive destinations include many EU Member States. Almost all of them project gains from the interest expressed in migrating. Generally speaking, EU-15 Member States (members before 2004) tend to be prospective migrant destinations, whereas newer Member States tend to be sources of emigrants.

Across the world, a small number of countries are at the top of the list of those expecting to gain from immigration, the largest being Canada (+160%) and Australia (+150%). While the United States attracts more migrants than the EU as a whole, some of the larger EU-27 countries are just as attractive as the United States in proportion to their adult populations.

The increase in migration recorded at the start of the 21st century, and which may continue, is not the only driver of increased diversity. The number of people of foreign descent – first or second generation – is expected to grow on account of the current, large migrant cohort of childbearing age. The proportion of people of foreign descent will depend on continuing migration flows and the degree to which young migrants intermarry with the host population<sup>(62)</sup>. In turn, migration flows will depend on the political, social and economic situation in other countries, as well as the capacity of EU Member States to integrate migrants.

<sup>(62)</sup> The higher fertility and mortality rates of migrants are an additional, albeit less important, factor.

### 3. MOVING INTO AND ACROSS THE EU

In the early years of the European Economic Community, citizens of Member States migrated across Europe for long periods, in many cases for life. They were often forced out of their countries by poverty and joblessness. They were mostly men, although some migrated with their families. They were generally moving from the south and provided manpower for the industrial sectors in the north.

Gradually, as the early intra-European migrants were settling and integrating into the populations they had joined, different groups and types of migrants began to emerge.

Firstly, the origins and destinations of the main flows changed. In 2008 nationals of non-EU-27 outnumbered EU nationals by more than 50% (Graph I.4.4). Within the EU, almost every enlargement has brought a wave of migrants from joining Member States into the other Member States. Earlier sources of migration, mostly Mediterranean countries, including Italy and Spain, are now characterised by large-scale net migration. In relative terms, perhaps the most notable change occurred in Ireland, which became a pole of attraction for migrants, although the 2008 recession reversed the trend in 2009.

Secondly, women are now much more likely to migrate than in the past. In some cases, they move simply to join a spouse who has already migrated, under family reunification schemes, but many more women are migrating to take up service sector jobs in the receiving countries.

Over the same period, the number and percentage of migrants in the population have also increased.

Thirdly, and most importantly, mobility within Europe has become increasingly dominated by people moving for short periods of time. Most of the new mobile population are young and well educated. It is not that they are being forced out of their countries of origin, rather that they are being attracted by opportunities elsewhere. They move independently or on secondment from their companies. Like their predecessors, most of this new mobile population are men.


Official statistics are not designed to study short-term mobility since people who move for less than one year are usually excluded. The indicators used

in this section come from *ad-hoc* Eurobarometer surveys<sup>(63)</sup>.

While only 2%<sup>(64)</sup> of EU citizens currently live in another Member State, many more have had experiences of living abroad in the past. Some 10% of the Eurobarometer respondents had lived and worked in another Member State (Graph II.3.1).

Also, most people experience work abroad as young adults in their twenties and thirties. Despite the fact that older citizens have had more time to accumulate experiences abroad, fewer of them have taken advantage of the opportunity to do so. If more young adults had worked and lived abroad in the past century, larger numbers of older people would be expected to have recorded work experience abroad in recent surveys. The Eurobarometer results below demonstrate that this was not the case.

Graph II.3.1: EU nationals who have lived and worked abroad in the past by age group, 2009 (%)




Source: Eurobarometer, EBS 337

There are similarly striking and telling differences by educational level. The Eurobarometer survey analysed the data with reference to the age at which respondents left full-time education.

<sup>(63)</sup> For a description of the Eurobarometer survey, see Chapter II.1

<sup>(64)</sup> This percentage is taken from official statistics. Since people who are abroad on short stays are largely excluded, 2% (about 12 million people) is an underestimate of the amount of the movement of citizens to other Member States.

Graph II.3.2: EU nationals who have lived and worked abroad in the past by group of age at end of full-time education, EU-27, 2009 (%)



Source: Eurobarometer, EBS 337

Most EU citizens who have had experience of work mobility are well educated. This contrasts with the relatively low level of education of (longer-term) migrants when compared to nationals (see Part I, Chapter 5.4). Similarly, striking differences are found by occupational level: managers and self-employed workers are much more likely to be mobile. Again, given that the profiles are rather different from those of current migrants, it can be concluded that most of the periods of work experience abroad were short.

The Eurobarometer survey used in Graphs II.3.1 and II.3.2 yielded similar results when EU citizens were asked about periods of study abroad and the experience of residing abroad without studying or working.

Unlike more traditional patterns of migration, these new short-term forms of mobility do not enable people to leave difficult situations in their own countries. Rather, they seem to offer short-term opportunities for professional and personal development abroad. The new mobility is driven more by ‘pull’ rather than ‘push’ factors.

### 3.1. ANCESTRY AND LIFE CHOICES

A distinction has been made between traditional, long-term migration and the more recent phenomenon of shorter-term mobility. A further distinction is made in this section between ‘ancestry’ and ‘life choices’ as factors determining European connectedness.

The term ‘life choices’ is used, for example, to describe individuals who are living or have lived with a foreign spouse and/or own a property abroad. These are considered as indicators of the

propensity for connectedness to other countries that are linked to mobility

**Ancestry**

An EU citizen is ‘Borderless by ancestry’ if s/he

- was born abroad, or
- has at least one parent who was born abroad, or
- has at least one grandparent who was born abroad.

The aggregate ‘Borderless Europeans by ancestry’ used in this section includes anyone who matches one or more of the above criteria and who had at least one grandparent who was born as a non-national of the country where s/he (the grandchild) resides.

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**Life choices**

An EU citizen is ‘Borderless by life choice’ if s/he


- has worked abroad for at least three consecutive months, or
- has studied abroad for at least half a school year, or
- lives/had lived with a foreign-born spouse/partner, and/or
- owns a property abroad.

The aggregate ‘Borderless Europeans by life choice, no ancestry’ used in this section includes anyone who matches one or more of the above criteria and who does not meet the ancestry requirements (definition above). The purpose of this exclusion is to avoid overlapping categories.

#### 3.1.1. Men are still more mobile

Whereas as many women as men have some cross-border ancestry, many more men than women have experience of cross-border life choices (Graph II.3.3).

Graph II.3.3: Borderless Europeans by ancestry and life choices/no ancestry by sex, EU-27, 2010 (%)



Source: Eurobarometer EBS 346, 2010

#### 3.1.2. Young adults across borders


The findings of the above analysis by age of respondents reporting work experience abroad are further reflected in the analysis by age of ancestry and life choices as factors determining Europeans’ degree of connectedness.

It takes young EU nationals some time before they feel attached to other countries and at ease with crossing national borders. However, younger adults are found to have more opportunities for cross-border connections, suggesting that overall rates could rise in the future.



According to the Eurobarometer survey, the largest number of respondents with connections abroad is found among young adults, aged 25-34 (Graph II.3.4). This applies to connections both by ancestry and by life choice abroad.

Graph II.3.4: Borderless Europeans by ancestry and life-choices/no ancestry by age group, 2010, (%)




Source: Eurobarometer EBS 346

### 3.1.3. The better educated are more connected

Education plays an important role in cross-border experience. Better educated people are much more likely to seek experiences abroad.

The education factor is strongest for life choices, especially among respondents who are not connected by ancestry (Graph II.3.5). Of those who remained in education until age 20 or above, about one in four made important life choices connecting them to other countries. These scores are well above (double) the rates for those who studied until the age of 16 (one third higher). This finding applies to all high scores for life choices, the effect being stronger for those who have studied abroad.

Graph II.3.5: Borderless Europeans by ancestry and life-choices/no ancestry by age at end of full-time education, EU-27, 2010 (%)



Source: Eurobarometer EBS 346


The link between education and cross-border experiences interacts with the age effect since the younger generations also display higher levels of educational attainment. The implication is that, in the future, the proportion of those with connections across borders will increase and extend into older age groups as a result of the ageing of the current young and connected generation, and due to increasing levels of education.

### 3.1.4. More cross-border connections for managers

Among the socio-occupational groups identified in the Eurobarometer survey, European managers seem more likely to have foreign connections than other groups (Graph II.3.6). Whereas they score relatively high on ancestry, they are far more likely to have made life choices abroad than respondents in other occupations. Manual workers and students are also relatively often of foreign ancestry; for manual workers, this may be explained by the characteristics of traditional migrants, their children and grandchildren.

Unemployed respondents tend to report a high incidence of foreign ancestry, which may in turn be explained by higher unemployment rates among migrants and their descendants. Students most frequently refer to foreign ancestry, although few of them were born in another country (6%), which is slightly below the overall proportion of those born in another country (7%). Many are the children of foreign-born parents.

Graph II.3.6: **Borderless Europeans by ancestry and life-choices/no ancestry by occupation, EU-27, 2010 (%)**



(1) 'Homemaker' refers to people without an occupation who look after the home.  
**Source:** Eurobarometer, EBS 346

### 3.2. CONNECTEDNESS AND ATTITUDES

Respondents with ancestry or life-choice connections tend to behave and feel differently from other respondents. They are more likely to feel an attachment to other countries and to envisage moving abroad to work, study or to live. They are also more likely to feel that they belong to a minority, although this applies in particular to people of foreign ancestry.

#### 3.2.1. Attachment to specific foreign countries and the EU

Respondents with foreign connections are more likely to feel attached to other countries as well as the EU, whether they are connected by ancestry or life choices.

Table II.3.1: **Attachment to specific foreign countries, EU-27, 2010 (%)**

<b>Connected by ancestry</b>	74
<b>Connected by life choices</b>	77
<b>Neither</b>	41
<b>Total</b>	51

**Source:** Eurobarometer EBS 346

Both ancestry and life choices make a difference when it comes to being attached to other countries, suggesting that experience and background have a lasting effect.

Table II.3.2: **Attachment to the EU, EU-27, 2010 (%)**

<b>Connected by ancestry</b>	50
<b>Connected by life choices</b>	55
<b>Neither</b>	51
<b>Total</b>	51

**Source:** Eurobarometer EBS 346

Both forms of connectedness also make little difference to feelings of attachment to the EU.

#### 3.2.2. Likelihood of moving abroad

Many more respondents of foreign ancestry (23%) expect to move abroad compared to those without any foreign ascendants (6%).

Part of the explanation is that many of the respondents are of foreign ancestry 'by choice' insofar as they migrated to their current host country at an adult age and are, therefore, of foreign ancestry because they chose to move abroad. They are distinguished from those who were born in the host country of foreign ancestors and those who moved there with their families. People who are connected by life choices may be more likely to repeat the move abroad since they have already shown a readiness to cross borders.

Overall, respondents of foreign descent and/or having had experiences abroad are almost four times more likely than those not of foreign descent to consider moving abroad. Those connected by life choice (24%) are as likely as those connected by ancestry (23%) to move abroad (Table II.3.3).

Table II.3.3: **Likelihood of moving abroad in the future, EU-27, 2010 (%)**

	<b>'Fairly or very likely'</b>
<b>Connected by ancestry</b>	23
<b>Connected by life choices</b>	24
<b>Neither</b>	6
<b>Total</b>	11

**Source:** Eurobarometer, EBS 346

The high propensity to move (move again, in many cases) is a sign that in the past moving has proven to be a beneficial experience; it may be part of a wider history of mobility, or be explained by having a partner from another country, insofar as people may acquire a willingness to move to a partner's country.

## 4. FURTHER WAYS OF CONNECTING TO OTHER COUNTRIES

Moving abroad, or having a foreign partner/spouse, creates strong links with other countries. There are also other, less direct ways in which people develop connections across borders.

Some take up jobs in other countries while continuing to live in their own. In many such cases, they live near a border. Cross-border commuting is relatively common among the closely-linked countries in the centre-north of the EU (France, Germany and, especially, Belgium, Luxembourg and the Netherlands).

Other people feel attached to the culture of another country. They speak the language, follow its news, and spend holidays there regularly. This type of connectedness is far more widespread than for the links illustrated in previous chapter.

### 4.1. COMMUTING ACROSS BORDERS

There are about one million cross-border workers within the EU, representing 0.4% of the working population. They reside in one EU Member State and work in another. About five times as many people (roughly 1% of EU's resident nationals) declare that they have been cross-border workers at some time during their life <sup>(65)</sup>.

Most commuters live near a border in one country and have a job just across the border; they commute across the border daily or weekly. However, a few are in less common arrangements. These include seasonal workers, tele-workers, or people who divide their work across more than one location.

Graph II.4.1 sets out Labour Force Survey data, showing the percentage of workers who reside in each Member State while working in another, as well as the percentage of those who work in each Member State while residing in another.

As the Graph presents percentages, the main factor is the geographical size of the country. In smaller countries, people are more likely to live or work closer to a border and to seek opportunities on the other side.

The comparison of outgoing and incoming flows in each country provides an indication of the economic performance of a country in relation to its neighbours. Luxembourg displays a very high rate of cross-border commuting since a large proportion of its work force (37%) resides abroad, mainly in neighbouring Germany, France and Belgium.

Graph II.4.1: **Workers residing in another EU Member State and residents working in another EU Member State, among workers, 2009 (%)**



Values that fall outside the Graph are Belgium 2%; Estonia 2.7%; Luxembourg 37.1%; Slovakia 5.5%.


Source: Eurostat, EU Labour Force Survey

Other countries with a substantial proportion of workers residing abroad are: the Czech Republic, Austria and the Netherlands, which receive commuters from Slovakia and Belgium. In addition, Belgium, Denmark and Ireland are commuting destinations for French, Dutch, Swedish and British residents in the main.

Slovakia, by contrast, has the highest percentage of workers who work abroad (half of them commute to the Czech Republic). Far behind in second place

<sup>(65)</sup> See Eurobarometer EBS 337, November 2009

Graph II.4.2: EU nationals who have close friends who live abroad, 2010 (%)



Source: Eurobarometer, EBS 346

is Estonia, with many commuters to Finland; a close third is Belgium, with commuters to Luxembourg and the Netherlands.

#### 4.2. PERSONAL AND CULTURAL CONNECTIONS ACROSS BORDERS

The Eurobarometer survey revealed that a substantial minority of respondents have either relatives (27%) or close friends (40%) abroad, or close friends of foreign origin in their own country (29%).

The prevalence of this type of cross-border connection is thus much higher than for the other forms of connectedness considered in the previous chapter, namely foreign ancestry and life choices.

Foreign ancestry is a major determinant of connectedness through friends and relatives (Table

II.4.1). Many of the respondents with foreign ancestry moved from abroad and left friends and relatives behind. In addition, they are more likely to be living in contact with communities that are joined by people from abroad.


Table II.4.1: EU nationals with foreign friends or relatives by ancestry, EU-27, 2010 (%)

	All	Borderless Europeans by ancestry	
		yes	no
Close relatives living abroad	27	57	21
Close friends living abroad	40	65	34
Close friends who moved from abroad	29	56	23

Source: Eurobarometer, EBS 346

Marked differences are found across Member States for the three types of relationships considered, reflecting the importance of emigration and immigration flows. At the higher end of the spectrum are Luxembourg and Ireland. The

Graph II.4.3: EU nationals who speak at least one other language than that of the interview, (%)



Source: Eurobarometer, EBS 346

percentage of people with close friends abroad by country is illustrated in Graph II.4.2.

The Eurobarometer survey considered a number of cultural links to other countries. One important indicator of cultural ties is fluency in at least one other language (Graph II.4.3). Almost one third of the EU citizens questioned say that they are able to hold a conversation in a language other than that of the country in which they were interviewed.

This proportion exceeds three quarters in Luxembourg, Latvia, Malta, Denmark, Lithuania and the Netherlands. It tends to be lower in the larger countries and in countries where English is widely spoken as the mother tongue. The United Kingdom and Ireland, together with Italy, are the countries with the lowest number of respondents fluent in a second language.

About 22% of EU nationals regularly spend their holidays in one particular country abroad (Table II.4.2). The percentages are generally higher in smaller countries. However, the percentage is also above the EU average in Germany and the United Kingdom.

Cultural links with other countries are more common than other strong forms of connectedness, through ancestry or life choices, with which they are likely to overlap (Table II.4.2).

Table II.4.2: EU nationals with cultural links to other countries by connectedness (ancestry and life-choices), 2010 (%)

	Total	Borderless Europeans	
		ancestry	life choices
Fluent in foreign language	34	62	66
Eat foreign food	36	62	62
Follow foreign news	34	53	58


Source: Eurobarometer, EBS 346

All cultural forms of connectedness to other countries are clearly influenced by ancestry or life choices. Whereas, on average, only about a third of respondents report cultural links to other countries, about two-thirds of EU citizens with connections through ancestry or life choices do so. The percentages are lower for respondents who regularly spend holidays in another country. Here the relative proportions for the whole population and for EU citizens with connections abroad are the same.

Although few EU citizens are of foreign ancestry and few have an opportunity to experience life

abroad, many more express their connections to other countries in more modest ways.

Graph II.4.4: EU nationals who spend regularly holidays in another country, 2010 (%)



Source: Eurobarometer, EBS 346

#### 4.2.1. Seeking health care abroad

According to a Eurobarometer survey, some 4% of EU nationals received medical treatment in another EU Member States in 2007<sup>(66)</sup>. Many found themselves in need of medical attention while on short visits abroad. Health care abroad is now facilitated by the Cross Border Healthcare Directive, adopted in February 2011<sup>(67)</sup>.

<sup>(66)</sup> see [http://ec.europa.eu/health-eu/doc/crossbordereurobaro\\_en.pdf](http://ec.europa.eu/health-eu/doc/crossbordereurobaro_en.pdf)

<sup>(67)</sup> see [http://ec.europa.eu/health/cross\\_border\\_care/policy/index\\_en.htm](http://ec.europa.eu/health/cross_border_care/policy/index_en.htm)



# Part III

Annex - Demography and the Recession





# 1. INTRODUCTION

This brief section highlights the main findings concerning demography and demographic policy during and after the recent recession. It is not an exhaustive analysis of the impact of the recession on demography or demography policy.

It is too early to assess the impact of the recession on fertility, mortality and family formation; this may become more evident next year, so the next report will include more evidence. However, there are already some indications of the impact the recession has had on migration, so the following chapter will look at this.

Demography policy overlaps with other domains which are analysed in other publications produced by the European Commission and other EU institutions:

- For an overview of the impact on social protection:  
<http://register.consilium.europa.eu/pdf/en/10/st16/st16905.en10.pdf>
- For a review of the measures taken on family support, see the specific report:  
[http://ec.europa.eu/employment\\_social/emplweb/families/admintool/userfiles/file/Final%20revised.pdf](http://ec.europa.eu/employment_social/emplweb/families/admintool/userfiles/file/Final%20revised.pdf)
- For the impact on employment and joblessness, see the 'Employment in Europe' report:  
<http://ec.europa.eu/social/main.jsp?langId=en&catId=113&newsId=948&furtherNews=yes>
- For education and productivity, see the '2010 Joint Report on Education and Training':  
<http://register.consilium.europa.eu/pdf/en/10/st05/st05394.en10.pdf>
- For the impact on migration policies, see the report from the 'Independent Network of Labour Migration and Integration Experts':  
<http://www.labourmigration.eu/research/report/12-migration-and-the-economic-crisis-implications-for-policy-in-the-european-union>
- For public finances, see the latest issue of the European Economic Forecasts (Autumn 2010):  
[http://ec.europa.eu/economy\\_finance/eu/forecasts/2010\\_autumn/statistical\\_en.pdf](http://ec.europa.eu/economy_finance/eu/forecasts/2010_autumn/statistical_en.pdf)

## 2. MIGRATION IN THE RECESSION

Economic and social conditions sooner or later affect demographic trends. The overall impact of the recent recession on demography will not be known for quite some time and will depend to a large extent on the speed, timing and scale of the recovery in global and national economies.

However, migration is one of the components of demography that is more responsive to change in economic and social conditions, both in sending and receiving countries.

### 2.1. HOW THE RECESSION AFFECTED MIGRATION

Due to limitations in the availability of comparable migration data for longer time series, data analysis in this chapter will focus on the period 2003-2009 and on selected EU-27 Member States only <sup>(68)</sup>.


#### 2.1.1. EU Member States that received the largest number of immigrants

Analysis of immigration data for the period 2003-2009 for the countries experiencing the highest flows of immigration in the EU (over half a million immigrants per year) has shown that the recent recession has had varied effects on migratory flows (see Graph III.2.1). Immigration to Italy and Spain started to fall from 2007 to 2008 and continued in 2009. In the United Kingdom, immigration was broadly stable from 2004, and fell slightly in 2009. In Germany, the number of immigrants has been slowly increasing from 2006 and continued to rise in 2009.

In Spain, the overall decrease in the flow of immigrants by almost one third (31 %) from 2008 to 2009 was mainly due to the reduced inflow of non-EU immigrants (35 % down) and fewer immigrants from other EU-27 Member States (25 % down). The highest absolute fall in immigrants to Spain was recorded for Moroccan citizens (falling by 32,000 in just one year), followed by citizens of Ecuador (by 20,000) and Romania (by 19,000). Most of the decline in the number of non-EU nationals migrating to Spain (apart from Moroccans) was due to lower inflows

of citizens from Latin America, with Ecuadorian, Colombian, Peruvian, Brazilian, Argentinean, Paraguayan and Dominican citizenship.

Graph III.2.1: Immigration to selected EU-27 Member States (Spain, Germany, the United Kingdom and Italy), 2003-2009 (thousands)




Source: Eurostat (online data code: migr\_imm1ctz) and national data

In Italy, the reduced inflow in 2009 compared to 2008 was mainly due to a fall in the numbers of citizens of other EU-27 Member States, in particular Romanians (69,000 fewer in 2009 than in 2008) and fewer immigrants with non-EU citizenship, especially Albanians, Moldavians and Moroccans.

In the United Kingdom, the slight decrease in immigration was mainly due to a fall in the number of migrants from other EU-27 Member States (Graph III.2.2).

Graph III.2.2: Structure of immigrants to selected EU-27 Member States (Spain, Italy and the United Kingdom) by citizenship groups, 2008 and 2009 (thousands)



Data on immigrants by citizenship groups for DE for 2009 are not available and therefore not included.


Source: Eurostat (online data code: migr\_imm1ctz) and national data

<sup>(68)</sup> In order to have comparable data for a longer time series, in some cases data by national definitions were used.

2.1.2. Trends in immigration in selected EU-27 Member States (receiving on average 100,000 to 500,000 immigrants per year)

Several different patterns can also be identified illustrating the effects of the recent recession on EU Member States that receive between 100,000 and 500,000 immigrants per year <sup>(69)</sup> (Graph III.2.3). In Belgium, the Netherlands and Sweden, immigration stabilised in 2008 and did not increase further in 2009. Austria differs since immigration was already starting to fall after 2004, slightly increased in 2006-2008 but then decreased slightly again from 2008 to 2009.


Graph III.2.3: Immigration to selected EU-27 Member States (Belgium, the Netherlands, Austria, Sweden and Ireland), 2003-2009 (thousands)



Data for BE for 2008 and 2009 are provisional.  
Source: Eurostat (online data code: migr\_imm1ctz) and national data

Comparable data for 2008 and 2009 by citizenship for France, Austria and Sweden showed that the number of immigrants with EU citizenship has decreased in all three countries (in France by 11 %, in Austria by 4 % and in Sweden by 12 %), although Sweden reported a slight overall increase in immigration (Graph III.2.4).


Graph III.2.4: Structure of immigrants to selected EU-27 Member States (France, Austria and Sweden) by citizenship groups, 2008 and 2009 (thousands)



Data on immigrants by citizenship groups for BE and NL for 2009 are not available and therefore not included in the comparison  
Source: Eurostat (online data code: migr\_imm1ctz) and national data

Ireland, one of the three EU Member States that opened its labour market to all citizens from the 2004 accession countries, and the country with the highest GNP growth among the EU-15 countries in the period 2000 and 2007 <sup>(70)</sup>, experienced high levels of immigration from 2003, peaking in 2005 and 2006. At the peak of immigration, it received just over 100,000 immigrants per year. After the peak, Ireland experienced one of the highest relative drops in immigration among EU Member States; a 64 % fall in the period 2006-2009 (Graph III.2.3). This was mainly due to a steep fall in immigration of non-nationals and particularly of other EU Member States nationals. In 2007, Ireland received in total 52,000 EU foreigners representing 59 % of all immigrants, dropping sharply to only 16,000 in 2009 (Graph III.2.5).

Graph III.2.5: Structure of immigrants to Ireland by citizenship groups, 2007-2009 (thousands)



Source: Eurostat (online data code: migr\_imm1ctz)

<sup>(69)</sup> France could not be included in the comparison since 2003 because data are available for 2008 and 2009 only.


<sup>(70)</sup> See: The Irish Economy in the Early 21st Century, 2008, No 117, National economic and Social Council, p. 1.

2.1.3. The effect on emigration from EU-27 Member States

Previous economic recessions have given some evidence that emigration of nationals and foreigners rises if the social and economic conditions in the host country worsen. Data for the EU-27 Member States with the highest emigration since 2003 shows that emigration from Germany had started to rise in 2007 and 2008 and stabilised in 2009. Although immigration to Germany in 2008 and 2009 was one of the highest among EU-27 Members States, emigrants outnumbered immigrants, resulting in negative net migration (Graph III.2.6).

The United Kingdom also saw a relatively high increase in emigration in 2007-2008, but it fell in 2009, almost to the same level as that in 2007. Emigration from Italy has been fairly stable, with a small increase after 2007. In Spain, however, emigration has increased since 2006 and continued to rise in 2009.

Graph III.2.6: Emigration from selected EU-27 Member States (Germany, the United Kingdom Spain and Italy), 2003-2009 (thousands)




Comparable emigration data are for ES available from 2006 on only.  
**Source:** Eurostat (online data code: migr\_emilctz) and national data

In the period 2006-2009, emigration from Spain increased on average by 33 % per year. From 2008 to 2009, emigration from Spain increased mainly due to the rise in emigration of EU nationals, especially Romanians. Although most of the emigration in 2008 and in 2009 was of non-nationals, the emigration of nationals was higher than other individual citizenships, such as Moroccans, Romanians, Bolivians, Ecuadorians and Brazilians.

In Italy, emigration fell in 2009 compared to 2008. In the United Kingdom too, emigration decreased and this was due to a decrease in all citizenship

groups (i.e. nationals, EU citizens and non-EU citizens – see Graph III.2.7).

Graph III.2.7: Structure of emigrants from selected EU-27 Member States (Spain, Italy and the United Kingdom) by citizenship groups, 2008 and 2009 (thousands)




Data on emigrants by citizenship groups for DE for 2009 are not available and therefore not included in comparison.  
**Source:** Eurostat (online data code: migr\_emilctz) and national data

To obtain a more complete picture of the effects of the recent economic recession on emigration, a further analysis of emigration was carried out for the countries that have received on average 100,000 to 500,000 immigrants in recent years (the same countries that were included in the analysis in paragraph 2.1.2), although in some cases, emigration did not reach 100,000 per year.

The analysis showed that the effects of the economic recession on emigration in these countries varied markedly (Graph III.2.8).

In Sweden, emigration has decreased in recent years, whereas in Belgium and Ireland it has increased slightly, and in the Netherlands and Austria, emigration has increased significantly.

Graph III.2.8: Emigration from selected EU-27 Member States (Belgium, the Netherlands, Austria, Sweden and Ireland), 2003-2009 (thousands)



Data for BE for 2008 and 2009 are provisional.  
Source: Eurostat (online data code: migr\_emil\_czt) and national data

In the Netherlands, emigration increased by 24 % in 2009, compared to 2008, and in Austria by 15 %. In Austria, most of the increase in emigration was due to German and Romanian citizens. However, as in Spain, emigration of nationals was higher than other individual citizenships.

#### 2.1.4. Overall effect of the recent recession on selected EU-27 Member States

The overall effect of the recession on migration flows is not straightforward: not all countries have been affected to the same extent.

In absolute terms, Spain seems to have been most severely affected by the recession, resulting in a fall in immigration since 2007 (especially by Moroccans and citizens of Latin America) and increasing emigration (especially of EU nationals). However, the balance between the inflow and outflow still resulted in positive net migration.

The recession has also affected Italy, but the effect has mainly been a reduction in the number of immigrants, in particular Romanians.

Ireland, the EU country that experienced one of the fastest increases in immigration at the beginning of the 21st century, already experienced a sharp fall in immigration in 2007, which was combined with a significant increase in emigration, resulting in negative net migration in 2009.

For Germany and the United Kingdom, countries with a long immigration tradition, the effect of the recession on migration flows was less marked.

Flows have generally been stable with small annual increases or decreases.

In Belgium and the Netherlands, immigration appeared to stabilise in 2009 at the level recorded in 2008, but emigration continued to increase.

#### 2.1.5. Immigration from non-EU countries

Flows and stocks of migrants from non-EU countries can be monitored through residence permit data, which are now also collected and published by Eurostat. This section looks at new permits issued in 2008 and 2009 and at the totals of all valid permits, including those issued before 2008 <sup>(71)</sup>. Roughly speaking, over 16.7 million foreigners reside in EU-27 <sup>(72)</sup> under a valid permit, and in both 2008 and 2009, more than 2 million new permits were issued in the EU <sup>(73)</sup>.

In 2009, EU Member States issued about 2.3 million new residence permits <sup>(74)</sup> to third-country nationals. This represents a reduction of over 8 % compared to the previous year and approximately 210,000 fewer permits in absolute terms.

Regarding the main reasons for issuing permits, there was a fall in the number of authorisations granted for family (e.g. family reunification and formation) and employment-related reasons.

About 8 %, i.e. about 55,000 fewer permits, were issued in 2009 (Graph III.2.9) for family-related reasons.


However, the decrease was greater in the number of permits issued for employment reasons. In 2009, the number of third-country nationals granted an employment-related permit in the EU fell by 28 %. This represents more than 215,000 fewer persons from third countries allowed to work in the EU in 2009 compared to the previous year. As a result of this sharp decrease, the share of employment-related permits in the volume of all permits issued shrank from 30 % in 2008 to about 24 % in 2009.

<sup>(71)</sup> Data collection only started in 2008 and certain methodological discrepancies may occur.

<sup>(72)</sup> No data available for Denmark, Luxembourg and the United Kingdom.

<sup>(73)</sup> No data available for Cyprus and Luxembourg.

<sup>(74)</sup> First residence permit is defined as a permit issued to a person for a first time and permits issued after at least 6 months since the expiry of the previous permit. Only permits with a validity of at least 3 months are included.

Graph III.2.9: **New residence permits issued by reason, EU-27, 2008 and 2009 (thousands)**

Other reasons are a miscellaneous group of reasons not covered by the three main reasons, such as international protection, residence without right to work (e.g. for pensioners), diplomatic, and people in intermediate phases of a regularisation process.

**Source:** Eurostat (online data code: migr\_resfirst)

A smaller number of permits were issued in 2009 in the majority of Member States, although the sharpest fall was recorded in most of the Baltic and Eastern European Member States. The number of permits issued halved or more than halved in Latvia, Hungary, Czech Republic and Lithuania. However, with nearly 110,000 fewer permits, Spain recorded the highest drop in absolute terms in 2009.

Only in a few Member States did the number of persons granted authorisation to reside increase in 2009 (see Table III.2.1). Noticeably, due to the large increase in education-related permits, the United Kingdom had the highest absolute increase in permits issued (up by 38,000). High relative increases were also recorded in Austria (29% or 6,000) and Belgium (27% or 12,000).

The number of employment-related permits fell in the vast majority of Member States, particularly sharply in Latvia, Czech Republic, Spain and Hungary, where the number of persons granted employment-related permits fell within a year by approximately three quarters. In absolute terms, the number of employment-related permits decreased most noticeably in Spain (70,000 less than in 2008), followed by Italy (down by 37,000), Czech Republic (down by 32,000) and the United Kingdom (down by 23,000).

Contrary to overall developments in 2009, the number of residence permits issued for education reasons increased in 2009 (up 11% or 51,000). The increase in education-related permits in the EU almost entirely stemmed from the sharp

increase in authorisations issued in the United Kingdom (46,000 more permits than in 2008). The United Kingdom remains by far the top destination country for non-EU citizens entering the EU for the purpose of education, accounting for more than 50% of all such permits issued in the EU.

The highest number of authorisations to reside in EU Member States in 2009 was issued to citizens of India (190,000), followed by the United States (176,000), China (170,000) and Morocco (156,000). These four countries accounted for nearly 30% of all permits issued in the EU in 2009. The majority of Indians and Chinese entered the EU for the purpose of education or employment. 72,000 Chinese and 61,000 Indians were granted education-related permits, while 51,000 Chinese and 63,000 Indians entered the EU for employment reasons. By contrast, Moroccans were granted the highest number of permits for family reasons in EU (62,000), and less than 5% (i.e. 7,000) were granted permission to reside for education reasons.

Table III.2.1: **New residence permits issued and valid permits at the end of the year, 2008 and 2009**

	New permits issued		Valid permits on 31.12	
	2008	2009	2008	2009
<b>EU-27</b>	2,520,045	2,307,704	15,717,133	16,680,169
<b>BE</b>	46,201	58,939	350,392	364,939
<b>BG</b>	3,933	4,385	11,168	12,444
<b>CZ</b>	61,350	27,539	306,316	305,146
<b>DK</b>	31,655	30,255	:	:
<b>DE</b>	114,289	121,954	3,643,677	3,695,144
<b>EE</b>	3,884	3,777	216,628	212,874
<b>IE</b>	28,926	25,509	141,816	134,152
<b>EL</b>	40,411	45,148	522,752	565,595
<b>ES</b>	399,827	290,813	2,680,720	2,992,492
<b>FR</b>	188,723	188,491	2,299,301	2,273,228
<b>IT</b>	550,226	506,833	3,035,573	3,587,653
<b>CY</b>	:	:	113,309	126,107
<b>LV</b>	7,706	2,304	397,628	385,323
<b>LT</b>	5,298	2,659	29,032	28,633
<b>LU</b>	:	:	:	:
<b>HU</b>	36,602	14,289	101,331	92,518
<b>MT</b>	4,989	3,682	4,875	4,608
<b>NL</b>	73,769	56,151	418,300	416,514
<b>AT</b>	21,783	28,035	457,034	445,990
<b>PL</b>	40,907	33,427	72,126	87,345
<b>PT</b>	63,715	46,324	357,439	360,322
<b>RO</b>	19,354	15,380	58,736	61,800
<b>SI</b>	29,215	15,759	96,284	89,079
<b>SK</b>	8,025	5,336	19,962	22,068
<b>FI</b>	21,873	18,034	107,015	112,914
<b>SE</b>	84,144	91,337	275,719	303,281
<b>UK</b>	633,240	671,344	:	:

EU totals are only for available country data, thus totals are underestimated. In Italy, children are not included in the number of permits issued during the year but are included in the number of all valid permits.

**Source:** Eurostat (online data code: migr\_resfirst and migr\_resvalid)

For the EU as a whole, the total number of valid permits increased by nearly 1 million between 2008 and 2009.





# Part IV

Country Annex

# 0. THE EUROPEAN UNION

		EU-27					*
1	<b>DEMOGRAPHIC TRENDS</b>	1970	2000	2009	2030	2050	
1	Population on 1 January (thousands)	435,474	482,768	501,103	519,942	505,718	2010
2	Total Fertility Rate (children per woman)	:	:	1.60	:	:	2008
3	Life expectancy at birth for women (years)	:	:	82.4	:	:	2008
4	Life expectancy at birth for men (years)	:	:	76.4	:	:	2008
5	Life expectancy at age 65 for women (years)	:	:	20.7	:	:	2008
6	Life expectancy at age 65 for men (years)	:	:	17.2	:	:	2008
7	Natural growth (births minus deaths) (thousands)	2,563.1	70.7	523.1	-846.1	-1,695.6	
8	Net migration (including corrections) (thousands)	-728.3	143.9	877.1	1,093.1	924.3	
9	Mean age of women at childbirth (years)	:	:	29.7	:	:	2008
10	Old age dependency ratio (65 or over / 15-64 years old) (%)	:	24.3	24.5	38.0	50.4	
2	<b>GENDER EQUALITY AND FAMILY SITUATIONS</b>	2000	2009				3 BEST MS 2009
11	Employment rate, women aged 20-64 (%)		57.3	62.5			74.4
12	Employment rate, men aged 20-64 (%)		75.8	75.8			83.1
13	Employment rate, women aged 25-54 with at least 1 child (%)		:	68.2			81.1
14	Employment rate, men aged 25-54 with at least 1 child (%)		:	88.5			94.0
15	Gender pay gap (unadjusted) (%)		17	18			7
16	Employed women working part time (%)		28.9	31.4			4.9
17	Employed men working part time (%)		6.5	8.1			2.4
18	Average number of usual weekly working hours, women		:	33.0			38.9
19	Average number of usual weekly working hours, men		:	39.9			42.2
20	Childcare provision for children aged 0-2 (%)		:	28			56
21	Childcare provision for children aged 3 to compulsory school age (%)		:	83			97
22	Children aged 0-16 at risk of poverty after social transfer (%)		:	20.1			10.7
23	Children aged 0-16 living in jobless households (%)		:	10.2			4.1
24	Social protection benefits targeted at family support (% in kind)		25.4	32.1			58.9
3	<b>AGEING AND THE LABOUR MARKET</b>	2000	2009				3 BEST MS 2009
25	Employment rate, women aged 55-64 (%)		27.4	37.8			61.4
26	Employment rate, men aged 55-64 (%)		47.1	54.8			70.4
27	Employment rate, women aged 55-59 (%)		39.0	51.4			75.5
28	Employment rate, men aged 55-59 (%)		62.1	69.1			83.0
29	Employment rate, women aged 60-64 (%)		15.8	22.8			47.0
30	Employment rate, men aged 60-64 (%)		30.9	38.5			59.6
31	Employment rate, women aged 65-69 (%)		6.4	7.4			20.6
32	Employment rate, men aged 65-69 (%)		11.7	13.2			28.3
33	Average exit age from the labour market, women (years)		:	60.8			64.0
34	Average exit age from the labour market, men (years)		:	62.0			64.7
35	Inactive for health reasons, population aged 50-64 (%)		18.0	21.0			48.4
36	Internet use, population aged 55-64 (%)		:	44			75

4	PRODUCTIVITY, EDUCATION AND R&D	EU-27		3 BEST MS	*	
		2000	2009	2009		
37	Early leavers from education and training, women aged 18-24 (%)	17.5	12.5		3.7	
38	Early leavers from education and training, men aged 18-24 (%)	18.8	16.3		5.9	
39	Educational att., women aged 30-34 with tertiary education level (%)	22.2	35.7		54.9	
40	Educational attainment, men aged 30-34 with tertiary education level (%)	22.7	28.9		44.4	
41	University graduates aged 20-29 (per 1,000 of the pop. of that age)	:	:		88.6	
42	Employment rate for the tertiary education level, age 20-64 (%)	82.5	83.0		87.7	
43	Employment rate for the upper secondary edu. level, age 20-64 (%)	69.7	70.5		79.7	
44	Employment rate for the less than upper sec. edu. level, age 20-64 (%)	54.9	54.4		66.5	
45	Total public expenditure on education (% of GDP)	4.9	5.0		7.15	
46	Life-long learning (pop. aged 25-64 in education and training) (%)	:	9.1		25.3	
47	Gross domestic expenditure on R&D (% of GDP)	1.9	2.0		3.52	
48	Population working in high-tech sectors (% of employed pop.)	4.8	3.7		6.1	
49	Internet use (%)	:	63.0		86	
50	Labour productivity per employed person (2000=100)	100.0	105.6		156.4	
<div style="display: flex; justify-content: space-around;"> <div style="text-align: center;"> <p><b>Employment rates (%), 2009</b></p> </div> <div style="text-align: center;"> <p><b>Social Protection (% of GDP), 2008</b></p> </div> </div>						
5	MIGRATION AND INTEGRATION	2000	2009		2009	
51	Non-nationals in the population (%)	:	6.4		21.4	
52	Employment rate of nationals, women aged 25-54 (%)	70.0	72.9		84.0	
53	Employment rate of nationals, men aged 25-54 (%)	88.2	85.4		92.2	
54	Empl. rate of citizens from outside EU-27, women aged 25-54 (%)	:	52.7		74.9	
55	Employment rate of citizens from outside EU-27, men aged 25-54 (%)	:	72.9		87.5	
56	Education level (tertiary), nationals aged 25-49 (%)	:	28.4		41.2	
57	Education level (less than upper secondary), nationals aged 25-49 (%)	:	22.3		6.4	
58	Educ. level (tertiary), citizens from outside EU-27 aged 25-49 (%)	:	20.4		48.3	
59	Educ. level (< up. sec.), citizens from outside EU-27 aged 25-49 (%)	:	43.8		12.5	
6	SUSTAINABILITY OF PUBLIC FINANCES & SOCIAL PROTECTION	2000	2009	2035	2060	2009
60	General government consolidated gross debt (% of GDP)	61.9	74.0	:	:	12.1
61	General government primary balance (% of GDP)	4.2	-4.2	:	:	-0.1
62	Total general government revenue (% of GDP)	45.4	44.0	:	:	54.1
63	Public expenditure on pensions (% of GDP)	13.9	13.5	11.9	12.6	7.0
64	Public expenditure on health care and sickness (% of GDP)	6.9	7.5	7.7	8.2	3.9
65	Public expenditure on family and children (% of GDP)	2.1	2.1	:	:	3.6
66	Public expenditure on social protection (% of GDP)	25.3	25.3	:	:	13.8
67	Expenditure on social protection (PPS / inhabitant)	4,829.9	6,337.2	:	:	1,688.9
68	Population at risk of poverty after social transfers (%)	:	16.3	:	:	10.2
69	Inequality of income distribution (S80/S20 income quintile share ratio)	:	4.9	:	:	3.4
70	Population aged 18-59 living in jobless households (%)	10.2	10.1	:	:	6.1

\*: 2009 or last year with data available (see the column placed to the right of the table)  
3 BEST MS: Average of the three best Member States according to country ranking

# 1. BELGIUM

		BELGIUM					EU-27	*
1 DEMOGRAPHIC TRENDS		1970	2000	2009	2030	2050	2009	
1	Population on 1 January (thousands)	9,660	10,239	10,840	11,745	12,194	501,103	2010
2	Total Fertility Rate (children per woman)	2.25	1.67	1.84	1.77	1.78	1.60	
3	Life expectancy at birth for women (years)	74.2	81.0	82.8	85.4	87.8	82.4	
4	Life expectancy at birth for men (years)	67.8	74.6	77.3	80.2	83.1	76.4	
5	Life expectancy at age 65 for women (years)	15.4	19.8	21.1	..	..	20.54	
6	Life expectancy at age 65 for men (years)	12.2	15.6	17.5	..	..	16.99	
7	Natural growth (births minus deaths) (thousands)	23.5	10.7	22.8	4.1	-13.8	523.1	
8	Net migration (including corrections) (thousands)	-32.7	14.3	64.0	31.4	25.2	877.1	
9	Mean age of women at childbirth (years)	27.2	28.8	29.6	..	..	29.7	
10	Old age dependency ratio (65 or over / 15-64 years old) (%)	21.2	25.5	25.9	37.6	43.9	25.6	
2 GENDER EQUALITY AND FAMILY SITUATIONS		2000	2009	2009	2009	2009		
11	Employment rate, women aged 20-64 (%)	56.4	61.0	62.5	62.5	74.4		
12	Employment rate, men aged 20-64 (%)	76.1	73.2	75.8	75.8	83.1		
13	Employment rate, women aged 25-54 with at least 1 child (%)	..	73.3	68.2	68.2	81.1		
14	Employment rate, men aged 25-54 with at least 1 child (%)	..	90.4	88.5	88.5	94.0		
15	Gender pay gap (unadjusted) (%)	13	9.0	17.5	17.5	7	2008	
16	Employed women working part time (%)	37.4	41.5	31.4	31.4	4.9		
17	Employed men working part time (%)	5.5	8.5	8.1	8.1	2.4		
18	Average number of usual weekly working hours, women	32.8	32.4	33.0	33.0	38.9		
19	Average number of usual weekly working hours, men	40.4	40.1	39.9	39.9	42.2		
20	Childcare provision for children aged 0-2 (%)	..	43.0	28	28	56	2008	
21	Childcare provision for children aged 3 to compulsory school age (%)	..	99.0	83	83	97	2008	
22	Children aged 0-16 at risk of poverty after social transfer (%)	11.0	16.4	20.1	20.1	10.7	2008	
23	Children aged 0-16 living in jobless households (%)	10.8	11.8	10.2	10.2	4.1		
24	Social protection benefits targeted at family support (% in kind)	17.5	19.0	32.1	32.1	58.9	2008	
3 AGEING AND THE LABOUR MARKET		2000	2009	2009	2009	2009		
25	Employment rate, women aged 55-64 (%)	16.6	27.7	37.8	37.8	61.4		
26	Employment rate, men aged 55-64 (%)	36.4	42.9	54.8	54.8	70.4		
27	Employment rate, women aged 55-59 (%)	24.1	41.3	51.4	51.4	75.5		
28	Employment rate, men aged 55-59 (%)	52.0	59.2	69.1	69.1	83.0		
29	Employment rate, women aged 60-64 (%)	7.0	13.0	22.8	22.8	47.0		
30	Employment rate, men aged 60-64 (%)	18.1	24.7	38.5	38.5	59.6		
31	Employment rate, women aged 65-69 (%)	1.7	1.7	7.4	7.4	20.6		
32	Employment rate, men aged 65-69 (%)	3.1	5.9	13.2	13.2	28.3		
33	Average exit age from the labour market, women (years)	..	61.9	60.8	60.8	64.0	2008	
34	Average exit age from the labour market, men (years)	..	61.2	62.0	62.0	64.7	2008	
35	Inactive for health reasons, population aged 50-64 (%)	..	15.3	21.0	21.0	48.4		
36	Internet use, population aged 55-64 (%)	..	58	44	44	75	2010	

		BELGIUM		EU-27	3 BEST MS	*	
		2000	2009	2009	2009		
4	<b>PRODUCTIVITY, EDUCATION AND R&amp;D</b>						
37	Early leavers from education and training, women aged 18-24 (%)	11.0	9.3	12.5	3.7		
38	Early leavers from education and training, men aged 18-24 (%)	16.4	12.8	16.3	5.9		
39	Educational att., women aged 30-34 with tertiary education level (%)	33.3	47.7	35.7	54.9		
40	Educational attainment, men aged 30-34 with tertiary education level (%)	37.1	36.4	28.9	44.4		
41	University graduates aged 20-29 (per 1,000 of the pop. of that age)	51.4	73.3	.	88.6	2008	
42	Employment rate for the tertiary education level, age 20-64 (%)	85.4	81.9	83.0	87.7		
43	Employment rate for the upper secondary edu. level, age 20-64 (%)	69.1	68.8	70.5	79.7		
44	Employment rate for the less than upper sec. edu. level, age 20-64 (%)	51.2	47.7	54.4	66.5		
45	Total public expenditure on education (% of GDP)	.	6.0	4.96	7.15	2007	
46	Life-long learning (pop. aged 25-64 in education and training) (%)	.	6.8	9.1	25.3		
47	Gross domestic expenditure on R&D (% of GDP)	1.97	2.0	2.01	3.52		
48	Population working in high-tech sectors (% of employed pop.)	4.83	4.5	3.7	6.1		
49	Internet use (%)	.	74.0	63	86		
50	Labour productivity per employed person (2000=100)	100	103.9	105.6	156.4		
5	<b>MIGRATION AND INTEGRATION</b>	2000	2009	2009	2009		
51	Non-nationals in the population (%)	8.8	9.1	6.4	21.4	2008	
52	Employment rate of nationals, women aged 25-54 (%)	70.4	76.4	72.9	84.0		
53	Employment rate of nationals, men aged 25-54 (%)	89.4	87.3	85.4	92.2		
54	Empl. rate of citizens from outside EU-27, women aged 25-54 (%)	.	30.7	52.7	74.9		
55	Employment rate of citizens from outside EU-27, men aged 25-54 (%)	.	56.9	72.9	87.5		
56	Education level (tertiary), nationals aged 25-49 (%)	.	38.6	28.4	41.2		
57	Education level (less than upper secondary), nationals aged 25-49 (%)	.	20.4	22.3	6.4		
58	Educ. level (tertiary), citizens from outside EU-27 aged 25-49 (%)	.	25.5	20.4	48.3		
59	Educ. level (< up. sec.), citizens from outside EU-27 aged 25-49 (%)	.	46.6	43.8	12.5		
6	<b>SUSTAINABILITY OF PUBLIC FINANCES &amp; SOCIAL PROTECTION</b>	2000	2009	2035	2060	2009	2009
60	General government consolidated gross debt (% of GDP)	107.9	96.2	.	.	74	12.1
61	General government primary balance (% of GDP)	6.5	-2.4	.	.	-4.2	-0.1
62	Total general government revenue (% of GDP)	49.1	48.1	.	.	44	54.1
63	Public expenditure on pensions (% of GDP)	13.3	12.7	14.3	14.7	13.5	7.0
64	Public expenditure on health care and sickness (% of GDP)	6.0	7.6	8.6	8.8	7.5	3.9
65	Public expenditure on family and children (% of GDP)	2.1	2.1	.	.	2.1	3.6
66	Public expenditure on social protection (% of GDP)	24.9	26.6	.	.	25.3	13.8
67	Expenditure on social protection (PPS / inhabitant)	5,969.6	7,685.7	.	.	6,337	1,688.9
68	Population at risk of poverty after social transfers (%)	13.0	14.6	.	.	16.3	10.2
69	Inequality of income distribution (S80/S20 income quintile share ratio)	4.3	3.9	.	.	4.9	3.4
70	Population aged 18-59 living in jobless households (%)	12.4	12.8	.	.	10.1	6.1

\*: 2009 or last year with data available (see the column placed to the right of the table)  
3 BEST MS: Average of the three best Member States according to country ranking

#### Demographic challenges and...

Belgium's fertility rate is well above the EU-27 average and population ageing is projected to be less pronounced than in EU-27 as a whole. Largely thanks to migration, Belgium's population is projected to grow by about 10% until 2050.

#### ... opportunities for tackling them

While childcare availability lies above the EU-27 average it could be extended for very young children. The gender pay gap is one of the lowest in EU-27. Nevertheless, there is scope for women's employment rates to catch up with men's; moreover a large proportion of women work part-time.

Employment rates of older workers, in particular women, are very low and they represent an important labour force reserve. Major gains are also possible with regard to the integration of minorities and third country nationals into labour markets and education systems. However, in the crisis non-EU foreigners have seen unemployment rates rise to the highest value in EU-27, above 30%.

Finally, the reduction of public debt, projected to rise to over 100% in 2011, would enhance the ability to meet future social protection needs linked to ageing.

## 2. BULGARIA

		BULGARIA					EU-27	*
1	DEMOGRAPHIC TRENDS	1970	2000	2009	2030	2050	2009	
	1) Population on 1 January (thousands)	8,464	8,191	7,564	6,753	5,923	501,103	2010
	2) Total Fertility Rate (children per woman)	2.17	1.26	1.57	1.46	1.52	1.60	
	3) Life expectancy at birth for women (years)	73.5	75.0	77.4	81.3	84.9	82.4	
	4) Life expectancy at birth for men (years)	69.1	68.4	70.1	75.3	79.6	76.4	
	5) Life expectancy at age 65 for women (years)	14.9	15.3	17.0	:	:	20.54	
	6) Life expectancy at age 65 for men (years)	13.3	12.7	13.8	:	:	16.99	
	7) Natural growth (births minus deaths) (thousands)	61.7	-41.4	-27.1	-44.1	-43.7	523.1	
	8) Net migration (including corrections) (thousands)	-11.0	0.0	-15.7	-0.5	1.6	877.1	
	9) Mean age of women at childbirth (years)	24.7	25.0	26.6	:	:	29.7	
	10) Old age dependency ratio (65 or over / 15-64 years old) (%)	14	23.8	25.1	36.3	55.4	25.6	
<p><b>Population distribution by age</b></p> <p>Stacked bar charts showing population distribution by age group (Pop. under 25, Pop. aged 25-64, Pop. aged 65-79, Pop. aged 80+) for EU-27 and Bulgaria in 2009, 2030, and 2050.</p> <p><b>Population growth, 1995-2050</b></p> <p>Line chart showing natural growth, net migration, and total population growth from 1995 to 2050. Data points for 2009-2050 are projected.</p>								
2	GENDER EQUALITY AND FAMILY SITUATIONS	2000	2009	2009	EU-27	3 BEST MS		
	11) Employment rate, women aged 20-64 (%)		51.7	64.0	62.5	74.4		
	12) Employment rate, men aged 20-64 (%)		61.5	73.8	75.8	83.1		
	13) Employment rate, women aged 25-54 with at least 1 child (%)		:	74.3	68.2	81.1		
	14) Employment rate, men aged 25-54 with at least 1 child (%)		:	85.7	88.5	94.0		
	15) Gender pay gap (unadjusted) (%)		:	13.6	17.5	7	2008	
	16) Employed women working part time (%)		:	2.7	31.4	4.9		
	17) Employed men working part time (%)		:	2.0	8.1	2.4		
	18) Average number of usual weekly working hours, women		40.1	39.9	33.0	38.9		
	19) Average number of usual weekly working hours, men		41.3	40.8	39.9	42.2		
	20) Childcare provision for children aged 0-2 (%)		:	11.0	28	56	2008	
	21) Childcare provision for children aged 3 to compulsory school age (%)		:	67.0	83	97	2008	
	22) Children aged 0-16 at risk of poverty after social transfer (%)		19	25.6	20.1	10.7	2008	
	23) Children aged 0-16 living in jobless households (%)		:	12.2	10.2	4.1		
	24) Social protection benefits targeted at family support (% in kind)		0.0	22.4	32.1	58.9	2008	
<p><b>Employment rate, population aged 20-64 yrs, 1995-2009 (%)</b></p> <p>Line chart showing employment rates for Bulgaria (BG) and EU-27 for women and men from 1995 to 2009. Includes data for 3-highest countries.</p> <p><b>Education, 2009</b></p> <p>Horizontal bar chart showing education attainment levels for men and women in Bulgaria and EU-27. Includes data for 3-best MS and early leavers from education and training.</p>								
3	AGEING AND THE LABOUR MARKET	2000	2009	2009	EU-27	3 BEST MS		
	25) Employment rate, women aged 55-64 (%)		10.3	39.2	37.8	61.4		
	26) Employment rate, men aged 55-64 (%)		33.2	54.1	54.8	70.4		
	27) Employment rate, women aged 55-59 (%)		16.2	62.0	51.4	75.5		
	28) Employment rate, men aged 55-59 (%)		53.6	67.4	69.1	83.0		
	29) Employment rate, women aged 60-64 (%)		6.1	17.7	22.8	47.0		
	30) Employment rate, men aged 60-64 (%)		15.7	41.4	38.5	59.6		
	31) Employment rate, women aged 65-69 (%)		2.9	4.3	7.4	20.6		
	32) Employment rate, men aged 65-69 (%)		7.1	12.8	13.2	28.3		
	33) Average exit age from the labour market, women (years)		:	64.1	60.8	64.0	2008	
	34) Average exit age from the labour market, men (years)		:	64.1	62.0	64.7	2008	
	35) Inactive for health reasons, population aged 50-64 (%)		10.9	23.8	21.0	48.4		
	36) Internet use, population aged 55-64 (%)		:	16	44	75	2010	

		BULGARIA		EU-27	3 BEST MS	*	
		2000	2009	2009	2009		
4	<b>PRODUCTIVITY, EDUCATION AND R&amp;D</b>						
37	Early leavers from education and training, women aged 18-24 (%)	:	15.8	12.5	3.7		
38	Early leavers from education and training, men aged 18-24 (%)	:	13.7	16.3	5.9		
39	Educational att., women aged 30-34 with tertiary education level (%)	16	35.6	35.7	54.9		
40	Educational attainment, men ged 30-34 with tertiary education level (%)	23.1	20.4	28.9	44.4		
41	University graduates aged 20-29 (per 1,000 of the pop. of that age)	38.1	50.7	:	88.6	2008	
42	Employment rate for the tertiary education level, age 20-64 (%)	77.4	85.5	83.0	87.7		
43	Employment rate for the upper secondary edu. level, age 20-64 (%)	61.5	71.6	70.5	79.7		
44	Employment rate for the less than upper sec. edu. level, age 20-64 (%)	37.5	45.0	54.4	66.5		
45	Total public expenditure on education (% of GDP)	3.97	4.1	4.96	7.15	2007	
46	Life-long learning (pop. aged 25-64 in education and training) (%)	:	1.4	9.1	25.3		
47	Gross domestic expenditure on R&D (% of GDP)	0.51	0.5	2.01	3.52		
48	Population working in high-tech sectors (% of employed pop.)	3.44	2.9	3.7	6.1		
49	Internet use (%)	:	39.0	63	86		
50	Labour productivity per employed person (2000=100)	100	130.0	105.6	156.4		
5	<b>MIGRATION AND INTEGRATION</b>	2000	2009	2009	2009		
51	Non-nationals in the population (%)	:	0.3	6.4	21.4		
52	Employment rate of nationals, women aged 25-54 (%)	:	75.8	72.9	84.0		
53	Employment rate of nationals, men aged 25-54 (%)	:	82.7	85.4	92.2		
54	Empl. rate of citizens from outside EU-27, women aged 25-54 (%)	:	:	52.7	74.9		
55	Employment rate of citizens from outside EU-27, men aged 25-54 (%)	:	:	72.9	87.5		
56	Education level (tertiary), nationals aged 25-49 (%)	:	24.7	28.4	41.2		
57	Education level (less than upper secondary), nationals aged 25-49 (%)	:	19.2	22.3	6.4		
58	Educ. level (tertiary), citizens from outside EU-27 aged 25-49 (%)	:	49.8	20.4	48.3		
59	Educ. level (< up. sec.), citizens from outside EU-27 aged 25-49 (%)	:	0.0	43.8	12.5		
6	<b>SUSTAINABILITY OF PUBLIC FINANCES &amp; SOCIAL PROTECTION</b>	2000	2009	2035	2060	2009	2009
60	General government consolidated gross debt (% of GDP)	74.3	14.7	:	:	74	12.1
61	General government primary balance (% of GDP)	3.7	-3.9	:	:	-4.2	-0.1
62	Total general government revenue (% of GDP)	40.7	35.9	:	:	44	54.1
63	Public expenditure on pensions (% of GDP)	9.1	8.6	9.0	11.3	13.5	7.0
64	Public expenditure on health care and sickness (% of GDP)	0.3	4.4	5.3	5.4	7.5	3.9
65	Public expenditure on family and children (% of GDP)	0.6	1.3	:	:	2.1	3.6
66	Public expenditure on social protection (% of GDP)	10.0	14.9	:	:	25.3	13.8
67	Expenditure on social protection (PPS / inhabitant)	542.5	1,604.3	:	:	6,337	1,688.9
68	Population at risk of poverty after social transfers (%)	14.0	21.8	:	:	16.3	10.2
69	Inequality of income distribution (S80/S20 income quintile share ratio)	3.7	5.9	:	:	4.9	3.4
70	Population aged 18-59 living in jobless households (%)	16.2	9.7	:	:	10.1	6.1

\*: 2009 or last year with data available (see the column placed to the right of the table)

3 BEST MS: Average of the three best Member States according to country ranking


<b>Demographic challenges and...</b>	
<p>Despite the current increase of the total fertility rate which reached the EU-27 average, the total population of Bulgaria is declining and this decline is projected to continue, as a result of moderately low birth rates, high adult mortality and net emigration. Mortality is expected to decrease, especially among men aged 40-59.</p> <p>The negative effect of the decreasing number of women in fertile age registered today will have an impact on the reproduction of the population in the decades to come. Life expectancy, for both men and women, is currently low and significant progress is expected; the education level plays an important role in life expectancy. The old-age dependency ratio, currently at the European average, is projected to rise to a higher level than for EU-27 as a whole.</p>	
<b>... opportunities for tackling them</b>	
<p>Investing in education and lifelong learning, promoting better conditions to combine labour and family duties could contribute to the employment growth. Productivity is only one third the EU-27 average, so there is an enormous catching-up potential. Reducing the number of early school leavers and increasing investment in research would contribute to realising this productivity growth potential.</p> <p>Current and projected public spending on health and long-term care is significantly below the EU-27 average, however, there may be pressure for increased spending.</p>	

### 3. THE CZECH REPUBLIC

		CZECH REPUBLIC					EU-27	*
1	<b>DEMOGRAPHIC TRENDS</b>	1970	2000	2009	2030	2050	2009	
1	Population on 1 January (thousands)	9,906	10,278	10,507	10,420	9,892	501,103	2010
2	Total Fertility Rate (children per woman)	1.92	1.14	1.49	1.41	1.49	1.60	
3	Life expectancy at birth for women (years)	73.1	78.5	80.5	83.7	86.5	82.4	
4	Life expectancy at birth for men (years)	66.1	71.7	74.2	78.1	81.6	76.4	
5	Life expectancy at age 65 for women (years)	14.3	17.3	18.8	:	:	20.54	
6	Life expectancy at age 65 for men (years)	11.0	13.8	15.2	:	:	16.99	
7	Natural growth (births minus deaths) (thousands)	24.5	-18.1	10.9	-47.0	-53.3	523.1	
8	Net migration (including corrections) (thousands)	-121.3	6.5	28.3	22.9	21.9	877.1	
9	Mean age of women at childbirth (years)	24.8	27.2	29.4	:	:	29.7	
10	Old age dependency ratio (65 or over / 15-64 years old) (%)	17.9	19.8	21.2	35.7	54.8	25.6	
<p><b>Population distribution by age</b></p> <p>2009, 2030, 2050: EU-27, CZECH REPUBLIC. Legend: Pop. under 25, Pop. aged 25-64, Pop. aged 65-79, Pop. aged 80+.</p> <p><b>Population growth, 1995-2050</b></p> <p>Line chart showing Natural growth, Net migration, Total population growth (projected) from 1995 to 2050.</p>								
2	<b>GENDER EQUALITY AND FAMILY SITUATIONS</b>	2000	2009	2009	2009	2009	2009	
11	Employment rate, women aged 20-64 (%)	61.8	61.4	62.5	74.4			
12	Employment rate, men aged 20-64 (%)	80.1	80.2	75.8	83.1			
13	Employment rate, women aged 25-54 with at least 1 child (%)	:	68.0	68.2	81.1			
14	Employment rate, men aged 25-54 with at least 1 child (%)	:	94.0	88.5	94.0			
15	Gender pay gap (unadjusted) (%)	22	26.2	17.5	7	2008		
16	Employed women working part time (%)	9.3	9.1	31.4	4.9			
17	Employed men working part time (%)	2.2	2.6	8.1	2.4			
18	Average number of usual weekly working hours, women	41.3	38.1	33.0	38.9			
19	Average number of usual weekly working hours, men	45.4	42.2	39.9	42.2			
20	Childcare provision for children aged 0-2 (%)	:	1.0	28	56	2008		
21	Childcare provision for children aged 3 to compulsory school age (%)	:	69.0	83	97	2008		
22	Children aged 0-16 at risk of poverty after social transfer (%)	:	12.8	20.1	10.7	2008		
23	Children aged 0-16 living in jobless households (%)	8.0	8.0	10.2	4.1			
24	Social protection benefits targeted at family support (% in kind)	9.5	12.5	32.1	58.9	2008		
<p><b>Employment rate, population aged 20-64 yrs, 1995-2009 (%)</b></p> <p>Line chart showing CZ women, CZ men, EU women, EU men, 3-highest-women, 3-highest-men from 1995 to 2009.</p> <p><b>Education, 2009</b></p> <p>Bar chart showing EARLY LEAVERS from EDU and TRA., EDUCATION ATTAINMENT LEVEL (pop. aged 30-34 with tertiary level) for MEN and WOMEN, comparing 3 BEST MS, EU-27, and CZECH REPUBLIC.</p>								
3	<b>AGEING AND THE LABOUR MARKET</b>	2000	2009	2009	2009	2009	2009	
25	Employment rate, women aged 55-64 (%)	22.4	35.0	37.8	61.4			
26	Employment rate, men aged 55-64 (%)	51.7	59.6	54.8	70.4			
27	Employment rate, women aged 55-59 (%)	30.4	54.2	51.4	75.5			
28	Employment rate, men aged 55-59 (%)	71.6	78.9	69.1	83.0			
29	Employment rate, women aged 60-64 (%)	11.2	15.0	22.8	47.0			
30	Employment rate, men aged 60-64 (%)	23.5	38.4	38.5	59.6			
31	Employment rate, women aged 65-69 (%)	5.2	7.4	7.4	20.6			
32	Employment rate, men aged 65-69 (%)	13.2	13.9	13.2	28.3			
33	Average exit age from the labour market, women (years)	:	59.0	60.8	64.0	2008		
34	Average exit age from the labour market, men (years)	:	62.3	62.0	64.7	2008		
35	Inactive for health reasons, population aged 50-64 (%)	21.0	5.0	21.0	48.4			
36	Internet use, population aged 55-64 (%)	:	36	44	75	2010		



4	PRODUCTIVITY, EDUCATION AND R&D	CZECH REPUBLIC		EU-27	3 BEST MS	*	
		2000	2009	2009	2009		
37	Early leavers from education and training, women aged 18-24 (%)	:	5.2	12.5	3.7	2008	
38	Early leavers from education and training, men aged 18-24 (%)	:	5.5	16.3	5.9		
39	Educational att., women aged 30-34 with tertiary education level (%)	14.4	18.7	35.7	54.9		
40	Educational attainment, men ged 30-34 with tertiary education level (%)	13	16.4	28.9	44.4		
41	University graduates aged 20-29 (per 1,000 of the pop. of that age)	22.4	59.0	:	88.6		
42	Employment rate for the tertiary education level, age 20-64 (%)	85.1	82.0	83.0	87.7		
43	Employment rate for the upper secondary edu. level, age 20-64 (%)	73.5	72.0	70.5	79.7		
44	Employment rate for the less than upper sec. edu. level, age 20-64 (%)	45.8	42.5	54.4	66.5		
45	Total public expenditure on education (% of GDP)	3.97	4.2	4.96	7.15		2007
46	Life-long learning (pop. aged 25-64 in education and training) (%)	:	6.8	9.1	25.3		
47	Gross domestic expenditure on R&D (% of GDP)	1.21	1.5	2.01	3.52		
48	Population working in high-tech sectors (% of employed pop.)	4.38	4.0	3.7	6.1		
49	Internet use (%)	:	60.0	63	86		
50	Labour productivity per employed person (2000=100)	100	126.3	105.6	156.4		



5	MIGRATION AND INTEGRATION	2000		2009		2009		*
		2000	2009	2009	2009	2009	2009	
51	Non-nationals in the population (%)	2.3	3.9	6.4	21.4			
52	Employment rate of nationals, women aged 25-54 (%)	73.8	74.2	72.9	84.0			
53	Employment rate of nationals, men aged 25-54 (%)	89.2	90.5	85.4	92.2			
54	Empl. rate of citizens from outside EU-27, women aged 25-54 (%)	:	64.0	52.7	74.9			
55	Employment rate of citizens from outside EU-27, men aged 25-54 (%)	:	87.2	72.9	87.5			
56	Education level (tertiary), nationals aged 25-49 (%)	:	17.2	28.4	41.2			
57	Education level (less than upper secondary), nationals aged 25-49 (%)	:	5.9	22.3	6.4			
58	Educ. level (tertiary), citizens from outside EU-27 aged 25-49 (%)	:	22.5	20.4	48.3			
59	Educ. level (< up. sec.), citizens from outside EU-27 aged 25-49 (%)	:	16.7	43.8	12.5			
6	SUSTAINABILITY OF PUBLIC FINANCES & SOCIAL PROTECTION	2000		2009		2009		*
60	General government consolidated gross debt (% of GDP)	18.5	35.3	:	74	12.1		
61	General government primary balance (% of GDP)	-2.9	-4.5	:	-4.2	-0.1		
62	Total general government revenue (% of GDP)	38.1	40.2	:	44	54.1		
63	Public expenditure on pensions (% of GDP)	9.7	9.8	7.5	11.0	13.5	7.0	2008
64	Public expenditure on health care and sickness (% of GDP)	6.4	6.0	7.6	8.4	7.5	3.9	2008
65	Public expenditure on family and children (% of GDP)	1.6	1.5	:	:	2.1	3.6	2008
66	Public expenditure on social protection (% of GDP)	18.9	18.1	:	:	25.3	13.8	2008
67	Expenditure on social protection (PPS / inhabitant)	2,463.6	3,653.3	:	:	6,337	1,688.9	2008
68	Population at risk of poverty after social transfers (%)	:	8.6	:	:	16.3	10.2	2008
69	Inequality of income distribution (S80/S20 income quintile share ratio)	:	3.5	:	:	4.9	3.4	2008
70	Population aged 18-59 living in jobless households (%)	7.8	6.7	:	:	10.1	6.1	

\*: 2009 or last year with data available (see the column placed to the right of the table)  
3 BEST MS: Average of the three best Member States according to country ranking

#### Demographic challenges and...

The Czech Republic fertility rate has recovered to almost the EU-27 level, and this may be partly the effect of a transition to women having children later in life. These projections indicate a moderately shrinking population and, in spite of below-average life expectancy, the old-age dependency ratio is projected to rise above the EU-27 average. Life-expectancy strongly depends on education level, especially for men.


#### ... opportunities for tackling them

Female employment rates could rise significantly and the gender pay gap remains large. Child-care provisions under age 2 are scarce. Households with children face a higher poverty risk than households without children. Employment rates for older workers are close to the EU-27 average, which means that there is still room for increasing the size of the labour force. While educational attainment is already high, productivity can still increase considerably. The government is also giving priority to reforming social, health and other public services to improve the conditions for more active and dignified ageing. Public debt is currently low, but a large ageing-related increase in public pension expenditure is expected, from the current 10% to a projected 11% of GDP in 2060.

## 4. DENMARK

1	DEMOGRAPHIC TRENDS	DENMARK					EU-27	*
		1970	2000	2009	2030	2050	2009	
1	Population on 1 January (thousands)	4,907	5,330	5,535	5,808	5,895	501,103	2010
2	Total Fertility Rate (children per woman)	1.95	1.77	1.84	1.85	1.85	1.60	
3	Life expectancy at birth for women (years)	:	79.2	81.1	84.5	87.2	82.4	
4	Life expectancy at birth for men (years)	:	74.5	76.9	80.0	82.9	76.4	
5	Life expectancy at age 65 for women (years)	:	18.3	19.5	:	:	20.54	
6	Life expectancy at age 65 for men (years)	:	15.2	16.8	:	:	16.99	
7	Natural growth (births minus deaths) (thousands)	22.6	9.1	7.9	3.7	-4.5	523.1	
8	Net migration (including corrections) (thousands)	21.1	10.1	15.3	8.7	5.7	877.1	
9	Mean age of women at childbirth (years)	26.7	29.7	30.5	:	:	29.7	
10	Old age dependency ratio (65 or over / 15-64 years old) (%)	18.9	22.2	24.2	37.8	41.3	25.6	
<p><b>Population distribution by age</b></p> <p>Stacked bar charts showing population distribution by age group (Pop. under 25, Pop. aged 25-64, Pop. aged 65-79, Pop. aged 80+) for EU-27 and Denmark in 2009, 2030, and 2050.</p> <p><b>Population growth, 1995-2050</b></p> <p>Line chart showing natural growth, net migration, and total population growth for EU-27 and Denmark from 1995 to 2050. Includes projected data for 2010 onwards.</p>								
2	GENDER EQUALITY AND FAMILY SITUATIONS	2000		2009	EU-27	3 BEST MS		
11	Employment rate, women aged 20-64 (%)		73.3	74.8	62.5	74.4		
12	Employment rate, men aged 20-64 (%)		82.4	80.8	75.8	83.1		
13	Employment rate, women aged 25-54 with at least 1 child (%)		:	:	68.2	81.1		
14	Employment rate, men aged 25-54 with at least 1 child (%)		:	:	88.5	94.0		
15	Gender pay gap (unadjusted) (%)		15	17.1	17.5	7	2008	
16	Employed women working part time (%)		34.1	37.9	31.4	4.9		
17	Employed men working part time (%)		10.2	15.3	8.1	2.4		
18	Average number of usual weekly working hours, women		32.6	31.3	33.0	38.9		
19	Average number of usual weekly working hours, men		39.2	36.7	39.9	42.2		
20	Childcare provision for children aged 0-2 (%)		:	73.0	28	56	2008	
21	Childcare provision for children aged 3 to compulsory school age (%)		:	96.0	83	97	2008	
22	Children aged 0-16 at risk of poverty after social transfer (%)		:	9.3	20.1	10.7	2008	
23	Children aged 0-16 living in jobless households (%)		:	4.3	10.2	4.1		
24	Social protection benefits targeted at family support (% in kind)		59.5	60.5	32.1	58.9	2008	
<p><b>Employment rate, population aged 20-64 yrs, 1995-2009 (%)</b></p> <p>Line chart showing employment rates for DK women, DK men, EU women, and EU men from 1995 to 2009. Includes 3-highest women and 3-highest men benchmarks.</p> <p><b>Education, 2009</b></p> <p>Horizontal bar chart showing education attainment levels for men and women in Denmark and EU-27, comparing tertiary level attainment with early leavers from education and training (EDU and TRA).</p>								
3	AGEING AND THE LABOUR MARKET	DENMARK		EU-27	3 BEST MS			
		2000	2009	2009	2009			
25	Employment rate, women aged 55-64 (%)		46.6	50.9	37.8	61.4		
26	Employment rate, men aged 55-64 (%)		64.1	64.1	54.8	70.4		
27	Employment rate, women aged 55-59 (%)		64.3	74.4	51.4	75.5		
28	Employment rate, men aged 55-59 (%)		79.7	82.6	69.1	83.0		
29	Employment rate, women aged 60-64 (%)		23.4	27.3	22.8	47.0		
30	Employment rate, men aged 60-64 (%)		37.8	45.8	38.5	59.6		
31	Employment rate, women aged 65-69 (%)		5.4	7.8	7.4	20.6		
32	Employment rate, men aged 65-69 (%)		11.3	18.5	13.2	28.3		
33	Average exit age from the labour market, women (years)		:	60.3	60.8	64.0	2008	
34	Average exit age from the labour market, men (years)		:	62.3	62.0	64.7	2008	
35	Inactive for health reasons, population aged 50-64 (%)		43.5	39.7	21.0	48.4		
36	Internet use, population aged 55-64 (%)		:	75	44	75	2010	

		DENMARK		EU-27	3 BEST MS	*
		2000	2009	2009	2009	
4	<b>PRODUCTIVITY, EDUCATION AND R&amp;D</b>					
37	Early leavers from education and training, women aged 18-24 (%)	10.4	7.7	12.5	3.7	
38	Early leavers from education and training, men aged 18-24 (%)	12.8	13.2	16.3	5.9	
39	Educational att., women aged 30-34 with tertiary education level (%)	30.5	54.4	35.7	54.9	
40	Educational attainment, men ged 30-34 with tertiary education level (%)	33.6	41.8	28.9	44.4	
41	University graduates aged 20-29 (per 1,000 of the pop. of that age)	54	79.8	:	88.6	2008
42	Employment rate for the tertiary education level, age 20-64 (%)	88.2	87.3	83.0	87.7	
43	Employment rate for the upper secondary edu. level, age 20-64 (%)	80.1	78.6	70.5	79.7	
44	Employment rate for the less than upper sec. edu. level, age 20-64 (%)	64.1	65.4	54.4	66.5	
45	Total public expenditure on education (% of GDP)	8.29	7.8	4.96	7.15	2007
46	Life-long learning (pop. aged 25-64 in education and training) (%)	:	31.6	9.1	25.3	
47	Gross domestic expenditure on R&D (% of GDP)	2.24	3.0	2.01	3.52	
48	Population working in high-tech sectors (% of employed pop.)	6.5	5.3	3.7	6.1	
49	Internet use (%)	:	84.0	63	86	
50	Labour productivity per employed person (2000=100)	100	100.9	105.6	156.4	



	2000		2009		2009	2009	*
	2000	2009	2035	2060	2009	2009	
5	<b>MIGRATION AND INTEGRATION</b>						
51	Non-nationals in the population (%)	4.9	5.8	:	6.4	21.4	
52	Employment rate of nationals, women aged 25-54 (%)	81.5	84.3	72.9	84.0		
53	Employment rate of nationals, men aged 25-54 (%)	89.2	87.8	85.4	92.2		
54	Empl. rate of citizens from outside EU-27, women aged 25-54 (%)	:	60.6	52.7	74.9		
55	Employment rate of citizens from outside EU-27, men aged 25-54 (%)	:	71.2	72.9	87.5		
56	Education level (tertiary), nationals aged 25-49 (%)	:	38.5	28.4	41.2		
57	Education level (less than upper secondary), nationals aged 25-49 (%)	:	17.9	22.3	6.4		
58	Educ. level (tertiary), citizens from outside EU-27 aged 25-49 (%)	:	20.7	20.4	48.3		
59	Educ. level (< up. sec.), citizens from outside EU-27 aged 25-49 (%)	:	25.3	43.8	12.5		
6	<b>SUSTAINABILITY OF PUBLIC FINANCES &amp; SOCIAL PROTECTION</b>						
60	General government consolidated gross debt (% of GDP)	52.4	41.4	:	:	74	12.1
61	General government primary balance (% of GDP)	5.9	-0.7	:	:	-4.2	-0.1
62	Total general government revenue (% of GDP)	55.8	55.4	:	:	44	54.1
63	Public expenditure on pensions (% of GDP)	14.0	15.5	10.5	9.2	13.5	7.0
64	Public expenditure on health care and sickness (% of GDP)	5.7	6.7	6.7	6.9	7.5	3.9
65	Public expenditure on family and children (% of GDP)	3.7	3.8	:	:	2.1	3.6
66	Public expenditure on social protection (% of GDP)	28.1	28.9	:	:	25.3	13.8
67	Expenditure on social protection (PPS / inhabitant)	7,030.7	8,700.8	:	:	6,337	1,688.9
68	Topulation at risk of poverty after social transfers (%)	:	13.1	:	:	16.3	10.2
69	Inequality of income distribution (S80/S20 income quintile share ratio)	:	4.6	:	:	4.9	3.4
70	Population aged 18-59 living in jobless households (%)	:	:	:	:	10.1	6.1

\*: 2009 or last year with data available (see the column placed to the right of the table)  
 3 BEST MS: Average of the three best Member States according to country ranking

#### Demographic challenges and...

Denmark has currently one of the highest fertility rates in EU-27 while life expectancy for women is below the EU-27 average. The projected increase in the old-age dependency ratio is much smaller than for EU-27 as a whole. Mainly thanks to assumed immigration the Danish population is projected to grow by over 6% by 2050.

#### ... opportunities for tackling them

Denmark has already achieved high female employment rates, although the gender pay gap remains significant and women are much more likely to work part-time than men. The employment rate of older workers is also far above the EU-27 average, but could still rise in the over-60 age group if health and disability issues as causes for early labour market exit can be tackled. There also appears to be scope for a better integration of third country nationals into labour markets and education systems. Public debt is low compared to the EU-27 average.

## 5. GERMANY

		GERMANY					EU-27	*
1 DEMOGRAPHIC TRENDS		1970	2000	2009	2030	2050	2009	
1	Population on 1 January (thousands)	78,269	82,163	81,802	80,152	74,491	501,103	2010
2	Total Fertility Rate (children per woman)	:	1.38	1.36	1.42	1.49	1.60	
3	Life expectancy at birth for women (years)	73.6	81.2	82.8	85.6	88.0	82.4	
4	Life expectancy at birth for men (years)	67.5	75.1	77.8	80.8	83.6	76.4	
5	Life expectancy at age 65 for women (years)	14.9	19.6	20.8	:	:	20.54	
6	Life expectancy at age 65 for men (years)	11.9	15.8	17.6	:	:	16.99	
7	Natural growth (births minus deaths) (thousands)	72.1	-71.8	-189.4	-365.8	-508.5	523.1	
8	Net migration (including corrections) (thousands)	-271.7	167.9	-10.7	187.1	135.7	877.1	
9	Mean age of women at childbirth (years)	:	28.8	30.2	:	:	29.7	
10	Old age dependency ratio (65 or over / 15-64 years old) (%)	21.4	23.9	30.8	46.2	56.4	25.6	
<p><b>Population distribution by age</b> Stacked bar chart showing population distribution by age group (under 25, 25-64, 65-79, 80+) for EU-27 and Germany in 2009, 2030, and 2050.</p> <p><b>Population growth, 1995-2050</b> Line chart showing natural growth, net migration, and total population growth for Germany from 1995 to 2050, with projected data from 2009 onwards.</p>								
2 GENDER EQUALITY AND FAMILY SITUATIONS		GERMANY		EU-27	3 BEST MS			
		2000	2009	2009	2009			
11	Employment rate, women aged 20-64 (%)	60.7	69.8	62.5	74.4			
12	Employment rate, men aged 20-64 (%)	76.5	79.7	75.8	83.1			
13	Employment rate, women aged 25-54 with at least 1 child (%)	:	72.0	68.2	81.1			
14	Employment rate, men aged 25-54 with at least 1 child (%)	:	91.0	88.5	94.0			
15	Gender pay gap (unadjusted) (%)	21	23.2	17.5	7	2008		
16	Employed women working part time (%)	37.9	45.2	31.4	4.9			
17	Employed men working part time (%)	5.0	9.5	8.1	2.4			
18	Average number of usual weekly working hours, women	31.9	30.0	33.0	38.9			
19	Average number of usual weekly working hours, men	41.1	39.7	39.9	42.2			
20	Childcare provision for children aged 0-2 (%)	:	20.0	28	56	2008		
21	Childcare provision for children aged 3 to compulsory school age (%)	:	91.0	83	97	2008		
22	Children aged 0-16 at risk of poverty after social transfer (%)	13	14.6	20.1	10.7	2008		
23	Children aged 0-16 living in jobless households (%)	9.0	9.6	10.2	4.1			
24	Social protection benefits targeted at family support (% in kind)	24.8	27.8	32.1	58.9	2008		
<p><b>Employment rate, population aged 20-64 yrs, 1995-2009 (%)</b> Line chart showing employment rates for DE women, DE men, EU women, EU men, and 3-highest countries from 1995 to 2009.</p> <p><b>Education, 2009</b> Horizontal bar chart showing early leavers from education and tertiary attainment levels for Germany and EU-27, comparing men and women.</p>								
3 AGEING AND THE LABOUR MARKET		GERMANY		EU-27	3 BEST MS			
		2000	2009	2009	2009			
25	Employment rate, women aged 55-64 (%)	29.0	48.7	37.8	61.4			
26	Employment rate, men aged 55-64 (%)	46.4	63.9	54.8	70.4			
27	Employment rate, women aged 55-59 (%)	46.6	63.4	51.4	75.5			
28	Employment rate, men aged 55-59 (%)	66.1	77.3	69.1	83.0			
29	Employment rate, women aged 60-64 (%)	12.1	30.6	22.8	47.0			
30	Employment rate, men aged 60-64 (%)	27.2	47.0	38.5	59.6			
31	Employment rate, women aged 65-69 (%)	2.8	6.0	7.4	20.6			
32	Employment rate, men aged 65-69 (%)	7.4	10.6	13.2	28.3			
33	Average exit age from the labour market, women (years)	:	61.4	60.8	64.0	2008		
34	Average exit age from the labour market, men (years)	:	62.1	62.0	64.7	2008		
35	Inactive for health reasons, population aged 50-64 (%)	9.4	16.3	21.0	48.4			
36	Internet use, population aged 55-64 (%)	:	56	44	75	2010		

		GERMANY		EU-27	3 BEST MS	*	
		2000	2009	2009	2009		
4	<b>PRODUCTIVITY, EDUCATION AND R&amp;D</b>						
37	Early leavers from education and training, women aged 18-24 (%)	10.4	10.7	12.5	3.7		
38	Early leavers from education and training, men aged 18-24 (%)	14.4	11.5	16.3	5.9		
39	Educational att., women aged 30-34 with tertiary education level (%)	28.8	29.2	35.7	54.9		
40	Educational attainment, men aged 30-34 with tertiary education level (%)	22.6	29.6	28.9	44.4		
41	University graduates aged 20-29 (per 1,000 of the pop. of that age)	31	40.5	:	88.6	2008	
42	Employment rate for the tertiary education level, age 20-64 (%)	83.1	87.0	83.0	87.7		
43	Employment rate for the upper secondary edu. level, age 20-64 (%)	70	74.8	70.5	79.7		
44	Employment rate for the less than upper sec. edu. level, age 20-64 (%)	52.7	56.1	54.4	66.5		
45	Total public expenditure on education (% of GDP)	4.46	4.5	4.96	7.15	2007	
46	Life-long learning (pop. aged 25-64 in education and training) (%)	:	7.8	9.1	25.3		
47	Gross domestic expenditure on R&D (% of GDP)	2.45	2.8	2.01	3.52		
48	Population working in high-tech sectors (% of employed pop.)	4.9	4.3	3.7	6.1		
49	Internet use (%)	:	74.0	63	86		
50	Labour productivity per employed person (2000=100)	100	102.2	105.6	156.4		
5	<b>MIGRATION AND INTEGRATION</b>	2000	2009	2009	2009		
51	Non-nationals in the population (%)	8.9	8.8	6.4	21.4		
52	Employment rate of nationals, women aged 25-54 (%)	73.6	79.8	72.9	84.0		
53	Employment rate of nationals, men aged 25-54 (%)	88.6	87.5	85.4	92.2		
54	Empl. rate of citizens from outside EU-27, women aged 25-54 (%)	:	47.9	52.7	74.9		
55	Employment rate of citizens from outside EU-27, men aged 25-54 (%)	:	71.6	72.9	87.5		
56	Education level (tertiary), nationals aged 25-49 (%)	:	27.3	28.4	41.2		
57	Education level (less than upper secondary), nationals aged 25-49 (%)	:	9.8	22.3	6.4		
58	Educ. level (tertiary), citizens from outside EU-27 aged 25-49 (%)	:	15.3	20.4	48.3		
59	Educ. level (< up. sec.), citizens from outside EU-27 aged 25-49 (%)	:	48.5	43.8	12.5		
6	<b>SUSTAINABILITY OF PUBLIC FINANCES &amp; SOCIAL PROTECTION</b>	2000	2009	2035	2060	2009	2009
60	General government consolidated gross debt (% of GDP)	59.7	73.4	:	:	74	12.1
61	General government primary balance (% of GDP)	4.5	-0.4	:	:	-4.2	-0.1
62	Total general government revenue (% of GDP)	46.4	44.5	:	:	44	54.1
63	Public expenditure on pensions (% of GDP)	14.2	13.5	11.9	12.8	13.5	7.0
64	Public expenditure on health care and sickness (% of GDP)	8.3	8.1	8.8	9.2	7.5	3.9
65	Public expenditure on family and children (% of GDP)	3.2	2.8	:	:	2.1	3.6
66	Public expenditure on social protection (% of GDP)	28.3	26.7	:	:	25.3	13.8
67	Expenditure on social protection (PPS / inhabitant)	6,384.6	7,683.7	:	:	6,337	1,688.9
68	Population at risk of poverty after social transfers (%)	10.0	15.5	:	:	16.3	10.2
69	Inequality of income distribution (S80/S20 income quintile share ratio)	3.5	4.5	:	:	4.9	3.4
70	Population aged 18-59 living in jobless households (%)	9.7	9.2	:	:	10.1	6.1

\*: 2009 or last year with data available (see the column placed to the right of the table)


3 BEST MS: Average of the three best Member States according to country ranking

Demographic challenges and...	
<p>Germany's fertility rate lies below the EU-27 average and was 1.36 in 2009. Net migration has turned to negative; the population is decreasing and is projected to shrink by almost 10% until 2050. Life expectancy in Germany is in line with the EU average while the old-age dependency ratio is already among the highest in EU-27 and expected to stay above the EU-27 average.</p>	
<p>... opportunities for tackling them</p>	
<p>Employment rates of older workers are already above the EU-27 average and the expected ageing-related increase in social spending may stay slightly below the EU-27 average. The share of older workers among workers is projected to increase considerably in the next decade.</p> <p>To increase and make better use of the labour force potential, the government seems committed to reviewing the role of immigration in meeting the future labour demand.</p> <p>To increase the participation of women in the labour market, the Government emphasises increasing childcare facilities; by 2013 there should be place to accommodate at least 35% of all children under 3 years old in childcare facilities; from 2013 onwards all children aged one and older will have a legal right to childcare. In 2007 Germany introduced a new parental leave scheme that is giving in particular fathers a greater financial incentive to become involved in the daily care of their children. The German Business Programme 'Success Factor Family' tries to convince enterprises of the usefulness of a more family-oriented personnel policy.</p> <p>Public debt is projected to grow to 80% of GDP by 2011.</p>	

## 6. ESTONIA

1	DEMOGRAPHIC TRENDS	ESTONIA					EU-27	*
		1970	2000	2009	2030	2050	2009	
1	Population on 1 January (thousands)	1,356	1,372	1,340	1,267	1,181	501,103	2010
2	Total Fertility Rate (children per woman)	:	1.38	1.62	1.60	1.64	1.60	
3	Life expectancy at birth for women (years)	:	76.2	80.2	82.9	86.1	82.4	
4	Life expectancy at birth for men (years)	:	65.2	69.8	74.0	78.8	76.4	
5	Life expectancy at age 65 for women (years)	:	17.0	19.2	:	:	20.54	
6	Life expectancy at age 65 for men (years)	:	12.6	14.0	:	:	16.99	
7	Natural growth (births minus deaths) (thousands)	6.4	-5.3	-0.3	-4.8	-4.7	523.1	
8	Net migration (including corrections) (thousands)	6.1	0.2	0.0	-0.3	0.3	877.1	
9	Mean age of women at childbirth (years)	:	27.0	29.1	:	:	29.7	
10	Old age dependency ratio (65 or over / 15-64 years old) (%)	17.7	22.4	25.1	34.4	47.2	25.6	
2	GENDER EQUALITY AND FAMILY SITUATIONS	2000		2009	2009	EU-27	3 BEST MS	
11	Employment rate, women aged 20-64 (%)		63.3	68.8	62.5		74.4	
12	Employment rate, men aged 20-64 (%)		72.0	71.0	75.8		83.1	
13	Employment rate, women aged 25-54 with at least 1 child (%)		:	72.2	68.2		81.1	
14	Employment rate, men aged 25-54 with at least 1 child (%)		:	82.2	88.5		94.0	
15	Gender pay gap (unadjusted) (%)		25	:	17.5		7	2008
16	Employed women working part time (%)		10.9	13.8	31.4		4.9	
17	Employed men working part time (%)		5.3	7.0	8.1		2.4	
18	Average number of usual weekly working hours, women		39.1	36.5	33.0		38.9	
19	Average number of usual weekly working hours, men		41.7	38.6	39.9		42.2	
20	Childcare provision for children aged 0-2 (%)		:	17.0	28		56	2008
21	Childcare provision for children aged 3 to compulsory school age (%)		:	88.0	83		97	2008
22	Children aged 0-16 at risk of poverty after social transfer (%)		21	20.4	20.1		10.7	2008
23	Children aged 0-16 living in jobless households (%)		11.3	12.2	10.2		4.1	
24	Social protection benefits targeted at family support (% in kind)		6.4	4.7	32.1		58.9	2008
3	AGEING AND THE LABOUR MARKET	ESTONIA		2009	2009	EU-27	3 BEST MS	
25	Employment rate, women aged 55-64 (%)		39.0	61.2	37.8		61.4	
26	Employment rate, men aged 55-64 (%)		55.9	59.4	54.8		70.4	
27	Employment rate, women aged 55-59 (%)		52.2	74.0	51.4		75.5	
28	Employment rate, men aged 55-59 (%)		66.8	64.5	69.1		83.0	
29	Employment rate, women aged 60-64 (%)		25.5	45.5	22.8		47.0	
30	Employment rate, men aged 60-64 (%)		35.6	52.7	38.5		59.6	
31	Employment rate, women aged 65-69 (%)		16.1	16.9	7.4		20.6	
32	Employment rate, men aged 65-69 (%)		23.9	24.1	13.2		28.3	
33	Average exit age from the labour market, women (years)		:	:	60.8		64.0	2008
34	Average exit age from the labour market, men (years)		:	:	62.0		64.7	2008
35	Inactive for health reasons, population aged 50-64 (%)		22.0	42.4	21.0		48.4	
36	Internet use, population aged 55-64 (%)		:	36	44		75	2010

	ESTONIA		EU-27	3 BEST MS	*
	2000	2009	2009	2009	
4	<b>PRODUCTIVITY, EDUCATION AND R&amp;D</b>				
37	11.0	9.3	12.5	3.7	
38	19.4	18.4	16.3	5.9	
39	21.7	41.9	35.7	54.9	
40	39.0	29.8	28.9	44.4	
41	34.0	55.7	:	88.6	2008
42	82.7	82.1	83.0	87.7	
43	67.2	67.5	70.5	79.7	
44	41.9	46.9	54.4	66.5	
45	6.1	4.9	4.96	7.15	2007
46	:	10.5	9.1	25.3	
47	0.6	1.4	2.01	3.52	
48	8.4	3.5	3.7	6.1	
49	:	66.0	63	86	
50	100.0	139.8	105.6	156.4	



	2000		2009		*
	2000	2009	2009	2009	
5	<b>MIGRATION AND INTEGRATION</b>				
51	20.0	16.0	6.4	21.4	
52	76.0	76.2	72.9	84.0	
53	79.2	79.5	85.4	92.2	
54	:	71.6	52.7	74.9	
55	:	69.4	72.9	87.5	
56	:	40.2	28.4	41.2	
57	:	10.3	22.3	6.4	
58	:	20.3	20.4	48.3	
59	:	7.9	43.8	12.5	
6	<b>SUSTAINABILITY OF PUBLIC FINANCES &amp; SOCIAL PROTECTION</b>				
60	5.1	7.2	:	74	12.1
61	0.0	-1.4	:	-4.2	-0.1
62	35.9	2.8	:	44	54.1
63	7.1	7.9	5.4	4.9	13.5
64	4.4	4.8	5.6	6.1	7.5
65	1.6	1.8	:	2.1	3.6
66	13.6	14.9	:	25.3	13.8
67	1,172.5	2,518.2	:	6,337	1,688.9
68	18.0	19.7	:	16.3	10.2
69	6.3	5.0	:	4.9	3.4
70	11.3	10.4	:	10.1	6.1

\*: 2009 or last year with data available (see the column placed to the right of the table)

3 BEST MS: Average of the three best Member States according to country ranking

Demographic challenges and...	
<p>Estonia's fertility rate is currently higher than the EU-27 average. Life expectancy is significantly lower than the EU-27 average, particularly for men and the less-well educated. The result would be a low old-age dependency ratio. By 2050 the Estonian population, which is already in decline, is projected to continue shrinking by 12%.</p>	
... opportunities for tackling them	
<p>Female employment rates are high and most women work full-time. Among older workers, female employment rates are higher than men's. However, their pay is significantly lower than men's, indicating scope for a qualitative improvement of female employment. Also, a high proportion of children live in jobless households.</p> <p>To help families through the recession and deal with unemployment and especially long-term unemployment the government increased expenditure on active labour market measures, subsistence benefit, family and parental benefit; maintained the universal state family benefits system. A high proportion of people in their 50s and 60s are still in employment. There is room to capitalize on this fact and further reinforce active labour market policies through focus on lifelong learning. There is much catch-up potential for productivity growth which could build on the high level of educational achievement and on efforts to ensure that R&amp;D results are translated into innovative services and products. Last year Estonia launched a National Health Strategy for 2009-2020 aiming to improve health, life expectancy and life quality. In 2020 the preparations for the development plan of children and families started. The children and family development plan 2011-2020 will focus on promoting positive parenting, early education and care, child well-being, child protection and child rights, work and family reconciliation issues.</p>	

## 7. IRELAND

		IRELAND					EU-27	*
1 DEMOGRAPHIC TRENDS		1970	2000	2009	2030	2050	2009	
1	Population on 1 January (thousands)	2,943	3,778	4,468	5,881	6,531	501,103	2010
2	Total Fertility Rate (children per woman)	3.85	1.89	2.07	1.89	1.88	1.60	
3	Life expectancy at birth for women (years)	:	79.2	82.5	85.3	88.0	82.4	
4	Life expectancy at birth for men (years)	:	74	77.4	81.1	83.9	76.4	
5	Life expectancy at age 65 for women (years)	:	18.0	20.6	:	:	20.54	
6	Life expectancy at age 65 for men (years)	:	14.6	17.2	:	:	16.99	
7	Natural growth (births minus deaths) (thousands)	30.7	23.4	45.4	28.2	19.4	523.1	
8	Net migration (including corrections) (thousands)	-2.8	31.8	-27.6	8.7	7.4	877.1	
9	Mean age of women at childbirth (years)	30.4	30.4	31.2	:	:	29.7	
10	Old age dependency ratio (65 or over / 15-64 years old) (%)	19.3	16.8	16.5	24.6	40.4	25.6	
2 GENDER EQUALITY AND FAMILY SITUATIONS		2000	2009	2009	2009	2009		
11	Employment rate, women aged 20-64 (%)	57.5	61.7	62.5	74.4			
12	Employment rate, men aged 20-64 (%)	82.6	71.8	75.8	83.1			
13	Employment rate, women aged 25-54 with at least 1 child (%)	:	60.4	68.2	81.1			
14	Employment rate, men aged 25-54 with at least 1 child (%)	:	80.3	88.5	94.0			
15	Gender pay gap (unadjusted) (%)	19	:	17.5	7	2008		
16	Employed women working part time (%)	30.3	33.8	31.4	4.9			
17	Employed men working part time (%)	6.9	10.3	8.1	2.4			
18	Average number of usual weekly working hours, women	32.8	30.0	33.0	38.9			
19	Average number of usual weekly working hours, men	42.0	39.1	39.9	42.2			
20	Childcare provision for children aged 0-2 (%)	:	24.0	28	56	2008		
21	Childcare provision for children aged 3 to compulsory school age (%)	:	85.0	83	97	2008		
22	Children aged 0-16 at risk of poverty after social transfer (%)	22	17.9	20.1	10.7	2008		
23	Children aged 0-16 living in jobless households (%)	10.2	17.2	10.2	4.1			
24	Social protection benefits targeted at family support (% in kind)	10.3	10.3	32.1	58.9	2008		
3 AGEING AND THE LABOUR MARKET		2000	2009	2009	2009	2009		
25	Employment rate, women aged 55-64 (%)	27.2	41.0	37.8	61.4			
26	Employment rate, men aged 55-64 (%)	63.2	60.9	54.8	70.4			
27	Employment rate, women aged 55-59 (%)	34.0	50.0	51.4	75.5			
28	Employment rate, men aged 55-59 (%)	71.7	68.3	69.1	83.0			
29	Employment rate, women aged 60-64 (%)	19.1	31.0	22.8	47.0			
30	Employment rate, men aged 60-64 (%)	52.6	52.4	38.5	59.6			
31	Employment rate, women aged 65-69 (%)	6.6	10.1	7.4	20.6			
32	Employment rate, men aged 65-69 (%)	23.3	24.5	13.2	28.3			
33	Average exit age from the labour market, women (years)	:	64.7	60.8	64.0	2008		
34	Average exit age from the labour market, men (years)	:	63.5	62.0	64.7	2008		
35	Inactive for health reasons, population aged 50-64 (%)	46.5	40.8	21.0	48.4			
36	Internet use, population aged 55-64 (%)	:	34	44	75	2010		



		IRELAND		EU-27	3 BEST MS	*
4	<b>PRODUCTIVITY, EDUCATION AND R&amp;D</b>	2000	2009	2009	2009	
37	Early leavers from education and training, women aged 18-24 (%)	:	8.2	12.5	3.7	
38	Early leavers from education and training, men aged 18-24 (%)	:	14.4	16.3	5.9	
39	Educational att., women aged 30-34 with tertiary education level (%)	25.8	54.8	35.7	54.9	
40	Educational attainment, men aged 30-34 with tertiary education level (%)	29.2	43.0	28.9	44.4	
41	University graduates aged 20-29 (per 1,000 of the pop. of that age)	70.4	80.0	:	88.6	2008
42	Employment rate for the tertiary education level, age 20-64 (%)	86.6	80.7	83.0	87.7	
43	Employment rate for the upper secondary edu. level, age 20-64 (%)	74.8	66.5	70.5	79.7	
44	Employment rate for the less than upper sec. edu. level, age 20-64 (%)	56.4	49.4	54.4	66.5	
45	Total public expenditure on education (% of GDP)	4.3	4.9	4.96	7.15	2007
46	Life-long learning (pop. aged 25-64 in education and training) (%)	:	6.3	9.1	25.3	
47	Gross domestic expenditure on R&D (% of GDP)	1.1	1.8	2.01	3.52	
48	Population working in high-tech sectors (% of employed pop.)	7.5	6.7	3.7	6.1	
49	Internet use (%)	:	60.0	63	86	
50	Labour productivity per employed person (2000=100)	100.0	113.8	105.6	156.4	

<b>Employment rates (%), 2009</b>		<b>Social Protection (% of GDP), 2008</b>	

<b>5 MIGRATION AND INTEGRATION</b>		2000	2009	2009	2009
51	Non-nationals in the population (%)	3.3	9.9	6.4	21.4
52	Employment rate of nationals, women aged 25-54 (%)	62.9	67.8	72.9	84.0
53	Employment rate of nationals, men aged 25-54 (%)	88.5	78.0	85.4	92.2
54	Empl. rate of citizens from outside EU-27, women aged 25-54 (%)	:	54.9	52.7	74.9
55	Employment rate of citizens from outside EU-27, men aged 25-54 (%)	:	69.1	72.9	87.5
56	Education level (tertiary), nationals aged 25-49 (%)	:	39.0	28.4	41.2
57	Education level (less than upper secondary), nationals aged 25-49 (%)	:	21.6	22.3	6.4
58	Educ. level (tertiary), citizens from outside EU-27 aged 25-49 (%)	:	52.9	20.4	48.3
59	Educ. level (< up. sec.), citizens from outside EU-27 aged 25-49 (%)	:	9.0	43.8	12.5

<b>6 SUSTAINABILITY OF PUBLIC FINANCES &amp; SOCIAL PROTECTION</b>		2000	2009	2035	2060	2009	2009
60	General government consolidated gross debt (% of GDP)	37.8	65.5	:	:	74	12.1
61	General government primary balance (% of GDP)	6.8	-12.2	:	:	-4.2	-0.1
62	Total general government revenue (% of GDP)	36.0	34.5	:	:	44	54.1
63	Public expenditure on pensions (% of GDP)	4.1	6.6	8.0	11.3	13.5	7.0
64	Public expenditure on health care and sickness (% of GDP)	5.5	8.5	6.7	7.6	7.5	3.9
65	Public expenditure on family and children (% of GDP)	1.8	3.1	:	:	2.1	3.6
66	Public expenditure on social protection (% of GDP)	13.2	20.9	:	:	25.3	13.8
67	Expenditure on social protection (PPS / inhabitant)	3,302.6	7,033.6	:	:	6,337	1,688.9
68	Population at risk of poverty after social transfers (%)	20.0	15.0	:	:	16.3	10.2
69	Inequality of income distribution (S80/S20 income quintile share ratio)	4.7	4.2	:	:	4.9	3.4
70	Population aged 18-59 living in jobless households (%)	8.3	12.9	:	:	10.1	6.1

\*: 2009 or last year with data available (see the column placed to the right of the table)


3 BEST MS: Average of the three best Member States according to country ranking

<b>Demographic challenges and...</b>	
<p>Ireland has currently the highest fertility rate in EU-27 and a high share of young people. Life expectancy matches the EU-27 average. The projections assume that fertility rates will remain high and that life expectancy will stay close to the EU-27 average. The old-age dependency ratio could more than double, but would remain significantly below the EU-27 average by 2050. Until 2050 the Irish population is projected to increase by almost 50%.</p>	
<p>... opportunities for tackling them</p>	
<p>Female labour force participation is already relatively high, but there remains scope for improvement with an employment rate gap between men and women of 10 percentage points and about one-third of women working part-time. Labour market opportunities for women could benefit from more accessible childcare. The gender pay gap is below the EU-27 average. In the crisis many children, especially those living with single parents, found themselves in jobless households. Migrants have been hit in the crisis and in 2009 there has been net emigration from Ireland.</p> <p>An increase in public spending on R&amp;D and a reduction of early school leaving would help to raise future productivity. Although employment rates of older workers are above the EU-27 average, potential still exists for improvement. Public debt is now one of the highest, above 80% of GDP, and a large ageing-related increase in public social protection expenditure is projected.</p>	

## 8. GREECE

		GREECE					EU-27	*
1 DEMOGRAPHIC TRENDS		1970	2000	2009	2030	2050	2009	
1	Population on 1 January (thousands)	8,781	10,904	11,305	11,573	11,445	501,103	2010
2	Total Fertility Rate (children per woman)	2.40	1.26	1.52	1.48	1.54	1.60	
3	Life expectancy at birth for women (years)	76.0	80.6	82.7	85.3	87.6	82.4	
4	Life expectancy at birth for men (years)	71.6	75.5	77.8	80.9	83.6	76.4	
5	Life expectancy at age 65 for women (years)	17.0	18.4	20.2	:	:	20.54	
6	Life expectancy at age 65 for men (years)	15.0	16.1	18.1	:	:	16.99	
7	Natural growth (births minus deaths) (thousands)	71.0	-2.0	9.6	-37.4	-55.6	523.1	
8	Net migration (including corrections) (thousands)	-46.4	29.4	35.1	37.2	31.0	877.1	
9	Mean age of women at childbirth (years)	27.4	29.5	30.2	:	:	29.7	
10	Old age dependency ratio (65 or over / 15-64 years old) (%)	17.2	24.2	27.8	38.5	57.0	25.6	
<p><b>Population distribution by age</b></p> <p>Stacked bar chart showing population distribution by age group (0-100%) for EU-27 and Greece in 2009, 2030, and 2050. Legend: Pop. under 25 (white), Pop. aged 25-64 (light grey), Pop. aged 65-79 (dark grey), Pop. aged 80+ (black).</p> <p><b>Population growth, 1995-2050</b></p> <p>Line chart showing population growth (Natural growth, Net migration, Total population growth) from 1995 to 2050. Legend: Natural growth (solid line), Net migration (dashed line), Total population growth (dotted line). Open circles and triangles represent projected data.</p>								
2 GENDER EQUALITY AND FAMILY SITUATIONS		2000	2009	EU-27 2009	3 BEST MS 2009			
11	Employment rate, women aged 20-64 (%)	45.7	52.7	62.5	74.4			
12	Employment rate, men aged 20-64 (%)	79.0	78.8	75.8	83.1			
13	Employment rate, women aged 25-54 with at least 1 child (%)	:	60.0	68.2	81.1			
14	Employment rate, men aged 25-54 with at least 1 child (%)	:	92.7	88.5	94.0			
15	Gender pay gap (unadjusted) (%)	15	22.0	17.5	7	2008		
16	Employed women working part time (%)	7.8	10.3	31.4	4.9			
17	Employed men working part time (%)	2.6	3.1	8.1	2.4			
18	Average number of usual weekly working hours, women	40.3	37.8	33.0	38.9			
19	Average number of usual weekly working hours, men	45.0	42.7	39.9	42.2			
20	Childcare provision for children aged 0-2 (%)	:	12.0	28	56	2008		
21	Childcare provision for children aged 3 to compulsory school age (%)	:	67.0	83	97	2008		
22	Children aged 0-16 at risk of poverty after social transfer (%)	19	22.7	20.1	10.7	2008		
23	Children aged 0-16 living in jobless households (%)	5.3	4.8	10.2	4.1			
24	Social protection benefits targeted at family support (% in kind)	37.4	31.4	32.1	58.9	2008		
<p><b>Employment rate, population aged 20-64 yrs, 1995-2009 (%)</b></p> <p>Line chart showing employment rates for EL women, EL men, EU women, and EU men from 1995 to 2009. Legend: EL women (solid line), EL men (dashed line), EU women (dotted line), EU men (dash-dot line).</p> <p><b>Education, 2009</b></p> <p>Horizontal bar chart showing education attainment levels for men and women in Greece and EU-27. Legend: GREECE (black), EU-27 (grey), 3 BEST MS (white).</p>								
3 AGEING AND THE LABOUR MARKET		2000	2009	EU-27 2009	3 BEST MS 2009			
25	Employment rate, women aged 55-64 (%)	24.3	27.7	37.8	61.4			
26	Employment rate, men aged 55-64 (%)	55.2	57.7	54.8	70.4			
27	Employment rate, women aged 55-59 (%)	30.0	36.3	51.4	75.5			
28	Employment rate, men aged 55-59 (%)	69.2	71.0	69.1	83.0			
29	Employment rate, women aged 60-64 (%)	20.3	19.6	22.8	47.0			
30	Employment rate, men aged 60-64 (%)	44.6	43.7	38.5	59.6			
31	Employment rate, women aged 65-69 (%)	6.5	5.8	7.4	20.6			
32	Employment rate, men aged 65-69 (%)	16.8	15.2	13.2	28.3			
33	Average exit age from the labour market, women (years)	:	61.0	60.8	64.0	2008		
34	Average exit age from the labour market, men (years)	:	61.9	62.0	64.7	2008		
35	Inactive for health reasons, population aged 50-64 (%)	4.7	7.4	21.0	48.4			
36	Internet use, population aged 55-64 (%)	:	10	44	75	2010		

4	PRODUCTIVITY, EDUCATION AND R&D	GREECE		EU-27	3 BEST MS	*	
		2000	2009	2009	2009		
37	Early leavers from education and training, women aged 18-24 (%)	13.6	10.6	12.5	3.7	2008	
38	Early leavers from education and training, men aged 18-24 (%)	22.9	18.3	16.3	5.9		
39	Educational att., women aged 30-34 with tertiary education level (%)	23.9	29.1	35.7	54.9		
40	Educational attainment, men aged 30-34 with tertiary education level (%)	26.9	24.0	28.9	44.4		
41	University graduates aged 20-29 (per 1,000 of the pop. of that age)	:	44.9	:	88.6		
42	Employment rate for the tertiary education level, age 20-64 (%)	80.6	81.6	83.0	87.7		
43	Employment rate for the upper secondary edu. level, age 20-64 (%)	60.6	62.8	70.5	79.7		
44	Employment rate for the less than upper sec. edu. level, age 20-64 (%)	57.0	59.8	54.4	66.5		
45	Total public expenditure on education (% of GDP)	3.4	:	4.96	7.15		2007
46	Life-long learning (pop. aged 25-64 in education and training) (%)	:	3.3	9.1	25.3		
47	Gross domestic expenditure on R&D (% of GDP)	:	:	2.01	3.52		
48	Population working in high-tech sectors (% of employed pop.)	2.8	2.1	3.7	6.1		
49	Internet use (%)	:	36.0	63	86		
50	Labour productivity per employed person (2000=100)	100.0	118.3	105.6	156.4		



5	MIGRATION AND INTEGRATION	2000	2009	2009	2009		
51	Non-nationals in the population (%)	:	8.3	6.4	21.4		
52	Employment rate of nationals, women aged 25-54 (%)	52.8	62.9	72.9	84.0		
53	Employment rate of nationals, men aged 25-54 (%)	88.6	88.1	85.4	92.2		
54	Empl. rate of citizens from outside EU-27, women aged 25-54 (%)	:	55.2	52.7	74.9		
55	Employment rate of citizens from outside EU-27, men aged 25-54 (%)	:	90.7	72.9	87.5		
56	Education level (tertiary), nationals aged 25-49 (%)	:	28.0	28.4	41.2		
57	Education level (less than upper secondary), nationals aged 25-49 (%)	:	27.3	22.3	6.4		
58	Educ. level (tertiary), citizens from outside EU-27 aged 25-49 (%)	:	10.0	20.4	48.3		
59	Educ. level (< up. sec.), citizens from outside EU-27 aged 25-49 (%)	:	59.0	43.8	12.5		
6	SUSTAINABILITY OF PUBLIC FINANCES & SOCIAL PROTECTION	2000	2009	2035	2060	2009	2009
60	General government consolidated gross debt (% of GDP)	103.4	126.8	:	:	74	12.1
61	General government primary balance (% of GDP)	3.6	-10.1	:	:	-4.2	-0.1
62	Total general government revenue (% of GDP)	43.0	37.8	:	:	44	54.1
63	Public expenditure on pensions (% of GDP)	12.4	13.9	19.4	24.1	13.5	7.0
64	Public expenditure on health care and sickness (% of GDP)	6.0	7.3	5.9	6.4	7.5	3.9
65	Public expenditure on family and children (% of GDP)	1.7	1.6	:	:	2.1	3.6
66	Public expenditure on social protection (% of GDP)	22.7	25.1	:	:	25.3	13.8
67	Expenditure on social protection (PPS / inhabitant)	3,642.1	5,851.1	:	:	6,337	1,688.9
68	Population at risk of poverty after social transfers (%)	20.0	19.7	:	:	16.3	10.2
69	Inequality of income distribution (S80/S20 income quintile share ratio)	5.8	5.8	:	:	4.9	3.4
70	Population aged 18-59 living in jobless households (%)	9.7	8.5	:	:	10.1	6.1

\*: 2009 or last year with data available (see the column placed to the right of the table)  
3 BEST MS: Average of the three best Member States according to country ranking

#### Demographic challenges and...

The fertility rate and expectancy in Greece are close to the EU-27 average. Greece's old-age- dependency ratio is projected to rise much more than the EU-27 average in the medium term. Until 2050 the Greek population is expected to grow only slightly.

#### ... opportunities for tackling them


Government initiatives aim to maintaining /increasing labour market participation and reducing unemployment especially of young people and women. Productivity levels might benefit from further improving the business environment and the climate for R&D and innovation. Raising percentages of the population completing higher education and facilitating movement between training/ education and the labour market could also bring benefits. Greece continues aggressive fiscal consolidation effort. The deficit is estimated to decline from 15.4% of GDP in 2009 to 9.4% of GDP in 2010. The aim for 2011 is to reduce the deficit to 7.4% of GDP. The public debt has risen sharply in the crisis and is now projected to reach 152.6% of GDP in 2011 (Source: Budget of 2011, Greek Ministry of Finance). By 2060, public expenditure on pensions is projected to approach 25% of GDP.

The recent pension reform (2010) limits the increase of public sector spending on pensions by altering the pension award formula, introduces a unified statutory retirement age of 65 years by December 2013, increasing in line with changes in life expectancy, increases the minimum early retirement age to 60 by 2011, increases the minimum contribution period for retirement on a full pension from 35-37 to 40 years by 2015, simplifies the fragmented pension system, restricts access to early retirement.

## 9. SPAIN

1	DEMOGRAPHIC TRENDS	SPAIN					EU-27	*
		1970	2000	2009	2030	2050	2009	
1	Population on 1 January (thousands)	33,588	40,050	45,989	52,661	53,229	501,103	2010
2	Total Fertility Rate (children per woman)	:	1.23	1.40	1.46	1.52	1.60	
3	Life expectancy at birth for women (years)	:	82.9	84.9	86.5	88.6	82.4	
4	Life expectancy at birth for men (years)	:	75.8	78.7	80.9	83.7	76.4	
5	Life expectancy at age 65 for women (years)	:	20.8	22.5	:	:	20.54	
6	Life expectancy at age 65 for men (years)	:	16.7	18.4	:	:	16.99	
7	Natural growth (births minus deaths) (thousands)	381.0	37.2	112.6	-76.3	-214.6	523.1	
8	Net migration (including corrections) (thousands)	72.9	389.8	48.2	160.8	135.2	877.1	
9	Mean age of women at childbirth (years)	:	30.7	31.0	:	:	29.7	
10	Old age dependency ratio (65 or over / 15-64 years old) (%)	15.2	24.5	24.3	34.3	58.7	25.6	
2	GENDER EQUALITY AND FAMILY SITUATIONS	2000	2009	EU-27 2009	3 BEST MS 2009			
11	Employment rate, women aged 20-64 (%)	44.4	56.3	62.5	74.4			
12	Employment rate, men aged 20-64 (%)	76.8	71.0	75.8	83.1			
13	Employment rate, women aged 25-54 with at least 1 child (%)	:	60.7	68.2	81.1			
14	Employment rate, men aged 25-54 with at least 1 child (%)	:	81.7	88.5	94.0			
15	Gender pay gap (unadjusted) (%)	15	16.1	17.5	7	2008		
16	Employed women working part time (%)	16.8	23.0	31.4	4.9			
17	Employed men working part time (%)	2.8	4.8	8.1	2.4			
18	Average number of usual weekly working hours, women	36.8	34.3	33.0	38.9			
19	Average number of usual weekly working hours, men	42.1	40.5	39.9	42.2			
20	Childcare provision for children aged 0-2 (%)	:	38.0	28	56	2008		
21	Childcare provision for children aged 3 to compulsory school age (%)	:	95.0	83	97	2008		
22	Children aged 0-16 at risk of poverty after social transfer (%)	19.0	23.3	20.1	10.7	2008		
23	Children aged 0-16 living in jobless households (%)	6.5	9.9	10.2	4.1			
24	Social protection benefits targeted at family support (% in kind)	68.8	57.0	32.1	58.9	2008		
3	AGEING AND THE LABOUR MARKET	2000	2009	EU-27 2009	3 BEST MS 2009			
25	Employment rate, women aged 55-64 (%)	20.2	32.3	37.8	61.4			
26	Employment rate, men aged 55-64 (%)	54.9	56.7	54.8	70.4			
27	Employment rate, women aged 55-59 (%)	24.8	41.1	51.4	75.5			
28	Employment rate, men aged 55-59 (%)	68.4	69.2	69.1	83.0			
29	Employment rate, women aged 60-64 (%)	14.9	22.9	22.8	47.0			
30	Employment rate, men aged 60-64 (%)	39.4	43.0	38.5	59.6			
31	Employment rate, women aged 65-69 (%)	2.5	4.3	7.4	20.6			
32	Employment rate, men aged 65-69 (%)	5.4	7.0	13.2	28.3			
33	Average exit age from the labour market, women (years)	:	62.7	60.8	64.0	2008		
34	Average exit age from the labour market, men (years)	:	62.5	62.0	64.7	2008		
35	Inactive for health reasons, population aged 50-64 (%)	14.0	28.9	21.0	48.4			
36	Internet use, population aged 55-64 (%)	:	28	44	75	2010		

4	PRODUCTIVITY, EDUCATION AND R&D	SPAIN		EU-27	3 BEST MS	*	
		2000	2009	2009	2009		
37	Early leavers from education and training, women aged 18-24 (%)	23.2	24.7	12.5	3.7	2008	
38	Early leavers from education and training, men aged 18-24 (%)	34.7	37.4	16.3	5.9		
39	Educational att., women aged 30-34 with tertiary education level (%)	27.9	44.9	35.7	54.9		
40	Educational attainment, men aged 30-34 with tertiary education level (%)	30.4	34.3	28.9	44.4		
41	University graduates aged 20-29 (per 1,000 of the pop. of that age)	39.5	45.2	:	88.6		
42	Employment rate for the tertiary education level, age 20-64 (%)	75.3	79.0	83.0	87.7		
43	Employment rate for the upper secondary edu. level, age 20-64 (%)	60.7	65.4	70.5	79.7		
44	Employment rate for the less than upper sec. edu. level, age 20-64 (%)	54.8	53.7	54.4	66.5		
45	Total public expenditure on education (% of GDP)	4.3	4.4	4.96	7.15		2007
46	Life-long learning (pop. aged 25-64 in education and training) (%)	:	10.4	9.1	25.3		
47	Gross domestic expenditure on R&D (% of GDP)	0.9	1.4	2.01	3.52		
48	Population working in high-tech sectors (% of employed pop.)	3.1	3.5	3.7	6.1		
49	Internet use (%)	:	57.0	63	86		
50	Labour productivity per employed person (2000=100)	100.0	105.1	105.6	156.4		



5	MIGRATION AND INTEGRATION	2000		2009		2009		*
		2000	2009	2009	2009	2009	2009	
51	Non-nationals in the population (%)	2.0	12.3	6.4	21.4			
52	Employment rate of nationals, women aged 25-54 (%)	50.9	64.5	72.9	84.0			
53	Employment rate of nationals, men aged 25-54 (%)	85.9	79.6	85.4	92.2			
54	Empl. rate of citizens from outside EU-27, women aged 25-54 (%)	:	58.6	52.7	74.9			
55	Employment rate of citizens from outside EU-27, men aged 25-54 (%)	:	63.5	72.9	87.5			
56	Education level (tertiary), nationals aged 25-49 (%)	:	38.1	28.4	41.2			
57	Education level (less than upper secondary), nationals aged 25-49 (%)	:	40.1	22.3	6.4			
58	Educ. level (tertiary), citizens from outside EU-27 aged 25-49 (%)	:	17.6	20.4	48.3			
59	Educ. level (< up. sec.), citizens from outside EU-27 aged 25-49 (%)	:	48.1	43.8	12.5			
6	SUSTAINABILITY OF PUBLIC FINANCES & SOCIAL PROTECTION	2000	2009	2035	2060	2009	2009	
60	General government consolidated gross debt (% of GDP)	59.3	53.2	:	:	74	12.1	
61	General government primary balance (% of GDP)	2.2	-9.4	:	:	-4.2	-0.1	
62	Total general government revenue (% of GDP)	38.1	34.7	:	:	44	54.1	
63	Public expenditure on pensions (% of GDP)	10.4	10.4	11.8	15.1	13.5	7.0	2008
64	Public expenditure on health care and sickness (% of GDP)	5.8	6.8	6.6	7.2	7.5	3.9	2008
65	Public expenditure on family and children (% of GDP)	1.0	1.5	:	:	2.1	3.6	2008
66	Public expenditure on social protection, % of GDP	19.8	22.2	:	:	25.3	13.8	2008
67	Expenditure on social protection (PPS / inhabitant)	3,678.0	5,713.2	:	:	6,337	1,688.9	2008
68	Population at risk of poverty after social transfers (%)	18.0	19.5	:	:	16.3	10.2	2008
69	Inequality of income distribution (S80/S20 income quintile share ratio)	5.4	6.0	:	:	4.9	3.4	2008
70	Population aged 18-59 living in jobless households (%)	7.7	10.8	:	:	10.1	6.1	

\*: 2009 or last year with data available (see the column placed to the right of the table)  
 3 BEST MS: Average of the three best Member States according to country ranking

### Demographic challenges and...

Spain's current fertility rate is lower than the EU-27 average and Spanish women tend to have their first child relatively late in life. Life expectancy is among the highest in EU-27. The projections assume that fertility will recover slightly and that life expectancies will roughly evolve in line with the EU-27 average. This would result in a high old-age dependency ratio in EU-27 in 2060. Over recent years, Spain has attracted large numbers of immigrants, many of whom were regularised, boosting the official population and employment of Spain. Under the assumption that immigration continues at the present level the Spanish population could grow considerably by 16% until 2050. However, in the crisis, unemployment among migrants has risen considerably.

### ... opportunities for tackling them

Female employment rates could rise, but this might require a more extensive provision of childcare for the youngest children. In the crisis, some 10% of households with children have found themselves jobless. Employment rates of older workers are above the EU-27 average, but could also be further increased. The share of older workers (55-64) in the work force is projected to increase to well above 20% in 2030. Educational attainment can be improved and early school leaving reduced; this could help Spain continue narrowing the productivity gap to the EU-27 average. In 2060, public pension expenditure is projected to reach 15% of GDP.

# 10. FRANCE

		FRANCE				EU-27	*	
1 DEMOGRAPHIC TRENDS		1970	2000	2009	2030	2050	2009	
1	Population on 1 January (thousands)	:	60,538	64,714	67,982	71,044	501,103	2010
2	Total Fertility Rate (children per woman)	:	1.89	2.00	1.96	1.94	1.60	
3	Life expectancy at birth for women (years)	:	83.0	85.0	87.0	89.1	82.4	
4	Life expectancy at birth for men (years)	:	75.3	78.0	81.0	83.9	76.4	
5	Life expectancy at age 65 for women (years)	:	21.4	23.2	:	:	20.54	
6	Life expectancy at age 65 for men (years)	:	16.8	18.7	:	:	16.99	
7	Natural growth (births minus deaths) (thousands)	:	267.5	276.9	131.0	15.4	523.1	
8	Net migration (including corrections) (thousands)	:	166.8	70.2	86.5	69.9	877.1	
9	Mean age of women at childbirth (years)	:	29.3	29.9	:	:	29.7	
10	Old age dependency ratio (65 or over / 15-64 years old) (%)	:	24.3	25.6	39.0	44.7	25.6	
<p><b>Population distribution by age</b></p> <p>Stacked bar charts showing population distribution by age group (Pop. under 25, Pop. aged 25-64, Pop. aged 65-79, Pop. aged 80+) for EU-27 and France in 2009, 2030, and 2050.</p> <p><b>Population growth, 1995-2050</b></p> <p>Line chart showing natural growth, net migration, and total population growth from 1995 to 2050. Includes projected data points.</p>								
2 GENDER EQUALITY AND FAMILY SITUATIONS		2000	2009	2009	EU-27	3 BEST MS	2009	
11	Employment rate, women aged 20-64 (%)	:	60.0	65.0	62.5	74.4		
12	Employment rate, men aged 20-64 (%)	:	75.2	74.2	75.8	83.1		
13	Employment rate, women aged 25-54 with at least 1 child (%)	:	:	74.6	68.2	81.1		
14	Employment rate, men aged 25-54 with at least 1 child (%)	:	:	91.2	88.5	94.0		
15	Gender pay gap (unadjusted) (%)	:	13	17.9	17.5	7	2008	
16	Employed women working part time (%)	:	30.8	29.8	31.4	4.9		
17	Employed men working part time (%)	:	5.3	6.0	8.1	2.4		
18	Average number of usual weekly working hours, women	:	33.9	33.0	33.0	38.9		
19	Average number of usual weekly working hours, men	:	40.1	39.5	39.9	42.2		
20	Childcare provision for children aged 0-2 (%)	:	:	41.0	28	56	2008	
21	Childcare provision for children aged 3 to compulsory school age (%)	:	:	95.0	83	97	2008	
22	Children aged 0-16 at risk of poverty after social transfer (%)	:	18.0	16.7	20.1	10.7	2008	
23	Children aged 0-16 living in jobless households (%)	:	9.4	9.4	10.2	4.1		
24	Social protection benefits targeted at family support (% in kind)	:	15.2	20.2	32.1	58.9	2008	
<p><b>Employment rate, pop. aged 20-64 yrs, 1995-2009 (%)</b></p> <p>Line chart showing employment rates for FR women, FR men, EU women, and EU men from 1995 to 2009. Includes 3-highest women and 3-highest men benchmarks.</p> <p><b>Education, 2009</b></p> <p>Horizontal bar chart showing early leavers from education and tertiary attainment level for men and women in France and EU-27.</p>								
3 AGEING AND THE LABOUR MARKET		2000	2009	2009	EU-27	3 BEST MS	2009	
25	Employment rate, women aged 55-64 (%)	:	26.3	36.5	37.8	61.4		
26	Employment rate, men aged 55-64 (%)	:	33.6	41.3	54.8	70.4		
27	Employment rate, women aged 55-59 (%)	:	42.5	55.6	51.4	75.5		
28	Employment rate, men aged 55-59 (%)	:	53.9	61.2	69.1	83.0		
29	Employment rate, women aged 60-64 (%)	:	9.8	15.1	22.8	47.0		
30	Employment rate, men aged 60-64 (%)	:	10.6	19.0	38.5	59.6		
31	Employment rate, women aged 65-69 (%)	:	1.4	3.0	7.4	20.6		
32	Employment rate, men aged 65-69 (%)	:	2.9	4.6	13.2	28.3		
33	Average exit age from the labour market, women (years)	:	:	59.1	60.8	64.0	2008	
34	Average exit age from the labour market, men (years)	:	:	59.4	62.0	64.7	2008	
35	Inactive for health reasons, population aged 50-64 (%)	:	13.4	1.3	21.0	48.4		
36	Internet use, population aged 55-64 (%)	:	:	58	44	75	2010	

		FRANCE		EU-27	3 BEST MS	*	
4	<b>PRODUCTIVITY, EDUCATION AND R&amp;D</b>	2000	2009	2009	2009		
37	Early leavers from education and training, women aged 18-24 (%)	11.9	10.3	12.5	3.7	2008	
38	Early leavers from education and training, men aged 18-24 (%)	14.8	14.3	16.3	5.9		
39	Educational att., women aged 30-34 with tertiary education level (%)	25.8	47.5	35.7	54.9		
40	Educational attainment, men aged 30-34 with tertiary education level (%)	29.0	39.1	28.9	44.4		
41	University graduates aged 20-29 (per 1,000 of the pop. of that age)	64.5	77.1	.	88.6		
42	Employment rate for the tertiary education level, age 20-64 (%)	78.8	80.8	83.0	87.7		
43	Employment rate for the upper secondary edu. level, age 20-64 (%)	71.8	71.4	70.5	79.7		
44	Employment rate for the less than upper sec. edu. level, age 20-64 (%)	55.3	55.3	54.4	66.5		
45	Total public expenditure on education (% of GDP)	6.0	5.6	4.96	7.15		2007
46	Life-long learning (pop. aged 25-64 in education and training) (%)	.	5.7	9.1	25.3		
47	Gross domestic expenditure on R&D (% of GDP)	2.2	2.2	2.01	3.52		
48	Population working in high-tech sectors (% of employed pop.)	5.5	3.9	3.7	6.1		
49	Internet use (%)	.	74.0	63	86		
50	Labour productivity per employed person (2000=100)	100.0	105.6	105.6	156.4		

Employment rates (%), 2009		Social Protection (% of GDP), 2008	

5	<b>MIGRATION AND INTEGRATION</b>	2000	2009	2009	2009
51	Non-nationals in the population (%)	.	5.8	6.4	21.4
52	Employment rate of nationals, women aged 25-54 (%)	71.7	78.6	72.9	84.0
53	Employment rate of nationals, men aged 25-54 (%)	88.3	88.6	85.4	92.2
54	Empl. rate of citizens from outside EU-27, women aged 25-54 (%)	.	41.0	52.7	74.9
55	Employment rate of citizens from outside EU-27, men aged 25-54 (%)	.	66.7	72.9	87.5
56	Education level (tertiary), nationals aged 25-49 (%)	.	34.4	28.4	41.2
57	Education level (less than upper secondary), nationals aged 25-49 (%)	.	20.7	22.3	6.4
58	Educ. level (tertiary), citizens from outside EU-27 aged 25-49 (%)	.	25.2	20.4	48.3
59	Educ. level (< up. sec.), citizens from outside EU-27 aged 25-49 (%)	.	49.4	43.8	12.5

6	<b>SUSTAINABILITY OF PUBLIC FINANCES &amp; SOCIAL PROTECTION</b>	2000	2009	2035	2060	2009	2009
60	General government consolidated gross debt (% of GDP)	57.3	78.1	.	.	74	12.1
61	General government primary balance (% of GDP)	1.4	-5.2	.	.	-4.2	-0.1
62	Total general government revenue (% of GDP)	50.2	48.4	.	.	44	54.1
63	Public expenditure on pensions (% of GDP)	13.9	15.2	14.4	14.0	13.5	7.0
64	Public expenditure on health care and sickness (% of GDP)	8.0	8.7	9.2	9.4	7.5	3.9
65	Public expenditure on family and children (% of GDP)	2.5	2.5	.	.	2.1	3.6
66	Public expenditure on social protection (% of GDP)	27.7	29.3	.	.	25.3	13.8
67	Expenditure on social protection (PPS / inhabitant)	6,083.2	7,913.5	.	.	6,337	1,688.9
68	Population at risk of poverty after social transfers (%)	16.0	12.9	.	.	16.3	10.2
69	Inequality of income distribution (S80/S20 income quintile share ratio)	4.2	4.4	.	.	4.9	3.4
70	Population aged 18-59 living in jobless households (%)	10.2	10.5	.	.	10.1	6.1

\*: 2009 or last year with data available (see the column placed to the right of the table)

3 BEST MS: Average of the three best Member States according to country ranking

Demographic challenges and...
<p>France has currently the second-highest fertility rate in EU-27 and the population projections assume that this will continue. Life expectancy is assumed to continue to be one of the very highest in EU-27. The total population is expected to grow by about 10% until 2050, while the old-age dependency ratio could evolve more favourably than for EU-27 as a whole.</p>
... opportunities for tackling them
<p>Employment opportunities for women are relatively well developed thanks to extensive childcare provision, and the gender pay gap is below the EU-27 average.</p> <p>By contrast, there is much scope for increasing the labour force participation of older workers; the average life time in retirement is the highest in EU-27. A more modern employment protection combined with lifelong learning would increase labour market flexibility. Another area which would generate employment growth is the integration of third country nationals whose employment rates and educational attainment are particularly low.</p> <p>Public debt is above the EU-27 average; in 2011, as a result of the crisis, it is projected to reach 90% of GDP. The projected increase in public social protection expenditure is also roughly in line with EU-27 as a whole.</p>

# 11. ITALY

		ITALY					EU-27	*
1 DEMOGRAPHIC TRENDS		1970	2000	2009	2030	2050	2009	
1	Population on 1 January (thousands)	53,685	56,924	60,340	61,868	61,240	501,103	2010
2	Total Fertility Rate (children per woman)	2.38	1.26	1.42	1.46	1.52	1.60	2008
3	Life expectancy at birth for women (years)	:	82.8	84.5	86.9	89.0	82.4	2008
4	Life expectancy at birth for men (years)	:	76.9	79.1	81.7	84.3	76.4	2008
5	Life expectancy at age 65 for women (years)	:	20.7	22.0	:	:	20.54	2008
6	Life expectancy at age 65 for men (years)	:	16.7	18.2	:	:	16.99	2008
7	Natural growth (births minus deaths) (thousands)	396.4	-12.4	-22.8	-215.8	-337.6	523.1	
8	Net migration (including corrections) (thousands)	-123.3	49.5	318.1	248.7	193.4	877.1	
9	Mean age of women at childbirth (years)	28.3	30.4	31.1	:	:	29.7	2008
10	Old age dependency ratio (65 or over / 15-64 years old) (%)	16.7	26.8	30.8	42.4	59.2	25.6	

**Population distribution by age**

0% 20% 40% 60% 80% 100%

EU-27  
ITALY

2009  
2030  
2050

EU-27  
ITALY

Legend:  
 ■ Pop. under 25  
 □ Pop. aged 25-64  
 ▨ Pop. aged 65-79  
 ■ Pop. aged 80+

**Population growth, 1995-2050**

800,000  
600,000  
400,000  
200,000  
0  
-200,000  
-400,000

1995 1996 1997 1998 1999 2000 2001 2002 2003 2004 2005 2006 2007 2008 2009 2010 2020 2030 2040 2050

Legend:  
 — Natural growth  
 ○ projected  
 — Net migration  
 ▲ projected  
 - - - Total population growth  
 ■ projected

2 GENDER EQUALITY AND FAMILY SITUATIONS		2000	2009	EU-27 2009	3 BEST MS 2009
11	Employment rate, women aged 20-64 (%)	42.0	49.7	62.5	74.4
12	Employment rate, men aged 20-64 (%)	72.4	73.8	75.8	83.1
13	Employment rate, women aged 25-54 with at least 1 child (%)	:	55.6	68.2	81.1
14	Employment rate, men aged 25-54 with at least 1 child (%)	:	89.3	88.5	94.0
15	Gender pay gap (unadjusted) (%)	6	4.9	17.5	7
16	Employed women working part time (%)	16.5	27.9	31.4	4.9
17	Employed men working part time (%)	3.7	5.0	8.1	2.4
18	Average number of usual weekly working hours, women	35.4	32.8	33.0	38.9
19	Average number of usual weekly working hours, men	41.3	40.1	39.9	42.2
20	Childcare provision for children aged 0-2 (%)	:	28.0	28	56
21	Childcare provision for children aged 3 to compulsory school age (%)	:	91.0	83	97
22	Children aged 0-16 at risk of poverty after social transfer (%)	25	24.6	20.1	10.7
23	Children aged 0-16 living in jobless households (%)	7.6	7.6	10.2	4.1
24	Social protection benefits targeted at family support (% in kind)	33.5	42.9	32.1	58.9

**Employment rate, population aged 20-64 yrs, 1995-2009 (%)**

90  
80  
70  
60  
50  
40  
30

1995 1996 1997 1998 1999 2000 2001 2002 2003 2004 2005 2006 2007 2008 2009

Legend:  
 — IT women  
 — IT men  
 — EU women  
 — EU men  
 — 3-highest-women  
 — 3-highest-men

**Education, 2009**

EARLY LEAVERS from EDU and TRA.

EDUCATION ATTAINMENT LEVEL (pop. aged 30-34 with tertiary level)

60 50 40 30 20 10 0 10 20 30

Legend:  
 ■ ITALY  
 □ EU-27  
 ■ 3 BEST MS

3 AGEING AND THE LABOUR MARKET		ITALY		EU-27	3 BEST MS
		2000	2009	2009	2009
25	Employment rate, women aged 55-64 (%)	15.3	25.4	37.8	61.4
26	Employment rate, men aged 55-64 (%)	40.9	46.7	54.8	70.4
27	Employment rate, women aged 55-59 (%)	22.9	38.5	51.4	75.5
28	Employment rate, men aged 55-59 (%)	50.8	63.5	69.1	83.0
29	Employment rate, women aged 60-64 (%)	7.6	11.9	22.8	47.0
30	Employment rate, men aged 60-64 (%)	29.4	29.2	38.5	59.6
31	Employment rate, women aged 65-69 (%)	2.4	3.3	7.4	20.6
32	Employment rate, men aged 65-69 (%)	10.1	11.4	13.2	28.3
33	Average exit age from the labour market, women (years)	:	60.7	60.8	64.0
34	Average exit age from the labour market, men (years)	:	60.8	62.0	64.7
35	Inactive for health reasons, population aged 50-64 (%)	7.4	8.2	21.0	48.4
36	Internet use, population aged 55-64 (%)	:	26	44	75



		ITALY		EU-27	3 BEST MS	*	
		2000	2009	2009	2009		
4	<b>PRODUCTIVITY, EDUCATION AND R&amp;D</b>						
37	Early leavers from education and training, women aged 18-24 (%)	21.7	16.3	12.5	3.7		
38	Early leavers from education and training, men aged 18-24 (%)	28.5	22.0	16.3	5.9		
39	Educational att., women aged 30-34 with tertiary education level (%)	10.8	23.0	35.7	54.9		
40	Educational attainment, men ged 30-34 with tertiary education level (%)	12.5	15.0	28.9	44.4		
41	University graduates aged 20-29 (per 1,000 of the pop. of that age)	24.8	59.3	:	88.6	2008	
42	Employment rate for the tertiary education level, age 20-64 (%)	81.0	77.0	83.0	87.7		
43	Employment rate for the upper secondary edu. level, age 20-64 (%)	64.6	67.8	70.5	79.7		
44	Employment rate for the less than upper sec. edu. level, age 20-64 (%)	49.3	51.0	54.4	66.5		
45	Total public expenditure on education (% of GDP)	4.6	4.3	4.96	7.15	2007	
46	Life-long learning (pop. aged 25-64 in education and training) (%)	:	6.0	9.1	25.3		
47	Gross domestic expenditure on R&D (% of GDP)	1.1	1.3	2.01	3.52		
48	Population working in high-tech sectors (% of employed pop.)	4.3	3.4	3.7	6.1		
49	Internet use (%)	:	44.0	63	86		
50	Labour productivity per employed person (2000=100)	100.0	93.6	105.6	156.4		
5	<b>MIGRATION AND INTEGRATION</b>	2000	2009	2009	2009		
51	Non-nationals in the population (%)	2.2	6.5	6.4	21.4		
52	Employment rate of nationals, women aged 25-54 (%)	:	59.2	72.9	84.0		
53	Employment rate of nationals, men aged 25-54 (%)	:	84.6	85.4	92.2		
54	Empl. rate of citizens from outside EU-27, women aged 25-54 (%)	:	53.6	52.7	74.9		
55	Employment rate of citizens from outside EU-27, men aged 25-54 (%)	:	84.6	72.9	87.5		
56	Education level (tertiary), nationals aged 25-49 (%)	:	16.9	28.4	41.2		
57	Education level (less than upper secondary), nationals aged 25-49 (%)	:	38.3	22.3	6.4		
58	Educ. level (tertiary), citizens from outside EU-27 aged 25-49 (%)	:	10.9	20.4	48.3		
59	Educ. level (< up. sec.), citizens from outside EU-27 aged 25-49 (%)	:	53.3	43.8	12.5		
6	<b>SUSTAINABILITY OF PUBLIC FINANCES &amp; SOCIAL PROTECTION</b>	2000	2009	2035	2060	2009	2009
60	General government consolidated gross debt (% of GDP)	109.2	116.0	:	:	74	12.1
61	General government primary balance (% of GDP)	5.5	-0.6	:	:	-4.2	-0.1
62	Total general government revenue (% of GDP)	45.3	46.6	:	:	44	54.1
63	Public expenditure on pensions (% of GDP)	16.5	17.7	15.2	13.6	13.5	7.0
64	Public expenditure on health care and sickness (% of GDP)	6.0	7.0	6.7	6.9	7.5	3.9
65	Public expenditure on family and children (% of GDP)	0.9	1.3	:	:	2.1	3.6
66	Public expenditure on social protection (% of GDP)	23.8	26.5	:	:	25.3	13.8
67	Expenditure on social protection (PPS / inhabitant)	5,296.6	6,759.9	:	:	6,337	1,688.9
68	Population at risk of poverty after social transfers (%)	18.0	18.4	:	:	16.3	10.2
69	Inequality of income distribution (S80/S20 income quintile share ratio)	4.8	5.2	:	:	4.9	3.4
70	Population aged 18-59 living in jobless households (%)	11.1	10.4	:	:	10.1	6.1

\*: 2009 or last year with data available (see the column placed to the right of the table)



3 BEST MS: Average of the three best Member States according to country ranking

Demographic challenges and...	
<p>Italy currently has the highest old-age dependency ratio in EU-27, shared with Germany. With a low fertility rate and high life expectancy - both being expected to continue - the old age dependency ratio could rise to almost two-thirds (2 persons aged 65 or over for every 3 persons of working age). The Italian population size is expected to remain more or less constant under the assumption that significant numbers of immigrants continue to arrive.</p>	
<p>... opportunities for tackling them</p>	
<p>There is significant scope for promoting the labour force participation of women. This would also help in reducing the risk of poverty for households with children. Employment rates for older workers are also comparatively low. The proportion of older workers (aged 55-64) in the work-force is projected to become the highest, almost 25%, in 2030.</p> <p>There is scope for raising productivity, notably by raising educational attainment levels, combating early school leaving and boosting R&amp;D spending.</p> <p>Reducing public debt would enhance Italy's ability to meet future social protection needs, even if the projected ageing-related increase in public expenditure is comparatively small. Italian workers have the second-longest average life-time in retirement in EU-27 and its debt ratio in the crisis is projected to near 120% in 2011.</p>	

## 12. CYPRUS

		CYPRUS					EU-27	*
1 DEMOGRAPHIC TRENDS		1970	2000	2009	2030	2050	2009	
1	Population on 1 January (thousands)	612	690	803	1,072	1,251	501,103	2010
2	Total Fertility Rate (children per woman)	:	1.64	1.51	1.52	1.57	1.60	
3	Life expectancy at birth for women (years)	:	80.0	83.6	84.9	87.5	82.4	
4	Life expectancy at birth for men (years)	:	75.4	78.6	81.5	84.0	76.4	
5	Life expectancy at age 65 for women (years)	:	18.3	20.9	:	:	20.54	
6	Life expectancy at age 65 for men (years)	:	15.9	18.1	:	:	16.99	
7	Natural growth (births minus deaths) (thousands)	5.8	3.1	4.4	2.5	1.2	523.1	
8	Net migration (including corrections) (thousands)	-0.9	4.0	1.8	7.8	6.6	877.1	
9	Mean age of women at childbirth (years)	:	28.7	30.4	:	:	29.7	
10	Old age dependency ratio (65 or over / 15-64 years old) (%)	:	17.0	17.8	27.4	37.7	25.6	
2 GENDER EQUALITY AND FAMILY SITUATIONS		2000	2009	EU-27	3 BEST MS			
11	Employment rate, women aged 20-64 (%)	58.5	68.1	62.5	74.4			
12	Employment rate, men aged 20-64 (%)	86.4	83.5	75.8	83.1			
13	Employment rate, women aged 25-54 with at least 1 child (%)	:	74.8	68.2	81.1			
14	Employment rate, men aged 25-54 with at least 1 child (%)	:	93.5	88.5	94.0			
15	Gender pay gap (unadjusted) (%)	26	21.6	17.5	7	2008		
16	Employed women working part time (%)	13.9	12.3	31.4	4.9			
17	Employed men working part time (%)	4.5	4.9	8.1	2.4			
18	Average number of usual weekly working hours, women	37.8	36.1	33.0	38.9			
19	Average number of usual weekly working hours, men	42.9	40.6	39.9	42.2			
20	Childcare provision for children aged 0-2 (%)	:	26.0	28	56	2008		
21	Childcare provision for children aged 3 to compulsory school age (%)	:	85.0	83	97	2008		
22	Children aged 0-16 at risk of poverty after social transfer (%)	:	11.7	20.1	10.7	2008		
23	Children aged 0-16 living in jobless households (%)	:	4.2	10.2	4.1			
24	Social protection benefits targeted at family support (% in kind)	9.9	14.0	32.1	58.9	2008		
3 AGEING AND THE LABOUR MARKET		2000	2009	EU-27	3 BEST MS			
25	Employment rate, women aged 55-64 (%)	32.1	40.8	37.8	61.4			
26	Employment rate, men aged 55-64 (%)	67.3	71.7	54.8	70.4			
27	Employment rate, women aged 55-59 (%)	40.7	50.2	51.4	75.5			
28	Employment rate, men aged 55-59 (%)	80.8	83.1	69.1	83.0			
29	Employment rate, women aged 60-64 (%)	21.5	29.9	22.8	47.0			
30	Employment rate, men aged 60-64 (%)	50.0	57.9	38.5	59.6			
31	Employment rate, women aged 65-69 (%)	9.1	12.4	7.4	20.6			
32	Employment rate, men aged 65-69 (%)	29.7	27.1	13.2	28.3			
33	Average exit age from the labour market, women (years)	:	:	60.8	64.0	2008		
34	Average exit age from the labour market, men (years)	:	:	62.0	64.7	2008		
35	Inactive for health reasons, population aged 50-64 (%)	16.4	20.6	21.0	48.4			
36	Internet use, population aged 55-64 (%)	:	15	44	75	2010		

4	PRODUCTIVITY, EDUCATION AND R&D	CYPRUS		EU-27	3 BEST MS	*	
		2000	2009	2009	2009		
37	Early leavers from education and training, women aged 18-24 (%)	13.9	8.8	12.5	3.7	2008	
38	Early leavers from education and training, men aged 18-24 (%)	25.0	15.2	16.3	5.9		
39	Educational att., women aged 30-34 with tertiary education level (%)	30.8	49.3	35.7	54.9		
40	Educational attainment, men aged 30-34 with tertiary education level (%)	31.5	40.2	28.9	44.4		
41	University graduates aged 20-29 (per 1,000 of the pop. of that age)	28.6	31.9	:	88.6		
42	Employment rate for the tertiary education level, age 20-64 (%)	85.6	84.8	83.0	87.7		
43	Employment rate for the upper secondary edu. level, age 20-64 (%)	72.4	74.9	70.5	79.7		
44	Employment rate for the less than upper sec. edu. level, age 20-64 (%)	62.6	65.2	54.4	66.5		
45	Total public expenditure on education (% of GDP)	5.4	6.9	4.96	7.15		2007
46	Life-long learning (pop. aged 25-64 in education and training) (%)	:	7.8	9.1	25.3		
47	Gross domestic expenditure on R&D (% of GDP)	0.2	0.5	2.01	3.52		
48	Population working in high-tech sectors (% of employed pop.)	2.6	2.5	3.7	6.1		
49	Internet use (%)	:	45.0	63	86		
50	Labour productivity per employed person (2000=100)	100.0	104.8	105.6	156.4		



5	MIGRATION AND INTEGRATION	2000	2009	2009	2009
51	Non-nationals in the population (%)	8.4	15.6	6.4	21.4
52	Employment rate of nationals, women aged 25-54 (%)	64.1	75.5	72.9	84.0
53	Employment rate of nationals, men aged 25-54 (%)	92.7	91.8	85.4	92.2
54	Empl. rate of citizens from outside EU-27, women aged 25-54 (%)	:	83.4	52.7	74.9
55	Employment rate of citizens from outside EU-27, men aged 25-54 (%)	:	57.7	72.9	87.5
56	Education level (tertiary), nationals aged 25-49 (%)	:	41.0	28.4	41.2
57	Education level (less than upper secondary), nationals aged 25-49 (%)	:	17.2	22.3	6.4
58	Educ. level (tertiary), citizens from outside EU-27 aged 25-49 (%)	:	32.7	20.4	48.3
59	Educ. level (< up. sec.), citizens from outside EU-27 aged 25-49 (%)	:	35.8	43.8	12.5

6	SUSTAINABILITY OF PUBLIC FINANCES & SOCIAL PROTECTION	2000	2009	2035	2060	2009	2009
60	General government consolidated gross debt (% of GDP)	48.7	58.0	:	:	74	12.1
61	General government primary balance (% of GDP)	1.0	-3.4	:	:	-4.2	-0.1
62	Total general government revenue (% of GDP)	34.7	39.8	:	:	44	54.1
63	Public expenditure on pensions (% of GDP)	7.6	8.9	11.7	17.7	13.5	7.0
64	Public expenditure on health care and sickness (% of GDP)	4.0	4.4	3.1	3.3	7.5	3.9
65	Public expenditure on family and children (% of GDP)	0.9	2.1	:	:	2.1	3.6
66	Public expenditure on social protection (% of GDP)	14.6	18.1	:	:	25.3	13.8
67	Expenditure on social protection (PPS / inhabitant)	2,462.1	4,345.9	:	:	6,337	1,688.9
68	Topulation at risk of poverty after social transfers (%)	:	16.2	:	:	16.3	10.2
69	Inequality of income distribution (S80/S20 income quintile share ratio)	:	4.2	:	:	4.9	3.4
70	Population aged 18-59 living in jobless households (%)	5.2	5.6	:	:	10.1	6.1

\*: 2009 or last year with data available (see the column placed to the right of the table)  
3 BEST MS: Average of the three best Member States according to country ranking

**Demographic challenges and...**

Life expectancy in Cyprus is above the EU-27 average, while fertility is below. This is assumed to continue over the next decades. Nevertheless, thanks to immigration, Cyprus' population is expected to grow significantly until 2050 and the increase in the old-age dependency ratio could be moderate compared to the EU-27 average.

**... opportunities for tackling them**

Employment rates are above the EU-27 average as is the employment gender gap at 15%. In particular a better availability of child care, particularly for very young children, might lead to a further increase in female employment. Labour force participation of older men is high, even in the higher age groups (65-69) but it could grow further for women aged 55-64. Due to ageing, public expenditure on pensions is projected to rise, exerting a heavy strain on public finances even if the public debt level remains moderate compared to other EU-27 Member States. Government policy priorities are focused on introducing parametric reforms to the pension system, to improve its financial viability, to raise the employment rates of women and older workers and to further reduce the public debt to GDP ratio.

# 13. LATVIA

		LATVIA					EU-27	*
1 DEMOGRAPHIC TRENDS		1970	2000	2009	2030	2050	2009	
1	Population on 1 January (thousands)	2,352	2,382	2,248	2,033	1,804	501,103	2010
2	Total Fertility Rate (children per woman)	:	:	1.31	1.43	1.50	1.60	
3	Life expectancy at birth for women (years)	:	:	78.0	81.5	85.2	82.4	
4	Life expectancy at birth for men (years)	:	:	68.1	72.8	78.1	76.4	
5	Life expectancy at age 65 for women (years)	:	:	18.2	:	:	20.54	
6	Life expectancy at age 65 for men (years)	:	:	13.4	:	:	16.99	
7	Natural growth (births minus deaths) (thousands)	7.8	-12.0	-8.2	-12.4	-11.9	523.1	
8	Net migration (including corrections) (thousands)	6.7	-5.5	-4.7	-0.6	0.7	877.1	
9	Mean age of women at childbirth (years)	:	:	28.4	:	:	29.7	
10	Old age dependency ratio (65 or over / 15-64 years old) (%)	18.0	22.1	25.1	34.6	51.2	25.6	
2 GENDER EQUALITY AND FAMILY SITUATIONS		2000		2009	EU-27	3 BEST MS		
11	Employment rate, women aged 20-64 (%)		58.7	66.8	62.5	74.4		
12	Employment rate, men aged 20-64 (%)		68.6	67.4	75.8	83.1		
13	Employment rate, women aged 25-54 with at least 1 child (%)		:	74.6	68.2	81.1		
14	Employment rate, men aged 25-54 with at least 1 child (%)		:	79.4	88.5	94.0		
15	Gender pay gap (unadjusted) (%)		20	13.4	17.5	7	2008	
16	Employed women working part time (%)		12.8	10.2	31.4	4.9		
17	Employed men working part time (%)		9.7	7.5	8.1	2.4		
18	Average number of usual weekly working hours, women		40.9	38.0	33.0	38.9		
19	Average number of usual weekly working hours, men		43.2	39.7	39.9	42.2		
20	Childcare provision for children aged 0-2 (%)		:	14.0	28	56	2008	
21	Childcare provision for children aged 3 to compulsory school age (%)		:	70.0	83	97	2008	
22	Children aged 0-16 at risk of poverty after social transfer (%)		21.0	24.9	20.1	10.7	2008	
23	Children aged 0-16 living in jobless households (%)		13.0	11.3	10.2	4.1		
24	Social protection benefits targeted at family support (% in kind)		17.9	16.4	32.1	58.9	2008	
3 AGEING AND THE LABOUR MARKET		LATVIA		EU-27	3 BEST MS			
25	Employment rate, women aged 55-64 (%)		26.7	53.3	37.8	61.4		
26	Employment rate, men aged 55-64 (%)		48.4	53.1	54.8	70.4		
27	Employment rate, women aged 55-59 (%)		37.4	69.1	51.4	75.5		
28	Employment rate, men aged 55-59 (%)		64.7	64.8	69.1	83.0		
29	Employment rate, women aged 60-64 (%)		14.8	34.7	22.8	47.0		
30	Employment rate, men aged 60-64 (%)		31.5	38.1	38.5	59.6		
31	Employment rate, women aged 65-69 (%)		9.7	14.2	7.4	20.6		
32	Employment rate, men aged 65-69 (%)		17.5	22.5	13.2	28.3		
33	Average exit age from the labour market, women (years)		:	:	60.8	64.0	2008	
34	Average exit age from the labour market, men (years)		:	:	62.0	64.7	2008	
35	Inactive for health reasons, population aged 50-64 (%)		:	25.1	21.0	48.4		
36	Internet use, population aged 55-64 (%)		:	26	44	75	2010	

		LATVIA		EU-27	3 BEST MS	*	
		2000	2009	2009	2009		
4	<b>PRODUCTIVITY, EDUCATION AND R&amp;D</b>						
37	Early leavers from education and training, women aged 18-24 (%)	:	10.4	12.5	3.7		
38	Early leavers from education and training, men aged 18-24 (%)	:	17.5	16.3	5.9		
39	Educational att., women aged 30-34 with tertiary education level (%)	13.6	40.5	35.7	54.9		
40	Educational attainment, men aged 30-34 with tertiary education level (%)	23.5	20.0	28.9	44.4		
41	University graduates aged 20-29 (per 1,000 of the pop. of that age)	46.7	69.2	:	88.6	2008	
42	Employment rate for the tertiary education level, age 20-64 (%)	79.6	82.3	83.0	87.7		
43	Employment rate for the upper secondary edu. level, age 20-64 (%)	65.0	65.8	70.5	79.7		
44	Employment rate for the less than upper sec. edu. level, age 20-64 (%)	41.8	46.6	54.4	66.5		
45	Total public expenditure on education (% of GDP)	5.6	5.0	4.96	7.15	2007	
46	Life-long learning (pop. aged 25-64 in education and training) (%)	:	5.3	9.1	25.3		
47	Gross domestic expenditure on R&D (% of GDP)	0.4	0.5	2.01	3.52		
48	Population working in high-tech sectors (% of employed pop.)	3.3	2.5	3.7	6.1		
49	Internet use (%)	:	58.0	63	86		
50	Labour productivity per employed person (2000=100)	100.0	138.9	105.6	156.4		
5	<b>MIGRATION AND INTEGRATION</b>	2000	2009	2009	2009		
51	Non-nationals in the population (%)	25.6	17.9	6.4	21.4		
52	Employment rate of nationals, women aged 25-54 (%)	:	77.0	72.9	84.0		
53	Employment rate of nationals, men aged 25-54 (%)	:	75.8	85.4	92.2		
54	Empl. rate of citizens from outside EU-27, women aged 25-54 (%)	:	62.8	52.7	74.9		
55	Employment rate of citizens from outside EU-27, men aged 25-54 (%)	:	68.8	72.9	87.5		
56	Education level (tertiary), nationals aged 25-49 (%)	:	29.9	28.4	41.2		
57	Education level (less than upper secondary), nationals aged 25-49 (%)	:	12.2	22.3	6.4		
58	Educ. level (tertiary), citizens from outside EU-27 aged 25-49 (%)	:	17.5	20.4	48.3		
59	Educ. level (< up. sec.), citizens from outside EU-27 aged 25-49 (%)	:	12.8	43.8	12.5		
6	<b>SUSTAINABILITY OF PUBLIC FINANCES &amp; SOCIAL PROTECTION</b>	2000	2009	2035	2060	2009	2009
60	General government consolidated gross debt (% of GDP)	12.3	36.7	:	:	74	12.1
61	General government primary balance (% of GDP)	-1.8	-8.7	:	:	-4.2	-0.1
62	Total general government revenue (% of GDP)	34.6	33.7	:	:	44	54.1
63	Public expenditure on pensions (% of GDP)	10.1	6.6	6.2	5.1	13.5	7.0
64	Public expenditure on health care and sickness (% of GDP)	2.5	3.7	3.9	4.1	7.5	3.9
65	Public expenditure on family and children (% of GDP)	1.5	1.4	:	:	2.1	3.6
66	Public expenditure on social protection (% of GDP)	15.0	12.4	:	:	25.3	13.8
67	Expenditure on social protection (PPS / inhabitant)	1,046.0	1,769.0	:	:	6,337	1,688.9
68	Population at risk of poverty after social transfers (%)	16.0	25.7	:	:	16.3	10.2
69	Inequality of income distribution (S80/S20 income quintile share ratio)	5.5	7.3	:	:	4.9	3.4
70	Population aged 18-59 living in jobless households (%)	14.8	10.5	:	:	10.1	6.1

\*: 2009 or last year with data available (see the column placed to the right of the table)

3 BEST MS: Average of the three best Member States according to country ranking

<b>Demographic challenges and...</b>	
<p>Latvia's fertility rate is currently below the EU-27 average, but this may partly be the effect of a transition to women having children later in life; a further recovery of fertility is assumed for the population projections. Life expectancy is significantly below the EU-27 average, particularly for men, and the gap is expected to remain large over the projection period. As a result the population, which is already declining, is expected to shrink dramatically (-16% by 2050) while the increase in the old-age dependency ratio will be higher than the EU-27's in 2060.</p>	
<b>... opportunities for tackling them</b>	
<p>Female employment rates are above the EU-27 average and most women work full-time. A better availability of child care, particularly for the youngest children, might allow further increases.</p> <p>The employment rates of older workers are also above the EU-27 average, but they could grow further.</p> <p>Latvia has a huge potential for catching up in terms of productivity and can build on a high level of educational attainment. There is also scope for more proactive education and labour market policies to improve the integration of third country nationals.</p> <p>Public finances are sound and public social protection expenditure is not expected to rise significantly over the coming decades.</p>	

# 14. LITHUANIA

		LITHUANIA					EU-27	*
1	<b>DEMOGRAPHIC TRENDS</b>	1970	2000	2009	2030	2050	2009	
	1 Population on 1 January (thousands)	3,119	3,512	3,329	3,083	2,737	501,103	2010
	2 Total Fertility Rate (children per woman)	2.40	1.39	1.55	1.43	1.51	1.60	
	3 Life expectancy at birth for women (years)	75.0	77.5	78.7	81.9	85.3	82.4	
	4 Life expectancy at birth for men (years)	66.8	66.8	67.5	72.8	78.1	76.4	
	5 Life expectancy at age 65 for women (years)	16.4	17.9	18.4	:	:	20.54	
	6 Life expectancy at age 65 for men (years)	13.7	13.7	13.4	:	:	16.99	
	7 Natural growth (births minus deaths) (thousands)	27.5	-4.8	-5.4	-16.3	-19.0	523.1	
	8 Net migration (including corrections) (thousands)	6.7	-5.5	-15.5	-0.6	0.7	877.1	
	9 Mean age of women at childbirth (years)	27.7	26.6	28.6	:	:	29.7	
	10 Old age dependency ratio (65 or over / 15-64 years old) (%)	15.9	20.8	23.2	34.7	51.1	25.6	
2	<b>GENDER EQUALITY AND FAMILY SITUATIONS</b>	2000	2009	2009	EU-27	2009	3 BEST MS	2009
	11 Employment rate, women aged 20-64 (%)	64.4	67.5	67.5	62.5	74.4		
	12 Employment rate, men aged 20-64 (%)	67.9	66.9	66.9	75.8	83.1		
	13 Employment rate, women aged 25-54 with at least 1 child (%)	:	78.9	78.9	68.2	81.1		
	14 Employment rate, men aged 25-54 with at least 1 child (%)	:	81.6	81.6	88.5	94.0		
	15 Gender pay gap (unadjusted) (%)	16	21.6	21.6	17.5	7	2008	
	16 Employed women working part time (%)	11.1	9.5	9.5	31.4	4.9		
	17 Employed men working part time (%)	9.2	6.9	6.9	8.1	2.4		
	18 Average number of usual weekly working hours, women	37.9	37.8	37.8	33.0	38.9		
	19 Average number of usual weekly working hours, men	39.7	39.4	39.4	39.9	42.2		
	20 Childcare provision for children aged 0-2 (%)	:	9.0	9.0	28	56	2008	
	21 Childcare provision for children aged 3 to compulsory school age (%)	:	62.0	62.0	83	97	2008	
	22 Children aged 0-16 at risk of poverty after social transfer (%)	18.0	24.1	24.1	20.1	10.7	2008	
	23 Children aged 0-16 living in jobless households (%)	:	10.9	10.9	10.2	4.1		
	24 Social protection benefits targeted at family support (% in kind)	29.8	21.1	21.1	32.1	58.9	2008	
3	<b>AGEING AND THE LABOUR MARKET</b>	2000	2009	2009	EU-27	2009	3 BEST MS	2009
	25 Employment rate, women aged 55-64 (%)	32.6	48.3	48.3	37.8	61.4		
	26 Employment rate, men aged 55-64 (%)	50.6	56.0	56.0	54.8	70.4		
	27 Employment rate, women aged 55-59 (%)	50.1	61.2	61.2	51.4	75.5		
	28 Employment rate, men aged 55-59 (%)	63.9	65.8	65.8	69.1	83.0		
	29 Employment rate, women aged 60-64 (%)	17.1	33.0	33.0	22.8	47.0		
	30 Employment rate, men aged 60-64 (%)	37.9	43.2	43.2	38.5	59.6		
	31 Employment rate, women aged 65-69 (%)	12.1	10.1	10.1	7.4	20.6		
	32 Employment rate, men aged 65-69 (%)	13.2	16.5	16.5	13.2	28.3		
	33 Average exit age from the labour market, women (years)	:	:	:	60.8	64.0	2008	
	34 Average exit age from the labour market, men (years)	:	:	:	62.0	64.7	2008	
	35 Inactive for health reasons, population aged 50-64 (%)	19.7	39.6	39.6	21.0	48.4		
	36 Internet use, population aged 55-64 (%)	:	24	24	44	75	2010	

		LITHUANIA		EU-27	3 BEST MS	*	
4	<b>PRODUCTIVITY, EDUCATION AND R&amp;D</b>	2000	2009	2009	2009		
37	Early leavers from education and training, women aged 18-24 (%)	12.8	5.7	12.5	3.7		
38	Early leavers from education and training, men aged 18-24 (%)	20.0	11.5	16.3	5.9		
39	Educational att., women aged 30-34 with tertiary education level (%)	37.3	48.5	35.7	54.9		
40	Educational attainment, men aged 30-34 with tertiary education level (%)	47.9	32.9	28.9	44.4		
41	University graduates aged 20-29 (per 1,000 of the pop. of that age)	51.8	84.5	:	88.6	2008	
42	Employment rate for the tertiary education level, age 20-64 (%)	79.3	85.9	83.0	87.7		
43	Employment rate for the upper secondary edu. level, age 20-64 (%)	65.2	63.2	70.5	79.7		
44	Employment rate for the less than upper sec. edu. level, age 20-64 (%)	37.3	36.7	54.4	66.5		
45	Total public expenditure on education (% of GDP)	5.9	4.7	4.96	7.15	2007	
46	Life-long learning (pop. aged 25-64 in education and training) (%)	:	:	4.5	9.1		
47	Gross domestic expenditure on R&D (% of GDP)	0.6	0.8	2.01	3.52		
48	Population working in high-tech sectors (% of employed pop.)	4.5	1.7	3.7	6.1		
49	Internet use (%)	:	54.0	63	86		
50	Labour productivity per employed person (2000=100)	100.0	149.6	105.6	156.4		
5	<b>MIGRATION AND INTEGRATION</b>	2000	2009	2009	2009		
51	Non-nationals in the population (%)	:	1.2	6.4	21.4		
52	Employment rate of nationals, women aged 25-54 (%)	76.7	78.1	72.9	84.0		
53	Employment rate of nationals, men aged 25-54 (%)	74.6	74.6	85.4	92.2		
54	Empl. rate of citizens from outside EU-27, women aged 25-54 (%)	:	:	52.7	74.9		
55	Employment rate of citizens from outside EU-27, men aged 25-54 (%)	:	:	72.9	87.5		
56	Education level (tertiary), nationals aged 25-49 (%)	:	34.4	28.4	41.2		
57	Education level (less than upper secondary), nationals aged 25-49 (%)	:	7.4	22.3	6.4		
58	Educ. level (tertiary), citizens from outside EU-27 aged 25-49 (%)	:	52.5	20.4	48.3		
59	Educ. level (< up. sec.), citizens from outside EU-27 aged 25-49 (%)	:	3.2	43.8	12.5		
6	<b>SUSTAINABILITY OF PUBLIC FINANCES &amp; SOCIAL PROTECTION</b>	2000	2009	2035	2060	2009	2009
60	General government consolidated gross debt (% of GDP)	23.7	29.5	:	:	74	12.1
61	General government primary balance (% of GDP)	-1.5	-7.9	:	:	-4.2	-0.1
62	Total general government revenue (% of GDP)	35.9	34.5	:	:	44	54.1
63	Public expenditure on pensions (% of GDP)	8.6	8.6	8.7	11.4	13.5	7.0
64	Public expenditure on health care and sickness (% of GDP)	4.6	4.6	5.2	5.6	7.5	3.9
65	Public expenditure on family and children (% of GDP)	1.3	1.9	:	:	2.1	3.6
66	Public expenditure on social protection (% of GDP)	15.3	15.7	:	:	25.3	13.8
67	Expenditure on social protection (PPS / inhabitant)	1,148.8	2,442.4	:	:	6,337	1,688.9
68	Population at risk of poverty after social transfers (%)	17.0	20.6	:	:	16.3	10.2
69	Inequality of income distribution (S80/S20 income quintile share ratio)	5.0	6.3	:	:	4.9	3.4
70	Population aged 18-59 living in jobless households (%)	10.0	12.0	:	:	10.1	6.1

\*: 2009 or last year with data available (see the column placed to the right of the table)  
 3 BEST MS: Average of the three best Member States according to country ranking

#### Demographic challenges and...

Lithuania's fertility rate is currently below the EU-27 average, and this may partly be the effect of a transition to women having children later in life; a further recovery of fertility is assumed for the population projections. Life expectancy is significantly below the EU-27 average, particularly for men, and the gap is expected to remain large over the projection period. As a result, the population, already in decline, is expected to continue shrinking considerably (-17% by 2050) and the old-age dependency ratio will increase to be the third-highest in EU-27 in 2060.

#### ... opportunities for tackling them

Female employment rates are above the EU-27 average and most women work full-time. A better availability of childcare, especially in the 0-2 age group, might still allow for further improvements.  
 The employment rates of older workers are also above the EU-27 average, but could still grow, particularly if health and disability issues are tackled.  
 Lithuania has great potential for catching up in terms of productivity and can build on a high level of educational attainment.  
 Public finances are sound although public social protection expenditure is expected to rise over the coming decades.

# 15. LUXEMBOURG

		LUXEMBOURG					EU-27	*
1	<b>DEMOGRAPHIC TRENDS</b>	1970	2000	2009	2030	2050	2009	
1	Population on 1 January (thousands)	339	434	502	607	697	501,103	2010
2	Total Fertility Rate (children per woman)	1.97	1.76	1.59	1.68	1.71	1.60	
3	Life expectancy at birth for women (years)	73.0	81.3	83.3	84.6	87.3	82.4	
4	Life expectancy at birth for men (years)	:	74.6	78.1	80.2	83.2	76.4	
5	Life expectancy at age 65 for women (years)	15.1	20.1	21.4	:	:	20.54	
6	Life expectancy at age 65 for men (years)	:	15.5	17.6	:	:	16.99	
7	Natural growth (births minus deaths) (thousands)	0.3	2.0	2.0	1.7	0.6	523.1	
8	Net migration (including corrections) (thousands)	1.1	3.4	6.6	3.7	3.1	877.1	
9	Mean age of women at childbirth (years)	27.2	29.3	30.7	:	:	29.7	
10	Old age dependency ratio (65 or over / 15-64 years old) (%)	19.1	21.4	21.0	30.8	37.8	25.6	
2	<b>GENDER EQUALITY AND FAMILY SITUATIONS</b>	2000	2009	EU-27 2009	3 BEST MS 2009			
11	Employment rate, women aged 20-64 (%)	53.8	61.5	62.5	74.4			
12	Employment rate, men aged 20-64 (%)	80.8	79.0	75.8	83.1			
13	Employment rate, women aged 25-54 with at least 1 child (%)	:	67.0	68.2	81.1			
14	Employment rate, men aged 25-54 with at least 1 child (%)	:	93.3	88.5	94.0			
15	Gender pay gap (unadjusted) (%)	15	12.4	17.5	7	2008		
16	Employed women working part time (%)	25.1	35.1	31.4	4.9			
17	Employed men working part time (%)	1.7	5.4	8.1	2.4			
18	Average number of usual weekly working hours, women	33.9	32.8	33.0	38.9			
19	Average number of usual weekly working hours, men	41.5	41.2	39.9	42.2			
20	Childcare provision for children aged 0-2 (%)	:	26.0	28	56	2008		
21	Childcare provision for children aged 3 to compulsory school age (%)	:	77.0	83	97	2008		
22	Children aged 0-16 at risk of poverty after social transfer (%)	18.0	21.7	20.1	10.7	2008		
23	Children aged 0-16 living in jobless households (%)	:	4.4	10.2	4.1			
24	Social protection benefits targeted at family support (% in kind)	15.4	16.9	32.1	58.9	2008		
3	<b>AGEING AND THE LABOUR MARKET</b>	2000	2009	EU-27 2009	3 BEST MS 2009			
25	Employment rate, women aged 55-64 (%)	16.4	29.4	37.8	61.4			
26	Employment rate, men aged 55-64 (%)	37.2	46.5	54.8	70.4			
27	Employment rate, women aged 55-59 (%)	20.9	42.6	51.4	75.5			
28	Employment rate, men aged 55-59 (%)	56.5	63.6	69.1	83.0			
29	Employment rate, women aged 60-64 (%)	12.5	13.1	22.8	47.0			
30	Employment rate, men aged 60-64 (%)	16.5	25.3	38.5	59.6			
31	Employment rate, women aged 65-69 (%)	:	:	7.4	20.6			
32	Employment rate, men aged 65-69 (%)	:	:	9.0	28.3			
33	Average exit age from the labour market, women (years)	:	:	60.8	64.0	2008		
34	Average exit age from the labour market, men (years)	:	:	62.0	64.7	2008		
35	Inactive for health reasons, population aged 50-64 (%)	14.7	14.5	21.0	48.4			
36	Internet use, population aged 55-64 (%)	:	:	75	75	2010		



		LUXEMBOURG		EU-27	3 BEST MS	*
4	<b>PRODUCTIVITY, EDUCATION AND R&amp;D</b>	2000	2009	2009	2009	
37	Early leavers from education and training, women aged 18-24 (%)	17.6	6.6	12.5	3.7	
38	Early leavers from education and training, men aged 18-24 (%)	15.9	8.9	16.3	5.9	
39	Educational att., women aged 30-34 with tertiary education level (%)	24.7	44.9	35.7	54.9	
40	Educational attainment, men aged 30-34 with tertiary education level (%)	17.7	48.4	28.9	44.4	
41	University graduates aged 20-29 (per 1,000 of the pop. of that age)	12.1	5.5	:	88.6	2008
42	Employment rate for the tertiary education level, age 20-64 (%)	80.4	83.8	83.0	87.7	
43	Employment rate for the upper secondary edu. level, age 20-64 (%)	70.1	66.6	70.5	79.7	
44	Employment rate for the less than upper sec. edu. level, age 20-64 (%)	58.6	58.9	54.4	66.5	
45	Total public expenditure on education (% of GDP)	:	3.2	4.96	7.15	2007
46	Life-long learning (pop. aged 25-64 in education and training) (%)	:	13.4	9.1	25.3	
47	Gross domestic expenditure on R&D (% of GDP)	1.7	1.7	2.01	3.52	
48	Population working in high-tech sectors (% of employed pop.)	3.6	:	3.7	6.1	
49	Internet use (%)	:	85.0	63	86	
50	Labour productivity per employed person (2000=100)	100.0	97.8	105.6	156.4	

5		2000		2009	2009	2009
<b>MIGRATION AND INTEGRATION</b>						
51	Non-nationals in the population (%)	:	:	43.5	6.4	21.4
52	Employment rate of nationals, women aged 25-54 (%)	61.7	:	71.8	72.9	84.0
53	Employment rate of nationals, men aged 25-54 (%)	94.4	:	92.2	85.4	92.2
54	Empl. rate of citizens from outside EU-27, women aged 25-54 (%)	:	:	47.8	52.7	74.9
55	Employment rate of citizens from outside EU-27, men aged 25-54 (%)	:	:	79.6	72.9	87.5
56	Education level (tertiary), nationals aged 25-49 (%)	:	:	31.9	28.4	41.2
57	Education level (less than upper secondary), nationals aged 25-49 (%)	:	:	15.8	22.3	6.4
58	Educ. level (tertiary), citizens from outside EU-27 aged 25-49 (%)	:	:	34.9	20.4	48.3
59	Educ. level (< up. sec.), citizens from outside EU-27 aged 25-49 (%)	:	:	24.6	43.8	12.5

6		2000		2009	2035	2060	2009	2009
<b>SUSTAINABILITY OF PUBLIC FINANCES &amp; SOCIAL PROTECTION</b>								
60	General government consolidated gross debt (% of GDP)	6.2	14.5	:	:	:	74	12.1
61	General government primary balance (% of GDP)	6.3	-0.4	:	:	:	-4.2	-0.1
62	Total general government revenue (% of GDP)	43.6	41.5	:	:	:	44	54.1
63	Public expenditure on pensions (% of GDP)	10.0	9.4	16.7	23.9	:	13.5	7.0
64	Public expenditure on health care and sickness (% of GDP)	4.8	5.0	6.7	7.0	:	7.5	3.9
65	Public expenditure on family and children (% of GDP)	3.1	3.9	:	:	:	2.1	3.6
66	Public expenditure on social protection (% of GDP)	18.8	19.8	:	:	:	25.3	13.8
67	Expenditure on social protection (PPS / inhabitant)	8,795.7	13,806.3	:	:	:	6,337	1,688.9
68	Population at risk of poverty after social transfers (%)	12.0	14.9	:	:	:	16.3	10.2
69	Inequality of income distribution (S80/S20 income quintile share ratio)	3.7	4.3	:	:	:	4.9	3.4
70	Population aged 18-59 living in jobless households (%)	7.0	7.3	:	:	:	10.1	6.1

\*: 2009 or last year with data available (see the column placed to the right of the table)

3 BEST MS: Average of the three best Member States according to country ranking

Demographic challenges and...	
<p>Luxembourg's fertility rate is above the EU-27 average while life expectancy is close to the EU-27 level. This is projected to continue. Thanks to immigration, the population is expected to grow by 39% until 2050. The old-age dependency ratio is projected to be the lowest in EU-27 by 2050.</p>	
<p>... opportunities for tackling them</p>	
<p>Female employment could grow, reducing the current 16 percentage point gap between male and female employment rates. A large proportion of women work part-time. The expansion in childcare facilities will certainly help in this respect. Another important labour force reserve is formed by older workers whose employment rates are significantly below the EU-27 average.</p>	
<p>Productivity levels are very high which could allow the country to attract more migrant workers in the future.</p>	
<p>Public debt is at a very low level, but the projected ageing-related increase in public pension expenditure is large.</p>	

# 16. HUNGARY

		HUNGARY					EU-27	*
1	DEMOGRAPHIC TRENDS	1970	2000	2009	2030	2050	2009	
1	Population on 1 January (thousands)	10,322	10,222	10,014	9,651	9,061	501,103	2010
2	Total Fertility Rate (children per woman)	1.98	1.32	1.32	1.42	1.50	1.60	
3	Life expectancy at birth for women (years)	72.1	76.2	78.4	82.4	85.8	82.4	
4	Life expectancy at birth for men (years)	66.3	67.6	70.3	75.4	79.9	76.4	
5	Life expectancy at age 65 for women (years)	14.4	16.8	18.2	:	:	20.54	
6	Life expectancy at age 65 for men (years)	12.0	13.0	14.0	:	:	16.99	
7	Natural growth (births minus deaths) (thousands)	31.6	38.0	-34.0	-47.5	-49.1	523.1	
8	Net migration (including corrections) (thousands)	0.0	16.7	17.3	17.3	17.9	877.1	
9	Mean age of women at childbirth (years)	25.4	27.3	29.1	:	:	29.7	
10	Old age dependency ratio (65 or over / 15-64 years old) (%)	17.0	22.0	23.8	34.1	50.8	25.6	
2	GENDER EQUALITY AND FAMILY SITUATIONS	2000	2009	2009	EU-27	2009	3 BEST MS	2009
11	Employment rate, women aged 20-64 (%)		53.6	54.4	62.5	74.4		
12	Employment rate, men aged 20-64 (%)		68.6	67.0	75.8	83.1		
13	Employment rate, women aged 25-54 with at least 1 child (%)		:	61.7	68.2	81.1		
14	Employment rate, men aged 25-54 with at least 1 child (%)		:	82.1	88.5	94.0		
15	Gender pay gap (unadjusted) (%)		21	17.5	17.5	7	2008	
16	Employed women working part time (%)		5.2	7.5	31.4	4.9		
17	Employed men working part time (%)		2.0	3.9	8.1	2.4		
18	Average number of usual weekly working hours, women		39.8	38.5	33.0	38.9		
19	Average number of usual weekly working hours, men		42.5	40.5	39.9	42.2		
20	Childcare provision for children aged 0-2 (%)		:	7.0	28	56	2008	
21	Childcare provision for children aged 3 to compulsory school age (%)		:	81.0	83	97	2008	
22	Children aged 0-16 at risk of poverty after social transfer (%)		17.0	20.7	20.1	10.7	2008	
23	Children aged 0-16 living in jobless households (%)		13.0	15.6	10.2	4.1		
24	Social protection benefits targeted at family support (% in kind)		24.4	20.2	32.1	58.9	2008	
3	AGEING AND THE LABOUR MARKET	2000	2009	2009	EU-27	2009	3 BEST MS	2009
25	Employment rate, women aged 55-64 (%)		13.3	27.0	37.8	61.4		
26	Employment rate, men aged 55-64 (%)		33.2	39.9	54.8	70.4		
27	Employment rate, women aged 55-59 (%)		19.8	41.1	51.4	75.5		
28	Employment rate, men aged 55-59 (%)		50.2	57.1	69.1	83.0		
29	Employment rate, women aged 60-64 (%)		5.1	10.0	22.8	47.0		
30	Employment rate, men aged 60-64 (%)		10.8	17.2	38.5	59.6		
31	Employment rate, women aged 65-69 (%)		2.5	3.2	7.4	20.6		
32	Employment rate, men aged 65-69 (%)		5.2	6.7	13.2	28.3		
33	Average exit age from the labour market, women (years)		:	58.7	60.8	64.0	2008	
34	Average exit age from the labour market, men (years)		:	61.2	62.0	64.7	2008	
35	Inactive for health reasons, population aged 50-64 (%)		11.4	26.6	21.0	48.4		
36	Internet use, population aged 55-64 (%)		:	41	44	75	2010	

		HUNGARY		EU-27	3 BEST MS	*	
		2000	2009	2009	2009		
4	<b>PRODUCTIVITY, EDUCATION AND R&amp;D</b>						
37	Early leavers from education and training, women aged 18-24 (%)	13.4	10.4	12.5	3.7		
38	Early leavers from education and training, men aged 18-24 (%)	14.4	12.0	16.3	5.9		
39	Educational att., women aged 30-34 with tertiary education level (%)	12.5	28.8	35.7	54.9		
40	Educational attainment, men aged 30-34 with tertiary education level (%)	17.1	19.0	28.9	44.4		
41	University graduates aged 20-29 (per 1,000 of the pop. of that age)	37.5	44.9	:	88.6	2008	
42	Employment rate for the tertiary education level, age 20-64 (%)	82.0	78.1	83.0	87.7		
43	Employment rate for the upper secondary edu. level, age 20-64 (%)	68.3	62.7	70.5	79.7		
44	Employment rate for the less than upper sec. edu. level, age 20-64 (%)	36.4	36.3	54.4	66.5		
45	Total public expenditure on education (% of GDP)	4.4	5.2	4.96	7.15	2007	
46	Life-long learning (pop. aged 25-64 in education and training) (%)	:	2.7	9.1	25.3		
47	Gross domestic expenditure on R&D (% of GDP)	0.8	1.2	2.01	3.52		
48	Population working in high-tech sectors (% of employed pop.)	5.7	4.7	3.7	6.1		
49	Internet use (%)	:	59.0	63	86		
50	Labour productivity per employed person (2000=100)	100.0	126.5	105.6	156.4		
5	<b>MIGRATION AND INTEGRATION</b>	2000	2009	2009	2009		
51	Non-nationals in the population (%)	1.5	1.9	6.4	21.4		
52	Employment rate of nationals, women aged 25-54 (%)	:	67.0	72.9	84.0		
53	Employment rate of nationals, men aged 25-54 (%)	:	78.8	85.4	92.2		
54	Empl. rate of citizens from outside EU-27, women aged 25-54 (%)	:	55.5	52.7	74.9		
55	Employment rate of citizens from outside EU-27, men aged 25-54 (%)	:	78.7	72.9	87.5		
56	Education level (tertiary), nationals aged 25-49 (%)	:	21.6	28.4	41.2		
57	Education level (less than upper secondary), nationals aged 25-49 (%)	:	15.9	22.3	6.4		
58	Educ. level (tertiary), citizens from outside EU-27 aged 25-49 (%)	:	41.5	20.4	48.3		
59	Educ. level (< up. sec.), citizens from outside EU-27 aged 25-49 (%)	:	10.2	43.8	12.5		
6	<b>SUSTAINABILITY OF PUBLIC FINANCES &amp; SOCIAL PROTECTION</b>	2000	2009	2035	2060	2009	2009
60	General government consolidated gross debt (% of GDP)	55.0	78.4	:	:	74	12.1
61	General government primary balance (% of GDP)	2.1	0.2	:	:	-4.2	-0.1
62	Total general government revenue (% of GDP)	43.7	46.1	:	:	44	54.1
63	Public expenditure on pensions (% of GDP)	9.8	12.2	11.4	13.8	13.5	7.0
64	Public expenditure on health care and sickness (% of GDP)	5.3	5.6	6.4	7.0	7.5	3.9
65	Public expenditure on family and children (% of GDP)	2.5	2.8	:	:	2.1	3.6
66	Public expenditure on social protection (% of GDP)	19.1	22.3	:	:	25.3	13.8
67	Expenditure on social protection (PPS / inhabitant)	2,019.9	3,623.7	:	:	6,337	1,688.9
68	Population at risk of poverty after social transfers (%)	11.0	12.4	:	:	16.3	10.2
69	Inequality of income distribution (S80/S20 income quintile share ratio)	3.3	3.5	:	:	4.9	3.4
70	Population aged 18-59 living in jobless households (%)	13.4	13.1	:	:	10.1	6.1

\*: 2009 or last year with data available (see the column placed to the right of the table)



3 BEST MS: Average of the three best Member States according to country ranking

Demographic challenges and...	
<p>Hungary's fertility rate is currently one of the lowest in EU-27, but this may partly be the effect of a transition to women having children later in life; a recovery of fertility is assumed for the population projections. In 2009, over 15% of children (aged 0-17) found themselves in jobless households. Life expectancy is significantly below the EU-27 average, particularly for men, and the gap is expected to remain large over the projection period. There are also large life expectancy differences by education level, indicating that there is scope for improvement. As a result, the population, which is already decreasing, is expected to shrink by 10% by 2050 and the old-age dependency ratio will increase to a level above that of EU-27 as a whole by 2060.</p>	
<p>... opportunities for tackling them</p>	
<p>Hungary has significant scope for increasing employment through higher labour force participation of women and older workers. Productivity levels can also catch up, building on a high level of educational attainment of the population. More R&amp;D investment could also help boost productivity. Public debt is close to the EU-27 average and public spending on pensions is expected to rise moderately. Reforms are also needed in the area of health and long term care, while avoiding deterioration in the quality of the services provided.</p>	

# 17. MALTA

		MALTA					EU-27	*
1 DEMOGRAPHIC TRENDS		1970	2000	2009	2030	2050	2009	
1	Population on 1 January (thousands)	303	380	413	432	415	501,103	2010
2	Total Fertility Rate (children per woman)	:	1.70	1.44	1.46	1.52	1.60	
3	Life expectancy at birth for women (years)	:	80.3	82.7	84.6	87.4	82.4	
4	Life expectancy at birth for men (years)	:	76.2	77.8	79.9	83	76.4	
5	Life expectancy at age 65 for women (years)	:	18.5	20.6	:	:	20.54	
6	Life expectancy at age 65 for men (years)	:	15.1	16.8	:	:	16.99	
7	Natural growth (births minus deaths) (thousands)	2.2	1.5	0.9	-1.2	-1.9	523.1	
8	Net migration (including corrections) (thousands)	-1.9	0.9	-1.6	0.9	0.9	877.1	
9	Mean age of women at childbirth (years)	:	27.9	29.2	:	:	29.7	
10	Old age dependency ratio (65 or over / 15-64 years old) (%)	:	17.9	20.1	39.1	49.8	25.6	
2 GENDER EQUALITY AND FAMILY SITUATIONS		2000	2009	2009	2009	2009	3 BEST MS	
11	Employment rate, women aged 20-64 (%)	33.5	39.8	62.5	74.4			
12	Employment rate, men aged 20-64 (%)	81.6	76.9	75.8	83.1			
13	Employment rate, women aged 25-54 with at least 1 child (%)	:	40.3	68.2	81.1			
14	Employment rate, men aged 25-54 with at least 1 child (%)	:	92.9	88.5	94.0			
15	Gender pay gap (unadjusted) (%)	11	9.2	17.5	7			2008
16	Employed women working part time (%)	15.5	23.4	31.4	4.9			
17	Employed men working part time (%)	3.0	5.1	8.1	2.4			
18	Average number of usual weekly working hours, women	37.2	34.9	33.0	38.9			
19	Average number of usual weekly working hours, men	42.1	40.9	39.9	42.2			
20	Childcare provision for children aged 0-2 (%)	:	15.0	28	56			2008
21	Childcare provision for children aged 3 to compulsory school age (%)	:	75.0	83	97			2008
22	Children aged 0-16 at risk of poverty after social transfer (%)	21.0	20.6	20.1	10.7			2008
23	Children aged 0-16 living in jobless households (%)	:	9.9	10.2	4.1			
24	Social protection benefits targeted at family support (% in kind)	5.9	11.7	32.1	58.9			2008
3 AGEING AND THE LABOUR MARKET		2000	2009	2009	2009	2009	3 BEST MS	
25	Employment rate, women aged 55-64 (%)	8.4	11.2	37.8	61.4			
26	Employment rate, men aged 55-64 (%)	50.8	45.3	54.8	70.4			
27	Employment rate, women aged 55-59 (%)	:	19.5	51.4	75.5			
28	Employment rate, men aged 55-59 (%)	78.1	70.5	69.1	83.0			
29	Employment rate, women aged 60-64 (%)	:	:	22.8	47.0			
30	Employment rate, men aged 60-64 (%)	21.7	22.2	38.5	59.6			
31	Employment rate, women aged 65-69 (%)	:	:	7.4	20.6			
32	Employment rate, men aged 65-69 (%)	:	:	13.2	28.3			
33	Average exit age from the labour market, women (years)	:	:	60.8	64.0			2008
34	Average exit age from the labour market, men (years)	:	:	62.0	64.7			2008
35	Inactive for health reasons, population aged 50-64 (%)	7.0	9.1	21.0	48.4			
36	Internet use, population aged 55-64 (%)	:	27	44	75			2010

		MALTA		EU-27	3 BEST MS	*
4	PRODUCTIVITY, EDUCATION AND R&D	2000	2009	2009	2009	
37	Early leavers from education and training, women aged 18-24 (%)	56.1	33.6	12.5	3.7	
38	Early leavers from education and training, men aged 18-24 (%)	52.5	39.7	16.3	5.9	
39	Educational att., women aged 30-34 with tertiary education level (%)	:	22.7	35.7	54.9	
40	Educational attainment, men aged 30-34 with tertiary education level (%)	:	19.6	28.9	44.4	
41	University graduates aged 20-29 (per 1,000 of the pop. of that age)	36.9	46.6	:	88.6	2008
42	Employment rate for the tertiary education level, age 20-64 (%)	85.5	83.4	83.0	87.7	
43	Employment rate for the upper secondary edu. level, age 20-64 (%)	77.0	76.4	70.5	79.7	
44	Employment rate for the less than upper sec. edu. level, age 20-64 (%)	51.8	49.7	54.4	66.5	
45	Total public expenditure on education (% of GDP)	4.5	6.3	4.96	7.15	2007
46	Life-long learning (pop. aged 25-64 in education and training) (%)	:	5.8	9.1	25.3	
47	Gross domestic expenditure on R&D (% of GDP)	:	0.6	2.01	3.52	
48	Population working in high-tech sectors (% of employed pop.)	10.1	5.9	3.7	6.1	
49	Internet use (%)	:	56.0	63	86	
50	Labour productivity per employed person (2000=100)	100.0	103.2	105.6	156.4	



5 MIGRATION AND INTEGRATION		2000	2009	2009	2009		
51	Non-nationals in the population (%)	:	4.4	6.4	21.4		
52	Employment rate of nationals, women aged 25-54 (%)	:	45.9	72.9	84.0		
53	Employment rate of nationals, men aged 25-54 (%)	:	89.4	85.4	92.2		
54	Empl. rate of citizens from outside EU-27, women aged 25-54 (%)	:	:	52.7	74.9		
55	Employment rate of citizens from outside EU-27, men aged 25-54 (%)	:	:	72.9	87.5		
56	Education level (tertiary), nationals aged 25-49 (%)	:	16.5	28.4	41.2		
57	Education level (less than upper secondary), nationals aged 25-49 (%)	:	64.2	22.3	6.4		
58	Educ. level (tertiary), citizens from outside EU-27 aged 25-49 (%)	:	22.0	20.4	48.3		
59	Educ. level (< up. sec.), citizens from outside EU-27 aged 25-49 (%)	:	44.8	43.8	12.5		
6 SUSTAINABILITY OF PUBLIC FINANCES & SOCIAL PROTECTION		2000	2009	2035	2060	2009	2009
60	General government consolidated gross debt (% of GDP)	55.9	68.6	:	:	74	12.1
61	General government primary balance (% of GDP)	-2.5	-0.6	:	:	-4.2	-0.1
62	Total general government revenue (% of GDP)	34.8	40.2	:	:	44	54.1
63	Public expenditure on pensions (% of GDP)	9.4	10.7	9.7	13.4	13.5	7.0
64	Public expenditure on health care and sickness (% of GDP)	4.9	5.5	6.9	8.0	7.5	3.9
65	Public expenditure on family and children (% of GDP)	1.6	1.3	:	:	2.1	3.6
66	Public expenditure on social protection (% of GDP)	16.6	18.6	:	:	25.3	13.8
67	Expenditure on social protection (PPS / inhabitant)	2,704.2	3,595.7	:	:	6,337	1,688.9
68	Population at risk of poverty after social transfers (%)	15.0	15.1	:	:	16.3	10.2
69	Inequality of income distribution (S80/S20 income quintile share ratio)	4.6	4.1	:	:	4.9	3.4
70	Population aged 18-59 living in jobless households (%)	7.7	8.3	:	:	10.1	6.1

\*: 2009 or last year with data available (see the column placed to the right of the table)  
3 BEST MS: Average of the three best Member States according to country ranking

#### Demographic challenges and...

Malta's fertility in 2009 was below the EU-27 average while life expectancy is higher than the EU-27 average for males, and at par with the EU-27 average for females. Declining fertility and a lengthening life expectancy, whose relative advances are expected to increase even faster over coming decades, will result in more rapid population ageing over the long-term. The population is expected to grow slightly as a result of developments in net migration inflows. Old-age dependency is lower than the EU-27 average, mainly due to Malta's late onset of fertility decline, whereby a higher life expectancy and a lower fertility rate are expected to lead to a rise in the old-age dependency ratio and in a mild decline in the youth-dependency ratio over time, although to different levels and with various degree of intensity in this decline; therefore, in the long term (2060), the population is projected to age substantially.

#### ... opportunities for tackling them

Measures are being taken to encourage more female participation in the labour market, particularly amongst married women as the gap between male and female employment rates currently stands at 37 percentage points. Similarly, there is increasing awareness of the labour force potential of older workers and measures are also being taken to encourage older workers to remain active in the labour market. Productivity levels are still significantly below the EU average and to close the gap, educational attainment levels need to be improved and R&D spending boosted. Public debt is below the EU-27 average, but public expenditure on pensions is projected to grow to 13.4% of GDP in 2060, whereby the demographic transition to an older population is the main driver underpinning the increase for the public pension expenditure over the long-term.

# 18. THE NETHERLANDS

		NETHERLANDS					EU-27	*
1 DEMOGRAPHIC TRENDS		1970	2000	2009	2030	2050	2009	
1	Population on 1 January (thousands)	12,958	15,864	16,575	17,208	16,909	501,103	2010
2	Total Fertility Rate (children per woman)	2.57	1.72	1.79	1.74	1.76	1.60	
3	Life expectancy at birth for women (years)	:	80.7	82.9	85.3	87.8	82.4	
4	Life expectancy at birth for men (years)	:	75.6	78.7	81.1	83.7	76.4	
5	Life expectancy at age 65 for women (years)	:	19.3	21.1	:	:	20.54	
6	Life expectancy at age 65 for men (years)	:	15.4	17.6	:	:	16.99	
7	Natural growth (births minus deaths) (thousands)	129.3	66.1	50.7	6.2	-42.6	523.1	
8	Net migration (including corrections) (thousands)	32.5	57.0	38.5	13.7	7.2	877.1	
9	Mean age of women at childbirth (years)	28.2	30.3	30.7	:	:	29.7	
10	Old age dependency ratio (65 or over / 15-64 years old) (%)	16.2	20.0	22.3	40.0	45.6	25.6	
2 GENDER EQUALITY AND FAMILY SITUATIONS		2000	2009	2009	2009	2009		
11	Employment rate, women aged 20-64 (%)	64.0	72.7	62.5	74.4			
12	Employment rate, men aged 20-64 (%)	84.2	84.9	75.8	83.1			
13	Employment rate, women aged 25-54 with at least 1 child (%)	:	78.3	68.2	81.1			
14	Employment rate, men aged 25-54 with at least 1 child (%)	:	94.4	88.5	94.0			
15	Gender pay gap (unadjusted) (%)	21	19.6	17.5	7	2008		
16	Employed women working part time (%)	71.0	75.8	31.4	4.9			
17	Employed men working part time (%)	19.3	24.8	8.1	2.4			
18	Average number of usual weekly working hours, women	24.7	25.2	33.0	38.9			
19	Average number of usual weekly working hours, men	37.0	36.6	39.9	42.2			
20	Childcare provision for children aged 0-2 (%)	:	47.0	28	56	2008		
21	Childcare provision for children aged 3 to compulsory school age (%)	:	89.0	83	97	2008		
22	Children aged 0-16 at risk of poverty after social transfer (%)	17.0	15.4	20.1	10.7	2008		
23	Children aged 0-16 living in jobless households (%)	7.0	4.9	10.2	4.1			
24	Social protection benefits targeted at family support (% in kind)	35.6	59.2	32.1	58.9	2008		
3 AGEING AND THE LABOUR MARKET		2000	2009	2009	2009			
25	Employment rate, women aged 55-64 (%)	26.1	44.7	37.8	61.4			
26	Employment rate, men aged 55-64 (%)	50.2	65.4	54.8	70.4			
27	Employment rate, women aged 55-59 (%)	38.6	61.4	51.4	75.5			
28	Employment rate, men aged 55-59 (%)	69.2	83.4	69.1	83.0			
29	Employment rate, women aged 60-64 (%)	10.9	27.6	22.8	47.0			
30	Employment rate, men aged 60-64 (%)	26.2	47.0	38.5	59.6			
31	Employment rate, women aged 65-69 (%)	3.1	7.6	7.4	20.6			
32	Employment rate, men aged 65-69 (%)	7.2	17.8	13.2	28.3			
33	Average exit age from the labour market, women (years)	:	62.8	60.8	64.0	2008		
34	Average exit age from the labour market, men (years)	:	63.7	62.0	64.7	2008		
35	Inactive for health reasons, population aged 50-64 (%)	30.2	36.0	21.0	48.4			
36	Internet use, population aged 55-64 (%)	:	79	44	75	2010		

		NETHERLANDS		EU-27	3 BEST MS	*	
		2000	2009	2009	2009		
4	<b>PRODUCTIVITY, EDUCATION AND R&amp;D</b>						
37	Early leavers from education and training, women aged 18-24 (%)	14.1	8.6	12.5	3.7		
38	Early leavers from education and training, men aged 18-24 (%)	16.6	13.1	16.3	5.9		
39	Educational att., women aged 30-34 with tertiary education level (%)	27.3	42.6	35.7	54.9		
40	Educational attainment, men aged 30-34 with tertiary education level (%)	25.6	38.4	28.9	44.4		
41	University graduates aged 20-29 (per 1,000 of the pop. of that age)	36.1	47.0	.	88.6	2008	
42	Employment rate for the tertiary education level, age 20-64 (%)	86.2	87.7	83.0	87.7		
43	Employment rate for the upper secondary edu. level, age 20-64 (%)	79.2	81.4	70.5	79.7		
44	Employment rate for the less than upper sec. edu. level, age 20-64 (%)	59.5	64.2	54.4	66.5		
45	Total public expenditure on education (% of GDP)	5.0	5.3	4.96	7.15	2007	
46	Life-long learning (pop. aged 25-64 in education and training) (%)	.	17.0	9.1	25.3		
47	Gross domestic expenditure on R&D (% of GDP)	1.8	1.8	2.01	3.52		
48	Population working in high-tech sectors (% of employed pop.)	5.1	4.0	3.7	6.1		
49	Internet use (%)	.	88.0	63	86		
50	Labour productivity per employed person (2000=100)	100.0	105.6	105.6	156.4		
5	<b>MIGRATION AND INTEGRATION</b>	2000	2009	2009	2009		
51	Non-nationals in the population (%)	4.1	3.9	6.4	21.4		
52	Employment rate of nationals, women aged 25-54 (%)	72.3	82.1	72.9	84.0		
53	Employment rate of nationals, men aged 25-54 (%)	93.2	92.5	85.4	92.2		
54	Empl. rate of citizens from outside EU-27, women aged 25-54 (%)	.	45.3	52.7	74.9		
55	Employment rate of citizens from outside EU-27, men aged 25-54 (%)	.	76.4	72.9	87.5		
56	Education level (tertiary), nationals aged 25-49 (%)	.	34.9	28.4	41.2		
57	Education level (less than upper secondary), nationals aged 25-49 (%)	.	21.6	22.3	6.4		
58	Educ. level (tertiary), citizens from outside EU-27 aged 25-49 (%)	.	19.8	20.4	48.3		
59	Educ. level (< up. sec.), citizens from outside EU-27 aged 25-49 (%)	.	54.9	43.8	12.5		
6	<b>SUSTAINABILITY OF PUBLIC FINANCES &amp; SOCIAL PROTECTION</b>	2000	2009	2035	2060	2009	2009
60	General government consolidated gross debt (% of GDP)	53.8	60.8	.	.	74	12.1
61	General government primary balance (% of GDP)	5.6	-3.2	.	.	-4.2	-0.1
62	Total general government revenue (% of GDP)	46.1	46.0	.	.	44	54.1
63	Public expenditure on pensions (% of GDP)	13.4	13.1	9.9	10.5	13.5	7.0
64	Public expenditure on health care and sickness (% of GDP)	7.3	8.8	5.7	5.8	7.5	3.9
65	Public expenditure on family and children (% of GDP)	1.1	1.8	.	.	2.1	3.6
66	Public expenditure on social protection (% of GDP)	24.7	26.9	.	.	25.3	13.8
67	Expenditure on social protection (PPS / inhabitant)	6,321.8	9,023.0	.	.	6,337	1,688.9
68	Population at risk of poverty after social transfers (%)	11.0	11.1	.	.	16.3	10.2
69	Inequality of income distribution (S80/S20 income quintile share ratio)	4.1	4.0	.	.	4.9	3.4
70	Population aged 18-59 living in jobless households (%)	7.6	6.0	.	.	10.1	6.1

\*: 2009 or last year with data available (see the column placed to the right of the table)

3 BEST MS: Average of the three best Member States according to country ranking

Demographic challenges and...
<p>Fertility in the Netherlands is at a relatively high level after having recovered from a much lower level in the 1980s. Life expectancy is above the EU-27 average. Projections are based on the assumption that fertility will remain high and that life expectancy will grow slower than for EU-27 as a whole. These trends combined with significant immigration will result in a below-EU-27 average old-age dependency ratio by 2050. The Dutch population is projected to grow by only a few percent until 2050.</p>
... opportunities for tackling them
<p>Female labour force participation is high, but the contribution of women to the economy could improve if women worked more hours and the gender pay gap was reduced. Better childcare provision could help in this respect. Employment could also grow through higher labour force participation of older workers and improved access of minorities and third country nationals to the labour market and education systems.</p> <p>Public debt is below the EU-27 average. Public social protection expenditure is expected to rise faster than for EU-27 as a whole, albeit to a level that would remain below the EU-27 average.</p>

# 19. AUSTRIA

		AUSTRIA					EU-27	*
1	DEMOGRAPHIC TRENDS	1970	2000	2009	2030	2050	2009	
1	Population on 1 January (thousands)	7,030	8,002	8,375	8,988	9,127	501,103	2010
2	Total Fertility Rate (children per woman)	2.29	1.36	1.39	1.48	1.54	1.60	
3	Life expectancy at birth for women (years)	73.5	81.2	83.2	85.8	88.1	82.4	
4	Life expectancy at birth for men (years)	66.5	75.2	77.6	80.9	83.6	76.4	
5	Life expectancy at age 65 for women (years)	14.9	19.6	21.2	:	:	20.54	
6	Life expectancy at age 65 for men (years)	11.7	16.0	17.7	:	:	16.99	
7	Natural growth (births minus deaths) (thousands)	13.5	1.6	-1.0	-11.0	-30.6	523.1	
8	Net migration (including corrections) (thousands)	10.4	17.3	21.1	31.2	24.7	877.1	
9	Mean age of women at childbirth (years)	26.7	28.2	29.7	:	:	29.7	
10	Old age dependency ratio (65 or over / 15-64 years old) (%)	22.7	22.9	25.7	38.1	48.3	25.6	
2	GENDER EQUALITY AND FAMILY SITUATIONS	2000	2009	2009	EU-27	2009	3 BEST MS	2009
11	Employment rate, women aged 20-64 (%)	62.2	69.4	62.5	74.4			
12	Employment rate, men aged 20-64 (%)	79.2	80.1	75.8	83.1			
13	Employment rate, women aged 25-54 with at least 1 child (%)	:	77.0	68.2	81.1			
14	Employment rate, men aged 25-54 with at least 1 child (%)	:	92.3	88.5	94.0			
15	Gender pay gap (unadjusted) (%)	20	25.5	17.5	7	2008		
16	Employed women working part time (%)	32.2	42.9	31.4	4.9			
17	Employed men working part time (%)	4.1	8.4	8.1	2.4			
18	Average number of usual weekly working hours, women	34.9	31.7	33.0	38.9			
19	Average number of usual weekly working hours, men	41.2	40.7	39.9	42.2			
20	Childcare provision for children aged 0-2 (%)	:	6.0	28	56	2008		
21	Childcare provision for children aged 3 to compulsory school age (%)	:	71.0	83	97	2008		
22	Children aged 0-16 at risk of poverty after social transfer (%)	12.0	13.8	20.1	10.7	2008		
23	Children aged 0-16 living in jobless households (%)	4.3	5.3	10.2	4.1			
24	Social protection benefits targeted at family support (% in kind)	16.6	19.1	32.1	58.9	2008		
3	AGEING AND THE LABOUR MARKET	2000	2009	2009	EU-27	2009	3 BEST MS	2009
25	Employment rate, women aged 55-64 (%)	17.2	31.7	37.8	61.4			
26	Employment rate, men aged 55-64 (%)	41.2	51.0	54.8	70.4			
27	Employment rate, women aged 55-59 (%)	25.6	48.5	51.4	75.5			
28	Employment rate, men aged 55-59 (%)	60.0	70.7	69.1	83.0			
29	Employment rate, women aged 60-64 (%)	7.9	13.6	22.8	47.0			
30	Employment rate, men aged 60-64 (%)	16.7	29.1	38.5	59.6			
31	Employment rate, women aged 65-69 (%)	4.0	6.4	7.4	20.6			
32	Employment rate, men aged 65-69 (%)	7.2	11.3	13.2	28.3			
33	Average exit age from the labour market, women (years)	:	59.4	60.8	64.0	2008		
34	Average exit age from the labour market, men (years)	:	62.6	62.0	64.7	2008		
35	Inactive for health reasons, population aged 50-64 (%)	4.6	9.7	21.0	48.4			
36	Internet use, population aged 55-64 (%)	:	47	44	75	2010		



		AUSTRIA		EU-27	3 BEST MS	*	
		2000	2009	2009	2009		
4	<b>PRODUCTIVITY, EDUCATION AND R&amp;D</b>						
37	Early leavers from education and training, women aged 18-24 (%)	10.7	8.9	12.5	3.7		
38	Early leavers from education and training, men aged 18-24 (%)	9.6	8.5	16.3	5.9		
39	Educational att., women aged 30-34 with tertiary education level (%)	:	24.0	35.7	54.9		
40	Educational attainment, men aged 30-34 with tertiary education level (%)	:	23.0	28.9	44.4		
41	University graduates aged 20-29 (per 1,000 of the pop. of that age)	24.1	41.2	:	88.6	2008	
42	Employment rate for the tertiary education level, age 20-64 (%)	85.8	86.1	83.0	87.7		
43	Employment rate for the upper secondary edu. level, age 20-64 (%)	74.0	76.9	70.5	79.7		
44	Employment rate for the less than upper sec. edu. level, age 20-64 (%)	52.9	55.6	54.4	66.5		
45	Total public expenditure on education (% of GDP)	5.7	5.4	4.96	7.15	2007	
46	Life-long learning (pop. aged 25-64 in education and training) (%)	:	13.8	9.1	25.3		
47	Gross domestic expenditure on R&D (% of GDP)	1.9	2.8	2.01	3.52		
48	Population working in high-tech sectors (% of employed pop.)	6.0	3.7	3.7	6.1		
49	Internet use (%)	:	68.0	63	86		
50	Labour productivity per employed person (2000=100)	100.0	106.0	105.6	156.4		
5	<b>MIGRATION AND INTEGRATION</b>	2000	2009	2009	2009		
51	Non-nationals in the population (%)		8.7	10.3	6.4	21.4	
52	Employment rate of nationals, women aged 25-54 (%)	74.5	82.3	72.9	84.0		
53	Employment rate of nationals, men aged 25-54 (%)	90.4	89.8	85.4	92.2		
54	Empl. rate of citizens from outside EU-27, women aged 25-54 (%)	:	55.3	52.7	74.9		
55	Employment rate of citizens from outside EU-27, men aged 25-54 (%)	:	75.1	72.9	87.5		
56	Education level (tertiary), nationals aged 25-49 (%)	:	20.0	28.4	41.2		
57	Education level (less than upper secondary), nationals aged 25-49 (%)	:	12.3	22.3	6.4		
58	Educ. level (tertiary), citizens from outside EU-27 aged 25-49 (%)	:	13.8	20.4	48.3		
59	Educ. level (< up. sec.), citizens from outside EU-27 aged 25-49 (%)	:	39.4	43.8	12.5		
6	<b>SUSTAINABILITY OF PUBLIC FINANCES &amp; SOCIAL PROTECTION</b>	2000	2009	2035	2060	2009	2009
60	General government consolidated gross debt (% of GDP)	66.5	67.5	:	:	74	12.1
61	General government primary balance (% of GDP)	1.8	-0.8	:	:	-4.2	-0.1
62	Total general government revenue (% of GDP)	50.3	48.8	:	:	44	54.1
63	Public expenditure on pensions (% of GDP)	15.9	15.5	13.9	13.6	13.5	7.0
64	Public expenditure on health care and sickness (% of GDP)	7.1	7.1	7.7	8.0	7.5	3.9
65	Public expenditure on family and children (% of GDP)	2.9	2.8	:	:	2.1	3.6
66	Public expenditure on social protection (% of GDP)	27.6	27.3	:	:	25.3	13.8
67	Expenditure on social protection (PPS / inhabitant)	6,898.1	8,492.6	:	:	6,337	1,688.9
68	Population at risk of poverty after social transfers (%)	12.0	12.0	:	:	16.3	10.2
69	Inequality of income distribution (S80/S20 income quintile share ratio)	3.4	3.7	:	:	4.9	3.4
70	Population aged 18-59 living in jobless households (%)	7.9	7.3	:	:	10.1	6.1

\*: 2009 or last year with data available (see the column placed to the right of the table)  
 3 BEST MS: Average of the three best Member States according to country ranking

Demographic challenges and...	
<p>Fertility in Austria lies below the EU-27 average and only a moderate recovery is expected. Thanks to life expectancy rising above the EU-27 average and significant immigration, the population is expected to grow until 2050 by almost 10%. The old-age dependency ratio is expected to double but will stay slightly below the EU-27 average.</p>	
<p>... opportunities for tackling them</p>	
<p>Female employment rates are high, but many women work part-time and their hourly pay is significantly lower than men's; childcare facilities for children 0-2 years are limited. Older workers represent a significant potential for increasing employment as their employment rates are well below the EU-27 average, although they have been on a steep increase over the last years. Employment may also benefit from improving qualification levels of third-country nationals and ensuring their better integration into the labour market.</p> <p>Public debt is close to the EU-27 average and public social protection expenditure is expected to rise only moderately over the coming decades.</p> <p>The government is particularly concerned about reconciliation of work and family life, integration of young people into the labour market, improvement of employment rates of older people and ensuring the sustainability of public finances for high quality social services. It has recently taken important measures to help young people enter the labour market. The government is keen to further promote the employability of older workers together with a higher effective retirement age and enhance the participation in pre-school education for children with a migrant background.</p>	

## 20. POLAND

		POLAND					EU-27	*
1 DEMOGRAPHIC TRENDS		1970	2000	2009	2030	2050	2009	
1	Population on 1 January (thousands)	32,671	38,654	38,167	36,975	33,275	501,103	2010
2	Total Fertility Rate (children per woman)	:	1.35	1.40	1.36	1.44	1.60	
3	Life expectancy at birth for women (years)	:	78.0	80.1	83.7	86.7	82.4	
4	Life expectancy at birth for men (years)	:	69.6	71.5	76.6	80.7	76.4	
5	Life expectancy at age 65 for women (years)	:	17.5	19.2	:	:	20.54	
6	Life expectancy at age 65 for men (years)	:	13.6	14.8	:	:	16.99	
7	Natural growth (births minus deaths) (thousands)	281.0	10.3	32.6	-153.3	-225.7	523.1	
8	Net migration (including corrections) (thousands)	-293.6	-409.9	-1.2	-1.3	26.4	877.1	
9	Mean age of women at childbirth (years)	:	27.4	28.6	:	:	29.7	
10	Old age dependency ratio (65 or over / 15-64 years old) (%)	12.6	17.6	18.9	36.0	55.7	25.6	
2 GENDER EQUALITY AND FAMILY SITUATIONS		2000	2009	2009	2009	2009	3 BEST MS	
11	Employment rate, women aged 20-64 (%)	54.5	57.6	62.5	62.5	74.4		
12	Employment rate, men aged 20-64 (%)	67.9	72.6	75.8	75.8	83.1		
13	Employment rate, women aged 25-54 with at least 1 child (%)	:	70.6	68.2	68.2	81.1		
14	Employment rate, men aged 25-54 with at least 1 child (%)	:	88.2	88.5	88.5	94.0		
15	Gender pay gap (unadjusted) (%)	:	9.8	17.5	17.5	7	2008	
16	Employed women working part time (%)	13.4	11.5	31.4	31.4	4.9		
17	Employed men working part time (%)	8.2	5.6	8.1	8.1	2.4		
18	Average number of usual weekly working hours, women	:	37.2	33.0	33.0	38.9		
19	Average number of usual weekly working hours, men	:	41.6	39.9	39.9	42.2		
20	Childcare provision for children aged 0-2 (%)	:	3.0	28	28	56	2008	
21	Childcare provision for children aged 3 to compulsory school age (%)	:	35.0	83	83	97	2008	
22	Children aged 0-16 at risk of poverty after social transfer (%)	:	22.7	20.1	20.1	10.7	2008	
23	Children aged 0-16 living in jobless households (%)	:	8.0	10.2	10.2	4.1		
24	Social protection benefits targeted at family support (% in kind)	0.0	0.0	32.1	32.1	58.9	2008	
3 AGEING AND THE LABOUR MARKET		2000	2009	2009	2009	2009	3 BEST MS	
25	Employment rate, women aged 55-64 (%)	21.4	21.9	37.8	37.8	61.4		
26	Employment rate, men aged 55-64 (%)	36.7	44.3	54.8	54.8	70.4		
27	Employment rate, women aged 55-59 (%)	28.9	29.4	51.4	51.4	75.5		
28	Employment rate, men aged 55-59 (%)	47.5	57.4	69.1	69.1	83.0		
29	Employment rate, women aged 60-64 (%)	15.4	11.8	22.8	22.8	47.0		
30	Employment rate, men aged 60-64 (%)	27.5	25.8	38.5	38.5	59.6		
31	Employment rate, women aged 65-69 (%)	8.2	6.6	7.4	7.4	20.6		
32	Employment rate, men aged 65-69 (%)	17.7	13.3	13.2	13.2	28.3		
33	Average exit age from the labour market, women (years)	:	57.5	60.8	60.8	64.0	2008	
34	Average exit age from the labour market, men (years)	:	61.4	62.0	62.0	64.7	2008	
35	Inactive for health reasons, population aged 50-64 (%)	43.6	29.1	21.0	21.0	48.4		
36	Internet use, population aged 55-64 (%)	:	24	44	44	75	2010	

		POLAND		EU-27	3 BEST MS	*
4 PRODUCTIVITY, EDUCATION AND R&D		2000	2009	2009	2009	
37	Early leavers from education and training, women aged 18-24 (%)	:	3.9	12.5	3.7	
38	Early leavers from education and training, men aged 18-24 (%)	:	6.6	16.3	5.9	
39	Educational att., women aged 30-34 with tertiary education level (%)	10.4	38.4	35.7	54.9	
40	Educational attainment, men aged 30-34 with tertiary education level (%)	14.6	27.3	28.9	44.4	
41	University graduates aged 20-29 (per 1,000 of the pop. of that age)	58.1	87.6	:	88.6	2008
42	Employment rate for the tertiary education level, age 20-64 (%)	83.8	83.7	83.0	87.7	
43	Employment rate for the upper secondary edu. level, age 20-64 (%)	63.1	63.6	70.5	79.7	
44	Employment rate for the less than upper sec. edu. level, age 20-64 (%)	41.6	41.0	54.4	66.5	
45	Total public expenditure on education (% of GDP)	4.9	4.9	4.96	7.15	2007
46	Life-long learning (pop. aged 25-64 in education and training) (%)	:	4.7	9.1	25.3	
47	Gross domestic expenditure on R&D (% of GDP)	0.6	0.6	2.01	3.52	
48	Population working in high-tech sectors (% of employed pop.)	:	2.7	3.7	6.1	
49	Internet use (%)	:	54.0	63	86	
50	Labour productivity per employed person (2000=100)	100.0	129.7	105.6	156.4	

5 MIGRATION AND INTEGRATION		2000	2009	2009	2009
51	Non-nationals in the population (%)	:	0.1	6.4	21.4
52	Employment rate of nationals, women aged 25-54 (%)	:	71.6	72.9	84.0
53	Employment rate of nationals, men aged 25-54 (%)	:	83.7	85.4	92.2
54	Empl. rate of citizens from outside EU-27, women aged 25-54 (%)	:	63.0	52.7	74.9
55	Employment rate of citizens from outside EU-27, men aged 25-54 (%)	:	86.6	72.9	87.5
56	Education level (tertiary), nationals aged 25-49 (%)	:	26.1	28.4	41.2
57	Education level (less than upper secondary), nationals aged 25-49 (%)	:	7.8	22.3	6.4
58	Educ. level (tertiary), citizens from outside EU-27 aged 25-49 (%)	:	40.9	20.4	48.3
59	Educ. level (< up. sec.), citizens from outside EU-27 aged 25-49 (%)	:	0.0	43.8	12.5

6 SUSTAINABILITY OF PUBLIC FINANCES & SOCIAL PROTECTION		2000	2009	2035	2060	2009	2009
60	General government consolidated gross debt (% of GDP)	36.8	50.9	:	:	74	12.1
61	General government primary balance (% of GDP)	0.0	-4.7	:	:	-4.2	-0.1
62	Total general government revenue (% of GDP)	38.1	37.2	:	:	44	54.1
63	Public expenditure on pensions (% of GDP)	13.3	12.5	9.3	8.8	13.5	7.0
64	Public expenditure on health care and sickness (% of GDP)	3.8	4.4	4.7	5.0	7.5	3.9
65	Public expenditure on family and children (% of GDP)	1.0	0.7	:	:	2.1	3.6
66	Public expenditure on social protection (% of GDP)	19.1	18.2	:	:	25.3	13.8
67	Expenditure on social protection (PPS / inhabitant)	1,749.5	2,580.8	:	:	6,337	1,688.9
68	Population at risk of poverty after social transfers (%)	16.0	17.1	:	:	16.3	10.2
69	Inequality of income distribution (S80/S20 income quintile share ratio)	4.7	5.0	:	:	4.9	3.4
70	Population aged 18-59 living in jobless households (%)	:	10.2	:	:	10.1	6.1

\*: 2009 or last year with data available (see the column placed to the right of the table)

3 BEST MS: Average of the three best Member States according to country ranking

Demographic challenges and...	
<p>Poland's fertility rate has dropped to one of the lowest levels in EU-27, but this may partly be the effect of a transition to women having children later in life; a moderate recovery of fertility is assumed for the population projections; childcare capacity is still low, almost inexistent for the 0-2 and below 40% for those aged 3 and over in 2008. Life expectancy is significantly below the EU-27 average and it is not expected that the gap will be closed over the projection period. Over recent years, Poland experienced significant emigration, but in 2009 this may have dwindled. Altogether, by 2050, this will lead to a shrinking of the population by more than 10% and to one of the highest proportions of those aged 65 and over in EU-27.</p>	
<p>... opportunities for tackling them</p>	
<p>There is a large life expectancy gap according to educational attainment, which can lead to overall increases as education becomes more widespread. Employment rates of both men and women are far below the EU average, leaving much scope for future employment growth. Promoting the labour force activation of women might also reduce the risk of poverty, which is higher for households with children. The employment rate gap between Poland and the EU average is particularly large for older workers.</p> <p>There is a large potential for productivity growth which could build on a high level of educational attainment. Public debt is below the EU-27 average and public pension expenditure is even expected to fall significantly over the coming decades.</p>	

## 21. PORTUGAL

1	DEMOGRAPHIC TRENDS	PORTUGAL					EU-27	*
		1970	2000	2009	2030	2050	2009	
1	Population on 1 January (thousands)	8,698	10,195	10,638	11,317	11,449	501,103	2010
2	Total Fertility Rate (children per woman)	3.01	1.55	1.32	1.44	1.51	1.60	
3	Life expectancy at birth for women (years)	69.7	80.2	82.6	85.4	87.7	82.4	
4	Life expectancy at birth for men (years)	63.7	73.2	76.5	79.7	82.7	76.4	
5	Life expectancy at age 65 for women (years)	14.6	18.9	20.5	:	:	20.54	
6	Life expectancy at age 65 for men (years)	12.2	15.4	17.1	:	:	16.99	
7	Natural growth (births minus deaths) (thousands)	87.6	14.6	-4.9	-29.0	-50.4	523.1	
8	Net migration (including corrections) (thousands)	-122.0	47.0	15.4	46.1	38.8	877.1	
9	Mean age of women at childbirth (years)	29.0	28.6	29.7	:	:	29.7	
10	Old age dependency ratio (65 or over / 15-64 years old) (%)	14.9	23.7	26.2	36.6	53.0	25.6	
<p><b>Population distribution by age</b></p> <p>Stacked bar charts showing population distribution by age group (Pop. under 25, Pop. aged 25-64, Pop. aged 65-79, Pop. aged 80+) for Portugal and EU-27 in 2009, 2030, and 2050.</p> <p><b>Population growth, 1995-2050</b></p> <p>Line chart showing natural growth, net migration, and total population growth for Portugal and EU-27 from 1995 to 2050. Includes projected data points.</p>								
2	GENDER EQUALITY AND FAMILY SITUATIONS	2000	2009	EU-27 2009	3 BEST MS 2009			
11	Employment rate, women aged 20-64 (%)	65.2	66.1	62.5	74.4			
12	Employment rate, men aged 20-64 (%)	82.1	76.5	75.8	83.1			
13	Employment rate, women aged 25-54 with at least 1 child (%)	:	75.2	68.2	81.1			
14	Employment rate, men aged 25-54 with at least 1 child (%)	:	89.2	88.5	94.0			
15	Gender pay gap (unadjusted) (%)	8	9.2	17.5	7	2008		
16	Employed women working part time (%)	16.4	15.2	31.4	4.9			
17	Employed men working part time (%)	6.4	6.3	8.1	2.4			
18	Average number of usual weekly working hours, women	37.4	36.0	33.0	38.9			
19	Average number of usual weekly working hours, men	41.6	39.6	39.9	42.2			
20	Childcare provision for children aged 0-2 (%)	:	33.0	28	56	2008		
21	Childcare provision for children aged 3 to compulsory school age (%)	:	78.0	83	97	2008		
22	Children aged 0-16 at risk of poverty after social transfer (%)	22.0	21.8	20.1	10.7	2008		
23	Children aged 0-16 living in jobless households (%)	3.9	6.1	10.2	4.1			
24	Social protection benefits targeted at family support (% in kind)	39.9	36.5	32.1	58.9	2008		
<p><b>Employment rate, population aged 20-64 yrs, 1995-2009 (%)</b></p> <p>Line chart showing employment rates for PT women, PT men, EU women, EU men, 3-highest-women, and 3-highest-men from 1995 to 2009.</p> <p><b>Education, 2009</b></p> <p>Horizontal bar chart showing early leavers from education and tertiary attainment level for Portugal and EU-27, comparing men and women.</p>								
3	AGEING AND THE LABOUR MARKET	2000	2009	EU-27 2009	3 BEST MS 2009			
25	Employment rate, women aged 55-64 (%)	40.6	42.7	37.8	61.4			
26	Employment rate, men aged 55-64 (%)	62.1	57.5	54.8	70.4			
27	Employment rate, women aged 55-59 (%)	46.8	50.9	51.4	75.5			
28	Employment rate, men aged 55-59 (%)	70.1	67.0	69.1	83.0			
29	Employment rate, women aged 60-64 (%)	36.8	33.8	22.8	47.0			
30	Employment rate, men aged 60-64 (%)	53.7	46.4	38.5	59.6			
31	Employment rate, women aged 65-69 (%)	20.5	21.8	7.4	20.6			
32	Employment rate, men aged 65-69 (%)	34.9	29.6	13.2	28.3			
33	Average exit age from the labour market, women (years)	:	62.3	60.8	64.0	2008		
34	Average exit age from the labour market, men (years)	:	62.9	62.0	64.7	2008		
35	Inactive for health reasons, population aged 50-64 (%)	17.7	14.1	21.0	48.4			
36	Internet use, population aged 55-64 (%)	:	24	44	75	2010		

		PORTUGAL		EU-27	3 BEST MS	*
		2000	2009	2009	2009	
4	<b>PRODUCTIVITY, EDUCATION AND R&amp;D</b>					
37	Early leavers from education and training, women aged 18-24 (%)	36.3	26.1	12.5	3.7	
38	Early leavers from education and training, men aged 18-24 (%)	50.9	36.1	16.3	5.9	
39	Educational att., women aged 30-34 with tertiary education level (%)	9.0	24.8	35.7	54.9	
40	Educational attainment, men aged 30-34 with tertiary education level (%)	13.5	17.5	28.9	44.4	
41	University graduates aged 20-29 (per 1,000 of the pop. of that age)	30.5	58.8	:	88.6	2008
42	Employment rate for the tertiary education level, age 20-64 (%)	89.8	84.3	83.0	87.7	
43	Employment rate for the upper secondary edu. level, age 20-64 (%)	67.2	70.1	70.5	79.7	
44	Employment rate for the less than upper sec. edu. level, age 20-64 (%)	72.8	68.8	54.4	66.5	
45	Total public expenditure on education (% of GDP)	5.4	5.3	4.96	7.15	2007
46	Life-long learning (pop. aged 25-64 in education and training) (%)	:	6.1	9.1	25.3	
47	Gross domestic expenditure on R&D (% of GDP)	0.7	1.7	2.01	3.52	
48	Population working in high-tech sectors (% of employed pop.)	2.5	2.3	3.7	6.1	
49	Internet use (%)	:	47.0	63	86	
50	Labour productivity per employed person (2000=100)	100.0	105.8	105.6	156.4	

**Employment rates (%), 2009**

**Social Protection (% of GDP), 2008**

		2000	2009	2009	2009		
5	<b>MIGRATION AND INTEGRATION</b>						
51	Non-nationals in the population (%)	1.9	4.2	6.4	21.4		
52	Employment rate of nationals, women aged 25-54 (%)	73.8	75.2	72.9	84.0		
53	Employment rate of nationals, men aged 25-54 (%)	89.8	84.7	85.4	92.2		
54	Empl. rate of citizens from outside EU-27, women aged 25-54 (%)	:	69.7	52.7	74.9		
55	Employment rate of citizens from outside EU-27, men aged 25-54 (%)	:	79.1	72.9	87.5		
56	Education level (tertiary), nationals aged 25-49 (%)	:	17.8	28.4	41.2		
57	Education level (less than upper secondary), nationals aged 25-49 (%)	:	64.2	22.3	6.4		
58	Educ. level (tertiary), citizens from outside EU-27 aged 25-49 (%)	:	14.0	20.4	48.3		
59	Educ. level (< up. sec.), citizens from outside EU-27 aged 25-49 (%)	:	53.3	43.8	12.5		
6	<b>SUSTAINABILITY OF PUBLIC FINANCES &amp; SOCIAL PROTECTION</b>	2000	2009	2035	2060	2009	2009
60	General government consolidated gross debt (% of GDP)	50.5	76.1	:	:	74	12.1
61	General government primary balance (% of GDP)	0.1	-6.5	:	:	-4.2	-0.1
62	Total general government revenue (% of GDP)	38.2	38.8	:	:	44	54.1
63	Public expenditure on pensions (% of GDP)	10.7	14.1	12.2	13.4	13.5	7.0
64	Public expenditure on health care and sickness (% of GDP)	6.0	6.5	8.2	9.1	7.5	3.9
65	Public expenditure on family and children (% of GDP)	1.0	1.3	:	:	2.1	3.6
66	Public expenditure on social protection (% of GDP)	18.7	23.2	:	:	25.3	13.8
67	Expenditure on social protection (PPS / inhabitant)	2,883.3	4,559.6	:	:	6,337	1,688.9
68	Population at risk of poverty after social transfers (%)	21.0	17.9	:	:	16.3	10.2
69	Inequality of income distribution (S80/S20 income quintile share ratio)	6.4	6.0	:	:	4.9	3.4
70	Population aged 18-59 living in jobless households (%)	4.5	6.7	:	:	10.1	6.1

\*: 2009 or last year with data available (see the column placed to the right of the table)  
 3 BEST MS: Average of the three best Member States according to country ranking

### Demographic challenges and...

The Portuguese fertility rate is below the EU-27 average and has decreased in recent years. The projection expects a moderate recovery. Life expectancy is close to the EU-27 average, especially for women. Net migration is positive but has been decreasing steadily since 2002. These underlying trends cause population to grow by 7.5% by 2050 and to increase the old-age dependency ratio to a level that is above the EU-27 average. The working population is ageing fast and in 2030 it is projected that one worker in five will be an older worker (aged 55-64). Because of the crisis, the debt ratio is increasing from just above 60% in 2007 to a projected 90% in 2011.

### ... opportunities for tackling them

Labour force participation, the gender employment gap and the gender pay gap compare favourably to the EU-27 average. But productivity levels are low and the number of early school leavers is high even if educational attainment is rising. Employment rates of men and women with young children are among the highest in EU-27 while childcare availability is increasing. This is likely to reduce the percentage of children at risk of poverty, presently close to the EU-27 average. The government continues to be concerned about income inequality and for this reason it is targeting social benefits towards the most vulnerable groups, especially older persons and families with children. Public expenditure could rise further due to the impact of ageing. The new pension reform aims to make future public finances more sustainable.

## 22. ROMANIA

		ROMANIA					EU-27	*
1 DEMOGRAPHIC TRENDS		1970	2000	2009	2030	2050	2009	
1	Population on 1 January (thousands)	20,140	22,455	21,462	20,049	18,149	501,103	2010
2	Total Fertility Rate (children per woman)	:	1.31	1.38	1.41	1.48	1.60	
3	Life expectancy at birth for women (years)	70.4	74.8	77.4	81.3	85.0	82.4	
4	Life expectancy at birth for men (years)	65.8	67.7	69.8	75.5	79.9	76.4	
5	Life expectancy at age 65 for women (years)	14.3	15.9	17.2	:	:	20.54	
6	Life expectancy at age 65 for men (years)	12.7	13.4	14.0	:	:	16.99	
7	Natural growth (births minus deaths) (thousands)	233.8	-21.3	-34.8	-92.0	-122.6	523.1	
8	Net migration (including corrections) (thousands)	-12.2	-3.7	-1.6	-0.8	12.7	877.1	
9	Mean age of women at childbirth (years)	:	25.7	26.9	:	:	29.7	
10	Old age dependency ratio (65 or over / 15-64 years old) (%)	13.0	19.7	21.3	30.3	54.0	25.6	
2 GENDER EQUALITY AND FAMILY SITUATIONS		2000	2009	EU-27 2009	3 BEST MS 2009			
11	Employment rate, women aged 20-64 (%)	64.8	56.3	62.5	74.4			
12	Employment rate, men aged 20-64 (%)	76.4	70.7	75.8	83.1			
13	Employment rate, women aged 25-54 with at least 1 child (%)	:	67.1	68.2	81.1			
14	Employment rate, men aged 25-54 with at least 1 child (%)	:	82.3	88.5	94.0			
15	Gender pay gap (unadjusted) (%)	17	9.0	17.5	7	2008		
16	Employed women working part time (%)	18.6	10.6	31.4	4.9			
17	Employed men working part time (%)	14.6	9.1	8.1	2.4			
18	Average number of usual weekly working hours, women	39.6	38.3	33.0	38.9			
19	Average number of usual weekly working hours, men	41.6	40.2	39.9	42.2			
20	Childcare provision for children aged 0-2 (%)	:	8.0	28	56	2008		
21	Childcare provision for children aged 3 to compulsory school age (%)	:	61.0	83	97	2008		
22	Children aged 0-16 at risk of poverty after social transfer (%)	23.0	32.8	20.1	10.7	2008		
23	Children aged 0-16 living in jobless households (%)	7.2	9.9	10.2	4.1			
24	Social protection benefits targeted at family support (% in kind)	43.9	38.5	32.1	58.9	2008		
3 AGEING AND THE LABOUR MARKET		2000	2009	EU-27 2009	3 BEST MS 2009			
25	Employment rate, women aged 55-64 (%)	43.8	34.1	37.8	61.4			
26	Employment rate, men aged 55-64 (%)	56.0	52.3	54.8	70.4			
27	Employment rate, women aged 55-59 (%)	51.1	40.7	51.4	75.5			
28	Employment rate, men aged 55-59 (%)	63.1	62.8	69.1	83.0			
29	Employment rate, women aged 60-64 (%)	44.1	25.4	22.8	47.0			
30	Employment rate, men aged 60-64 (%)	52.5	37.9	38.5	59.6			
31	Employment rate, women aged 65-69 (%)	41.6	23.0	7.4	20.6			
32	Employment rate, men aged 65-69 (%)	48.9	28.2	13.2	28.3			
33	Average exit age from the labour market, women (years)	:	63.2	60.8	64.0	2008		
34	Average exit age from the labour market, men (years)	:	65.5	62.0	64.7	2008		
35	Inactive for health reasons, population aged 50-64 (%)	21.4	24.0	21.0	48.4			
36	Internet use, population aged 55-64 (%)	:	11	44	75	2010		

		ROMANIA		EU-27	3 BEST MS	*
4	PRODUCTIVITY, EDUCATION AND R&D	2000	2009	2009	2009	
37	Early leavers from education and training, women aged 18-24 (%)	22.0	17.2	12.5	3.7	
38	Early leavers from education and training, men aged 18-24 (%)	23.8	16.1	16.3	5.9	
39	Educational att., women aged 30-34 with tertiary education level (%)	9.0	18.5	35.7	54.9	
40	Educational attainment, men aged 30-34 with tertiary education level (%)	8.9	15.2	28.9	44.4	
41	University graduates aged 20-29 (per 1,000 of the pop. of that age)	18.0	92.1	:	88.6	2008
42	Employment rate for the tertiary education level, age 20-64 (%)	83.9	84.1	83.0	87.7	
43	Employment rate for the upper secondary edu. level, age 20-64 (%)	69.8	63.3	70.5	79.7	
44	Employment rate for the less than upper sec. edu. level, age 20-64 (%)	68.1	53.7	54.4	66.5	
45	Total public expenditure on education (% of GDP)	2.9	4.3	4.96	7.15	2007
46	Life-long learning (pop. aged 25-64 in education and training) (%)	:	1.5	9.1	25.3	
47	Gross domestic expenditure on R&D (% of GDP)	0.4	0.5	2.01	3.52	
48	Population working in high-tech sectors (% of employed pop.)	1.7	1.8	3.7	6.1	
49	Internet use (%)	:	33.0	63	86	
50	Labour productivity per employed person (2000=100)	100.0	177.4	105.6	156.4	

Employment rates (%), 2009		Social Protection (% of GDP), 2008	

5 MIGRATION AND INTEGRATION		2000	2009	2009	2009
51	Non-nationals in the population (%)	:	0.1	6.4	21.4
52	Employment rate of nationals, women aged 25-54 (%)	:	66.9	72.9	84.0
53	Employment rate of nationals, men aged 25-54 (%)	:	80.5	85.4	92.2
54	Empl. rate of citizens from outside EU-27, women aged 25-54 (%)	:	:	52.7	74.9
55	Employment rate of citizens from outside EU-27, men aged 25-54 (%)	:	:	72.9	87.5
56	Education level (tertiary), nationals aged 25-49 (%)	:	15.1	28.4	41.2
57	Education level (less than upper secondary), nationals aged 25-49 (%)	:	19.6	22.3	6.4
58	Educ. level (tertiary), citizens from outside EU-27 aged 25-49 (%)	:	37.9	20.4	48.3
59	Educ. level (< up. sec.), citizens from outside EU-27 aged 25-49 (%)	:	5.1	43.8	12.5

6 SUSTAINABILITY OF PUBLIC FINANCES & SOCIAL PROTECTION		2000	2009	2035	2060	2009	2009
60	General government consolidated gross debt (% of GDP)	22.5	23.9	:	:	74	12.1
61	General government primary balance (% of GDP)	-0.7	-7.1	:	:	-4.2	-0.1
62	Total general government revenue (% of GDP)	33.9	32.4	:	:	44	54.1
63	Public expenditure on pensions (% of GDP)	6.9	8.5	11.6	15.8	13.5	7.0
64	Public expenditure on health care and sickness (% of GDP)	3.3	3.5	4.2	4.9	7.5	3.9
65	Public expenditure on family and children (% of GDP)	1.5	1.5	:	:	2.1	3.6
66	Public expenditure on social protection (% of GDP)	12.7	14.1	:	:	25.3	13.8
67	Expenditure on social protection (PPS / inhabitant)	630.3	1,693.3	:	:	6,337	1,688.9
68	Population at risk of poverty after social transfers (%)	17.0	22.4	:	:	16.3	10.2
69	Inequality of income distribution (S80/S20 income quintile share ratio)	4.5	6.7	:	:	4.9	3.4
70	Population aged 18-59 living in jobless households (%)	9.0	10.9	:	:	10.1	6.1

\*: 2009 or last year with data available (see the column placed to the right of the table)  
 3 BEST MS: Average of the three best Member States according to country ranking

### Demographic challenges and...

The total population of Romania is expected to decline significantly by almost 16% until 2050 as a result of low birth rates and a high level of net emigration. Fertility rates are expected to recover from the current low level while net emigration should come to a halt. As of 2009, 10% of families with children are jobless. Life expectancy, particularly for men, is currently low and significant progress is expected. Even so, the population is projected to decrease significantly by 2060. The old-age dependency ratio is expected to remain below the EU-27 average for a couple decades, then increase to well above the EU-27 average by 2060, when, as a result, public expenditure on pensions is projected to be above 15% of GDP.

### ... opportunities for tackling them

Low employment rates mean that there is a major potential for employment growth. Productivity is just above one-third the EU-27 average, so there is an enormous catching-up potential. Reducing the number of early school leavers and increasing investment in research and development would contribute to realising this productivity growth potential. At the beginning of 2009 the government improved paid parental leave for young children. Parents can now take leave for any child under the age of two at 85% of the average income. New legislation is also going to make it possible for private providers to create childcare places. Current public debt is well below the EU-27 average. Projections of future ageing-related public spending suggest a considerable increase over the coming decades, in particular in the area of pensions.

## 23. SLOVENIA

		SLOVENIA					EU-27	*
1	DEMOGRAPHIC TRENDS	1970	2000	2009	2030	2050	2009	
1	Population on 1 January (thousands)	1,718	1,988	2,047	2,023	1,878	501,103	2010
2	Total Fertility Rate (children per woman)	:	1.26	1.53	1.40	1.48	1.60	
3	Life expectancy at birth for women (years)	:	79.9	82.7	85.1	87.6	82.4	
4	Life expectancy at birth for men (years)	:	72.2	75.9	78.9	82.2	76.4	
5	Life expectancy at age 65 for women (years)	:	18.7	20.5	:	:	20.54	
6	Life expectancy at age 65 for men (years)	:	14.2	16.4	:	:	16.99	
7	Natural growth (births minus deaths) (thousands)	10.1	-0.4	3.1	-9.1	-12.3	523.1	
8	Net migration (including corrections) (thousands)	3.7	2.7	11.5	3.4	3.0	877.1	
9	Mean age of women at childbirth (years)	:	28.2	30.0	:	:	29.7	
10	Old age dependency ratio (65 or over / 15-64 years old) (%)	14.8	19.8	23.0	40.8	59.4	25.6	
<p><b>Population distribution by age</b></p> <p>2009, 2030, 2050: EU-27, SLOVENIA</p> <p>Legend: Pop. under 25, Pop. aged 25-64, Pop. aged 65-79, Pop. aged 80+</p> <p><b>Population growth, 1995-2050</b></p> <p>Legend: Natural growth, Net migration, Total population growth</p>								
2	GENDER EQUALITY AND FAMILY SITUATIONS	2000	2009	EU-27	3 BEST MS			
11	Employment rate, women aged 20-64 (%)	64.1	67.9	62.5	74.4	2008		
12	Employment rate, men aged 20-64 (%)	72.9	75.6	75.8	83.1			
13	Employment rate, women aged 25-54 with at least 1 child (%)	:	86.0	68.2	81.1			
14	Employment rate, men aged 25-54 with at least 1 child (%)	:	91.6	88.5	94.0			
15	Gender pay gap (unadjusted) (%)	12	8.5	17.5	7			
16	Employed women working part time (%)	7.8	12.8	31.4	4.9			
17	Employed men working part time (%)	5.3	8.1	8.1	2.4			
18	Average number of usual weekly working hours, women	40.6	37.5	33.0	38.9			
19	Average number of usual weekly working hours, men	42.5	39.9	39.9	42.2			
20	Childcare provision for children aged 0-2 (%)	:	31.0	28	56	2008		
21	Childcare provision for children aged 3 to compulsory school age (%)	:	85.0	83	97	2008		
22	Children aged 0-16 at risk of poverty after social transfer (%)	9.0	11.2	20.1	10.7	2008		
23	Children aged 0-16 living in jobless households (%)	4.0	3.9	10.2	4.1			
24	Social protection benefits targeted at family support (% in kind)	29.6	28.1	32.1	58.9	2008		
<p><b>Employment rate, population aged 20-64 yrs, 1995-2009 (%)</b></p> <p>Legend: SI women, SI men, EU women, EU men, 3-highest-women, 3-highest-men</p> <p><b>Education, 2009</b></p> <p>Legend: EARLY LEAVERS from EDU and TRA., EDUCATION ATTAINMENT LEVEL, (pop. aged 30-34 with tertiary level)</p>								
3	AGEING AND THE LABOUR MARKET	2000	2009	EU-27	3 BEST MS			
25	Employment rate, women aged 55-64 (%)	13.8	24.8	37.8	61.4	2008		
26	Employment rate, men aged 55-64 (%)	32.3	46.4	54.8	70.4			
27	Employment rate, women aged 55-59 (%)	17.5	35.0	51.4	75.5			
28	Employment rate, men aged 55-59 (%)	40.3	59.2	69.1	83.0			
29	Employment rate, women aged 60-64 (%)	11.2	11.6	22.8	47.0			
30	Employment rate, men aged 60-64 (%)	19.8	26.4	38.5	59.6			
31	Employment rate, women aged 65-69 (%)	7.2	8.1	7.4	20.6			
32	Employment rate, men aged 65-69 (%)	13.8	13.2	13.2	28.3			
33	Average exit age from the labour market, women (years)	:	:	60.8	64.0	2008		
34	Average exit age from the labour market, men (years)	:	:	62.0	64.7	2008		
35	Inactive for health reasons, population aged 50-64 (%)	5.9	20.6	21.0	48.4			
36	Internet use, population aged 55-64 (%)	:	32	44	75	2010		



		SLOVENIA		EU-27	3 BEST MS	*	
		2000	2009	2009	2009		
4	<b>PRODUCTIVITY, EDUCATION AND R&amp;D</b>						
37	Early leavers from education and training, women aged 18-24 (%)	:	3.2	12.5	3.7	2008	
38	Early leavers from education and training, men aged 18-24 (%)	:	7.2	16.3	5.9		
39	Educational att., women aged 30-34 with tertiary education level (%)	13.8	39.3	35.7	54.9		
40	Educational attainment, men aged 30-34 with tertiary education level (%)	24.0	24.6	28.9	44.4		
41	University graduates aged 20-29 (per 1,000 of the pop. of that age)	39.0	60.7	:	88.6		
42	Employment rate for the tertiary education level, age 20-64 (%)	85.8	88.1	83.0	87.7		
43	Employment rate for the upper secondary edu. level, age 20-64 (%)	70.6	71.2	70.5	79.7		
44	Employment rate for the less than upper sec. edu. level, age 20-64 (%)	52.7	53.2	54.4	66.5		
45	Total public expenditure on education (% of GDP)	:	5.2	4.96	7.15		2007
46	Life-long learning (pop. aged 25-64 in education and training) (%)	:	14.6	9.1	25.3		
47	Gross domestic expenditure on R&D (% of GDP)	1.4	1.9	2.01	3.52		
48	Population working in high-tech sectors (% of employed pop.)	3.5	4.8	3.7	6.1		
49	Internet use (%)	:	60.0	63	86		
50	Labour productivity per employed person (2000=100)	100.0	120.5	105.6	156.4		
5	<b>MIGRATION AND INTEGRATION</b>	2000	2009	2009	2009		
51	Non-nationals in the population (%)	2.1	3.5	6.4	21.4		
52	Employment rate of nationals, women aged 25-54 (%)	:	84.0	72.9	84.0		
53	Employment rate of nationals, men aged 25-54 (%)	:	86.5	85.4	92.2		
54	Empl. rate of citizens from outside EU-27, women aged 25-54 (%)	:	25.3	52.7	74.9		
55	Employment rate of citizens from outside EU-27, men aged 25-54 (%)	:	82.9	72.9	87.5		
56	Education level (tertiary), nationals aged 25-49 (%)	:	27.0	28.4	41.2		
57	Education level (less than upper secondary), nationals aged 25-49 (%)	:	11.7	22.3	6.4		
58	Educ. level (tertiary), citizens from outside EU-27 aged 25-49 (%)	:	10.2	20.4	48.3		
59	Educ. level (< up. sec.), citizens from outside EU-27 aged 25-49 (%)	:	41.5	43.8	12.5		
6	<b>SUSTAINABILITY OF PUBLIC FINANCES &amp; SOCIAL PROTECTION</b>	2000	2009	2035	2060	2009	2009
60	General government consolidated gross debt (% of GDP)	:	35.4	:	:	74	12.1
61	General government primary balance (% of GDP)	-1.3	-4.4	:	:	-4.2	-0.1
62	Total general government revenue (% of GDP)	43.0	43.2	:	:	44	54.1
63	Public expenditure on pensions (% of GDP)	12.8	11.3	14.7	18.6	13.5	7.0
64	Public expenditure on health care and sickness (% of GDP)	7.2	7.1	8.0	8.5	7.5	3.9
65	Public expenditure on family and children (% of GDP)	2.2	1.8	:	:	2.1	3.6
66	Public expenditure on social protection (% of GDP)	23.6	21.0	:	:	25.3	13.8
67	Expenditure on social protection (PPS / inhabitant)	3,590.0	4,806.0	:	:	6,337	1,688.9
68	Population at risk of poverty after social transfers (%)	11.0	11.3	:	:	16.3	10.2
69	Inequality of income distribution (S80/S20 income quintile share ratio)	3.2	3.2	:	:	4.9	3.4
70	Population aged 18-59 living in jobless households (%)	8.7	7.5	:	:	10.1	6.1

\*: 2009 or last year with data available (see the column placed to the right of the table)

3 BEST MS: Average of the three best Member States according to country ranking

#### Demographic challenges and...

Slovenia's fertility rate has reverted to almost the EU-27 average and is already higher than the projected 2060 value. Life expectancy is near the EU-27 average. The old-age dependency ratio is expected to increase faster than for EU-27 as a whole and to exceed the EU-27 level by 2050. Under the current projections, until 2050 the Slovenian population is projected to decrease by 8% and pension payments will be almost 20% of its GDP.

#### ... opportunities for tackling them

Female employment rates are well above the EU-27 average and few women work part-time. The gender pay gap is smaller than for EU-27 as a whole.

There is significant scope for increased employment of older workers. There is also a high share of older people who have retired prematurely due to past restructuring; older workers participation rates, currently below 40%, could increase. With productivity standing roughly at 4/5 of the EU-15 level, there is still some potential for growth. The pension reform and measures to promote active ageing will contribute to higher employment rate of elderly and later exit from the working life. Public debt is comparatively low, but projections of future ageing-related public spending suggest a considerable increase in the decades to come.

## 24. SLOVAKIA

		SLOVAKIA					EU-27	*
1 DEMOGRAPHIC TRENDS		1970	2000	2009	2030	2050	2009	
1	Population on 1 January (thousands)	4,537	5,399	5,425	5,332	4,859	501,103	2010
2	Total Fertility Rate (children per woman)	2.41	1.30	1.41	1.34	1.43	1.60	
3	Life expectancy at birth for women (years)	73.0	77.5	79.1	82.7	85.9	82.4	
4	Life expectancy at birth for men (years)	66.8	69.2	71.4	76.0	80.2	76.4	
5	Life expectancy at age 65 for women (years)	14.6	16.7	18.0	:	:	20.54	
6	Life expectancy at age 65 for men (years)	12.3	12.9	14.1	:	:	16.99	
7	Natural growth (births minus deaths) (thousands)	38.4	2.4	8.3	-21.9	-34.3	523.1	
8	Net migration (including corrections) (thousands)	-35.1	-22.3	4.4	3.9	6.1	877.1	
9	Mean age of women at childbirth (years)	26.2	26.6	28.5	:	:	29.7	
10	Old age dependency ratio (65 or over / 15-64 years old) (%)	14.4	16.6	16.7	32.3	55.5	25.6	
2 GENDER EQUALITY AND FAMILY SITUATIONS		2000	2009	EU-27	3 BEST MS			
11	Employment rate, women aged 20-64 (%)	56.9	58.2	62.5	62.5	74.4		
12	Employment rate, men aged 20-64 (%)	69.3	74.6	75.8	81.1	83.1		
13	Employment rate, women aged 25-54 with at least 1 child (%)	:	67.8	68.2	81.1	81.1		
14	Employment rate, men aged 25-54 with at least 1 child (%)	:	88.7	88.5	94.0	94.0		
15	Gender pay gap (unadjusted) (%)	22	20.9	17.5	7	7	2008	
16	Employed women working part time (%)	3.1	4.7	31.4	4.9	4.9		
17	Employed men working part time (%)	1.1	2.7	8.1	2.4	2.4		
18	Average number of usual weekly working hours, women	41.5	38.0	33.0	38.9	38.9		
19	Average number of usual weekly working hours, men	43.5	40.2	39.9	42.2	42.2		
20	Childcare provision for children aged 0-2 (%)	:	2.0	28	56	56	2008	
21	Childcare provision for children aged 3 to compulsory school age (%)	:	60.0	83	97	97	2008	
22	Children aged 0-16 at risk of poverty after social transfer (%)	:	17.0	20.1	10.7	10.7	2008	
23	Children aged 0-16 living in jobless households (%)	12.5	8.4	10.2	4.1	4.1		
24	Social protection benefits targeted at family support (% in kind)	7.8	9.2	32.1	58.9	58.9	2008	
3 AGEING AND THE LABOUR MARKET		SLOVAKIA		EU-27	3 BEST MS			
25	Employment rate, women aged 55-64 (%)	9.8	26.1	37.8	61.4	61.4		
26	Employment rate, men aged 55-64 (%)	35.4	54.9	54.8	70.4	70.4		
27	Employment rate, women aged 55-59 (%)	16.8	41.5	51.4	75.5	75.5		
28	Employment rate, men aged 55-59 (%)	55.3	72.7	69.1	83.0	83.0		
29	Employment rate, women aged 60-64 (%)	2.7	6.0	22.8	47.0	47.0		
30	Employment rate, men aged 60-64 (%)	10.4	29.2	38.5	59.6	59.6		
31	Employment rate, women aged 65-69 (%)	:	2.2	7.4	20.6	20.6		
32	Employment rate, men aged 65-69 (%)	3.2	4.8	13.2	28.3	28.3		
33	Average exit age from the labour market, women (years)	:	57.8	60.8	64.0	64.0	2008	
34	Average exit age from the labour market, men (years)	:	59.7	62.0	64.7	64.7	2008	
35	Inactive for health reasons, population aged 50-64 (%)	2.9	25.5	21.0	48.4	48.4		
36	Internet use, population aged 55-64 (%)	:	43	44	75	75	2010	

		SLOVAKIA		EU-27	3 BEST MS	*	
		2000	2009	2009	2009		
4	<b>PRODUCTIVITY, EDUCATION AND R&amp;D</b>						
37	Early leavers from education and training, women aged 18-24 (%)	:	4.1	12.5	3.7		
38	Early leavers from education and training, men aged 18-24 (%)	:	5.7	16.3	5.9		
39	Educational att., women aged 30-34 with tertiary education level (%)	11.2	19.8	35.7	54.9		
40	Educational attainment, men aged 30-34 with tertiary education level (%)	10.1	15.5	28.9	44.4		
41	University graduates aged 20-29 (per 1,000 of the pop. of that age)	25.4	72.2	:	88.6	2008	
42	Employment rate for the tertiary education level, age 20-64 (%)	85.0	80.3	83.0	87.7		
43	Employment rate for the upper secondary edu. level, age 20-64 (%)	66.9	67.9	70.5	79.7		
44	Employment rate for the less than upper sec. edu. level, age 20-64 (%)	29.5	29.0	54.4	66.5		
45	Total public expenditure on education (% of GDP)	3.9	3.6	4.96	7.15	2007	
46	Life-long learning (pop. aged 25-64 in education and training) (%)	:	2.8	9.1	25.3		
47	Gross domestic expenditure on R&D (% of GDP)	0.7	0.5	2.01	3.52		
48	Population working in high-tech sectors (% of employed pop.)	4.5	3.5	3.7	6.1		
49	Internet use (%)	:	72.0	63	86		
50	Labour productivity per employed person (2000=100)	100.0	142.3	105.6	156.4		
5	<b>MIGRATION AND INTEGRATION</b>	2000	2009	2009	2009		
51	Non-nationals in the population (%)	:	1.0	6.4	21.4		
52	Employment rate of nationals, women aged 25-54 (%)	:	71.3	72.9	84.0		
53	Employment rate of nationals, men aged 25-54 (%)	:	84.2	85.4	92.2		
54	Empl. rate of citizens from outside EU-27, women aged 25-54 (%)	:	:	52.7	74.9		
55	Employment rate of citizens from outside EU-27, men aged 25-54 (%)	:	:	72.9	87.5		
56	Education level (tertiary), nationals aged 25-49 (%)	:	17.2	28.4	41.2		
57	Education level (less than upper secondary), nationals aged 25-49 (%)	:	5.8	22.3	6.4		
58	Educ. level (tertiary), citizens from outside EU-27 aged 25-49 (%)	:	25.2	20.4	48.3		
59	Educ. level (< up. sec.), citizens from outside EU-27 aged 25-49 (%)	:	0.0	43.8	12.5		
6	<b>SUSTAINABILITY OF PUBLIC FINANCES &amp; SOCIAL PROTECTION</b>	2000	2009	2035	2060	2009	2009
60	General government consolidated gross debt (% of GDP)	50.3	35.4	:	:	74	12.1
61	General government primary balance (% of GDP)	-8.2	-6.5	:	:	-4.2	-0.1
62	Total general government revenue (% of GDP)	28.2	33.6	:	:	44	54.1
63	Public expenditure on pensions (% of GDP)	8.4	8.0	7.8	10.2	13.5	7.0
64	Public expenditure on health care and sickness (% of GDP)	6.5	5.0	6.4	7.2	7.5	3.9
65	Public expenditure on family and children (% of GDP)	1.7	1.5	:	:	2.1	3.6
66	Public expenditure on social protection (% of GDP)	18.8	15.5	:	:	25.3	13.8
67	Expenditure on social protection (PPS / inhabitant)	1,797.3	2,807.7	:	:	6,337	1,688.9
68	Population at risk of poverty after social transfers (%)	:	11.0	:	:	16.3	10.2
69	Inequality of income distribution (S80/S20 income quintile share ratio)	:	3.6	:	:	4.9	3.4
70	Population aged 18-59 living in jobless households (%)	10.4	8.2	:	:	10.1	6.1

\*: 2009 or last year with data available (see the column placed to the right of the table)  
 3 BEST MS: Average of the three best Member States according to country ranking

#### Demographic challenges and...

Slovakia's fertility rate during the period 2005–2009 has increased, especially since 2007, although it is still below the EU-27 average. This may be the effect of a transition to women having children later in life; a further recovery of fertility is assumed for the population projections. The low figures above on childcare capacity for children under age 3 are disputed. Life expectancy is below the EU-27 average, particularly for men, and it is not expected that the gap will be closed over the projection period. The old-age dependency ratio, currently far below the EU-27 average, is expected to grow fast and to become the highest in EU-27 by 2060. Until 2050 the Slovakian population is expected to shrink by 10%.

#### ... opportunities for tackling them

While the gender gap in employment rates is small (reflecting also low employment rates for men), the pay gap is particularly large and childcare is only available for a minority of children. There is significant scope for employment growth by raising the labour force participation of older workers and by assisting the long term unemployed to find work. Slovakia could also benefit from catching up in terms of productivity and can build on a high level of educational attainment. More expenditure for R&D and for lifelong learning could also help. Public debt is low and the expected ageing-related increase in public social protection expenditure is moderate.

## 25. FINLAND

		FINLAND					EU-27	*
1 DEMOGRAPHIC TRENDS		1970	2000	2009	2030	2050	2009	
1	Population on 1 January (thousands)	4,614	5,171	5,351	5,569	5,448	501,103	2010
2	Total Fertility Rate (children per woman)	1.82	1.73	1.86	1.84	1.84	1.60	
3	Life expectancy at birth for women (years)	:	81.2	83.5	85.9	88.2	82.4	
4	Life expectancy at birth for men (years)	:	74.2	76.6	79.9	83.0	76.4	
5	Life expectancy at age 65 for women (years)	:	19.5	21.5	:	:	20.54	
6	Life expectancy at age 65 for men (years)	:	15.5	17.3	:	:	16.99	
7	Natural growth (births minus deaths) (thousands)	20.4	7.4	10.5	-5.8	-10.6	523.1	
8	Net migration (including corrections) (thousands)	-36.4	2.4	14.6	5.8	4.9	877.1	
9	Mean age of women at childbirth (years)	27.1	29.6	30.1	:	:	29.7	
10	Old age dependency ratio (65 or over / 15-64 years old) (%)	13.6	22.2	25.2	43.9	46.6	25.6	
2 GENDER EQUALITY AND FAMILY SITUATIONS		2000	2009	EU-27	3 BEST MS			
11	Employment rate, women aged 20-64 (%)	69.0	72.4	62.5	74.4			
12	Employment rate, men aged 20-64 (%)	75.5	74.7	75.8	83.1			
13	Employment rate, women aged 25-54 with at least 1 child (%)	:	78.1	68.2	81.1			
14	Employment rate, men aged 25-54 with at least 1 child (%)	:	90.1	88.5	94.0			
15	Gender pay gap (unadjusted) (%)	17	20.0	17.5	7	2008		
16	Employed women working part time (%)	17.0	19.0	31.4	4.9			
17	Employed men working part time (%)	8.0	9.2	8.1	2.4			
18	Average number of usual weekly working hours, women	36.2	33.8	33.0	38.9			
19	Average number of usual weekly working hours, men	40.5	38.2	39.9	42.2			
20	Childcare provision for children aged 0-2 (%)	:	26.0	28	56	2008		
21	Childcare provision for children aged 3 to compulsory school age (%)	:	78.0	83	97	2008		
22	Children aged 0-16 at risk of poverty after social transfer (%)	6.0	11.9	20.1	10.7	2008		
23	Children aged 0-16 living in jobless households (%)	:	:	10.2	4.1			
24	Social protection benefits targeted at family support (% in kind)	41.6	48.7	32.1	58.9	2008		
3 AGEING AND THE LABOUR MARKET		FINLAND		EU-27	3 BEST MS			
		2000	2009	2009	2009			
25	Employment rate, women aged 55-64 (%)	40.4	56.3	37.8	61.4			
26	Employment rate, men aged 55-64 (%)	42.9	54.6	54.8	70.4			
27	Employment rate, women aged 55-59 (%)	60.3	73.6	51.4	75.5			
28	Employment rate, men aged 55-59 (%)	56.6	69.2	69.1	83.0			
29	Employment rate, women aged 60-64 (%)	20.3	39.2	22.8	47.0			
30	Employment rate, men aged 60-64 (%)	25.6	39.4	38.5	59.6			
31	Employment rate, women aged 65-69 (%)	2.5	6.7	7.4	20.6			
32	Employment rate, men aged 65-69 (%)	8.3	13.3	13.2	28.3			
33	Average exit age from the labour market, women (years)	:	61.3	60.8	64.0	2008		
34	Average exit age from the labour market, men (years)	:	62.0	62.0	64.7	2008		
35	Inactive for health reasons, population aged 50-64 (%)	44.2	26.9	21.0	48.4			
36	Internet use, population aged 55-64 (%)	:	62	44	75	2010		

		FINLAND		EU-27	3 BEST MS	*	
		2000	2009	2009	2009		
4	<b>PRODUCTIVITY, EDUCATION AND R&amp;D</b>						
37	Early leavers from education and training, women aged 18-24 (%)	6.5	9.0	12.5	3.7	2008	
38	Early leavers from education and training, men aged 18-24 (%)	11.5	10.7	16.3	5.9		
39	Educational att., women aged 30-34 with tertiary education level (%)	32.9	55.5	35.7	54.9		
40	Educational attainment, men aged 30-34 with tertiary education level (%)	47.9	36.6	28.9	44.4		
41	University graduates aged 20-29 (per 1,000 of the pop. of that age)	56.3	86.2	.	88.6		
42	Employment rate for the tertiary education level, age 20-64 (%)	84.0	84.4	83.0	87.7		
43	Employment rate for the upper secondary edu. level, age 20-64 (%)	73.1	72.4	70.5	79.7		
44	Employment rate for the less than upper sec. edu. level, age 20-64 (%)	59.1	55.8	54.4	66.5		
45	Total public expenditure on education (% of GDP)	5.9	5.9	4.96	7.15		2007
46	Life-long learning (pop. aged 25-64 in education and training) (%)	.	22.1	9.1	25.3		
47	Gross domestic expenditure on R&D (% of GDP)	3.4	3.9	2.01	3.52		
48	Population working in high-tech sectors (% of employed pop.)	6.5	5.7	3.7	6.1		
49	Internet use (%)	.	78.0	63	86		
50	Labour productivity per employed person (2000=100)	100.0	108.3	105.6	156.4		
5	<b>MIGRATION AND INTEGRATION</b>	2000	2009	2009	2009		
51	Non-nationals in the population (%)	1.7	2.7	6.4	21.4		
52	Employment rate of nationals, women aged 25-54 (%)	78.0	81.2	72.9	84.0		
53	Employment rate of nationals, men aged 25-54 (%)	84.9	84.5	85.4	92.2		
54	Empl. rate of citizens from outside EU-27, women aged 25-54 (%)	.	46.3	52.7	74.9		
55	Employment rate of citizens from outside EU-27, men aged 25-54 (%)	.	72.3	72.9	87.5		
56	Education level (tertiary), nationals aged 25-49 (%)	.	42.3	28.4	41.2		
57	Education level (less than upper secondary), nationals aged 25-49 (%)	.	10.5	22.3	6.4		
58	Educ. level (tertiary), citizens from outside EU-27 aged 25-49 (%)	.	26.0	20.4	48.3		
59	Educ. level (< up. sec.), citizens from outside EU-27 aged 25-49 (%)	.	30.2	43.8	12.5		
6	<b>SUSTAINABILITY OF PUBLIC FINANCES &amp; SOCIAL PROTECTION</b>	2000	2009	2035	2060	2009	2009
60	General government consolidated gross debt (% of GDP)	43.8	43.8	.	.	74	12.1
61	General government primary balance (% of GDP)	9.6	-1.3	.	.	-4.2	-0.1
62	Total general government revenue (% of GDP)	55.1	53.3	.	.	44	54.1
63	Public expenditure on pensions (% of GDP)	12.1	12.9	14.0	13.4	13.5	7.0
64	Public expenditure on health care and sickness (% of GDP)	5.8	6.8	6.4	6.5	7.5	3.9
65	Public expenditure on family and children (% of GDP)	3.0	3.0	.	.	2.1	3.6
66	Public expenditure on social protection (% of GDP)	24.3	25.5	.	.	25.3	13.8
67	Expenditure on social protection (PPS / inhabitant)	5,426.7	7,487.6	.	.	6,337	1,688.9
68	Population at risk of poverty after social transfers (%)	11.0	13.8	.	.	16.3	10.2
69	Inequality of income distribution (S80/S20 income quintile share ratio)	3.3	3.7	.	.	4.9	3.4
70	Population aged 18-59 living in jobless households (%)	.	.	.	.	10.1	6.1

\*: 2009 or last year with data available (see the column placed to the right of the table)

3 BEST MS: Average of the three best Member States according to country ranking

### Demographic challenges and...

The average life span has risen by 10 years in the last 30 years in Finland. Fertility rates and life expectancy in Finland are above the EU-27 average and this positive development is expected to continue. In the next few years, population ageing will be faster in Finland than in most other EU-27 Member States. In 2020, Finland will have the oldest population in EU-27, measured in terms of the old-age dependency ratio. The working-age population, 15-64-year-olds, has been already decreasing since 2010. From 2010 to 2050 the Finnish population is expected to grow by 2%.

### ... opportunities for tackling them

In the current decade, pension expenditure will grow quickly. Finland has funded a major part of the future pension expenditure and reformed social security and taxation. Finland is preparing itself for demographic change in particular through active ageing policies. The female employment rate is high and the gap between male and female rates is small. The employment rate of older workers is also comparatively high, but could be further improved by health promotion and tackling disability as a major cause for early labour market exit. Extending working careers and improving the productivity of public services, e.g. by reforming the structure of municipal health and social services, will play a key role. The Government has launched a policy programme for health promotion as well as a programme promoting employment, entrepreneurship and work life.

The Government has carried out a broad re-assessment of the impact of ageing on existing policies which was published in 2009.

## 26. SWEDEN

		SWEDEN					EU-27	*
1	DEMOGRAPHIC TRENDS	1970	2000	2009	2030	2050	2009	
1	Population on 1 January (thousands)	8,004	8,861	9,341	10,270	10,672	501,103	2010
2	Total Fertility Rate (children per woman)	1.92	1.54	1.94	1.85	1.85	1.60	
3	Life expectancy at birth for women (years)	77.3	82.0	83.5	86.0	88.3	82.4	
4	Life expectancy at birth for men (years)	72.3	77.4	79.4	81.9	84.3	76.4	
5	Life expectancy at age 65 for women (years)	17.1	20.2	21.2	:	:	20.54	
6	Life expectancy at age 65 for men (years)	14.3	16.8	18.3	:	:	16.99	
7	Natural growth (births minus deaths) (thousands)	30.1	-3.0	21.7	6.4	5.2	523.1	
8	Net migration (including corrections) (thousands)	46.7	24.4	62.6	20.2	16.7	877.1	
9	Mean age of women at childbirth (years)	27.0	29.9	30.7	:	:	29.7	
10	Old age dependency ratio (65 or over / 15-64 years old) (%)	20.7	26.9	27.1	37.4	41.9	25.6	
2	GENDER EQUALITY AND FAMILY SITUATIONS	2000	2009	EU-27 2009	3 BEST MS 2009			
11	Employment rate, women aged 20-64 (%)	74.4	75.7	62.5	74.4			
12	Employment rate, men aged 20-64 (%)	78.2	80.9	75.8	83.1			
13	Employment rate, women aged 25-54 with at least 1 child (%)	:	:	68.2	81.1			
14	Employment rate, men aged 25-54 with at least 1 child (%)	:	:	88.5	94.0			
15	Gender pay gap (unadjusted) (%)	18	17	17.5	7	2008		
16	Employed women working part time (%)	32.3	41.2	31.4	4.9			
17	Employed men working part time (%)	8.2	14.2	8.1	2.4			
18	Average number of usual weekly working hours, women	33.9	32.2	33.0	38.9			
19	Average number of usual weekly working hours, men	39.1	37.4	39.9	42.2			
20	Childcare provision for children aged 0-2 (%)	:	49.0	28	56	2008		
21	Childcare provision for children aged 3 to compulsory school age (%)	:	95.0	83	97	2008		
22	Children aged 0-16 at risk of poverty after social transfer (%)	:	12.7	20.1	10.7	2008		
23	Children aged 0-16 living in jobless households (%)	:	:	10.2	4.1			
24	Social protection benefits targeted at family support (% in kind)	43.5	50.0	32.1	58.9	2008		
3	AGEING AND THE LABOUR MARKET	2000	2009	EU-27 2009	3 BEST MS 2009			
25	Employment rate, women aged 55-64 (%)	62.1	66.7	37.8	61.4			
26	Employment rate, men aged 55-64 (%)	67.8	73.2	54.8	70.4			
27	Employment rate, women aged 55-59 (%)	76.5	78.0	51.4	75.5			
28	Employment rate, men aged 55-59 (%)	80.6	82.5	69.1	83.0			
29	Employment rate, women aged 60-64 (%)	43.2	56.3	22.8	47.0			
30	Employment rate, men aged 60-64 (%)	49.0	64.6	38.5	59.6			
31	Employment rate, women aged 65-69 (%)	11.2	12.8	7.4	20.6			
32	Employment rate, men aged 65-69 (%)	:	22.2	13.2	28.3			
33	Average exit age from the labour market, women (years)	:	3.6	60.8	64.0	2008		
34	Average exit age from the labour market, men (years)	6.9	5.0	62.0	64.7	2008		
35	Inactive for health reasons, population aged 50-64 (%)	:	85.0	21.0	48.4			
36	Internet use, population aged 55-64 (%)	100.0	111.3	44	75	2010		

		SWEDEN		EU-27	3 BEST MS	*
4 PRODUCTIVITY, EDUCATION AND R&D		2000	2009	2009	2009	
37	Early leavers from education and training, women aged 18-24 (%)	5.8	9.5	12.5	3.7	
38	Early leavers from education and training, men aged 18-24 (%)	8.7	11.9	16.3	5.9	
39	Educational att., women aged 30-34 with tertiary education level (%)	30.5	50.0	35.7	54.9	
40	Educational attainment, men aged 30-34 with tertiary education level (%)	33.2	38.0	28.9	44.4	
41	University graduates aged 20-29 (per 1,000 of the pop. of that age)	38.0	54.3	:	88.6	2008
42	Employment rate for the tertiary education level, age 20-64 (%)	82.7	87.0	83.0	87.7	
43	Employment rate for the upper secondary edu. level, age 20-64 (%)	78.2	79.2	70.5	79.7	
44	Employment rate for the less than upper sec. edu. level, age 20-64 (%)	65.4	63.3	54.4	66.5	
45	Total public expenditure on education (% of GDP)	7.2	6.7	4.96	7.15	2007
46	Life-long learning (pop. aged 25-64 in education and training) (%)	21.6	22.2	9.1	25.3	
47	Gross domestic expenditure on R&D (% of GDP)	:	3.75	2.01	3.52	
48	Population working in high-tech sectors (% of employed pop.)	7.9	6.5	3.7	6.1	
49	Internet use (%)	:	86	63	86	
50	Labour productivity per employed person (2000=100)	101.7	100.6	105.6	156.4	

Employment rates (%), 2009		Social Protection (% of GDP), 2008	

5 MIGRATION AND INTEGRATION		2000	2009	2009	2009
51	Non-nationals in the population (%)	5.5	5.9	6.4	21.4
52	Employment rate of nationals, women aged 25-54 (%)	82.6	83.8	72.9	84.0
53	Employment rate of nationals, men aged 25-54 (%)	85.8	88.1	85.4	92.2
54	Empl. rate of citizens from outside EU-27, women aged 25-54 (%)	:	44.0	52.7	74.9
55	Employment rate of citizens from outside EU-27, men aged 25-54 (%)	:	60.0	72.9	87.5
56	Education level (tertiary), nationals aged 25-49 (%)	:	35.7	28.4	41.2
57	Education level (less than upper secondary), nationals aged 25-49 (%)	:	12.7	22.3	6.4
58	Educ. level (tertiary), citizens from outside EU-27 aged 25-49 (%)	:	39.9	20.4	48.3
59	Educ. level (< up. sec.), citizens from outside EU-27 aged 25-49 (%)	:	32.1	43.8	12.5

6 SUSTAINABILITY OF PUBLIC FINANCES & SOCIAL PROTECTION		2000	2009	2035	2060	2009	2009
60	General government consolidated gross debt (% of GDP)	53.6	41.9	:	:	74	12.1
61	General government primary balance (% of GDP)	7.2	0.0	:	:	-4.2	-0.1
62	Total general government revenue (% of GDP)	58.7	53.7	:	:	44	54.1
63	Public expenditure on pensions (% of GDP)	15.4	16.4	9.4	9.4	13.5	7.0
64	Public expenditure on health care and sickness (% of GDP)	7.9	7.5	7.8	8.0	7.5	3.9
65	Public expenditure on family and children (% of GDP)	2.6	3.0	:	:	2.1	3.6
66	Public expenditure on social protection (% of GDP)	29.4	28.8	:	:	25.3	13.8
67	Expenditure on social protection (PPS / inhabitant)	7,138.9	8,850.7	:	:	6,337	1,688.9
68	Topulation at risk of poverty after social transfers (%)	:	13.3	:	:	16.3	10.2
69	Inequality of income distribution (S80/S20 income quintile share ratio)	:	3.7	:	:	4.9	3.4
70	Population aged 18-59 living in jobless households (%)	:	:	:	:	10.1	6.1

\*: 2009 or last year with data available (see the column placed to the right of the table)  
 3 BEST MS: Average of the three best Member States according to country ranking

Demographic challenges and...
<p>Sweden's fertility rate is above the EU average and this is expected to continue. Life expectancy is well above the EU average. This situation is assumed to prevail over the projection period. Combined with significant immigration, these trends will result in further population growth by near 8% in 2050. The increase in the old-age dependency ratio will be modest to a level below the EU average. In the crisis, many migrants in Sweden found themselves unemployed.</p>
... Opportunities for tackling them
<p>Sweden has the highest employment rate in the EU and the employment gap between men and women is small. However, the gender pay gap is larger than the EU average and a large proportion of women work part-time. Employment rates of older workers are very high too; improvements would require further efforts to prevent increases in disability pensions. While productivity exceeds the EU-15 average, the high levels of educational attainment and investment in research and development could allow further growth. Access of minorities and third-country nationals to the labour market and education system might be improved. The public debt is below the EU average; the expected ageing-related increase in public social protection expenditure is moderate.</p>

## 27. THE UNITED KINGDOM

		UNITED KINGDOM					EU-27	*
1	<b>DEMOGRAPHIC TRENDS</b>	1970	2000	2009	2030	2050	2009	
1	Population on 1 January (thousands)	55,546	58,785	62,008	69,224	74,506	501,103	2010
2	Total Fertility Rate (children per woman)	:	1.64	1.96	1.84	1.84	1.60	2008
3	Life expectancy at birth for women (years)	:	80.3	81.9	85.0	87.7	82.4	2008
4	Life expectancy at birth for men (years)	:	75.5	77.8	80.9	83.8	76.4	2008
5	Life expectancy at age 65 for women (years)	:	19.0	20.3	:	:	20.54	2008
6	Life expectancy at age 65 for men (years)	:	15.8	17.7	:	:	16.99	2008
7	Natural growth (births minus deaths) (thousands)	248.5	70.7	230.6	157.6	109.6	523.1	
8	Net migration (including corrections) (thousands)	-14.8	143.9	182.4	150.9	126.3	877.1	
9	Mean age of women at childbirth (years)	:	28.5	29.3	:	:	29.7	2008
10	Old age dependency ratio (65 or over / 15-64 years old) (%)	20.5	24.3	24.5	33.2	38.0	25.6	
2	<b>GENDER EQUALITY AND FAMILY SITUATIONS</b>	2000	2009	2009	2009	2009	3 BEST MS	
11	Employment rate, women aged 20-64 (%)	66.6	68.2	62.5	74.4			
12	Employment rate, men aged 20-64 (%)	81.3	79.6	75.8	83.1			
13	Employment rate, women aged 25-54 with at least 1 child (%)	:	69.1	68.2	81.1			
14	Employment rate, men aged 25-54 with at least 1 child (%)	:	89.2	88.5	94.0			
15	Gender pay gap (unadjusted) (%)	24	21	17.5	7			2008
16	Employed women working part time (%)	44.3	42.4	31.4	4.9			
17	Employed men working part time (%)	8.9	11.6	8.1	2.4			
18	Average number of usual weekly working hours, women	30.9	30.3	33.0	38.9			
19	Average number of usual weekly working hours, men	43.3	39.6	39.9	42.2			
20	Childcare provision for children aged 0-2 (%)	:	35	28	56			2008
21	Childcare provision for children aged 3 to compulsory school age (%)	:	87	83	97			2008
22	Children aged 0-16 at risk of poverty after social transfer (%)	27.0	24.4	20.1	10.7			2008
23	Children aged 0-16 living in jobless households (%)	:	17.5	10.2	4.1			
24	Social protection benefits targeted at family support (% in kind)	16.5	31.2	32.1	58.9			2008
3	<b>AGEING AND THE LABOUR MARKET</b>	2000	2009	2009	2009	2009	3 BEST MS	
25	Employment rate, women aged 55-64 (%)	41.7	49.2	37.8	61.4			
26	Employment rate, men aged 55-64 (%)	60.1	66.2	54.8	70.4			
27	Employment rate, women aged 55-59 (%)	55.9	64.9	51.4	75.5			
28	Employment rate, men aged 55-59 (%)	70.8	76.4	69.1	83.0			
29	Employment rate, women aged 60-64 (%)	25.4	34.1	22.8	47.0			
30	Employment rate, men aged 60-64 (%)	47.3	56.2	38.5	59.6			
31	Employment rate, women aged 65-69 (%)	8.4	14.6	7.4	20.6			
32	Employment rate, men aged 65-69 (%)	14.3	21.8	13.2	28.3			
33	Average exit age from the labour market, women (years)	:	62.0	60.8	64.0			2008
34	Average exit age from the labour market, men (years)	:	64.1	62.0	64.7			2008
35	Inactive for health reasons, population aged 50-64 (%)	39.0	33.7	21.0	48.4			
36	Internet use, population aged 55-64 (%)	:	67	44	75			2010



		UNITED KINGDOM		EU-27	3 BEST MS	*
4	PRODUCTIVITY, EDUCATION AND R&D	2000	2009	2009	2009	
37	Early leavers from education and training, women aged 18-24 (%)	17.5	14.5	12.5	3.7	
38	Early leavers from education and training, men aged 18-24 (%)	18.8	16.9	16.3	5.9	
39	Educational att., women aged 30-34 with tertiary education level (%)	30.7	42.3	35.7	54.9	
40	Educational attainment, men ged 30-34 with tertiary education level (%)	27.4	40.7	28.9	44.4	
41	University graduates aged 20-29 (per 1,000 of the pop. of that age)	66.4	82.4	:	88.6	2008
42	Employment rate for the tertiary education level, age 20-64 (%)	87.4	84.3	83.0	87.7	
43	Employment rate for the upper secondary edu. level, age 20-64 (%)	80.3	75.6	70.5	79.7	
44	Employment rate for the less than upper sec. edu. level, age 20-64 (%)	64.5	57.3	54.4	66.5	
45	Total public expenditure on education (% of GDP)	4.5	5.4	4.96	7.15	2007
46	Life-long learning (pop. aged 25-64 in education and training) (%)	:	20.1	9.1	25.3	
47	Gross domestic expenditure on R&D (% of GDP)	1.8	1.9	2.01	3.52	
48	Population working in high-tech sectors (% of employed pop.)	6.0	4.1	3.7	6.1	
49	Internet use (%)	:	77.0	63	86	
50	Labour productivity per employed person (2000=100)	100.0	107.7	105.6	156.4	

5	MIGRATION AND INTEGRATION	2000	2009	2009	2009
51	Non-nationals in the population (%)	:	6.8	6.4	21.4
52	Employment rate of nationals, women aged 25-54 (%)	74.1	75.9	72.9	84.0
53	Employment rate of nationals, men aged 25-54 (%)	88.1	86.0	85.4	92.2
54	Empl. rate of citizens from outside EU-27, women aged 25-54 (%)	:	56.5	52.7	74.9
55	Employment rate of citizens from outside EU-27, men aged 25-54 (%)	:	79.1	72.9	87.5
56	Education level (tertiary), nationals aged 25-49 (%)	:	35.7	28.4	41.2
57	Education level (less than upper secondary), nationals aged 25-49 (%)	:	24.7	22.3	6.4
58	Educ. level (tertiary), citizens from outside EU-27 aged 25-49 (%)	:	40.2	20.4	48.3
59	Educ. level (< up. sec.), citizens from outside EU-27 aged 25-49 (%)	:	19.5	43.8	12.5

6	SUSTAINABILITY OF PUBLIC FINANCES & SOCIAL PROTECTION	2000	2009	2035	2060	2009	2009
60	General government consolidated gross debt (% of GDP)	41.0	68.2	:	:	74	12.1
61	General government primary balance (% of GDP)	6.3	-9.3	:	:	-4.2	-0.1
62	Total general government revenue (% of GDP)	40.4	40.4	:	:	44	54.1
63	Public expenditure on pensions (% of GDP)	14.8	11.5	7.9	9.3	13.5	7.0
64	Public expenditure on health care and sickness (% of GDP)	6.5	7.6	8.7	9.4	7.5	3.9
65	Public expenditure on family and children (% of GDP)	1.8	1.7	:	:	2.1	3.6
66	Public expenditure on social protection (% of GDP)	25.5	22.7	:	:	25.3	13.8
67	Expenditure on social protection (PPS / inhabitant)	5,777.4	6,609.2	:	:	6,337	1,688.9
68	Topulation at risk of poverty after social transfers (%)	19.0	17.3	:	:	16.3	10.2
69	Inequality of income distribution (S80/S20 income quintile share ratio)	5.2	5.2	:	:	4.9	3.4
70	Population aged 18-59 living in jobless households (%)	11.3	11.5	:	:	10.1	6.1

\*: 2009 or last year with data available (see the column placed to the right of the table)  
3 BEST MS: Average of the three best Member States according to country ranking

#### Demographic challenges and...

The UK's fertility rate is above the EU average and it is assumed that this will persist. Life expectancy is close to the EU average, and a more favourable evolution for men is expected in the population projections. These trends, combined with a significant level of immigration, will lead to a growing population and a much more favourable evolution of the old-age dependency ratio than for the EU as a whole. The UK population is projected to grow by 20% by 2050. Many children younger than 17 (17%), especially those with single parents, live in jobless households. The debt to GDP ratio is now above 80%, constraining policies.

#### ... opportunities for tackling them

The gap between male and female employment rates is smaller than for the EU as a whole, but, at 11 percentage points, there is scope for further progress. The gender pay gap is particularly large and many women only work part-time. An improvement in the situation may require better availability of childcare. Improved female employment might also reduce the risk of poverty for households with children. Employment rates of older workers are high, even for people in their 60s. Government initiatives are focused on increasing labour market participation by reforming the incapacity benefit policy and expanding the initiatives to guide people back to work (the Pathways model) - around half the potential customers are over 50. There is also a focus on skills enhancement - particularly in pre- and in-work support. Public debt is comparatively low; the expected ageing-related increase in public social protection expenditure is slightly above the increase for the EU as a whole.

## C. COUNTRY INDICATOR SOURCES

	Title of the indicator	Eurostat online data code(s) / online link
1	DEMOGRAPHIC TRENDS	
1	Population on 1 January (thousands)	<a href="#">demo_pjan</a>
2	Total Fertility Rate (children per woman)	<a href="#">demo_find</a>
3	Life expectancy at birth for women (years)	<a href="#">demo_mlexpec</a>
4	Life expectancy at birth for men (years)	<a href="#">demo_mlexpec</a>
5	Life expectancy at age 65 for women (years)	<a href="#">demo_mlexpec</a>
6	Life expectancy at age 65 for men (years)	<a href="#">demo_mlexpec</a>
7	Natural growth (births minus deaths) (thousands)	<a href="#">demo_gind</a>
8	Net migration (including corrections) (thousands)	<a href="#">demo_gind</a>
9	Mean age of women at childbirth (years)	<a href="#">demo_find</a>
10	Old age dependency ratio (65 or over / 15-64 years old) (%)	<a href="#">tsdde511</a>
1-10	Population projections 2030 and 2050	<a href="#">Proj_08c1250p</a> <a href="#">Proj_08c1250a</a>
2	GENDER EQUALITY AND FAMILY SITUATIONS	
11	Employment rate, women aged 20-64 (%)	<a href="#">lfsa_ergan</a>
12	Employment rate, men aged 20-64 (%)	<a href="#">lfsa_ergan</a>
13	Employment rate, women aged 25-54 with at least 1 child (%)	<a href="#">lfst_hheredch</a>
14	Employment rate, men aged 25-54 with at least 1 child (%)	<a href="#">lfst_hheredch</a>
15	Gender pay gap (unadjusted) (%)	<a href="#">tsiem040</a>
16	Employed women working part time (%)	<a href="#">lfsa_epgaed</a>
17	Employed men working part time (%)	<a href="#">lfsa_epgaed</a>
18	Average number of usual weekly working hours, women	<a href="#">lfsa_ewhais</a>
19	Average number of usual weekly working hours, men	<a href="#">lfsa_ewhais</a>
20	Childcare provision for children aged 0-2 (%)	<a href="#">ilc_caindformal</a>
21	Childcare provision for children aged 3 to compulsory school age (%)	<a href="#">ilc_caindformal</a>
22	Children aged 0-16 at risk of poverty after social transfer (%)	<a href="#">ilc_li02</a>
23	Children aged 0-16 living in jobless households (%)	<a href="#">lfsi_jhh_a</a>

24	Social protection benefits targeted at family support, (% in kind)	<a href="#">spr_exp_ffa</a>
3	AGEING AND THE LABOUR MARKET	
25	Employment rate, women aged 55-64 (%)	<a href="#">lfsa_ergan</a>
26	Employment rate, men aged 55-64 (%)	<a href="#">lfsa_ergan</a>
27	Employment rate, women aged 55-59 (%)	<a href="#">lfsa_ergan</a>
28	Employment rate, men aged 55-59 (%)	<a href="#">lfsa_ergan</a>
29	Employment rate, women aged 60-64 (%)	<a href="#">lfsa_ergan</a>
30	Employment rate, men aged 60-64 (%)	<a href="#">lfsa_ergan</a>
31	Employment rate, women aged 65-69 (%)	<a href="#">lfsa_ergan</a>
32	Employment rate, men aged 65-69 (%)	<a href="#">lfsa_ergan</a>
33	Average exit age from the labour market, women (years)	<a href="#">tsiem030</a>
34	Average exit age from the labour market, men (years)	<a href="#">tsiem030</a>
35	Inactive for health reasons, population aged 50-64 (%)	<a href="#">lfsa_igar</a>
36	Internet use, population aged 55-64 (%)	<a href="#">isoc_ci_ac_i</a>
4	PRODUCTIVITY, EDUCATION AND R&D	
37	Early leavers from education and training, women aged 18-24 (%)	<a href="#">edat_lfse_14</a>
38	Early leavers from education and training, men aged 18-24 (%)	<a href="#">edat_lfse_14</a>
39	Educational att., women aged 30-34 with tertiary education level (%)	<a href="#">edat_lfse_07</a>
40	Educational attainment, men aged 30-34 with tertiary education level (%)	<a href="#">edat_lfse_07</a>
41	University graduates aged 20-29 (per 1,000 of the population of that age)	<a href="#">educ_itertc</a>
42	Employment rate for the tertiary education level, age 20-64 (%)	<a href="#">lfsa_ergaed</a>
43	Employment rate for the upper secondary education level, age 20-64 (%)	<a href="#">lfsa_ergaed</a>
44	Employment rate for the less than upper sec. edu. level, age 20-64 (%)	<a href="#">lfsa_ergaed</a>
45	Total public expenditure on education (% of GDP)	<a href="#">educ_figdp</a>
46	Life-long learning (pop. aged 25-64 in education and training) (%)	<a href="#">trng_lfs_01</a>
47	Gross domestic expenditure on R&D (% of GDP)	<a href="#">rd_e_gerdtot</a>
48	Population working in high-tech sectors (% of employed pop.)	<a href="#">htec_emp_nat2</a>

49	Internet use (%)	<a href="#">isoc_ci_ac_i</a>
50	Labour productivity per employed person (2000=100)	<a href="#">nama_aux_lp</a>
5	MIGRATION AND INTEGRATION	
51	Non-nationals in the population (%)	<a href="#">migr_pop1ctz</a>
52	Employment rate of nationals, women aged 25-54 (%)	<a href="#">lfsa_ergan</a>
53	Employment rate of nationals, men aged 25-54 (%)	<a href="#">lfsa_ergan</a>
54	Employment rate of citizens from outside EU-27, women aged 25-54 (%)	<a href="#">lfsa_ergan</a>
55	Employment rate of citizens from outside EU-27, men aged 25-54 (%)	<a href="#">lfsa_ergan</a>
56	Education level (tertiary), nationals aged 25-49 (%)	
57	Education level (less than upper secondary), nationals aged 25-49 (%)	
58	Educ. level (tertiary), citizens from outside EU-27 aged 25-49 (%)	
59	Educ. level (< up. sec.), citizens from outside EU-27 aged 25-49 (%)	
6	SUSTAINABILITY OF PUBLIC FINANCES & SOCIAL PROTECTION	
60	General government consolidated gross debt (% of GDP)	<a href="#">gov_dd_edptl</a>
61	General government primary balance (% of GDP)	<a href="#">gov_dd_edptl</a>
62	Total general government revenue (% of GDP)	<a href="#">gov_a_main</a> (TR)
63	Public expenditure on pensions (% of GDP)	<a href="#">spr_exp_gdp</a>
64	Public expenditure on health care and sickness (% of GDP)	<a href="#">spr_exp_gdp</a>
63-4	Expenditure projections	<a href="#">ageing report</a>
65	Public expenditure on family and children (% of GDP)	<a href="#">spr_exp_gdp</a>
66	Public expenditure on social protection (% of GDP)	<a href="#">spr_exp_gdp</a>
67	Expenditure on social protection (PPS / inhabitant).	<a href="#">spr_exp_ppsh</a>
68	Population at risk of poverty after social transfers (%)	<a href="#">ilc_li02</a>
69	Inequality of income distribution (S80/S20 income quintile share ratio)	<a href="#">ilc_di11</a>
70	Population aged 18-59 living in jobless households (%)	<a href="#">lfsi_jhh_a</a>

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